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ABSTRACT 
As awareness of the importance of CG has grown, it has received increasing attention 
from academic researchers, regulators and public policy makers, first in developed 
and latterly in developing countries. As yet, however, CG research in the MENA 
region is still relatively rare. This research seeks to address this gap by investigating 
CG and accountability practices in the listed companies of one MENA country: 
Libya. The study draws on data gathered from internal and external stakeholder 
groups to explore how CG and accountability are perceived, the extent to which CG 
mechanisms are being implemented, the current state of accountability practice and 
whether the current legal and regulatory framework of CG and accountability is 
adequate. Lastly, it investigates which factors these stakeholders perceive as having 
the most influence on CG and accountability in the Libyan environment. 
The research employed a mixed methods research design comprising a quantitative 
survey followed by semi-structured, qualitative interviews. This allowed for 
methodological triangulation, enhancing the reliability of the findings; the semi-
structured interviews were conducted after the questionnaire survey in order to 
confirm the earlier quantitative findings and to provide deeper understanding. 
The findings suggest that stakeholders in Libyan listed companies are generally aware 
of and understand the concept of CG. Despite this, however, the perception in all 
stakeholder groups was that awareness of CG issues within the Libyan environment is 
currently inadequate. The results demonstrate that Libyan listed companies are 
generally committed to implementing CG mechanisms, but that there are significant 
weaknesses in terms of practice. Listed companies‟ commitment is most evident in 
their adherence to the LCGC‟s (2007) requirements regarding the board of directors 
mechanism. In contrast, the level of disclosure and transparency in these companies is 
barely satisfactory, since at present, disclosure and transparency practices in Libya are 
designed only to meet local requirements. Listed companies have also taken practical 
steps towards meeting the LCGC‟s requirements regarding the internal and external 
audit mechanisms, but the general view among stakeholders was that these 
mechanisms are currently not robust enough to ensure strong internal control systems. 
Majority shareholders were seen to enjoy much greater protection, both legally and in 
practice, than minority shareholders. 
The findings indicate that Libya does not currently have a legal/regulatory framework 
that supports CG and accountability practices, but the interviewees were almost 
unanimous in identifying the lack of knowledge and awareness about CG at all 
company levels as the biggest factor inhibiting the advance of CG. The weakness of 
the legislative environment was seen as the second most influential factor, followed 
by the weakness of Libya‟s accountability mechanisms. The results suggest that both 
internal and external stakeholders are well aware of the concept of accountability, but 
that they see it as largely non-existent within Libyan listed companies in practice. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Over the last two decades, the debate about CG has intensified, driven by a string of 
major corporate collapses in the US and elsewhere (e.g. WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat, 
Arthur Anderson and Tyco) (Steger, 2014; Hamidi & Gabrielsson, 2014; Briano-
Turrent & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2016). Subsequent investigations have revealed the role 
played by weak or non-existent governance structures (Ghafran & O‟Sullivan, 2017) 
in these corporate failures, which have had long-term economic consequences at both 
national and global levels (Monks & Minow, 2004; Al-Baidhani, 2015). As a result, 
interest in CG has grown exponentially, with international initiatives being launched 
to improve CG practice (Al-Matari et al., 2012) and develop systems that protect the 
rights and interests of all stakeholders. The most significant is the OECD‟s creation of 
a set of internationally accepted principles of CG, the purpose of which is to protect 
companies from crises by ensuring they follow best practice (OECD, 2004).  
At national level, too, there have been many initiatives, most notably in the UK, 
which has seen the publication of a series of recommendations and reports designed to 
improve CG mechanisms within British companies. These range from the Cadbury 
Report in 1992, through the Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the 
Turnbull Report (1999) and the Smith Report (2003), to the Combined Code of 2003 
and finally, the UK CG Code of 2010, which brings together many of the previous 
reports‟ recommendations to clarify and give guidance on key aspects of CG, 
including the role and responsibilities of the BOD, disclosure and transparency, and 
internal control systems (Holland, 2002). In developing countries, the growth of 
interest being shown in adopting CG over the last two decades has prompted 
increased (though still limited) research interest in the extent to which CG codes in 
these countries are being implemented at firm level, the factors facilitating and 
impeding their implementation, and the consequences of implementation at national 
level (Andreasson, 2011; Salterio et al., 2013; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016; Ntim et 
al., 2017). Claessens & Yurtoglu (2012) highlight the particular importance of 
understanding how CG practices in developing countries compare with best practices, 
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arguing that such an understanding is central to improving CG mechanisms in these 
countries and, in turn, increasing listed companies‟ access to finance, raising 
performance and ensuring fair treatment for all relevant stakeholders. These are 
crucial considerations for Libya, which over the last twenty years has been shifting 
from a centrally controlled to a free-market economy. 
Since 2001, the government has been pursuing a far-reaching programme of economic 
reform which has involved abandoning the socialist model and transferring some 
state-owned economic activities into the private sector (Masoud, 2013). The major 
driver of this shift towards privatisation has been the demands of international 
economic organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), who have 
made these changes a condition of membership (Alafi & Bruijn, 2010), but 
privatisation is also seen as a way of resolving the economic problems created by the 
socialist system (Metz, 2004; Alafi & Bruijn, 2010). At the same time, awareness is 
growing in Libya that adopting good CG practices – whether the organisation is in the 
private or public sector – helps protect shareholder and stakeholder rights and 
increases transparency and board independence (Basuony et al., 2014; Iswaissi & 
Falahati, 2017). A major step towards improving the economy and regulating the 
capital market was the establishment of the LSM in 2006. This has further intensified 
Libya‟s need for an effective CG system that will enhance the functioning of Libyan 
listed companies, the majority of which are in the banking and finance sector, and 
attract more local and foreign investment into the LSM (Otman & Karlberg, 2007; 
Abdulsaleh, 2014). Efforts so far to encourage listed companies to apply CG 
principles have included the CBL‟s LCGC (2005) and LCGC (2010), the LSM‟s 
LCGC (2007), and the government‟s enactment of Law No. (11/2010), which 
provided for the establishment of the LSMA. Investigation of whether the CG 
mechanisms mandated by these laws and regulations are actually being adopted by 
Libyan listed companies is now a matter of urgency. 
The vast majority of CG research has concentrated on developed countries such as the 
the US, UK, Australia and Canada. However, the research results from these countries 
are not necessarily applicable to developing countries, where environmental, 
economic and cultural factors may be radically different (Barghathi et al., 2017). 
Mangena & Chamisa (2008) argue that national variances make it necessary to 
examine CG structures state by state, but to date, there has been limited investigation 
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of CG and accountability in the context of a developing state. The current research 
therefore presents evidence from the Libyan environment – a developing country with 
an emerging stock market and high levels of concentrated shareholding and state 
ownership. CG practice in the Libyan environment is still in its early stages and, as 
numerous researchers have observed, there are still significant obstacles to be 
overcome (e.g. Pratten & Mashat, 2009; Larbsh, 2010; Abu-Azza, 2012; Hamuda & 
Sawan, 2014; Faraj & El-Firjani, 2014; Iswaissi & Falahati, 2017). To date, however, 
there has been little support from researchers in terms of investigation into the current 
state of CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed companies or attempts to 
assess the legal and regulatory framework governing CG within these companies. 
This study seeks to address this gap. 
1.2 The Rationale and Motivation for the Research 
As noted above, relatively few CG studies focus on less-developed countries (Okike, 
2007; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2015; Al-Faryan, 2017), and those that do tend to 
characterise CG practice in these countries as generally weak (Al-Matari et al., 2012; 
Zagoub, 2016). This weakness is often attributed to the lack of institutional 
frameworks (Boubakri et al., 2005) and inadequate legal and regulatory systems in 
these countries (Owusu & Vaaland, 2016). This is also a problem in Libya (Zagoub, 
2016), but as yet, there has been little attempt to investigate the impact the country‟s 
legal and regulatory framework, which has undergone significant reform over the last 
two decades, is having on CG mechanisms and accountability. Crucially, the few 
studies that have highlighted CG in the Libyan environment were conducted prior to 
the Libyan revolution of 17 February 2011, since when there have been dramatic 
changes to this framework, including the establishment of the LSMA and the 
replacement of the LCGC (2005) with the compulsory LCGC (2010).  
Since 2006, numerous changes have occurred in the Libyan business environment, 
especially with the issuance of more regulations and rules designed to improve the 
LSM. In 2007, this body introduced its own LCGC for all Libyan listed companies 
with the aim of enhancing corporate performance and encouraging local investment. 
The code covered the key mechanisms of CG, namely, the BOD, disclosure and 
transparency, the internal and external audit functions and shareholder rights. It was 
expected that the implementation of CG mechanisms would enhance supervision and 
monitoring within Libyan listed companies and in turn raise performance, but as yet, 
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there is no proof that this has happened, or even that the mechanisms have been 
implemented.  
The growing focus on CG practices within Libyan listed companies has been driven 
by the desire to enhance corporate performance and encourage not only local but also 
foreign investment into the LSM. When Libya began accession talks with the WTO in 
2004, it became even more crucial for the country to develop CG, not just to reduce 
the risk of company failure but also to attract this investment. According to the 
African Development Bank Economic Brief (AFDB) (2011), the Libyan government 
has made good progress, especially in its privatisation programme and restructuring of 
the banking sector (Shalba, 2016). However, recent corporate scandals have raised 
continuing questions about the role of governance in Libyan listed companies. At this 
point, one of the most important tasks facing the government in this area is to support 
the LSMA in monitoring and regulating these listed companies so that CG and 
accountability practice improves. Empirical evidence regarding current practice is a 
necessary starting point. 
Finally, no one has yet investigated Libyan stakeholders‟ perceptions regarding the 
current state of CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies and the 
legal and regulatory framework of CG. This includes their views on the duties, 
responsibilities and composition of the BOD; disclosure and transparency; the internal 
and external audit functions; shareholders‟ rights and the factors influencing 
companies‟ CG and accountability practice. The study aims to respond to the dearth 
of practical evidence on CG mechanisms and accountability in Arab and developing 
countries by providing insights from both internal and external stakeholders in the 
Libyan environment. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The key aim of the study is to investigate CG and accountability practices in Libyan 
listed companies. In furtherance of this aim, a number of objectives were identified: 
 To investigate stakeholders‟ understanding regarding the meaning of CG in 
Libyan listed companies. 
 To investigate the extent to which CG mechanisms are implemented in Libyan 
listed companies. 
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 To identify whether the legal and regulatory framework is adequate to support CG 
and accountability practices. 
 To identify the key factors influencing CG and accountability practice in Libyan 
listed companies. 
 To explore current accountability practice in Libyan listed companies.  
 To gather recommendations from different groups of stakeholders for the 
improvement of CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies. 
1.4 Research Questions  
In order to frame the fundamental problem and achieve the aim and objectives of the 
research, a number of research questions were developed. It is intended that, at the 
end of this thesis, the following questions will have been answered with the help of 
the acquired results: 
 How is the concept of CG understood in the Libyan context? 
 To what extent are Libyan listed companies committed to implementing CG 
mechanisms? 
 Does Libya have an adequate legal and regulatory framework to support CG and 
accountability practices? 
 What factors influence CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed 
companies? 
 How is accountability understood and practised in Libyan listed companies?  
 What suggestions and recommendations would different groups of stakeholders 
make to develop CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies? 
1.5 Significance of the Research and Expected Contribution 
Corporate collapses over the last two decades have underlined the importance of 
robust CG mechanisms and have led researchers, theorists and regulators around the 
world to call for renewed attention to be paid to the improvement of CG. However, 
the literature review shows that most of what has been produced so far focuses on 
developed countries; there is much less on CG in developing countries, including 
MENA countries such as Libya (Larbsh, 2010; Iswaissi & Falahati, 2017). This 
research is therefore important because it addresses a gap in the accounting literature 
by exploring the CG and accountability practices of listed companies in a developing 
country – a context that is still poorly understood. By offering new, primary evidence 
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from a context that is legally, culturally, politically and socially distinct from those 
examined in most previous studies, and by representing a range of stakeholder 
perspectives, the research may help deepen our understanding of the concepts of CG 
and accountability. Consideration of the Libyan context is especially important as CG 
practice in the country is still in the early stages of development, and little is known 
about how CG and accountability are understood and enacted by its listed companies.  
The research highlights the adverse effect that weaknesses in the Libyan legal and 
regulatory system are having on attempts to develop a CG framework in the country. 
The study shows that Libyan laws and regulations provide a weak environment that 
does little to encourage CG and accountability practices. These findings have 
significant policy implications for Libyan legislative and regulatory bodies such as the 
LSM and the CBL because they highlight firstly, that the country‟s legal framework 
needs to be reviewed to bring it into line with CG requirements, and secondly, that the 
quality and consistency of attempts at enforcement need to improve. They also have 
policy implications for regulators, external auditors and legislators seeking to review 
and update the CG system to meet international requirements. The findings of the 
research may thus serve as an empirical basis to inform future policy change. 
Finally, the research offers an initial picture of those factors that have the most 
significant inhibiting effects on CG and accountability practices within Libyan listed 
companies. It takes steps towards identifying ways of enhancing CG and 
accountability practices, contributing to the CG literature with its discussion of the 
enabling factors which may have a positive influence on these practices in Libyan 
listed companies. Again, the findings of this research provide empirical evidence 
upon which policy makers and practitioners can draw to improve CG standards in the 
Libyan environment.  
1.6 Research Methodology  
The pragmatism paradigm framed both the data-gathering and analysis processes. 
The study, which is exploratory in nature, employed a mixed-method research design 
comprising a quantitative survey followed by semi-structured, qualitative interviews 
with representatives from different stakeholder groups. The survey allowed the 
collection of preliminary data to answer the five research questions relating to the 
level of compliance with CG mechanisms and accountability. However, the research 
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questions also required the collection of data that were beyond the scope of the 
questionnaire; in order to gain a more comprehensive insight into the issues 
surrounding CG and accountability, it was necessary to conduct qualitative, in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with representatives from internal and external stakeholder 
groups. These interviews were used to investigate stakeholders‟ views of current 
practice and how it might be improved (Research Question 6). The two methods were 
carried out concurrently, with the survey being employed to gather general data and 
the interviews being used to access local knowledge and develop theoretical 
explanations (Kelle, 2006). The use of a mixed-method design allowed for 
methodological triangulation, enhancing the reliability of the findings (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011). Also, as a way of minimising reactivity and researcher bias and 
neutralising the influence of individual methods, thereby promoting the validity of 
and increasing confidence in the findings.  
The quantitative data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 21, one of the statistical programs most commonly used by social 
science researchers (Miller et al., 2010). Descriptive statistics were used to describe 
and summarise the collected data into simplified forms, while non-parametric tests 
including the Mann-Whitney (MW) and Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests were employed to 
investigate whether there were fundamental differences between four stakeholder 
groups (board members, executive managers, regulators and other stakeholders) in 
terms of their answers. 
Ghauri & Gronhaug (2010) indicate that qualitative data analysis software is helpful 
where there is a large amount of data that require coding, linking and explaining. 
Several such programs are available, but as only 20 interviews were conducted in this 
study and the amount of qualitative data generated was manageable, coding was done 
manually. Thematic analysis was applied as it was felt to be the most suitable for 
answering the research questions. Quantitative and qualitative data was gathered and 
analysed consecutively, with the second technique being used to supplement and 
interpret the findings derived from the first, but in this case, time and cost constraints 
made it necessary to conduct the quantitative and qualitative studies at the same time. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative and qualitative data analyses were mutually supportive. 
Table 1.1 shows the research aim, objectives, questions and the instruments employed 
for data collection.  
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Table 1.1 Summary of Research Aim, Objectives, Questions and Methods of Data Collection 
Research Aim: To investigate CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed companies 
Research Objectives Research Questions Instruments 
To investigate stakeholders‟ 
understanding regarding the 
meaning of CG in Libyan listed 
companies. 
How is the concept of CG 
understood in the Libyan 
context? 
Questionnaire & 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
To investigate the extent to which 
CG mechanisms are implemented in 
Libyan listed companies. 
To what extent are Libyan 
listed companies committed to 
implementing CG mechanisms? 
Questionnaire & 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
To identify whether the legal and 
regulatory framework is adequate to 
support CG and accountability 
practices. 
Does Libya have an adequate 
legal and regulatory framework 
to support CG and 
accountability practices? 
Questionnaire & 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
To identify the key factors 
influencing CG and accountability 
practice in Libyan listed companies. 
What factors influence CG and 
accountability practice in 
Libyan listed companies? 
Questionnaire & 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
To explore current accountability 
practice in Libyan listed companies. 
How is accountability 
understood and practised in 
Libyan listed companies?  
Questionnaire & 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
To gather recommendations from 
different groups of stakeholders for 
the improvement of CG and 
accountability practice in Libyan 
listed companies. 
What suggestions and 
recommendations would 
different groups of stakeholders 
make to develop CG and 
accountability practice in 
Libyan listed companies? 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis has been divided into nine chapters (see Figure 1.1). The present chapter 
provides an overview of the study, explaining the rationale and motivation for the 
research before outlining the research‟s aim, objectives and questions, explaining the 
significance of the research and its expected contribution, and describing its 
methodology.  
Chapter Two presents an overview of the Libyan context, focusing on Libya‟s 
geographical location, population, language and religion, historical and political 
background, the evolution of its privatisation programme and the development of the 
accounting and auditing profession in the country. This chapter describes the Libyan 
banking sector in detail. It also discusses the establishment of the LSM and addresses 
the evolution of CG in the Libyan environment. The legal and regulatory framework 
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governing CG practice in the LSM is outlined. Finally, the main barriers faced by the 
LSM as it seeks to implement CG reforms are discussed. 
Chapter Three aims to review some of the literature relating to CG and its theoretical 
underpinnings. It presents the most common definitions of CG before going on to 
discuss in detail the theories associated with its evolution. It also addresses the 
development of the CG concept, the differences between the insider and outsider 
models of CG and the legal and economic importance of CG, after which it discusses 
at length the main internal and external CG mechanisms. Finally, it reviews some of 
the key studies exploring CG practice in the emerging markets of Libya and other 
MENA countries. 
Chapter Four addresses the theoretical framework of accountability. It presents the 
most common definitions of accountability and discusses the objectives of 
accountability in the private and public sectors. It also presents a generalised model of 
the formal relationship of accountability and discusses accountability codes. The 
structure of accountability in Libya is then discussed at length.  
Chapter Five describes and justifies the research methodology that was employed in 
this research. It discusses the philosophical assumptions that guide social science 
research and the paradigms that are most commonly employed by researchers in this 
area before justifying the choice of the pragmatism paradigm for this study on the 
grounds that this encourages a mixed-method approach and the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. It describes at length the data collection 
methods that were employed before discussing how the quantitative and qualitative 
findings were combined. 
Chapters Six and Seven report and analyse the data obtained from the questionnaires 
and semi-structured interviews respectively. For the purpose of the latter analysis, the 
interviewees were divided into two broad categories: internal and external 
stakeholders.  
Chapter Eight synthesises the results derived from the questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews and compares them with the results discussed in the literature 
review. Finally, Chapter Nine presents a concluding summary. This chapter begins by 
summarising the major research findings, presents the stakeholders‟ suggestions for 
developing CG practices and accountability in Libyan listed companies, outlines the 
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key contributions made by the study, acknowledges its main potential limitations and 
finally suggests avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIBYAN CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
Numerous studies have pointed out that CG and accountability practices are 
influenced by a range of social, economic, legal and political factors (Dartey-Baah & 
Amponsah-Tawiah, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Mallin, 2010; Silveira & 
Saito, 2009; La Porta et al., 1997 and Demirguc-Kunt & Ross, 1996); Mallin (2007), 
for example, asserts that the ability of CG practice to evolve in any given country 
depends primarily on where the country is in terms of the development of its 
economic, social, legal and political structures. Accordingly, this chapter presents an 
overview of the Libyan context. Section 2.2 provides a comprehensive account of 
Libya‟s geographical location, population, language and religion, historical and 
political background, the evolution of its privatisation programme and the 
development of the accounting and auditing profession in the country. Section 2.3, 
which describes the Libyan banking sector, is divided into four sub-sections: sub-
section 2.3.1 focuses on the CBL, sub-section 2.3.2 discusses Libyan commercial 
banks, sub-section 2.3.3 the Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), and sub-section 2.3.4 
Libyan specialised banks. Section 2.4 discusses the establishment of the LSM, while 
Section 2.5 addresses the evolution of CG in the Libyan environment. Section 2.6 
outlines the legal framework for CG practices in the LSM. Section 2.7 describes the 
main barriers faced by the LSM as it seeks to implement CG reforms, after which 
Section 2.8 provides a brief summary of the chapter.  
2.2 The Libyan Background 
This section provides a comprehensive overview of the Libyan context. It is divided 
into five sub-sections: sub-section 2.2.1 briefly describes Libya‟s location and key 
geographical features; sub-section 2.2.2 gives details of the country‟s population, 
language and religion; sub-section 2.2.3 offers a brief summary of Libya‟s historical 
and political development; sub-section 2.2.4 discusses the evolution of the 
privatisation programme in Libya; and the development of the accounting and 
auditing profession are discussed in sub-section 2.2.5. 
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2.2.1 The Geographical Location of the Libyan State 
The Libyan state is a developing Arab state located in North Africa. Covering 
1,759,540 square kilometres (1,092,882 square miles), it is the fourth largest country 
in Africa and the fifteenth largest in the world (Pratten & Mashat, 2009). It has an 
area equivalent to one-quarter the size of the US or approximately one-half the size of 
Europe. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, Libya shares boundaries with six neighbouring 
countries; it is bounded to the west and northwest by Algeria and Tunisia respectively, 
to the south and southwest by Chad and Niger, and to the east and southeast by Egypt 
and Sudan respectively. To the north, its Mediterranean coastline extends 
approximately 1,800 kilometres (1,118 miles) from Egypt in the east to Tunisia in the 
west (Otman & Karlberg, 2007).  
Geographically, Libya can be divided into three key regions – Tripolitania in the 
northwest, Cyrenaica in the northeast and Fezzan in the south (Malcolm & Losleben, 
2004) – though in fact, nearly 90% of the country is unpopulated. 94.73% of the land 
is desert or semi-desert (characterised by vast sandy areas and mountains rising up to 
3,000 feet above sea level), with just 0.29% being forest and 3.94% being used for 
agriculture  (Terterov & Wallace, 2002). These geographical characteristics mean that 
the population is distributed unevenly, with most Libyan cities being located on the 
northern coast of the country. Among these major coastal cities are Tripoli, Zawia, 
Misurata and Benghazi. 
The climate is Mediterranean along the northern coast and Saharan in the south; 
temperatures in most of the coastal cities reach about 30-35 °C in the summer and 7-
15 °C in the winter, while those in southern areas range from 30 to 46 °C in the 
summer, dropping as low as 1-15 °C in the winter. 
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Figure 2.1 Map of Libyan State 
 
Source: https://www.welt-atlas.de/map of Libya - Accessed 2016 
2.2.2 Libya’s Population, Language and Religion 
Libya‟s last official census, conducted in 2011, measured the population at 6.423 
million. Even though this figure is expected to increase in the future, it remains quite 
small, given the country‟s (mostly still untapped) huge land area. 
The official language of Libya is Arabic, and Libyan legislation requires all legal 
documents to be in this language (Ahmad & Gao, 2004). English, French and Italian 
are widely used in the tourism and trade sectors, while ethnic groups such as the 
Imazighens, Touareqs and Tabou, who live in the deserts and mountains, speak a 
range of local languages (Oxford Business Group, 2008). The official religion in 
Libya is Islam, which is embraced by nearly 97% of the population. The 
overwhelming majority of Libyan Muslims follow the Sunni doctrine. 
2.2.3 Historical and Political Background 
On 24
th
 December 1951, Libya obtained its independence from the United Nations to 
become the first independent Arab state. Before this, Libya‟s history was one of 
occupation and colonisation; over the centuries, it was occupied by the Greeks, 
Phoenicians, the Byzantine Empire and Imperial Rome (Kilani, 1988; Mahmud, 
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1997). Arguably its most difficult experience of colonialism began with the Italian 
invasion of 1911. This occupation only came to an end when Italian forces were 
driven out of Libya during the Second World War, and from 1943 to 1951, Libya was 
jointly managed by the British and French forces (Steel, 1967; Nyrop, 1973). 
Since 1951, Libya has reinvented its political system several times; it has gone from 
being the United Libyan Kingdom (1951-1969), to the Libyan Arab Republic (1969- 
March 1977) and then the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Wright, 1981). Describing the 
early days of the newly independent Libya, Mahmud (1997, p.112) argues that: 
“The first major development of the new State was its admission to the 
Arab League in March 1953. The second major development indicated the 
close links of the new State with Western Europe, and the economic 
difficulties which it faced. The main problem for the new regime by that 
time was to ensure that enough funds from abroad should be available 
to meet the normal expenses of the State and to pay for much-needed 
improvements”. 
From 1951 until the military coup in 1969, Libya was a monarchy. Under the Libyan 
Constitution of 7
th
 October 1951 (Kilani, 1988), the state followed a federal political 
system based on parliamentary government with the monarch, King Idris, serving as 
president (El-Shukri, 2007). It is perhaps not surprising that Libya should choose such 
a system, given its strong relationships with the US, the UK, France and Italy 
(Mahmud, 1997). During the reign of King Idris, the Libyan government sought to 
cement these international relationships, especially those with the UK and US, to help 
it improve Libya‟s economic and political situation. In 1953, for example, it signed an 
agreement with the UK permitting the latter to keep its military bases in Libya in 
exchange for providing military assistance to the Libyan army. These relationships 
were also to play an active role in oil exploration operations in Libya in 1959 
(Alferjani, 2013). 
In 1969, a group of military officers led by Muammar Gaddafi took advantage of the 
absence of Idris, who was out of the country undergoing medical treatment, to seize 
power in a coup. Domestically, there followed a period of major change, including a 
change of name – from the United Kingdom of Libya to the Libyan Arab Republic          
(Alferjani, 2013) – and a move from parliamentary government to dictatorship. 
Internationally, Gaddafi‟s support for acts of terrorism, including the 1988 Lockerbie 
bombing in Scotland, led to the United Nations imposing sanctions on Libya in April 
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1992. These sanctions continued for more than ten years (Vandewalle, 2012), 
isolating Libya from the rest of the world and doing significant harm to the country‟s 
economy. Finally, in 2008, Gaddafi began to seek a rapprochement with the Western 
world, which commanded him immediately to withdraw his support for terrorism 
(Alferjani, 2013). 
Coinciding with the Arab Spring revolutions, on 17
th
 February 2011, Libya witnessed 
its own popular revolution to overthrow the dictatorial rule of the Gaddafi regime. 
The revolutionaries sought enhanced civil rights for citizens, improvement in the 
Libyan economy and the adoption of a fair political system in the country. (Schwab, 
2010) identifies the main drivers of the revolution as being rising unemployment, the 
lack of transparency in government policies and the lack of public trust in politicians; 
Libyans were aggrieved that despite the country being rich in natural resources such 
as oil and gas, they had, under the Gaddafi regime, suffered four decades of economic 
inertia, high unemployment, widespread financial and administrative corruption in 
state institutions, and international isolation.  
Libya‟s political background is thus the major reason why it has been unable to 
achieve the conditions necessary to establish a strong business environment. Since 
1951 it has experienced two very different political systems – monarchy and 
dictatorship. Under the first of these, the lack of internal financial resources left Libya 
dependent on foreign assistance, particularly from the UK, while under the second, 
chronic instability (not to mention the lack of a state constitution) created uncertainty 
which had a negative impact on the national economy. One negative consequence of 
this uncertainty was the absence of a clear policy to modify and update Libyan 
legislation to keep pace with the economic system of the state, including laws 
affecting CG practice. 
2.2.4 The Evolution of the Privatisation Programme in Libya 
The private sector has been a critical part of the Libyan economy since ancient times 
(Maghur, 2004), but in the late 1960s, Gaddafi sought to overturn this longstanding 
tradition by instituting a socialist, state-owned economy. This involved tightening the 
government‟s control over all commercial activity and abolishing all privately-owned 
enterprises. This policy lasted for several decades; it was not until the beginning of 
the twenty-first century that the government finally abandoned the socialist model and 
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once more endorsed the privatisation of economic activity by announcing its intention 
to transfer some state-owned economic activities into the private sector. This 
privatisation was seen as a means to resolve the economic problems created by the 
socialist system (Metz, 2004; Alafi & Bruijn, 2010). Vandewalle (2012, p.183) 
observes that: “In June 2006, Gaddafi admitted the country‟s public sector had failed 
and should be abolished and called in addition for privatisation of the country‟s oil 
sector”. These authors argue that the socialist system in Libya failed to achieve its 
objectives for three main reasons: (i) a lack of transparency at all administrative levels 
of the state institutions, (ii) financial and administrative corruption within state 
institutions, and (iii) the failure to find alternative economic resources that might 
replace oil resources. Another major driver of the shift toward privatisation was the 
demands of international economic organisations such as the WTO (Alafi & Bruijn, 
2010). 
The privatisation programme has the following objectives (Privatisation Agency, 
2010): 
 “To improve the efficiency and competitiveness of productive and service 
projects; 
 To remove the imbalances and distortions that accompanied the control of 
the public sector of the Libyan economy; 
 To support the public treasury by stopping the subsidies paid to loss-making 
companies, and obtaining financial returns from the privatisation process; 
 To encourage and develop the private sector by stimulating domestic savings for 
investment in economic activity, attracting foreign investors, and facilitating 
access to technology and modern management methods”. 
The progress of the privatisation process has been accompanied by a series of laws 
and regulations designed to facilitate private economic activity in the country. Table 
2.1 shows how this legislation has influenced the development of the privatisation 
programme. 
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Table 2.1 Progress of the Privatisation Programme 
Source: Adapted from Alferjani (2010)   
Although, as the above table shows, the Libyan government has implemented a 
number of policies to facilitate the privatisation of some of the country‟s economic 
activities, the overall success of its privatisation programme has been negatively 
impacted by Libya‟s economic and political instability. In his study Libya: Reforming 
the Impossible?, Alison (2006) concludes that the government‟s economic reforms 
cannot achieve their goals without a stable economic and political environment. Even 
so, the privatisation programme, along with other measures such as the restructuring 
of banking rules and the establishment of the LSM, have already had a profound 
impact on CG practices in the Libyan environment. 
2.2.5 The Accounting and Auditing Profession in Libya 
Libya‟s accounting and auditing profession is relatively young compared with its 
counterparts in developed countries. Since 1951, the development of the profession 
has been shaped by a number of factors, particularly the fact that many accounting 
professionals in the country are either non-Libyans or are Libyans who have 
completed their studies abroad (primarily in the UK and the US). It has also been 
shaped by the accounting education available in the Libyan environment, and by the 
Law  Objective of the Law Consequence 
Law No. (198/2000) 
* “To assess state economic units with a view to 
    transfer of ownership; 
* To evaluate the companies targeted for 
    privatisation”. 
General Board of Ownership 
Transfer (GBOT) established 
Law No. (31/2003) “To determine which public economic units will be  
  transferred to the privatisation programme”. 
360 state-owned companies named 
for privatisation 
Law No. (138/2004) 
“To determine areas for foreign investment and set up 
 investment projects in industry, agriculture, health 
 and service sectors”.  
10 foreign firms invested with a 
capital of 88 million Libyan dinars 
Law No. (134/2006) 
“To create a suitable environment for the privatisation 
 programme, allowing all companies to benefit from 
 investment”. 
Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
established 
Law No. (89/2009) 
“Amending Law No. (198/2000) to allow the 
establishment of a professional body for the private 
sector”. 
Privatisation and Investment 
Council (PIC) established 
Law No. (9/2010) “Amending Law No. 5 to: 
* Increase investment of national and foreign capital”.   
Contribution amounted of 
investment in Libya 34.88% of GDP 
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remarkable political, economic, legal and social changes that have taken place in 
Libya (Mahmud & Russell, 2003). Foreign companies (specifically British and 
American) operating in Libya have positively influenced the development of the 
profession by exposing Libyan employees in these companies to international 
accounting practice. There has been a “trickle-down effect” in that dealings between 
these companies and local enterprises have led to significant improvements in the 
generally less-developed accounting systems of the latter (Bait El-Mal et al., 1973). 
It was not until the early 1960s that Libyan accountants were required to obtain a 
professional licence from the Ministry of Finance before they could start practising. In 
an effort to ensure the credibility of the profession, and of the information it produced, 
the government insisted that applicants for the licence had to be graduates in 
accounting and to have at least two years‟ professional experience (Kilani, 1988). In 
1973, it took further steps to raise standards in the accounting and auditing profession 
by issuing Law No. (116/1973), which provided for the establishment of the Libyan 
Association for Accountants and Auditors (LAAA). Article (13) of Law No. 
(116/1973) stipulates that the objectives of this body are:  
 “To organise and improve the conditions of the accounting profession and to 
raise the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, academically, 
culturally and socially; 
 To establish assistance and pension funds for its members; 
 To organise conferences and seminars and to participate in such conferences and 
seminars internally and externally and to keep in touch with new events, 
scientific periodicals, lectures and so on; 
 To penalise those who violate the traditions and ethics of the profession; 
 To achieve consensus between accountants and auditors and to protect their 
rights”. 
In its efforts to raise standards within the profession, the LAAA insists that any 
accountant seeking to become a member must have obtained a Bachelor‟s Degree in 
accounting from a university and have at least five years‟ experience of working in an 
accounting office (Kilani, 1998). However, it has failed to achieve other key 
objectives such as promoting research, developing training programmes for 
practitioners, and keeping members informed about new developments within the 
profession (Ahmad & Gao, 2004). Mashat (2005, p.55) makes the serious criticism 
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that: “The LAAA has so far done nothing to regulate and organise Libyan accounting 
practice in terms of issuing or adopting accounting and auditing standards. Many 
professional accounting services are not widely provided by the public accounting 
profession in Libya”. 
2.3 Libyan Banking Sector 
The banking sector in Libya contributes significantly to the Libyan economy, first by 
financing the public institutions that carry out most of the country‟s development 
projects and second, by providing the finance that private enterprises need to achieve 
growth (Shernanna, 2012). Recognising the economic importance of the sector, the 
government has implemented a series of reforms over the last decade aimed at 
improving the performance of banks and bringing them into line with its development 
plans. A key step was the appearance of Libyan Banking Law (LBL) No. (1/2005) in 
2005, which stipulated that banking operations in Libya were to be advanced by 
encouraging more private banks to enter the market.  
The CBL has also played a part in the reforms of the past decade, issuing the LCGC in 
2005 (and its updated successor in 2010), transferring ownership of some public 
commercial banks over to the private sector, and allowing the establishment of new 
private banks which are open to foreign investors. This last step in particular has 
contributed significantly to improving efficiency in the sector (CBL, 2010). 
Collectively, these steps have been designed to strengthen the framework of monetary 
policy and banking supervision within the CBL and to support the investment 
environment. 
2.3.1 Central Bank of Libya (CBL) 
The CBL was established in 1956 as the National Bank of Libya. Renamed the Central 
Bank of Libya in 1969, its core function is to serve as the central bank of the Libyan 
state. LBL No. (1/2005) gives the CBL, which is wholly state-owned, the independence 
and authority to manage and implement Libya‟s banking and monetary policy, and to 
monitor the performance of its banking system. LBL No. (46/2012, Article 5) defines 
the fundamental duties and responsibilities of the CBL as follows:  
 “Issue the Libyan currency and maintain its stability within Libya and abroad; 
 Manage its reserves and the government‟s reserves of gold and foreign exchange; 
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 Regulate monetary policy and supervise currency conversion transactions within 
Libya and abroad; 
 Regulate credit and banking policy and supervise its implementation within the 
framework of the government‟s general policy; 
 Achieve the goals of economic policy in terms of stabilising the general level of 
prices and maintaining the soundness of the banking system; 
 Manage the liquidity of the national economy; 
 Regulate and supervise the foreign exchange market; 
 Provide advice to the government on matters related to the general economic 
policy”. 
2.3.2 Commercial Banks 
All commercial banks operating in Libya undertake banking operations under the 
supervision of the CBL, according to the provisions of LBL No. (46/2012). Libyan 
commercial banks are the most important part of the Libyan financial sector in terms 
of numbers, the role they play in the Libyan economy, geographical spread and the 
range of services provided to customers (Hawashe, 2015). Article (65/1) of the same 
law provides a clear definition of a commercial bank as “any company that ordinarily 
accepts deposits in current demand accounts or time deposits, grants loans and credit 
facilities, and engages in other such banking activities according to the provisions of 
paragraph (2) of this article”. 
 
As shown in Table 2.2, there are currently sixteen commercial banks operating in the 
Libyan environment. These banks have three kinds of ownership structure: state-
owned, private and mixed ownership. Mixed ownership banks are owned jointly by 
some combination of the Libyan government (the CBL), the private sector (domestic 
investors) and foreign investors. 
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Table 2.2 Ownership Structure of Libyan Commercial Banks 
No  Name of Bank State-Owned Private  
Mixed Ownership 
Total Assets 
(bi LYD) State-Owned 
Domestic 
Investors 
Foreign 
Investors 
1 
Al-Sahara Bank 
 
 55% 26% 19% 10.15 
2 
Al-Jumhouria Bank 100%     24.65 
3 
Al-Saraya Bank  100%    0.09 
4 
Mediterranean Bank  100%    0.12 
5 
Al-Wahda Bank   54% 27% 19% 8.39 
6 
National Commercial Bank 100%     11.11 
7 Bank of Commerce and 
Development 
 100%    2.27 
8 
United Bank    60% 40% 0.29 
9 
Al-Aman Bank    60% 40% 0.78 
10 
North Africa Bank 100%     1.78 
11 
Al-Wafa Bank   20% 80%  0.18 
12 
Al-Waha Bank   45%  55% 0.60 
13 
Arab Commercial Bank  100%    0.09 
14 
First Gulf Bank   50%  50% 0.42 
15 
Al-Ejmaa Al-Arabei Bank  100%    0.29 
16 
Libyan Foreign Bank 100%     4.00 
  Source: Adapted from CBL Online (2016). http://cbl.gov.ly/eng/. Accessed 12/11/2016 
2.3.3 The Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB) 
In 1993, the Libyan government issued Law No. (1) allowing foreign banks to 
operate in Libya, though this operation was limited to the opening of representative 
offices only. It was not until LBL No. (1/2005, Article 67/3) that banks were 
permitted to set up with foreign capital, or that foreign banks were permitted to open 
branches in Libya or own shares in Libyan banks. These concessions came with strict 
conditions, however: the board of the CBL must be satisfied that the head office of 
the foreign bank has a particular nationality, that the foreign bank is subject to the 
supervision of the monetary authority in the state where this head office is located, 
and that it has allocated capital of at least $50 million for its activity in Libya. The 
2005 law was followed in September 2006 by Resolution No. (41), which authorised 
22 
the opening of three foreign banks in Libya: these were the Arab International Bank 
of Tunisia, HSBC and BNP Paribas (The CBL, 2006). 
The LFB serves as an external agent for Libya‟s commercial banks while also 
performing international tasks and transactions for the CBL. Operating from its head 
office in Tripoli and with branches in almost 30 countries around the world, its main 
activities are opening accounts for and accepting deposits from overseas and non-
residents, and conducting financial transactions with domestic commercial banks 
(Hawashe, 2014). Article (20) of the LFB‟s Statute lists the banking and financial 
services the bank offers outside Libya: 
 “Acceptance of demand and time deposits, opening current accounts, loans held 
and granting other credit facilities; 
 Collection and payment orders, promissory notes and other securities with 
financial value; 
 Issuance of bonds, notes and other commercial paper; 
 Discount, re-discount and trading of commercial paper;  
 Issuance of letters of guarantee and credits, opening credits and financing foreign 
trade operations, providing facilities for importers and exporters as well as the 
issuance of securities, as well as project financing and development investment on 
commercial grounds;  
 Carrying out trustees‟ investment”.  
The services and transactions that the LFB is authorised to undertake within Libya 
are: 
 “Opening accounts and accepting deposits in foreign convertible currency from 
abroad and from non-residents in Libya; 
 Opening accounts and accepting deposits from allocated from the Central Bank of 
Libya, the public institutions to deal with; 
 Conducting banking and financial transactions with local commercial banks in 
line with the Bank‟s objectives”. 
2.3.4 Specialised Banks 
These banks, also called lending institutions, finance specific sectors or certain 
economic activities. Structured along cooperative principles, they do not operate for 
profit, and their activities differ from those of Libyan commercial banks. This is made 
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explicit in LBL No. (46/2012, Article 65/1), which stipulates that: “A specialised bank 
whose main purpose is to finance and grant credit for specific activities, and whose 
basic activities do not include the acceptance of demand deposits, shall not be 
considered a commercial bank”. Specialised banks were established specifically in 
order to accelerate economic and social development in the Libyan environment by 
offering medium- and long-term loans to the industrial, agricultural and real estate 
sectors. There are four specialised banks in Libya, all of which are fully state-owned. 
These are the National Agricultural Bank, the Development Bank, the Rural Bank and 
the Real Estate Investment Bank. 
2.4 Establishment of the Libyan Stock Market (LSM)  
Realising that a stock market was crucial to promote investment, accelerate the 
privatisation programme, facilitate the granting of credit and expand the ownership 
base in Libya, the Libyan government established the LSM in principle in 2001 with 
the enactment of Law No. (21/2001) (Masoud, 2013). The establishment of the LSM 
was seen as a major step towards improving the economy, as it would allow the 
government to mobilise domestic savings, encourage foreign savings and channel 
these resources in the direction of productive projects by the developing of a sound 
capital market (Masoud, 2013). 
The LSM was officially opened in 2006 with the Libyan Government‟s Resolution 
No. (134). Supervised by the Ministry of Economy, it has headquarters in the capital 
(Tripoli) and one other branch in the city of Benghazi. Its central functions are to 
facilitate the state‟s privatisation programme through the sale of public Libyan 
companies and to provide sources of finance for these new private companies.  
In accordance with Resolution No. (134), the LSM performs as a depository centre, an 
exchange and a stock market authority. The company that runs the LSM was itself 
listed on the Commercial Register (on 7
th
 January 2007) as a joint-stock company 
with capital of LYD 20 million ($16.2 million) divided into 2 million shares with a 
nominal value of LYD 10 per share. Nearly 30% of these shares are owned by the 
Libyan government, 25% are owned by the Libyan commercial banks and the rest are 
owned by individuals. According to the LSM‟s Statute (Article 4), its membership 
should include: “Commercial and specialised banks; insurance companies; financial 
funds; subscribed companies with capitals that are no less than the limit stated by the 
24 
market‟s management committee; brokers accepted in the market according to the 
provisions of this regulation”.  
Article (3) of Resolution No. (134/2006) sets out the main objectives and functions of 
the LSM as follows: 
 “to create a suitable investment climate for securities in the interest of the national 
economy;  
 to encourage savings and raise investment consciousness in ways capable of 
directing savings towards the economic sectors of potential greater return; 
 to supervise the organisation and operation of share dealings and ownership 
transfer operations;  
 to serve the goals of economic and social development, including achieving the 
employment of individuals‟ savings by allowing buying and selling shares 
operations as well as carrying out investment transactions;   
 to contribute to the implementation of the programme of public ownership of 
economic entities, enterprises and companies to contribute to the expansion of the 
ownership base; 
 to put in place, the necessary rules for the protection and ensure the honesty of 
transactions in the market to achieve trade based on economic efficiency; 
 to develop linkages and cooperation between the Libyan Stock Market and Arab 
regional and international markets, in ways that lead to raising the level of 
investors‟ trust in the domestic economy” (Zakari, 2014, p.401).  
In 2007, there were seven Libyan companies listed in the LSM with a combined 
capitalisation of LYD 1.2 billion, representing 1.4 per cent of GDP (International 
Monetry Fund, 2008). By 2014, this number had gone up to fourteen companies. 
Table 2.3 lists these companies, their trading value, the number of shares traded, and 
the number of transactions conducted in that year. 
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Table 2.3 Libyan Companies Listed in the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
No Company 
Capital 
(LYD) 
Trading Value 
(LYD) 
Trading Volume 
(Number of 
Shares)  
Number of 
Transactions 
1 
Al-Sahara Bank 378,000,000 296,192.100 32,698 56 
2 
Al-Jumhouria Bank 1,000,000,000 547,723.960 44,051 92 
3 
Alsaraya Bank 33,333,330 - - - 
4 
Mediterranean Bank 16,446,130 164,288.000 9,664 9 
5 
Al-Wahda Bank 432,000,000 95,763.640 10,000 29 
6 
National Commercial Bank 500,000,000 140,207.460 12,402 14 
7 
Bank of Commerce and Development 105,000,000 95,551.710 4,785 29 
8 
Alsahara Insurance Company 15,000,000 102,586.000 9,765 10 
9 
United Insurance Company 20,000,000 60,823.750 2,415 12 
10 
Libyan Insurance Company 70,000,000 93,419.450 9,936 26 
11 
Libyan National Cement Company 600,000,000 - - - 
12 
The Libyan Stock Market Company 50,000,000 58,576.980 6,292 25 
13 
National Investment Company 100,000,000 - - - 
14 National Union Company for 
Engineering Consultants 
4,000,000 8,000 400 2 
Source: Adapted from LSM Annual Trading Report (2014) 
2.5 The Evolution of CG in the Libyan Environment 
The evolution of CG in the Libyan environment has been marked by a number of 
legal and regulatory milestones since Libya obtained its independence in 1951. The 
first key moment came in 1953 with the issuing of the Libyan Commercial Law 
(LCL), which contained a range of provisions addressing many of the basic principles 
of CG, including the structure and responsibilities of the BOD and the fundamental 
rights of shareholders. The LCL was technically superseded in 2010 by the revised 
Commercial Law No. (23/2010), but the latter has not yet come into force as the 
Libyan government has not yet issued executive regulations relating to this law. 
The second key moment in the development of CG in Libya came in 1973, when the 
government issued Law No. (16). This was the first law to focus on the accounting 
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and auditing profession in Libya; it sought to raise standards by setting out the 
responsibilities of and a code of conduct for Libyan accountants and auditors, and it 
laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Libyan Association of Accountants 
and Auditors (LAAA) (Laga, 2013; El-Firjani et al., 2014). 
In 2005, the CBL issued the first Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC). This 
set out basic guidelines regarding CG practice for commercial banks in Libya, though 
these were advisory rather than mandatory. The code was divided into five main 
sections (CBL, 2005). The first discussed the underlying principles of CG and its 
importance in ensuring the credibility of banking transactions, and highlighted 
examples of international best practice. The second section set out the standards for 
assigning board members and senior management and explained what both groups 
should do in order to perform their duties vis-ä-vis shareholders and other 
stakeholders effectively and efficiently. Section three concentrated on the BOD‟s role 
in selecting and supervising executive management. It also contained a 
comprehensive description of the most important tasks of the board, and how it should 
interact with the executive management. The fourth section highlighted the duties and 
responsibilities of the BOD in terms of its formulation and monitoring of targeted 
plans and policies, while section five focused on its role in auditing and internal 
control. This section also addressed the main role played by internal auditing, internal 
control systems and the audit committee. 
In 2007, the LSM issued a second LCGC geared towards protecting the rights of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Aimed specifically at listed companies, it 
included a number of articles relating to the duties and responsibilities of the BOD, 
the formation of sub-committees such as the audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees, disclosure and transparency, the internal and external audit functions and 
the rights of shareholders and stakeholders. Once again, however, the code was 
advisory, with the only mandatory article being the requirement that companies must 
disclose which articles they have not complied with and why. 
In the same year, the LSM signed an agreement with the University of Reading that 
the latter would provide training and technical assistance for securities dealers 
working in Libya. The training has dealt with a number of issues relating to CG 
practices such as financial and non-financial disclosure, the arbitration and settlement 
of disputes, governance, and the setting up of legal rules and regulations to protect 
27 
investors. The agreement also includes the provision of advisory services, which have 
contributed significantly to the development of the LSM (Masoud, 2013). 
In 2010, the CBL, seeking to raise the level of performance of commercial banks, 
replaced the 2005 LCGC with a new, compulsory code (CBL, 2010). In the same 
year, the government enacted Law No. (11/2010), which provided for the creation of 
the Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA), an independent body (though working 
under the supervision and control of the Ministry of Economy) tasked with regulating 
and monitoring the LSM. Law No. (11/2010) sets out a series of measures designed to 
enhance the operation of the LSM and to increase the level of transparency therein so 
that more domestic and foreign investment might be attracted into the Libyan 
environment. One of these measures is the requirement that all necessary information 
be properly disclosed to investors, including all relevant statistics, biographical and 
financial details about board members, externally certified financial statements, an 
annual list of shareholders and any information that could affect the share price in the 
market.  
Law No. (11) stipulates that the LSMA should be administered by an independent 
board containing five members, and that these should be appointed by the Prime 
Minister. The central objective of the authority being to create an environment that 
will foster stability and growth in the LSM, the law defines the tasks of the LSMA as 
follows: 
 “Regulating and controlling the issuance of securities; 
 Regulating and controlling the disclosure of essential information for investors; 
 Gathering information and statistics on the capital market, and publishing 
reports thereon; 
 Receiving and following up reports and complaints relating to market activity or 
intermediaries, and taking appropriate decisions including the imposition of 
sanctions; 
 Ensuring the implementation of the accounting and auditing standards in the 
preparation of final accounts and financial statements of actors in the market; 
 Imposing the standards of corporate governance on listed companies and all 
those working in the field of securities; 
 Supervising and monitoring the market operations; 
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 Issuing and granting of permits and licences necessary for the exercising of 
activities related to the capital market; 
 Adopting a proper system to ensure the fulfilment of obligations arising from 
trading operations; 
 Adopting an appropr i a te  sys tem to  protect clients in securities, including 
effective methods to compensate those affected by non-commercial risks” (Law 
No. 11/2010). 
To summarise, since 1951, the Libyan government and the CBL have launched a 
series of legal and regulatory initiatives designed to foster more effective CG. Despite 
this, however, CG practice in the Libyan environment is still in its early stages and, as 
numerous researchers have observed, there are still significant obstacles to be 
overcome (e.g. Pratten & Mashat, 2009; Larbsh, 2010; Abu-Azza, 2012; Hamuda & 
Sawan, 2014; Faraj & El-Firjani, 2014). 
2.6 The Legal Framework for CG Practices in the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
As interest in the concept of CG has grown, international institutions and stock 
markets around the world have increasingly sought guidance regarding its underlying 
principles and best practice. The OECD responded by issuing its five Principles of 
Corporate Governance in 1999, before going on to add a sixth in 2004 (OECD, 2004). 
In preparing its Principles, the OECD drew on the experiences of its various member 
countries, along with contributions from the IMF, occupational unions, businesses, 
investors and other relevant parties. The objectives of the Principles are: 
 To assist member and non-member states in evaluating and improving the legal, 
organisational and institutional framework, in order to make application of 
corporate governance in these countries easier. 
 To provide directives to support the management of companies and the 
effectiveness of the stock market, and to help stabilise the economy as a whole. 
In Libya, as in many other countries, the law is the primary instrument for supervising 
and controlling the business environment; the regulations that govern companies‟ 
procedures and practices derive ultimately from the country's legal system (Otman & 
Karlberg, 2007). In Libya, this legal system is largely based on French civil law 
(Otman & Karlberg, 2007). The aim of this section is to present an overview of the 
Libyan legal system in relation to the OECD‟s Principles of 2004. 
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The issuance of Resolution No. (134) in 2006 was a significant turning point in the 
history of Libya‟s financial system as it provided for the establishment of the LSM 
and with it, an acknowledgement of the need to implement CG principles in Libyan 
listed companies. The LSM follows the OECD‟s 2004 Principles; the following sub-
sections discuss how the provisions of Libyan law, including the 1972 Libyan 
Commercial Law (LCL), align with these Principles. 
2.6.1 Providing the Basis for an Effective CG Framework  
The CG framework should aim to improve the transparency and effectiveness of the 
market. The division of responsibilities between the different bodies in charge of 
supervision, control and enforcement should be clearly specified in law (Solomon, 
2013), but CG principles should be presented in the form of a set of optional rules 
and standards. Although these rules and standards may have no compulsory force, 
CG practice may also be affected by existing corporate and stock market regulation 
and by accounting and auditing standards. 
 2.6.2 Protection of Shareholders’ Rights  
The OECD Principles stipulate that within the CG framework, shareholders should be 
protected, and their ability to exercise their rights facilitated by means of ownership 
registration and share trading. They should be given, regularly and in due time, 
information related to the company's activities, be able to participate in general 
assembly meetings (GAM) and to elect and remove from office members of the 
BOD. Finally, they should be given warranties of dividend distribution (OECD, 
2004). 
The rights of shareholders in joint-stock companies listed in the LSM are protected 
by legislation such as Act No. (23/2010), which contains a range of articles 
addressing the same concerns as are addressed in the OECD Principles. Article (155), 
for example, states that shareholders have the right to attend the GAM and vote, or to 
assign a representative to attend and vote on their behalf, provided that the vote is 
given in writing and kept by the company. No director or employee of the company 
may act as such a representative, however. The same article indicates that the BOD 
can convene an emergency meeting of the general assembly if this is demanded by 
shareholders who collectively own one-tenth (1/10) or more of the company's capital, 
while Article (156) states that as long as new shareholders have their name registered 
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in the company records at least five days prior to any GAM, they can attend the 
meeting. Article (163) states that the general assembly has the authority to approve 
financial statements; elect directors, a board chairman and the members of the 
supervisory committee; determine the compensation to be given to these individuals; 
appoint an external auditor and determine his compensation; and respond to any 
issues raised by the BOD. 
Article (147) gives existing shareholders priority in the subscription to new shares, 
unless an extraordinary general assembly decides this is not in the company's best 
interest. The article stipulates that a statement should be published in a daily 
newspaper, declaring which shareholders will be given priority, when the 
subscription will open and close, and the value of the new shares. Shareholders 
should also be advised by registered mail, email or some other means of 
communication.  
Article (235) states that it is for the general assembly to approve the balance sheet 
and distribute dividends to shareholders. Shareholders have the right to review the 
balance sheet before the meeting of the general assembly. Further, the right to buy or 
sell shares freely (i.e. without consulting the company administration) is guaranteed 
under Article (500) of the LCL of 1972, and under Article (6) of Act No. (65/1970), 
which asserts that no limits must be put on the transfer of share ownership. 
Article (26) of Act No. (11/2010) specifies the function of the LSM as being to 
supervise and regulate the trading of negotiable instruments and the transfer of their 
ownership, including setting the rules necessary to protect and guarantee the safety of 
transactions. It is also responsible for overseeing the distribution of annual profits to 
the shareholders of listed entities. Article (36) of the same act reminds these entities 
that they are obliged to provide investors with a periodical account and to abstain 
from any operation which may cause damage to investors, while Article (38) states 
that they may not disclose to any other party any information relevant to investors‟ 
transactions or negotiable instruments without the written permission of the investor. 
2.6.3 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
The OECD Principles stipulate that the CG framework should guarantee equal 
treatment for all shareholders, including minority shareholders and foreign 
subscribers, and that companies should set in place a system and procedures to ensure 
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that shareholders have the same voting rights whether they are inside or outside the 
country where the company is located. All shareholders should be allowed the 
opportunity to obtain adequate compensation if their rights are violated, with a 
system in place that guarantees their right to take legal and administrative action 
against the BOD and the executive administration of the company (Solomon, 2013). 
Within the LSM, Act No. (23/2010) permits companies to issue different categories 
of shares (i.e. ordinary or preferential), depending on their articles of incorporation. 
These categories differ in terms of the rights vested to them, with the holders of 
preferential shares enjoying three main advantages. Firstly, they have the right to cast 
multiple votes, according to the laws of the company; secondly, they are given 
priority in the distribution of dividends; and finally, they are also given priority in the 
event of either an increase in capital, or liquidation. 
Articles (528), (541) and (545) of the LCL of 1972 stipulate that all shareholders shall 
have the right, whether they are absent or opponent or holders of vote-limited shares, 
to contest the decisions made by the general assembly if those decisions violate the 
law or the company‟s articles of incorporation. Furthermore, every shareholder has 
the right to claim compensation against any damages he may have incurred as a result 
of the actions of the BOD or one of its members.  
2.6.4 The Role of Stakeholders in CG 
The term “stakeholder” refers to anyone who has a relationship with or interest in the 
company, so aside from shareholders, it also encompasses the company‟s employees, 
customers and creditors. The OECD observes that within the corporate governance 
framework, stakeholders‟ rights should be recognised in law, since they are central to 
helping companies create profit, protect jobs and remain in business (Solomon, 2013).  
According to Article (185) of LCL No. (23/2010), in joint-stock companies, the 
chairman and members of the BOD are responsible towards debtors of the company 
in terms of not carrying out the duties related to maintaining the company‟s 
continuity, thus creditors have the right to file a lawsuit when they reveal that the 
properties of the company not sufficient to pay their debts. Article (577) of the LCL 
of 1972 also gives creditors special protection, stating that each company should have 
a legal reserve of not less than one-fifth of the capital of the company, and that in the 
event of bankruptcy, the company should place itself in the hands of the receiver. 
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Creditors may reserve their right to file a lawsuit even if the company has sought to 
legally limit the liability of directors or it has attempted to reach an informal 
agreement with the creditor. 
The 1972 LCL also provides special protection for bond holders, with Articles (217), 
(218), (219), (220), (221) and (222) stipulating that bond holders may form their own 
assembly and elect a representative to act on their behalf. This representative has the 
right to attend the general assembly meeting (though he has no voting rights)  
Stakeholders‟ rights in Libya are further protected by means of the country‟s labour 
and environmental legislation, and by a range of vocational societies, professional 
associations and federations. 
2.6.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
The OECD Principles call for the full and timely disclosure of all relevant information 
to shareholders, including information relating to the company‟s financial position, 
performance and supervision arrangements. Effective measures for ensuring 
disclosure and transparency are central to achieving control of the company‟s 
activities (Solomon, 2013). 
The disclosure of accounting information to users is one of the most significant 
functions of the profession, while the external auditor plays a key role in enhancing 
trust and transparency by presenting a neutral opinion on the reliability of the 
financial statements. Libya‟s corporate legislation addresses the requirement for 
accounting disclosure in Article (572) of the 1972 LCL, which states that the 
managers of joint-stock companies must prepare lists of income, a balance sheet and a 
report on the company's activity each financial year. Further, these documents, along 
with the external auditor's report, must be made available to shareholders in advance 
of the GAM to allow time for their examination. 
In terms of the banking sector specifically, Article (83) of the LBL (1/2005) states 
that each bank should assign two public accountants to examine its accounts, to be 
selected by the general assembly of the bank from among the external auditors 
registered in the CBL‟s records. The Central Bank stipulates that the chosen external 
auditors must not be a member of the administration of the bank they are auditing or 
be in receipt of loans or credit from it; nor should they have any connection or family 
relationship with any member of the BOD. 
33 
Transparency and disclosure are also at the heart of Act No. (11/2010), which covers 
the duties and jurisdiction of the General Board of the LSM. Article (4) of the act 
stipulates that the board is responsible for ensuring the disclosure of all information 
necessary to investors and relevant to the issuing of negotiable instruments, while 
Article (3) describes its objectives as being to guarantee the fairness, effectiveness 
and transparency of transactions in the LSM. Pursuant to this objective, Article (7) 
specifies that the board‟s duties include setting regulations and conditions governing 
disclosure by companies operating in the field of securities. These companies are 
obliged to disclose any information that could affect their activities or financial 
position, including information regarding any changes the board believes may affect 
the value of the securities.  
In the penalties chapter, Article (62) states that anyone who is proved to have dealt in 
undeclared or undisclosed information may be prosecuted and could face a prison 
sentence of not more than six months and/or a fine of between LYD 10,000 and LYD 
1,000,000. Anyone presenting or publishing incorrect statements or information with 
the aim of influencing investors' decisions, including board members or employees, 
may also face prosecution. 
In terms of the general provisions of the act, Article (78) states that any entity 
encountering a contingent circumstance that may affect its activity or financial 
position should immediately disclose this information to the LSM, which may ask the 
said entity to publish this information in a daily newspaper. If the entity fails to do 
this, the LSM must publish the information in the media on the entity's behalf. 
2.6.6 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
The CG framework should ensure that the BOD, while responsible for the strategic 
direction and guidance of the company, is itself accountable to the company and its 
shareholders (OECD, 2004). 
In the LSM, boards are responsible for supervising the performance of the executive 
and ensuring that they achieve the objectives set by the general assembly of the 
shareholders. Articles (172) to (188) of Act No. (23/2010) stipulate that the general 
assembly shall assign a BOD pursuant to the company‟s articles of association, for a 
renewable three-year term, unless the articles of incorporation or articles of 
association expressly state otherwise. They do not stipulate that the board members 
34 
should be chosen from among the shareholders of the company, apart from the 
chairman, who is chosen by the general assembly from among its own membership. 
Article (530) of the LCL of 1972 indicates that compensation of the members of the 
BOD and their portion of the company‟s profits are to be determined in the articles of 
incorporation, with a maximum limit being set. There should be no fewer than three 
members of the board and not more than eleven members including the chairman. 
The duties of the board are: 
 To make all decisions and conclude all actions necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the company. 
 To set policies and issue internal orders for the organisation of the company‟s 
administrative and financial affairs. 
 To invite the general assembly to convene. 
 To prepare an annual report, signed by the chairman, and submit this to 
shareholders for review at least seven days before the GAM. This report should 
include details of all monies paid to the chairman and each member during the 
fiscal year, such as wages, salaries…etc. It should also include details of any 
commissions or other payments they may receive in return for technical, 
administrative or consultative work. The advantages in kind that the chairman and 
the members of the board of directors enjoy during the fiscal year must be 
indicated such as cars, houses etc. 
 The board may vest its authority in an executive committee formed from some of 
its members, determining the period of this authorisation. The authorisation 
should not extend to include issues that may lead to basic changes in the 
company. 
The same law makes the chairman and BOD responsible to the company‟s debtors. It 
is down to the individual company‟s articles of association whether the board‟s 
responsibilities also include appointing the CEO and other managers and specifying 
their duties and remuneration packages. 
The previous sections show clearly that many of the principles of CG issued by the 
OECD in 2004 are already enshrined within Libya‟s legislation. The LCGC, issued by 
the LSM in 2007, was the first formal attempt to gather these principles, previously 
scattered across a wide range of laws and regulations, into one coherent whole and to 
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present an integrated framework for CG in Libya. However, this code remains 
indicative rather than mandatory, apart from the stipulation that companies must 
disclose in the BOD‟s report which provisions have been applied, which have not, and 
the reasons for any non-compliance. Ultimately, it is in the interests of Libyan listed 
companies to apply the CG principles detailed in the LCGC because this will raise 
their efficiency, aid their long-term development and increase their profitability. At 
the national level, it will raise confidence among investors and attract more foreign 
capital into the market. 
2.7 Main Barriers Faced by the LSM as it Seeks to Implement CG Reforms  
As discussed previously, Libya, like many other developing countries, has long 
suffered as a result of inadequate economic policy, with low employment rates and 
poor growth creating an imbalanced economy. However, perhaps the most significant 
barriers currently facing the LSM as it attempts to encourage the adoption of CG 
practices within Libyan listed companies are poor enforcement of the legal system, 
and the prevailing ownership structures. These are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
2.7.1 Poor Enforcement of the Legal System 
The legal system is a fundamental pillar of the CG framework because it is the 
primary means through which the responsibilities and duties of concerned parties are 
defined and the main recourse for those wanting to see these responsibilities enforced. 
The LSM, like many emerging financial markets in developing countries, is seeking 
to strengthen and improve the economy by forging partnerships and harmonising 
standards with the economies of developed countries. A necessary step to achieving 
this harmonisation is for the Libyan government to enhance the economic 
environment by reconsidering the regulatory framework and developing robust 
enforcement mechanisms. 
According to Berglöf & Claessens (2004), enforcement is widely considered even 
more important than the issuance of the law itself; it is crucial to achieving effective 
CG and accountability, especially in the transitional phase. Establishing and 
maintaining good CG and accountability practice requires the efficient and fair 
application of the legal system by an array of supervisory, regulatory and judicial 
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authorities with direct connections to the stock market. All of this will help raise 
investors‟ confidence in the market. 
However, for many developing countries, enforcing legislation remains problematic. 
While the LMS may not face as big a challenge as some other emerging markets 
Oyejide & Soyibo (2001), for example, point to an urgent need to strengthen law 
enforcement mechanisms within regulatory and supervisory bodies in Nigeria), weak 
enforcement in the Libyan environment generally and within the LSM in particular 
can only have an adverse influence on the efficiency of CG and accountability 
mechanisms. 
2.7.2 Ownership Structure 
The economy of the Libyan state is not yet highly developed, being still largely 
dominated by the government, which controls, directly or indirectly, the majority of 
the country‟s assets and enterprises. These include interests in many industrial sectors, 
financial institutions and real estate (Porter & Yergin, 2006). The government‟s recent 
privatisation programme is intended to provide the economic fundamentals to shift 
towards a more open system, but although private enterprises are now theoretically 
able to compete alongside or even replace state-owned ventures, continuing ambiguity 
within the privatisation policy means that in reality, it has done little to assist the 
Libyan economy in overcoming the accumulated problems created by previous 
economic policies. 
Although the Libyan government has encouraged the transition to a free market 
economy through the establishment of the LSM, there have been some changes in 
ownership structures since the establishment of the LSM for the aim of opening the 
prospects of investments, there is still uncertainty over the ownership policies. And 
therefore, ownership structures in Libya are officially dominated by the government 
and institutions. However, it is not considered a major barrier to successful CG 
practice; other emerging markets with similar ownership structures (e.g. Malaysian 
listed companies) have been able to implement CG successfully. 
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2.8 Summary 
This chapter started by providing a comprehensive background picture of the Libyan 
context, including details of the country‟s geographical location, population, language 
and religion. It then briefly outlined the main features of Libya‟s historical and 
political development before describing the evolution firstly, of the Libyan 
privatisation programme and secondly, of the accounting and auditing profession. 
The chapter described the make-up of the Libyan banking sector, briefly discussing 
the role played by the CBL, the commercial banks, the Libyan Foreign Bank and the 
specialised banks, before describing the establishment of the LSM and the key points 
within the evolution of CG in Libya. It then outlined the legal framework for CG 
practices within the LSM before highlighting the two main barriers to CG reform, 
which it identified as weak enforcement mechanisms and the prevailing ownership 
structures. This chapter having given some insight into the context of the study, the 
next presents the literature review and discusses the theoretical framework of CG.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (CG) 
3.1 Introduction 
CG has drawn significant attention from academic researchers, regulators and public 
policy makers in both developed and developing countries (Solomon & Solomon, 
2004). The latter groups have expended significant effort on developing rules and 
standards to help companies improve their CG performance and avoid governance 
problems, while researchers have produced a large body of literature on the issues 
surrounding CG. The key purpose of this chapter is to review some of this literature. It 
begins by presenting the most common definitions of CG before going on to discuss in 
detail the theories associated with its evolution. Section 3.4 addresses the development 
of the CG concept, while section 3.5 discusses the differences between the insider and 
outsider models of CG. Section 3.6 focuses on the legal and economic importance of 
CG, after which section 3.7 discusses at length the main internal and external CG 
mechanisms. Section 3.8 reviews some of the key studies exploring CG practice in the 
emerging markets of Libya and other MENA countries. Finally, section 3.9 provides a 
brief summary of the chapter.  
3.2 Definitions of Corporate Governance (CG)    
Although a subject of growing importance to researchers, academics, regulators, 
professional bodies and policy makers around the world (Mallin, 2007; Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004; Sternberg, 2004), there is still no genuine consensus on how the 
concept of CG should be defined (Solomon, 2013). Solomon (2010) argues that 
definitions differ depending on country, on whether the person concerned is a policy 
maker or theorist and, if the latter, which perspective they favour. Monks & Minow 
(2004, p.9) define a corporation as: 
“A mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute capital, 
expertise and labour for the maximum benefit of all of them. The investor gets 
the chance to participate in the profits of the enterprise without taking 
responsibility for the operations. The management gets the chance to run the 
company without taking the responsibility of personally providing the funds”. 
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There may be no commonly accepted definition of CG, but researchers are generally 
agreed that the fundamental problem of CG is this separation of management and 
ownership (Keasey et al., 1997; Solomon & Solomon, 2004); a conflict of interest can 
arise between the owners, whose primary goal is to maximise profits, and the 
administration, which typically seeks to balance the shareholders‟ interests against the 
desire to keep the company running for the long term.  
Corporate literature offers numerous definitions of CG, reflecting a range of 
perceptions and points of view. These definitions may be divided into two groups: 
narrow and broad definitions. Narrow definitions focus on the relationship between 
the company and its shareholders; thus, Keasey et al., (1997) state that: “In the 
narrowest sense, companies may be described as a formal system of accountability of 
senior management to shareholders” (p.2). According to Solomon (2010), this view 
envisages a clear relationship between companies and their stakeholders. Shleifer & 
Vishny (1997) define CG as “ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (p.737). The Cadbury 
Report (1992) defines CG as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”, while MacAvoy & Millstein (2003) call it “a set of structured 
relationships that determine authority and responsibility for the conduct of an 
organisation and its management” (p.47). It is interesting to note that as recently as 
2009, the Walker Review described the role of CG as being “to protect and advance 
the interests of shareholders through setting the strategic direction of a company and 
appointing and monitoring capable management to achieve this” (p.19). These 
definitions see CG as essentially a mechanism for managing the company in order to 
maximise shareholders‟ wealth (Allen, 2005). 
Broader definitions take a more comprehensive view, going beyond shareholders to 
encompass the interactions between the full range of stakeholders, including 
customers, employees, creditors, suppliers and society as a whole (Baker & Owsen, 
2002). Thus, Prowse (1998, p.2) defines CG as “rules, standards and organisations in 
an economy that govern the behaviour of corporate owners, directors, and managers 
and define their duties and accountability to outside investors, i.e., shareholders and 
lenders”.  
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Tricker (1984) argues that:  
“The governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of the 
company per se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with 
overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and with 
satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulation by interests 
beyond the corporate boundaries”.     
Similarly, the OECD (2004, p.11) describe CG as involving   
“a set of relationships between a company‟s management, its board, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring”. 
Finally, Solomon & Solomon (2004, p.14) describe CG as  
“a system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity”. 
Most countries favour the broader definitions, even though they may disagree on how 
best to implement CG in practice (Braendle et al., 2013). These definitions make it 
clear that accountability and corporate responsibility do not stop with shareholders 
but extend to all relevant stakeholders and even society as a whole, and that the 
company should seek to resolve any conflicts of interest between different 
stakeholder groups. Under these definitions, future generations are regarded as 
potential stakeholders whose interests should also be taken into account. Thus, 
corporations should strive to reduce pollution and avoid environmental degradation, 
even though this may impact negatively on current benefits to stakeholders and 
shareholders. Essentially, the broad definitions reflect the idea that corporations 
should behave in a socially responsible way.  
In both groups of definitions, CG is highly concerned with accountability, whether 
this is to a narrow or broad group of interests. This is supported by Solomon (2013), 
who argues that similarities exist in the various definitions of CG, the most important 
being the notion of accountability. While narrow definitions see this accountability as 
owed only to shareholders, broader definitions see shareholders as just one of several 
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stakeholder groups (others include lenders, employees, investors, customers, suppliers 
and government auditors) to whom the company is accountable. 
3.3 Theories Associated with the Evolution of Corporate Governance (CG)    
A number of different theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain the 
impact of CG (Solomon, 2013). Some of these frameworks are better suited to some 
environments than others,  and they vary from one country to another (Mallin, 2013), 
but while they represent a range of perspectives, they share a number of common 
denominators. Agency theory is the dominant theory in this field both in terms of its 
popularity with researchers and its influence on the development of CG practice 
(Patrick et al., 2015), but a number of researchers have argued that the complex nature 
of the phenomenon requires a multi-theoretical approach (Sharma, 2013). 
Accordingly, researchers have employed a range of theoretical perspectives to analyse 
and interpret CG practice, including resource dependence theory, stewardship theory, 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. The assumptions and limitations of each of 
the above theories are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
3.3.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory, which was originally developed by Jensen & Meckling (1976), is the 
dominant theory for interpreting CG issues (Krambia-Kapardis & Psaros, 2006; Ward 
& Filatotchev, 2010; Ermongkonchai, 2010; King & Wen, 2011; Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012; Bezemer et al., 2012). Focusing on the separation of ownership 
and control, agency theory addresses the relationship between principals (e.g. 
shareholders) and agents (e.g. managers and company executives). Fama & Jensen 
(1983) built on the work of Jensen & Meckling to develop the potential of agency 
theory, and researchers ever since have relied on its assumptions, arguments and 
models to better understand a range of issues including ownership and capital 
structure, board practice, CG reform and agency conflicts (Manos et al., 2007). In 
developing countries, researchers such as Reed (2002), Imam & Malik (2007) and 
Manos et al., (2007) have used agency theory to examine the structures of CG and to 
look for ways to ensure good CG practice. 
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Jensen & Meckling (1976, p.308) define the agency relationship as  
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”.  
The basic premise of agency theory was inspired by the separation of ownership and 
management (Schneider & Scherer, 2015). It posits that managers and owners do not 
necessarily have the same interests and that when these diverge, managers tend to put 
their own interests ahead of the owners‟ (Mulili & Wong, 2011; Chambers et al., 
2013). Shareholders run the risk that managers will use the money supplied to the 
company to maximise their own utility rather than corporate value. Control 
mechanisms are therefore necessary to ensure that managers perform their fiduciary 
duty honestly. Agency theory posits that the company‟s top priority should be to 
protect and maximise the interests of its owners, and that any moral responsibility it 
has towards other stakeholder groups, such as employees, customers or the 
community at large, is of secondary importance (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). The 
implication of this, as Kim & Kim (2015) point out, is that the interests of these other 
stakeholders are likely to be compromised. This shareholder-oriented approach to CG 
is the version adopted in many countries that follow common law. In the UK and the 
US, it was encouraged by Thatcher and Regan, but it has also been embraced by 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. These countries generally see the role of CG as 
being to ensure that companies accomplish the goals set by their owners (Mulili & 
Wong, 2011), and so develop CG structures that focus primarily on shareholders‟ 
interests. The remarkable growth in the US stock market over recent decades has also 
encouraged companies in major economies such as France, Germany, Japan, Italy and 
Korea to adopt a shareholder-oriented approach to CG (Lazonick & O‟Sullivan, 
2000). 
Agency theory sees the firm as a series of contracts between principals and the agents 
who are committed to look after their interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Chan et al., 
2014), but companies may actually be seen as a collection of agency relationships – 
not just between managers and shareholders, but also between shareholders and 
external auditors, and between managers and employees (Prencipe et al., 2014; 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015). Agency theory is primarily concerned with the 
problems that arise in the first of these relationships; that is, when the relationship 
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between principles and agents is weak or dysfunctional (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wright et 
al., 2001). It assumes that the best way to resolve agency problems is to ensure that 
the interests of the two groups are aligned (Prencipe et al., 2014). Resolving problems 
within the principal-agent relationship is important because they damage the 
company‟s internal efficiency and increase costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) divide 
these agency costs into monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual losses. 
Monitoring costs are what the owner pays to reduce deviant activity by the agent (e.g. 
by observing his behaviour or offering him incentives to perform his duties more 
efficiently), while bonding costs are the expenses he incurs to ensure that he (rather 
than the agent) benefits from the agent‟s decisions. If, however, the agent lacks 
commitment to serving the interests and objectives of the owner to the point that the 
performance of the company is undermined, this may lead to residual losses. Lack of 
research means that it is unclear whether the agency costs incurred by Libyan listed 
companies are the result of conflicts within the principal-agent relationship or 
conflicts between majority and minority shareholders (Abdou, 2015). In fact, little is 
understood about how agency relationships operate in the Libyan environment, where 
CG is still a relatively recent phenomenon. It is not known, for example, whether 
these relationships are more or less subject to conflict than their counterparts in 
developed nations.  
Both the accounting and economic literature recognise that the agency relationship is 
made more difficult by information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Laffont, 
1989); if managers have greater access to information than shareholders, this leaves 
the latter unable to properly evaluate the decisions made by the former. However, all 
groups and individuals that have a relationship with the company have a right to 
expect others to be accountable for their behaviour and actions (Laughlin, 1996). 
Agency theory has been used to demonstrate these accountability relationships, 
especially that between owners and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Bushman & 
Smith, 2001). Having been authorised by the owner to act on his behalf and given 
resources and responsibilities in the expectation that they will be used in a certain 
way, the agent is answerable for his actions to the owner (Perks, 1993; Laughlin, 
1996). This accountability relationship facilitates the monitoring process, reducing 
the risk of fraud and raising the confidence of investors (Bushman & Smith, 2001). 
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Agency theory sees the implementation of CG mechanisms as crucial in allowing 
owners to monitor and control managers, reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour 
and ensure managers‟ interests are aligned with their own (Fama, 1980; McKnight & 
Weir, 2009; Agustina et al., 2015). Agency theorists have highlighted a number of CG 
mechanisms that are designed to protect shareholder interests, reduce agency costs 
and stabilise the agent-owner relationship. Among these are the BOD, the internal and 
external audit and the shareholders‟ rights mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997). 
Mechanisms that support the alignment of manager and shareholder interests are seen 
as particularly important, whether this is raising the number of NEDs on the BOD 
(which reduces agency problems by strengthening board independence and 
effectiveness) (Fama & Jensen, 1983) or increasing board diversity (which enhances 
the BOD‟s ability to monitor management, thereby reducing information asymmetry) 
(Walt & Ingley, 2003). Board sub-committees are also seen as playing a central role 
in monitoring managers (thereby reducing agency costs) and reducing the information 
asymmetry between them and owners (Beasley et al., 2009; Samaha et al., 2015), as 
are the disclosure and transparency and external audit mechanisms (Beasley et al., 
2009; Fernandes & Lourenço, 2018). However, there is some disagreement on the 
question of CEO duality, with some proponents of agency theory arguing that it 
makes conflicts of interest more likely ( Jensen, 1993; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) and 
others claiming that it “contributes to a unity of command at the top of a corporation 
that helps ensure the existence, or the illusion, of strong leadership” (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1994), thereby allowing companies to better serve their shareholders. This 
disagreement has led some recent studies to suggest that agency-based CG approaches 
may need to be modified to take account of current economic realities (Chancharat et 
al., 2012; Lin & Chuang, 2011). The impact of external realities is also acknowledged 
by Mallin (2013), who argues that agency theory assumes the existence of a legal 
system that is strong and stable enough to guarantee and enforce the rights of 
shareholders, particularly minority shareholders. While countries like the UK and the 
US may have such a system, many developing nations do not.  
Mallin is not the only researcher to raise concerns about the suitability of agency 
theory as a means of understanding CG. While useful in explaining the influence of 
CG mechanisms on compliance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), its 
key assumption – that managers behave opportunistically and work primarily to 
45 
maximise their own interests at the expense of shareholders – has been challenged by 
scholars who instead see managers as generally honest stewards whose interests are 
broadly aligned with those of the shareholders they serve (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). 
Agency theory has also been criticised for the narrowness of its focus (e.g. Aguilera et 
al., 2008 argue that CG goes beyond the relationships between shareholders and board 
members) as well as for ignoring the moral, ethical and social responsibility firms 
have towards stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). It has been argued that agency 
theory fails to take into account the social context surrounding the relationship 
between principal and agent (Bruce et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005) and that it 
ignores the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders who can also affect a company‟s 
long-term success (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Hummels, 1998). 
The Libyan government has acted in accordance with the assumptions of agency 
theory in its initiation of a series of measures designed to encourage the advance of 
CG in the country. The most important of these in terms of the LSM is the 
establishment of the LCGC (2007), which aims to mitigate agency conflicts between 
owners and managers by enhancing transparency and BOD responsibility and 
accountability in listed companies. At present, however, these mechanisms seem to 
work in theory rather than in practice. The diverse ownership structure and separation 
of ownership and control assumed in agency theory are not generally found in 
developing countries like Libya, where ownership instead tends to be concentrated, 
much of it in the hands of the state. As a result, there is little emphasis on NEDs‟ 
stewardship and monitoring functions, or on protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders in the face of pressure from controlling (state) shareholders. 
3.3.2 Resource Dependence Theory  
In general, resource dependence theory assumes that CG mechanisms can assist 
companies in creating, obtaining or conserving resources and thereby help improve 
financial performance (Chen & Roberts, 2010). The BOD and its sub-committees are 
seen as particularly crucial in facilitating the company‟s access to these resources 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Issa, 2017) and to information, advice and legitimacy 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). According to Pfeffer & Salancik (2003), resource 
dependence theory places emphasis on the distribution of power within the company. 
It focuses on the BOD as a human capital resource whose principal role is to use its 
powers, skills and knowledge to advise the company‟s managers and further its 
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interests. In terms of understanding CG practice, resource dependence theory assumes 
that: 
“First, the organisation depends on others for survival. Secondly, board 
members add value because of their background, skills and contacts. Thirdly, 
the main role of the board is leveraging and managing external relationships. 
Fourthly, board members may belong to a network of other powerful people 
who exercise control over the direction of public life in a series of board 
interlocks” (Chambers et al., 2013). 
As the above quote highlights, the BOD, and NEDs in particular, are able to bridge 
the gap between the company and its environment to attract resources, create value 
and build reputation (Udayasankar, 2008; Neville, 2011). However, the wider 
experience of board members is also likely to contribute to firm performance through 
its impact on the quality of internal decision making (Ovidiu-Niculae et al., 2012). 
Resource dependence theory suggests that companies may voluntarily disclose 
information about their CG practices in order to acquire access to critical resources 
(Amran et al., 2014). At the same time, being seen to comply with CG mechanisms 
also helps reassure external actors that managers are acting appropriately (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002).  
While agency theory focuses primarily on the BOD‟s monitoring role (Arena et al., 
2015), resource dependence theory acknowledges the role that skilled, experienced 
and well-connected directors play in managing the effects of internal and external 
environmental influences on CG systems within companies. As a result, the two 
theories are often seen as complementary; according to Hillman & Dalziel (2003), 
“The integration of monitoring and the provision of resources will not only more 
accurately reflect the real world but also may overcome theoretical weaknesses in 
choosing one approach over another” (p.388). Resource dependence theory is also 
considered complementary to stakeholder theory because it takes into account the 
complications arising from multiple forces acting on a broad base of stakeholders. It 
posits that the company‟s ability to operate in its environment is linked to its ability to 
access resources from stakeholders, and that the range of stakeholders upon whom it 
can draw depends in large part on the effectiveness of the BOD (Bouwman, 2011; 
Christopher, 2010; Bouwman, 2011). The BOD‟s role is thus to support companies to 
respond to outside changes and to maintain good relationships with main stakeholders 
so that it can access the resources it needs (Cornforth, 2004). 
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Although resource dependence theory is helpful for interpreting the antecedents of 
CG compliance, it has been criticised for its inability to identify or explain the 
influence non-BOD factors (e.g. the political environment) have on company success 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, as Christopher (2010) explains, it cannot 
comprehensively explain the effect of different CG structures. It is therefore best 
employed as a complement to agency theory and stakeholder theory. It may be 
especially relevant where multiple stakeholders complicate the operational 
environment and make efficient resource management even more critical 
(Christopher, 2010). 
3.3.3 Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory assumes that managers are primarily motivated not by monetary 
considerations but by the personal satisfaction they derive from performing the 
difficult tasks entrusted to them (Patrick et al., 2015). It posits that managers are 
collectively oriented; they work hard to improve corporate performance and 
shareholder returns (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007) and to ensure the long-term success of 
the company (Mallin, 2007). Accordingly, it argues that they be given the latitude to 
protect shareholders‟ interests and maximise their returns as they see fit. This 
assumption that owners are willing to take risks on how managers will run their 
business suggests a level of trust that is absent in agency theory (Chambers et al., 
2013). Stewardship theory posits that there is virtually no conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers (Davis et al., 1997); rather, managers want to be seen as 
actively working on behalf of investors, as establishing a good reputation and strong 
relationships with shareholders helps them maintain their position (Daily et al., 2003; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Stewardship theory sees the board‟s job as being to assist 
the CEO rather than to exert control within the company (Albrecht et al., 2004); 
indeed, proponents of the theory argue that the roles of board chairman and CEO 
should be combined as this allows a more efficient decision-making process and 
reduces agency costs (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). The core principles of this 
management philosophy, according to Davis et al., (1997), are trust, long-term 
orientation, empowerment, open communication and performance improvement. 
Prior research indicates that it is up to companies themselves to strike the right 
balance between monitoring and stewardship critical (Christopher, 2010); small firms, 
for example, may need less monitoring (Christensen et al., 2015). This means that 
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some of the recommendations in CG codes may not be suitable for some companies. 
Some may favour having more executive directors on the BOD on the grounds that 
they are the most knowledgeable about the company‟s activities (Muth & Donaldson, 
1998) and therefore the most likely to contribute to the efficiency of the decision-
making process (Donaldson & Davis, 1994).  
Numerous authors have argued that although they represent very different 
perspectives, agency theory and stewardship theory both have a role to play in 
explaining CG (Clarke, 2004). Muth & Donaldson (1998) see stewardship theory as 
offering an alternative view of the structure of CG mechanisms, while Lam & Lee 
(2008) claim that neither theory adequately explains the effects of duality and 
performance by itself. Similarly, Hu & Alon (2014) argue that although agency theory 
is the most widely used approach in the CG literature, stewardship theory is a viable 
alternative, and no one theory offers an integrated explanation of CG mechanisms. 
Stewardship theory can also be integrated with stakeholder, resource dependence and 
legitimacy theories (Christopher, 2010). It has been argued that dealing with the 
complex effects of external forces on a broad stakeholder base demands qualified and 
experienced employees from several managerial levels who are supported by efficient 
internal CG structures that direct the BOD to maximise shareholders‟ wealth 
(Albrecht et al., 2004).  
As a lens for understanding CG and board governance, stewardship theory has a 
number of implications (Chambers et al., 2013); it assumes that managers on the 
whole devote their efforts to the well-being of the company in which they work, 
collaborating with shareholders‟ representatives on the BOD (e.g. NEDs or 
governors) to develop the company‟s strategies and monitor its performance, and 
drawing on their skills and knowledge to advise executive directors on the BOD as 
required. Schneider & Scherer (2015) indicate that the key advantage of stewardship 
theory is its stress on the integrity of management decision making, and it has been 
suggested that the theory “needs to be incorporated in any governance model to 
provide a more holistic view of governance” (Christopher, 2010, p.690). However, 
while its value in explaining CG mechanisms in general and board governance in 
particular has been recognised, it has also been criticised for failing to acknowledge 
that some managers neglect the interests of shareholders, while others are guilty of 
malfeasance (Choo & Tan, 2007). This has given rise to fears that its application 
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could open corporations to the risk of CG failure (Chambers et al., 2013). The theory 
does not acknowledge the dangers of groupthink or dominated thinking within the 
BOD, nor does it demand a detailed understanding of the board‟s activities or 
decision-making process (Ovidiu-Niculae et al., 2012). Finally, it seems inadequate to 
explain the challenges faced by firms in unstable environments. 
3.3.4 Legitimacy Theory  
Accounting researchers have paid increasing attention to legitimacy theory over the 
last decade (Hoque, 2006). Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate with some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions” (p.574). Legitimacy theory supposes that companies will obtain the 
support of main stakeholders so long as their activities are regarded as useful or 
acceptable to society. It assumes a close social relationship between the company and 
the society that surrounds it; both operate according to a social contract, under which 
the company enjoys the protection of the government‟s laws and regulations and is in 
turn expected to manage its operations in an ethical manner (Patrick et al., 2015). The 
theory regards the needs of organisations, managers and stakeholders as components 
within a cultural and institutional framework (Suchman, 1995); the activities of the 
company must have a social value consistent with the values of society in general, or 
the company‟s legitimacy will be undermined. 
In this perspective, CG systems are seen as a tool to ensure that companies operate for 
the good of stakeholders (Judge et al., 2008). The primary way companies legitimise 
their activities is by enhancing disclosure and transparency, including their disclosure 
of their CG practices (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). According to (Deegan et al., 2000), 
“organizations utilize their annual report as a means of influencing society‟s 
perception of their operations, and as a means of legitimizing their on-going 
existence” (p.101). They may also seek to demonstrate the social value of their 
activities – and forestall any criticism (Jouha, 2015) – by setting out for the public 
their social and environmental impacts (both positive and negative) in disclosure 
reports. A number of researchers have examined these social and environmental 
reports and identified a relationship between company disclosure and community 
expectations (Deegan, 2004). They explain this relationship in terms of legitimacy 
theory, arguing that organisations use strategies such as disclosure to prove to the 
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surrounding community that they are attempting to comply with its expectations 
(Hoque, 2006). Corporate operations are constantly changing in response to these 
community expectations because, as Meyer & Rowan (1977) point out, organisations 
can only achieve legitimacy by ensuring that their organisational structures and 
practices are consistent with current social principles, behaviours and values. 
Companies who see their legitimacy as under threat are likely to take a range of 
actions, including raising the level of disclosure about CG practices, to change 
stakeholders‟ perceptions and reassure them that their activities are sociably desirable 
(Reverte, 2009).  
Legitimacy theory sees CG-related disclosure as central to maintaining legitimacy 
because of its importance in polishing corporate reputations and addressing public 
concerns (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). However, it can also add corporate value; 
demonstrating conformance to social standards and expectations reassures markets 
and investors, who see it as an indicator of accountability (Certo et al., 2001), and 
makes it easier for companies to enlist the support of powerful stakeholders and 
access the resources they need (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Liao et al., 2015; Low et 
al., 2015). 
Legitimacy theory appears to be a useful lens for interpreting the antecedents of CG 
disclosure and the influence of good CG on company performance. It has been 
employed in numerous studies, with the general conclusion being that most 
companies are driven to disclose information about their CG practices by the desire to 
improve their reputation in the environment in which they operate, and thus their 
legitimacy (e.g. Melis et al., 2015). On the other hand, the theory has some significant 
limitations. For example, it does not explicitly consider the differences in power of 
various stakeholder groups, placing main importance on financial stakeholders 
(Parker, 2005). Guthrie & Parker (1989) also argue that legitimacy theory does not 
adequately explain the drivers of compliance with CG mechanisms or the influence of 
CG quality on company performance. These limitations mean that the theory is best 
used in combination with stakeholder theory. 
3.3.5 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory offers a broader perspective on CG than agency theory 
(Bendickson et al., 2016). It was developed in response to the criticism that 
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concentrating exclusively on the interests of shareholders will not lead to better 
performance or more effective accountability (Baydoun et al., 2013). As awareness 
has grown that corporations are not merely production systems but complex entities 
made up of multiple diverse and interrelated systems, all requiring equal attention and 
strategic thinking (Pande & Ansari, 2014), these corporations have come under 
increasing pressure to democratise their decision making and prioritise the 
maximisation of social, rather than just shareholder‟ welfare. (Gomez & Korine, 
2008). Thus, countries following civil law (e.g. France, Italy, Germany and the 
Netherlands) have developed CG structures whose main role is to balance the interests 
of a wide range of groups including managers, employees, creditors, customers, 
suppliers and the wider community (Mulili & Wong, 2011).  
The term stakeholder theory was first employed by Ansoff (1965), but it was Freeman 
(1984) who proposed a general theory of the company which posited that companies 
are accountable to a wide variety of stakeholders. Freeman (1984, p.53) defined 
stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm‟s objectives”. In other words, stakeholder theory, rather than 
focusing solely on the interests of shareholders, also encompasses suppliers, 
employees, creditors, customers and any members of society who might be affected, 
directly or indirectly, by the firm‟s actions (Solomon, 2013; Phillips et al., 2003). 
Solomon (2010) suggests that the central question in stakeholder theory is how to 
identify these stakeholders, and researchers have made numerous attempts to 
categorise stakeholder groups. Clarkson (1995) identifies two categories of 
stakeholder: those playing a role within the company, which he calls the core group 
(employees, customers, creditors, the government and service providers), and those 
with no direct relationship with or authority over the company, which he calls the 
secondary group (special interest groups, competitors and others). Mitchell et al. 
(1997), meanwhile, draw on the legitimacy perspective to classify stakeholders into 
eight different groups on the basis of their importance and power. Supporters of 
stakeholder theory argue that companies have a responsibility to meet the legitimate 
demands not just of shareholders but also of these other groups. More pragmatically, 
acknowledging the interests of other stakeholders can also help a company enhance its 
profitability (Ayuso & Argandoña, 2009). 
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Jones & Wicks (1999, p.207) identify four fundamental assumptions of stakeholder 
theory:  
“(i) the firm has relationships with many constituent groups (stakeholders) 
that affect and are affected by its decisions; (ii) the theory is concerned with 
the nature of these relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes for 
the firm and its stakeholders; (iii) the interests of all (legitimate) stakeholders 
have intrinsic value and no set of interests is assumed to dominate the others; 
and finally, (iv) the theory focuses on managerial decision making”. 
The theory posits that the responsibility of management is to maximise owners‟ 
wealth by providing a diverse range of products and services for a broad range of 
stakeholders, but at the same time, it also emphasises that the company must operate 
efficiently in its social context. In other words, it sees the company as a social entity 
(Letza et al., 2004). As this perspective has gained currency among policy makers, a 
range of legislative and regulatory mechanisms have been introduced to ensure 
companies take into account the environmental, social and ethical impacts of their 
activities (Pease & McMillan, 1993). 
Stakeholder theory shares some assumptions with agency theory, such as the view 
that the separation of ownership and management leads to CG problems, and that 
contractual relationships between parties within the corporation play a vital role in 
mitigating these problems by reducing opportunistic management behaviour (Hill & 
Jones, 1992). On the other hand, stakeholder theory rejects agency theory‟s 
assumption that CG problems can be mitigated solely by aligning the interests of 
shareholders and managers. It posits instead that managers need to be accountable to 
the broader stakeholder base (Shankman, 1999); that CG problems are more likely to 
arise when the company defines its objectives in narrow terms – that is, when it 
concentrates solely on maximising shareholder interests – and that by broadening its 
objectives to serve wider societal interests, it can not only add economic value for 
shareholders but ultimately benefit society as a whole. 
Stakeholder theory may also be considered an extension of agency theory in its view 
that by accommodating the interests and balancing the power of all relevant 
stakeholders (Christopher, 2012), managers can mitigate agency costs and thus 
enhance corporate financial performance (Hill & Jones, 1992). In terms of CG 
compliance, the BOD is seen as a key mechanism for responding to the views and 
interests of stakeholder groups (Freeman et al., 2004), while voluntary disclosure is 
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seen as a way of gaining the support of influential stakeholders (Chan et al., 2014; 
Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015) and reassuring them that their interests and rights are 
being protected (Liao et al., 2015). These stakeholders are then more likely to provide 
companies with the resources they need to thrive (Ruf et al., 2001; Ayuso et al., 
2014). In general terms, the best way to avert and resolve CG problems is by creating 
an environment in which ethical behaviour, employee participation, inter-firm co-
operation, trust and long-term relationships are encouraged (Keasey et al., 1997). Full 
participation by a range of stakeholders increases the likelihood that the information 
provided to the BOD will be accurate and comprehensive, which will in turn 
strengthen CG (Turnbull, 1997b). Supporters of the stakeholder perspective argue that 
this broad approach to CG can even give companies a competitive advantage; 
according to (Kelly et al., 1997), “Companies which draw on the experience of all of 
their stakeholders will be more effective and this social cohesion is a fundamental 
requirement for being internationally competitive” (p.244).  
The central tenet of stakeholder theory is that as companies have got larger, so has 
their effect on society. Ijiri (1983) explains that this creates accountability 
relationships both inside and outside the company, with employees and officers being 
accountable to their immediate superiors within the organisational hierarchy, and the 
company as a whole being accountable to shareholders, consumers, creditors, the 
government and the general public. Benston (1982), who also argues that firms should 
be accountable to shareholders, stakeholders and the general public, asserts that 
internal and external monitoring systems, and the free market system as a whole, are 
sufficient to protect the interests of employees, customers and creditors. As far as 
management accountability is concerned, he claims that: “External auditors and 
published financial statements serve to monitor and control the actions of managers” 
(p.92). However, critics of stakeholder theory claim that making managers 
accountable to an array of stakeholder groups without giving them guidance on how 
to resolve potential conflicts of interest can lead to poor results (Patrick et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, appointing them specifically to serve certain stakeholder groups 
may create division within the board and weaken its ability to take collective 
decisions (Varottil, 2014). In these circumstances, stakeholder-oriented governance 
might actually undermine accountability. 
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Although stakeholder theory is a useful lens for explaining CG practice, it has been 
criticised for not clarifying how the interests of different stakeholder groups can be 
aligned (Sternberg, 1997), and for failing to be sufficiently specific on the question of 
corporate purpose or mechanisms for sound governance (Sternberg, 1997; Jansson, 
2005; Lepineux, 2005; Plaza-Ubeda et al., 2010; Tse, 2011). Sternberg (1997), for 
example, claims that “An organization accountable to everyone is actually 
accountable to no one” (p.5) and argues that efforts to balance stakeholder interests 
may not be worthwhile. The theory has also been criticised on the grounds that giving 
equal weight to all stakeholders might actually have a damaging effect on company 
welfare (Etzioni, 1998). 
In conclusion, the research employs stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory to gain 
a more comprehensive picture and deeper understanding of CG and accountability 
practices within Libyan listed companies. The first of these was selected because most 
listed companies in Libya are mostly or entirely state-owned. As such, they are 
expected to provide outputs to a variety of stakeholders within the broader social 
context; not only must they protect the rights of shareholders, but they must also take 
into account the interests of all relevant stakeholders. Legitimacy theory was 
considered appropriate because the LSM and indeed the concept of CG itself are still 
becoming established in the Libyan environment. Under the LCGC (2007), Libyan 
listed companies are required to disclose in their financial statements brief details of 
the CG mechanisms they have implemented, which have not been implemented, and 
the reasons for noncompliance. By complying with this requirement, listed companies 
can reassure all relevant stakeholders that their interests are being protected, thereby 
enhancing their legitimacy and reputation (Melis et al., 2015). Furthermore, as more 
listed companies signal their compliance with these CG practices, the practices 
themselves also gain in legitimacy.  
3.4 Development of the Concept of Corporate Governance (CG)  
Cadbury (1992) defines CG as the method through which a company is directed and 
controlled. Since the emergence of agency theory, which posits that there is a 
fundamental conflict of interest between board members and executive officers on the 
one hand and shareholders and stakeholders on the other, there has been a growing 
awareness of the need for legislation to protect owners‟ interests. Accordingly, many 
countries have now introduced legislation requiring corporations to apply CG 
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principles. Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue that CG is central to reducing the 
problems that arise when ownership is separated from management – a view that has 
been echoed in numerous other studies. Within the accounting and financial literature, 
the ongoing debate over how to enhance the performance of joint-stock companies 
has extended to encompass issues such as the separation of ownership and 
management and the relationship between the two, ownership structures, financing,  
information asymmetry and board accountability (Cheffins, 2001; Labelle, 2002; 
Monks & Minow, 2004).  
According to Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and Turnbull (1997), effective CG reassures 
investors that they will see a return on their investments, and that managers will not 
waste their capital or use it unwisely; in other words, it enables them to supervise the 
managers. The company‟s CG mechanisms should ensure that decision making is 
transparent and that directors are clearly accountable to shareholders; that accounting 
standards are applied and the necessary information is supplied to directors, investors 
and other stakeholders to enable them to make decisions; that company policies are in 
line with national and international laws and regulations; and that the board, which 
should be elected by shareholders, is able to vote on key issues and make decisions. 
The following sections discuss how a number of countries have attempted to 
implement the concept of CG. 
3.4.1 Corporate Governance in the UK 
Following a series of reforms in this area, the UK is now regarded as a world leader in 
CG (Solomon, 2013). The modern evolution of CG in the UK began with the 
publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 by the Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance. The report, which followed the collapse of several major 
joint-stock companies (e.g. Maxwell and BCCI), was designed to restore market 
confidence in corporations‟ financial reporting by setting out principles for financial 
and accounting practice. The report addressed issues such as audit effectiveness, the 
relationship between shareholders, directors and auditors and the structure and 
responsibilities of the BOD (Rayton & Cheng, 2004). British companies registered on 
the London Stock Exchange were advised to follow the recommendations in the 
report, which sought to enhance the independence of the board and executive officers, 
and to improve transparency and disclosure. The report emphasised the importance of 
board committees such as the audit, nomination and incentive committees and urged 
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that these (especially the audit committee) should be made up of independent 
members from outside the company. It emphasised that:  
“Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders‟ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and 
to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. ... 
The Board‟s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders at the 
general assembly meeting” (p.14).  
The report also advised that the BOD should be separate from top management and 
that both should be accountable to shareholders. Finally, it recommended that 
shareholder participation (in terms of both rights and responsibilities) should be 
increased in the interests of disclosure and transparency (Cadbury Report, 1992; Stiles 
& Taylor, 1993). Since 1993, listed companies have been required by the stock 
exchange to disclose the extent to which they comply with the Cadbury Report‟s 
recommendations and to explain any deviations therefrom.  
The next step forward came in 1995, when the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) issued a group study in response to growing shareholder concern about 
directors‟ remuneration (Greenbury Report, 1995). As part of its remit to identify 
effective practices for determining director remuneration and prepare a code of 
practice for the UK (Short, 1999), the Greenbury Committee produced a code dealing 
explicitly with: “The establishment, membership and status of remuneration 
committees; the determinants of remuneration policy for executive directors and other 
senior executives; the disclosure and approval of the details of remuneration policy; 
and the length of service contracts and the determination of compensation when these 
are terminated” (James, 1996). 
Further progress was made in 1998, when the Hampel Committee issued a set of 
regulations and procedures outlining the responsibilities of directors, and the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued guidelines to help auditors assess the 
extent of companies‟ commitment to and application of CG principles. The APB‟s 
report identified seventeen “principles of corporate governance”, which were grouped 
into four main categories: directors, the remuneration of directors, shareholders, and 
auditing and accountability (Short, 1999). The report was designed to protect 
investors‟ interests and enhance the standing of UK listed companies (Rayton & 
Cheng, 2004). A year later, the Turnbull Report sought to provide guidance to listed 
firms on how to implement internal control requirements (Kendrick, 2000). This 
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guidance covered five main areas: the internal audit, the importance of internal 
control and risk management, preserving an effective internal control system, 
reviewing internal control effectiveness and BOD disclosure regarding internal 
control (Vinten, 2001).  
The continuing importance of the Cadbury Report was highlighted in 2000, when the 
Combined Codes: Principles of Good Governance and Codes of Best Practice drew 
on its recommendations to set out a vision of best practice (Greenbury Report, 1995; 
Moerland, 1995). By that point, corporate collapses in the US (e.g. WorldCom and 
Enron) had highlighted deficiencies in that country‟s CG system and triggered 
concerns about the CG system in the UK, particularly in regard to the internal audit 
function and audit committees, which were seen as key factors in the Enron collapse 
(Solomon, 2013). Accordingly, the Smith Committee was established in 2002 with the 
twin aims of reviewing the effectiveness of corporate audit committees in the UK and 
assisting boards and directors to ensure these committees operate properly (Smith 
Report, 2003). The Smith Committee responded to the concerns with the 
recommendation that audit committees should be made up of no fewer than three 
INEDs, one of whom should be qualified in the field of accounting or finance (Smith 
Report, 2003).  
The following years saw a steady stream of initiatives, starting with the 2003 issue of 
the Higgs Report, which offered a set of recommendations aimed at enhancing 
transparency around the nomination and appointment of directors and increasing the 
level of expertise among board members (Rayton & Cheng, 2004). Like the Smith 
Report, the Higgs Report emphasised the importance of INEDs, recommending that 
these should account for at least half of board members. It also recommended the 
separation of the CEO and chairman roles (Dewing & Russell, 2004).The Higgs 
Report was followed that August by the reissue of a modified version of the 
Combined Code (Garratt, 2010). 
In 2004, the Turnbull Review Group was launched by the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) to examine the impact of previous guidance and whether this guidance 
needed to be strengthened. In addition, a new revision was issued to help corporate 
directors assess whether their firms were complying with the Combined Code‟s 
requirements concerning internal control and risk management (Mallin, 2010). In 
2005, Cadbury‟s recommendations were again used to produce guidelines for setting 
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remuneration for directors and executive officers. The guidelines underlined the 
importance of disclosing these remuneration arrangements in the annual report. In 
2006, the Combined Code was revised again to include guidance on the roles of the 
CEO and chairman, board composition and the composition of the main sub-
committees (Pass, 2006). A 2007 review by the FRC concluded that there was overall 
support for the UK Combined Code (2006), which was updated again in June 2008. 
The Turner Review was set up in 2009 in response to a request from the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer for an assessment of the causes of the 2008 financial 
crisis (Turner, 2009). The Turner Review concentrated particularly on the role played 
by internal control within CG and risk management (Solomon, 2010), but Tourani-
Rad & Ingley (2010) argue that its failure to address the inadequacy of internal risk 
management mechanisms in minimising risk-taking in the banking sector made it 
necessary for the UK government to launch its own review of bank governance. This 
review, led by Sir David Walker, made a series of recommendations regarding risk 
management at board level; board skills, experience and independence; board 
practice; the role of institutional shareholders; and “how national and global practice 
can be spread” (Walker Review, 2009). In the same year, the FRC requested another 
revision of the UK Combined Code (Mizuno & Tabner, 2009). When this came in 
2010, it covered five key principles: “leadership, effectiveness, remuneration, 
relations with shareholders and accountability”. Further revisions followed in 2012 (in 
sections B.2.4 and B6.216) and 2014, before the current version of the Combined 
Code, now known as the UK Corporate Governance Code, was launched in April 
2016. This version retains the same five key sections, namely: “leadership, 
effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and relations with shareholders” (FRC, 
2016). 
3.4.2 Corporate Governance in the US   
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the United States‟ response to a series of 
collapses among major American companies including Enron and WorldCom. The act 
imposes significant CG and disclosure requirements upon companies listed in the 
national stock exchanges as well as providing the main regulatory system for 
accountant independence and certification (Brewer et al., 2011). It requires CEOs and 
CFOs to certify the reliability of the financial information in corporate reports, 
mandates the structure and functioning of audit committees, forbids CEOs incentive 
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compensation upon accounting restatements, and prohibits executive loans and the 
procurement of non-audit services from auditors (Romano, 2009). Recognising the 
importance of external auditor independence, the act stipulates that there should be no 
conflict of interest in the relationship between the external auditor and the entity 
under review (Calder, 2008).  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has developed a number of rules to 
ensure that the provisions of the act are implemented, while the importance of CG 
principles has been further underlined by their adoption by high profile institutions 
such as the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) (Blue Ribbon 
Committee, 1999; Chandler et al., 2009).  
There is some argument over whether the benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
outweigh the expense of implementing its provisions, but it has undeniably been 
instrumental in renewing municipal confidence in capital markets by imposing 
auditing standards and corporate accounting rules. As Koehn & Vecchio (2004) point 
out, it has had a positive influence on audit committee activities and CG disclosure. It 
has forced corporations to spend more money on their internal control systems, 
particularly auditing, but this increase in expenditure has brought with it the long-term 
benefits of enhanced disclosure and transparency and more reliable financial 
statements, all of which are appealing to investors (Swartz, 2006).  
3.4.3 Corporate Governance in Egypt  
In its Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), the World Bank, 
(2009) compared Egypt‟s implementation of CG with international principles, 
especially those issued by the OECD (2004). The report, which was conducted jointly 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, discussed the commitment 
shown by various states to international standards and rules. It made three key 
recommendations as far as Egypt was concerned. The first of these was that corporate, 
accounting and auditing law should be upgraded to protect shareholders‟ rights and 
enhance disclosure. It identified making these legislative changes – and ensuring that 
companies conform to them – as the top priority. Secondly, the report called for 
greater institutional strength, arguing that the disclosure provision should be imposed 
without exception. It advised that the Egyptian Stock Exchange (ESE) should improve 
its control capacity in terms of disclosure and train specialists to understand the CG 
principles and detect violations. Finally, the authors argued that voluntary and private 
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initiatives should be encouraged. Although there is growing awareness of the need for 
CG in Egypt, the rules and regulations are changing more quickly than the business 
culture. Managers have two key roles here: in establishing a national consensus (in 
cooperation with the ESE) regarding the role, duties and functions of the BOD and in 
setting CG principles, be they compulsory or voluntary; and in establishing 
mechanisms to train managers and increase their professional capacity (Fawzy, 2003; 
Rosc, 2004).  
It is worth noting that Egypt‟s Managers‟ Centre, founded under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs‟ Decision No. 675 (2003), was the first centre to focus on CG in the 
Arab world. This centre aims at improving CG practice across Egypt, the Middle East 
and North Africa and deals with managers, executive officers, shareholders and 
stakeholders in both private and state-owned organisations. Working under the 
Ministry of Investment in cooperation with international organisations such as the 
World Bank, the International Finance Institute and the Centre of International Project 
Enterprise, the centre published the first two CG codes in Egypt. The first Egyptian 
Corporate Governance Code (ECGC), designed for private companies, was issued 
under Act No. 159 in 1981, though it was not registered on the ESE until 2005. The 
second, for state-owned projects (public sector companies), was issued under Act No. 
203 in 1991 and registered on the ESE in 2007. Both were voluntary. In 2011, the 
ESE issued a revised version of the ECGC code for private firms, this time with the 
stipulation that any listed company not complying with its recommendations should 
disclose this and explain why (Abdelfattah, 2018). This was followed in 2016 by the 
issue of a third version of the ECGC. The new code offers Egyptian listed companies 
a range of guidelines to ensure the effective implementation of CG, again adopting the 
“comply or explain” approach, which the ESE considers fundamental to supporting 
compliance with CG principles (Abdelfattah, 2018). 
To sum up, most of the experiments discussed above underline that the efficiency of 
CG practices in any country depends not only on the availability of suitable methods 
and organisational and legislative procedures, but also on the interaction between the 
internal and external systems on the one hand, and boards, auditing committees, 
executives and auditors on the other. 
Countries around the world have rushed to implement CG principles because they 
offer the possibility of an advanced institutional administrative and accounting model 
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that helps companies achieve a high level of performance and accountability. 
However, cultural differences, including local economic and political conditions, 
affect how CG is applied in practice. As a result, different countries have 
implemented CG in different ways and with different concerns in mind. 
CG mechanisms are a mixture of external and internal systems. External systems 
include government legislation (e.g. corporate, investment and privatisation-related 
law), stock market regulation, accounting and auditing standards and other systems 
designed to regulate the commercial environment. Internal systems are those 
procedures and principles that companies themselves apply to manage their activities 
and monitor performance in order to increase the value of the company (and the 
owners‟ wealth), protect the interests of relevant parties and ensure the business 
survives. 
3.5 Insider and Outsider Models of Corporate Governance (CG) 
As observed in section 3.4.3, the concept of CG has been implemented in different ways 
in different countries. The CG system in any given country is determined by a set of 
internal factors including the legal system, ownership structure, the state of the 
country‟s economy and political and cultural factors (Solomon, 2013). As a result, a 
wide range of CG frameworks have been developed. These may be broadly divided into 
those that are stakeholder-oriented and those that are shareholder-oriented. The former 
are found in countries that follow civil law (e.g. France, Italy, Germany and the 
Netherlands). In these countries, the main role of CG is to balance the interests of a 
wide range of groups including managers, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers 
and the wider community (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Anglo-Saxon countries 
following common law, on the other hand (e.g. Australia, US, UK, Canada and New 
Zealand), have developed CG structures which focus upon the interests of shareholders. 
In these countries, the prime purpose of CG is to ensure managers achieve the firm‟s 
objectives (Mulili & Wong, 2011). These systems are known as insider and outsider 
models of firm control respectively; while the stakeholder model recognises that control 
is best placed in the hands of those who are closest to the company‟s day-to-day 
activities, the shareholder model recognises the distance between agents (managers) and 
principals (owners) (Mulili & Wong, 2011).  
62 
Solomon (2013, p.194) defines the insider-oriented system as “one in which a 
country‟s publicly listed companies are owned and controlled by a small number of 
major shareholders”. The insider model of CG is characteristically two-tier, with 
shareholders appointing a management board and a supervisory board. The former 
deals with operational matters, is controlled by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and consists solely of executives, while the latter oversees both the management 
board and the company‟s strategic decision making. The chairman of the management 
board attends meetings of the supervisory board as a non-executive (Solomon, 2013). 
The aim in separating the administrative and monitoring functions in this way is to 
avoid conflicts of interest arising between owners and managers (Dahya & 
Mcconnell, 2002). The insider model is also characterised by “a high reliance on bank 
finance; concentrated ownership; weak legal protection of minority shareholders; a 
central role for stakeholders in the ownership and management of companies; weak 
disclosure; and limited freedom to merge or acquire” (Robertson, 2007, p.107). 
Outsider systems, on the other hand, are defined by Solomon & Solomon (2004, 
p.150) as “systems of finance and corporate governance where most large firms are 
controlled by their managers but owned by outside shareholders, such as financial 
institutions or individual shareholders”. Such systems are characterised by “equity 
finance; dispersed ownership; strong legal protection of shareholders; strong 
bankruptcy regulations and courts; less role for creditors, employees and other 
stakeholders in company management; strong requirements for disclosure; and 
considerable freedom to merge with or acquire other organisations” (Nestor & 
Thompson, 2000, p.5). Table 3.1 summarises the differences between the insider and 
outsider systems of CG. 
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Table 3.1 Features of Insider and Outsider Systems of CG 
Feature Insider System Outsider System 
Company owners Insider shareholders Outsider shareholders 
Ownership structure Concentrated ownership Dispersed ownership 
Ownership separation 
and control 
Little Separated 
Agency problems Rare Exist 
Control over 
administration 
A small group of insider 
shareholders 
A wide range of shareholders 
Hostile takeover 
activity 
Rare Frequent 
Investor protection Weak in corporate law Strong in corporate law 
Shareholder rights 
Likely abuse of authority by 
majority shareholders 
Likely to be a shareholder 
democracy 
Shareholder voting 
Majority shareholders tend to 
have a louder voice 
Shareholders more likely to exit 
than shout 
Wealth transfer 
Wealth transfers from minority 
shareholders to majority 
shareholders 
Wealth does not transfer from 
minority shareholders to majority 
shareholders 
Source: Adapted from Solomon (2013) 
Notwithstanding their differences, insider and outsider systems share a few similarities. 
For instance, both advocate that boards should be elected by shareholders, that they 
should develop policy and that they should delegate authority to managers (Hilmer, 
1998). The OECD (2004) recognises that no one model is applicable to all 
organisations, even within the same country, and in practice, most countries that have 
adopted CG draw on elements from both models (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). 
However, adoption of the philosophy of CG has not prevented corporate failures and 
financial scandals such as those affecting the Golden Quadrilateral in India and Enron 
and WorldCom in the US (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2003). This has led to calls for the 
development of a comprehensive CG framework which increases the remit of 
independent directors and encourages boards to make more use of external advisors 
(Cutting & Kouzmin, 2000; Monks, 2002). Advancing corporate globalisation has made 
the discussion of CG more urgent; it is widely acknowledged that company managers 
play a key role in both developed and developing countries, but, as Davies & Schlitzer 
(2008) observe, CG practices are currently inconsistent. 
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3.6 The Importance of Corporate Governance (CG) 
Monks & Minow (2004) argue that CG has become increasingly important in the 
wake of financial meltdowns in some of the world‟s most prominent companies, 
while Jaswal (2015) argues that companies need to focus on the legal, economic and 
social consequences of their activities if they are to be successful.  Beyond this, 
however, Claessens & Yurtoglu (2012) give two reasons why CG is vital to global 
economic development. Firstly, companies with good CG are more likely to attract 
private investors, making it especially important in countries making the transition to 
a market-based economy. Secondly, the opening up of financial markets, advancing 
technology, trade liberalisation and other structural reforms are all contributing to an 
increase in the level of domestic and foreign investment in developing countries. 
Good CG is especially crucial in these countries if they are to increase investor 
confidence, enhance their competitiveness and achieve economic growth. According 
to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), CG‟s primary role in emerging 
markets is to improve companies‟ access to global stock portfolios, but it is also a way 
to ensure the quality of decision-making processes and enhance companies‟ prosperity 
in the long term (IFC, 2005).     
The OECD (2004) claims that good CG can play a significant role in enhancing the 
productivity and economic growth not just of individual firms but of whole 
economies: 
“Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The presence 
of effective corporate governance systems, within an individual company and 
across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. As a result, the 
cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more 
efficiently, thereby underpinning growth” (p.11). 
3.6.1 The Economic Importance of CG 
The ultimate objective of CG in practice is to improve company performance and 
ensure investors receive a return on their investment. There is a direct correlation 
between the quality of governance and economic performance. First and foremost, 
high-quality governance works to reduce investment risk and consequently the cost of 
capital. It is therefore important in attracting investment (Kambil et al., 2006). It 
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reassures shareholders and prospective investors that they will achieve an adequate 
return on their investment and that their rights will be safeguarded – this is especially 
important to minority shareholders. Crucially, effective CG mechanisms ensure that 
agents cannot place their own interests ahead of principals‟ (Wheelen & Hunger, 
2004). Providing full and transparent information to investors enables them to learn 
more about the company and its performance, how successfully it is implementing 
corporate strategy and how it determines risk.  
Claessens (2006) identifies a number of reasons why CG has become increasingly 
important: 
1. Privatisation: more companies are going public to maximise their capital. 
2. Liberalisation: trade liberalisation and the establishment of stock markets are 
increasing the flow of international capital. 
3. Firms are getting bigger, and financial intermediaries and institutional 
investors are playing an increasingly important role. 
4. Recent corporate reforms and new institutional arrangements rely on effective 
CG systems. 
3.6.2 The Legal Importance of CG 
Corporate and financial law, accounting standards and audit regulations collectively 
form the legal backbone of the CG framework. In an effort to ensure that this 
regulatory framework operates efficiently, in 2002, the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) issued a CG code of its own that was designed to be compatible with 
existing capital market law (IIF, 2002). 
As far as investors are concerned, CG offers a safety valve, increasing transparency, 
improving control procedures and protecting their rights (e.g. voting rights and the 
right to participate in strategic decision making). The obligation to disclose details of 
company performance and financial health and management decisions means that 
shareholders have the information they need to be able to determine the risks of 
investing in the company. As far as the company is concerned, CG plays a key role in 
improving economic performance. It strengthens the relationship between managers, 
the BOD and shareholders and has a significant impact on the regulatory framework, 
which in turn determines the company‟s objectives, which take into account the 
interests of shareholders. Companies with good CG enjoy greater investor confidence, 
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as investors see this as a guarantee that their rights and interests will be legally 
protected (Calder, 2008).  
3.7 Mechanisms of Corporate Governance (CG) 
Supporters of agency theory emphasise that effective CG mechanisms are important 
to protect shareholders‟ rights and interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Dalwai et al., 
(2015) argue that it is necessary to recognise what impact these mechanisms are 
having, and to monitor them constantly to ensure that the interests of agents do not 
conflict with those of other stakeholders. Wahba (2015) also argues that CG 
mechanisms should be regularly evaluated. There is a broad consensus among 
researchers that CG mechanisms can be divided into two groups: internal mechanisms 
(established by the company) and external mechanisms (established by the market) 
(Al-Baidhani, 2015). However, they disagree about which mechanisms belong in each 
group and how these mechanisms affect the overall CG system (Jensen, 1993). It is 
perhaps not surprising then that they have not yet found a way of classifying CG 
mechanisms that suits all countries (Weir et al., 2002). 
Brennan & Solomon (2008) found that both accounting and finance researchers tend 
to concentrate on internal mechanisms, but while the former generally focus on 
disclosure, transparency and audit committees, the latter tend to concentrate on 
mechanisms related to the BOD and its performance. In its explanation of the CG 
framework applied in this research, this part of the chapter discusses both internal CG 
mechanisms (the BOD, the audit committee, internal auditing, disclosure and 
transparency) and external mechanisms (shareholders‟ rights and external auditing). 
3.7.1 The Board of Directors Mechanism      
As the key link between management and shareholders (Al Daoud et al., 2015; Yoo & 
Reed, 2015) and the senior internal governance mechanism (Abdullah, 2016), the 
BOD plays a crucial role in CG practice. Cadbury (2002, p.31) attributes central 
importance to the board, defining it as “the bridge between those to whom the board is 
accountable and those who are accountable to the board”. It is the main internal 
governance mechanism in charge of supervising and controlling executive directors‟ 
decisions (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012) and resolving any conflicts of interest between 
managers and other stakeholders (Halal et al., 2014). Its responsibilities may include 
developing long-term strategy, determining the compensation of corporate executives, 
67 
evaluating the performance of managers and improving internal control systems 
(Marciukaityte et al., 2009; Cimerovaa et al., 2015; Brooks, 2016). Such is the BOD‟s 
importance, legislation exists to determine its responsibilities and to set out 
expectations concerning its performance (Volonté, 2015). This legislation demands 
that it protects shareholders‟ rights and interests by monitoring the performance of 
and offering advice to senior management (Keay & Loughrey, 2015; Bankewitz, 
2016). The Cadbury Report (1992) pays particular attention to the BOD as it 
considers this one of the most important mechanisms for achieving CG best practice. 
Accordingly, the following sub-sections discuss this mechanism in more detail, 
including some of the factors that impact upon its effectiveness. 
3.7.1.1 Unitary and Dual Boards  
Corporate law in most developed and developing countries compels companies to 
have a BOD to look into the affairs of the company. This board may be unitary (one-
tier) or dual (two-tier) in structure. A unitary board is usually made up of a mix of 
executive and non-executive directors who are elected by shareholders during the 
GAM (Jungmann, 2007). Its responsibilities cover all the activities of the company. 
This type of board, which is widespread in Anglo-Saxon countries such as in the US, 
the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, is associated with the shareholder model 
of CG (Hayes et al., 2014). In contrast, the dual board is made up of two separate 
entities: a supervisory board and an executive (or management) board. The 
supervisory board, which is appointed by shareholders, is responsible for the 
company‟s strategic decision making and for appointing and overseeing the executive 
board. The executive board, meanwhile, is responsible for managing the day-to-day 
operation of the company. This model is widespread in countries that depend on civil 
law and are influenced by the stakeholder model of CG, such as France, Japan, 
Germany, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands (Jungmann, 2007; Mallin, 2013). 
Both the dual board and the unitary board system have their advantages. The dual 
board system allows stakeholders to be represented on the board, thus protecting their 
interests (Solomon, 2007), and unlike the unitary board, there is a clear separation 
between the monitoring and management functions, the chairman and CEO roles, and 
executive and non-executive directors (Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). On the 
other hand, supporters of unitary boards argue that the one-tier system fosters closer 
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relationships between directors and other stakeholders and allows better information 
flows (Mallin, 2007).  
The majority of boards in the MENA countries are unitary and comprise a 
combination of executives and NEDs (IFC, 2008). This is also stipulated in the LCL 
of 2010, though as the following sections will show, it is unclear to what degree 
NEDs are represented on the boards of Libyan listed companies. 
3.7.1.2 Board Composition 
Most international CG codes and rules, recognising that board composition directly 
impacts upon company activities and value, recommend that BODs in listed 
companies should have equal numbers of executive and non-executive directors or 
even a majority of NEDs, since this facilitates the board‟s role as a governing 
authority (McKnight & Weir, 2009). Such recommendations highlight the impact of 
board composition on independence, monitoring, effectiveness and performance. 
Ahmed et al., (2006) argue that NEDs enhance the board‟s objectivity and its ability 
to make independent judgements because they may raise questions that executive 
directors miss and contribute new insights to the decision-making process (Minichilli 
et al., 2009). This is contingent, however, on executive directors and NEDs having a 
mutual understanding (Roberts et al., 2005). In the case of INEDs, it is important that 
they are truly independent; Al-Sawalqa (2014) notes that Jordan‟s Corporate 
Governance Code defines INEDs as “one whose directorship constitutes his only 
connection to the Bank, and whose judgement is therefore unlikely to be influenced 
by external considerations”.   
As the BOD is the principal entity responsible for planning and controlling the 
operations of the company, its members need to be highly qualified and fully 
conversant with their duties towards the company (Klein, 1998). Solomon (2010) 
makes the point that to enhance the board‟s administrative efficiency, a balance needs 
to be struck not only between executives and non-executives but also between those 
with practical experience and those with relevant educational qualifications. The most 
talented and qualified people are more likely to be recruited if there are mechanisms 
in place to ensure that the right candidates are appointed and that directors are fairly 
compensated (Fratini & Tettamanzi, 2015; Walker, 2005). 
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It is uncertain whether all this is happening in Libya. The LCGC, issued by the LSM 
in 2007, and the 2005 Libyan Bank Code stipulate that the majority of board members 
should be NEDs, but there is no conclusive evidence that Libyan listed companies 
comply with this requirement. It is also questionable whether these companies pay 
sufficient attention to qualifications and experience when appointing new board 
members. Consequently, this was one of the empirical phenomena examined in this 
research. 
3.7.1.3 Board Size 
Given the vital importance attributed to the BOD mechanism in the CG literature, it is 
not surprising that there has been significant concentration on the linkage between 
board size and firm performance (Isik & Ince, 2016). However, empirical proof of the 
effect of board size on company performance is still inconclusive (Hassan et al., 
2017); although the number of directors is considered a key determinant of 
effectiveness, there is disagreement over what constitutes the optimum board size 
(Abdulsamad et al., 2018; Tulung & Ramdani, 2018). Those authors arguing the 
merits of large boards claim that these boards perform better because they encompass 
a wide range of up-to-date skills, which allows them to make better decisions and 
monitor CEO performance more closely (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Abidin et al., 
2009; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Haan & Vlahu, 2016). Albu & 
Girbina (2015) argue that large boards are more capable of monitoring the actions of 
senior management and that their CG practices are likely to be more advanced, which 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) point out can reduce agency costs and lead to better 
financial performance. Al-Mosharrafa (2015) also asserts that large boards are more 
effective at overseeing companies than small boards. 
In contrast, other studies argue that small boards are more effective (Dabor et al., 
2015). Alzoubi & Selamat (2012), for example, explain that communication between 
directors in small boards is easier and that there is less chance of misunderstandings. 
Yermack (1996) examined a sample of 452 US companies and concluded that small 
boards were the best choice for these companies as they were the most likely to 
increase the companies‟ market value. Similarly, Chan & Li (2008) identified an 
inverse relationship between the size of the board and company performance, while 
Jensen (1993) concluded that a small board is better able to oversee a company‟s 
activities effectively. In a study of 450 non-financial corporations from the UK, 
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Switzerland, the US, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Spain and Belgium, 
De Andres et al., (2005) found that large boards generally perform worse than small 
boards, and that their lack of flexibility and coordination outweighs any potential 
advantages. 
The difficulty of determining the best board size is acknowledged in a number of 
national CG codes; the UK‟s codes, for example, do not specify an ideal board size, 
though they advise corporations to give careful thought to composition. Thus, the UK 
Combined Code (2006) recommends that: “The board should not be so large as to be 
unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and 
experience is appropriate for the requirements of the business and that changes to the 
board‟s composition can be managed without undue disruption”. 
Boards in listed companies should have between eight and ten members. Libya‟s 
Commercial Law (2010) does not stipulate a board size but leaves this to the general 
assembly to decide. In contrast, the LCGC (2007) recommends that the board should 
have between three and eleven members (Benomran et al., 2015), while the Libyan 
Banking Code (2010) requires commercial banks to have no fewer than five and no 
more than seven members on the board, the majority of whom should be NEDs. 
However, there is no conclusive proof that Libyan listed companies comply with 
these requirements in practice, and hence, this issue was investigated in this research. 
3.7.1.4 Selecting and Appointing Board Members 
The UK CG Code (2010) recommends that appointments to the board should be 
scrutinised by a nomination committee in order to ensure that a suitable balance of 
experience and skills is maintained within the board (and by extension, the company). 
The rules for selecting and appointing board members are typically stipulated in 
national CG codes and regulations (Mallin, 2013), with the result that they vary from 
one country to another. In countries with a unitary board system, board members are 
generally elected by the shareholders, while in countries with a dual board system, 
supervisory board members are appointed by shareholders and management board 
members are appointed by the supervisory board. 
In Libya, the LCGC (2007) stipulates that the general assembly, as the shareholders‟ 
representative, is solely responsible for selecting board members. The assembly is 
supposed to choose candidates according to specific criteria, the most important of 
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which are technical and practical efficiency, specialist knowledge and experience. 
However, there is no definitive evidence that Libyan listed companies are practically 
committed to this requirement. Accordingly, this was investigated in this research.  
3.7.1.5 Duties and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
The Cadbury Report (2002, p.33) describes boards as “the link between shareholders 
and managers, companies and the outside world. This is why the board is inescapably 
the centre of the government system”. Investigations carried out in the wake of 
corporate collapse have focused particularly on the board‟s role and found that in 
many cases, corporate boards bore the major part of the responsibility because they 
failed to perform their monitoring function adequately, instead allowing companies to 
engage in manipulative behaviour without restriction (Popli & Popli, 2015). First and 
foremost, the BOD plays a vital role in overseeing the management on behalf of 
shareholders and protecting the latters‟ interests, though its effectiveness in this 
supervisory function is likely to be influenced by several factors such as its size, 
composition, diversity and whether the positions of CEO and chairman are separated 
or shared (Brennan, 2006).  
Mallin (2007) describes the primary role of the BOD as being to set the company‟s 
objectives and monitor the achievement of its goals; its responsibilities include 
appointing the CEO, holding regular meetings and making appropriate decisions in 
areas within its purview. Views differ on the importance of regular meetings to board 
effectiveness; Abdulsamad et al., (2018) caution that holding meetings too often can 
lead to directors becoming too involved in day-to-day management and leave the 
CEO feeling controlled by the board, and that directors should not call for a meeting 
unless necessary to discuss a particular problem, while Noor & Fadzil (2013), on the 
other hand, argue that holding regular meetings can help improve company 
performance.   
Taking a broader view, Clarke (2007) describes the BOD as having three main roles: 
(i) the control role, which requires it to monitor management performance and ensure 
accountability to stakeholders; (ii) the strategic role, which requires it to make key 
strategic decisions and/or monitor strategic decisions taken by senior management; 
and (iii) the institutional role, which involves establishing institutional relations with 
shareholders, stakeholders and society as a whole. 
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Given the differing views described above, it is perhaps not surprising that while the 
BOD is a widely recognised legal mechanism, the roles ascribed to it vary from code 
to code (Brennan, 2006). The UK Combined Code (2006) states that the role of the 
board is to give skilled leadership and design wise and effective oversight 
mechanisms to assess and manage risk. It stipulates that it is the duty of the board to 
“make decisions in an objective way and in the company‟s best interests”. 
Recognising that the purview of the board should be clearly defined, the code 
recommends that: “There should be a formal schedule of matters over which the 
board has the right to make decisions”. It also recognises the importance of good 
information flow in helping the board carry out its roles effectively; it advises that: 
“There should be appropriate reporting procedures defined for the board and its 
subcommittees”, that the board should have regular meetings, with an agenda, and 
that: “All directors should have access to the company secretary and also be able to 
take independent professional advice”. Finally, it recommends that all directors 
receive appropriate training when they are first appointed to the board. 
As far as Libya is concerned, the LCGC (2005) makes no explicit recommendations 
concerning the board‟s role or responsibilities, but the LCGC (2007) describes the 
board‟s role as being: 
 To make all decisions and conclude all actions necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the company; 
 To set policies and issue internal orders pertaining to the company‟s 
administrative and financial affairs; 
 To invite the general assembly to convene; 
 To prepare an annual report, signed by the chairman, to be submitted to 
shareholders for review at least seven days before the GAM. 
 The BOD can vest its authority in an executive committee formed from some of 
its members and determine the period of this authorisation. The authorisation 
should not extend to include issues that may lead to fundamental changes in the 
company. 
The 2010 version of the LCGC adds that among the functions and responsibilities of 
the BOD is the job of monitoring the implementation of policy. Once again, however, 
there is no conclusive empirical evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies 
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perform their roles and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of the 
LCGC. This was therefore another area of investigation in this study. 
3.7.1.6 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman  
The CEO is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the company, while the board 
chairman is responsible for running the BOD. Duality refers to a state where the CEO 
and chairman positions are occupied by the same person (Pillai & Al-Malkawi, 2017; 
Abdulsamad et al., 2018). Theoretical paradigms differ on the desirability of CEO 
duality; agency theory posits that separating the two functions ensures that the board 
can monitor the activities of the CEO and protect shareholders‟ interests (Abdullah, 
2016), while stewardship theory claims that this division of power is more likely to 
lead to competition and conflict and to undermine the CEO‟s ability to make 
important investment decisions and raise firm performance (Abdulsamad et al., 2018). 
However, the majority of international CG codes, and most of the literature, favour 
the separation of the role of CEO and chairman.  
Researchers have argued that combining the two roles gives the individual concerned 
too much power (Mallin, 2013), and that this may make them more inclined to put 
their own interests ahead of the company‟s (Al-Matari et al., 2012). Meca & Ballesta 
(2009) conclude in their research that CEO duality leads to less control being 
exercised over the behaviour and activities of managers, while Mohamad-Nor et al. 
(2010) argue that it adversely affects the timeliness of annual reports. Empirical 
results have been mixed, however; Shrivastav & Kalsie (2016) appeared to offer 
support for the widespread opposition to CEO/chairman duality when they found a 
significantly negative association between CEO duality and company performance, 
but Moscu (2015) found a positive association between the same two variables. 
Furthermore, there are those who argue that the cost of separation may outweigh its 
potential benefits (Brickley et al., 1997).  
In Libya, both the 2007 and 2010 versions of the LCGC stipulate that the roles of 
CEO and chairman must be separated, but there is no definitive evidence that Libyan 
listed companies are practically committed to this requirement. Accordingly, this was 
investigated in this research.  
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3.7.1.7 Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
Bliss (2011) defines NEDs as board members who have no relationship with the 
company other than their directorship, and who own only a small amount of stock. 
Much of the CG literature focuses on why companies should appoint NEDs, but their 
impact on corporate performance is a matter of debate (Georgiou et al., 2012). 
Agency theory suggests that the presence of NEDs on the board is critical to protect 
stakeholders‟ interests, and that their knowledge and experience assist the board in its 
monitoring function, eventually leading to improved corporate performance (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Since their own reputation also relies on this performance, they have 
an additional incentive to facilitate the oversight process and increase value for 
shareholders (Rouf, 2011). The importance of NEDs in protecting shareholders‟ 
interests is highlighted by numerous researchers, including Yoo & Reed (2015), who 
argue that having a large percentage of NEDs on the corporate board is the main 
requirement for ensuring that shareholders‟ interests and rights are protected, and 
Volonté (2015), who claims that NEDs are better able to offer this protection than 
executive directors.  
Others discuss the importance of NED independence in promoting board 
performance; Al-Faryan (2017) argues that boards with a higher proportion of NEDs 
are better able to control managers, thereby alleviating agency problems, while 
Lemonakis et al., (2018) indicate that NEDs can help boards be more independent, 
efficient and effective. Al-Janadi et al., (2013) conclude that NEDs can help boards 
improve the quality of their reporting and be more independent in their decision 
making, while Muniandy & Hillier (2014) and El-Faitouri (2014) argue that 
appointing a combination of executive and non-executive directors minimises the 
probability that the decision-making process will be dominated by one person or 
group within the board. 
NEDs are thus widely regarded as central in helping BODs to achieve company 
objectives by enhancing board control, serving as a counterbalance to executives and 
contributing to the overall leadership and development of the firm (Shalba, 2016). 
Their key roles may be summarised as being to contribute to strategic decision 
making, to protect the interests of shareholders and to ensure the company continues 
to perform competitively (Pye, 2001).Their perceived importance is reflected in the 
prominence given to NEDs in CG codes and stock market laws and regulations 
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around the world (Muravyev et al., 2014); many require boards to have a combination 
of executive and non-executive directors, or even a majority of the latter.  
However, there are a number of obstacles that can prevent NEDs from carrying out 
their responsibilities effectively. Bozec (2005) argues that NEDs may sit on several 
different boards, leaving them only limited time to devote to any one board or to learn 
about the company‟s activities. They may also be asked to undertake complex tasks 
with inadequate information, leading to poor results. This leads Pye (2001, p.191) to 
observe that:  
“Even where NEDs are encouraged to contribute to and interrogate executive 
actions and proposals, they do not have perfect access to information or even 
access to perfect information: hence even those who have no prior connection 
with a board (i.e. „truly independent‟) are still very much in the hands of the 
chairman and the CE in terms of how agendas are put together, meetings are 
framed, information shared and decisions made”. 
A couple of studies have examined the role of NEDs in the MENA countries. Hussain 
& Mallin (2002) examined CG practice in firms listed on the Bahraini Stock 
Exchange and found that a number of these firms had NED-dominated boards. In 
contrast, El-Mehdi (2007) points out that the majority of board members in Tunisian 
listed companies are executives, and that the positions of CEO and chairman are often 
held by the same person. These two sets of results suggest that this aspect of board 
composition varies significantly across the MENA region.  
As far as Libya is concerned, the LCGC (2007) stipulates that the majority of the 
BOD must be NEDs, and that no board member should sit on more than five company 
boards at once. In the absence of any definitive evidence that Libyan listed companies 
comply with these requirements, this empirical issue was investigated in this research.  
3.7.1.8 Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) 
Considerable attention has been paid by academics and policy makers to the question 
of NED independence (Volonté, 2015). INEDs are seen as central to ensuring the 
independence of the board and thus its ability to carry out its principal role of 
monitoring managers (Romano et al., 2008); Prabowo & Simpson (2011) go so far as 
to define board independence as the proportion of INEDs to the total number of 
company directors. Al-Sahafi et al., (2015, p.6) define an INED as “a member of the 
board of directors who does not have a full-time management position at the 
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company, or who does not receive a monthly or yearly salary”. Independent of 
managers and of any relationships that might interfere with their judgement or 
decision making (Habtoor & Ahmad, 2017), INEDs are seen as a sign of CG quality; 
Braswell et al., (2012), for example, claim that the presence of INEDs indicates strong 
CG mechanisms, and that boards with a high proportion of INEDs are more likely to 
support managers by routinely monitoring their activities. The perceived importance 
of board independence means that CG codes in developed and developing countries 
alike pay attention to INEDs (Lappalainen & Niskanen, 2012; Abdullah, 2016). Most 
leading CG codes recommend that the majority of board members should be 
independent; the UK CG Code (2010), for example, stipulates that no less than half 
the board (excluding the chairman) should be INEDs.  
There is a wide, but not universal, consensus in the CG literature that the presence of 
INEDs significantly improves board performance and consequently company value. 
Isik & Ince (2016) argue that having a high proportion of INEDs on the board 
positively affects company performance, while Garefalakis et al., (2017) conclude 
that board independence is positively associated with efficiency. Similarly, Cotter & 
Silvester (2003) found that most Australian firms benefit from having INEDs on their 
boards, while Deli & Gillan (2000) found a direct correlation between board 
independence and company performance.  
However, Lawrence & Stapledon (1999) take the opposite view, arguing that INEDs 
generally fail to add real value to companies and claiming that many lack the ability 
or the time (for example because of extensive commitments elsewhere) to make a real 
difference. The authors argue that the ability of INEDs to contribute may in any case 
be limited if the board is dominated by executive directors and affiliated NEDs. They 
may not even be truly independent, for example if they have a personal relationship 
with the CEO, if they have held the appointment for a long time, or if they are an 
executive director elsewhere. These factors can all reduce the INED‟s effectiveness in 
their monitoring role. Finally, Lawrence and Stapledon argue that INED monitoring 
can actually be counterproductive in some circumstances, for example if it adversely 
affects decision making. 
Turning to the MENA countries, Jordan‟s CG code (2007) for the banking sector 
recommends that boards include at least three INEDs (whether these represent natural 
persons or legal entities), indicating that this is now seen as a key aspect of CG best 
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practice (Al-Sawalqa, 2014). In Libya, the LCGC (2010) requires the board to be 
independent of the bank‟s management in order to avoid any possible conflict 
between the monitoring and management processes and to strengthen accountability. 
The same code emphasises that there should be at least two INEDs on the board. Even 
so, there is no definitive evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies ensure that 
directors are practically independent, so this was another empirical issue investigated 
in this research.  
3.7.1.9 Board Sub-committees 
The concept of board sub-committees emerged early on in the development of CG as 
a mechanism for protecting the integrity of corporate boards and dealing with 
potential conflicts of interest with managers. Since then, the mechanism has become 
an essential element of CG in both developed and less-developed countries, and is 
widely seen as evidence of high CG standards (Lekvall, 2012). Board sub-committees 
strengthen CG by allowing independent monitoring of the BOD‟s activities and 
improving board accountability (Brown et al., 2011). They also enhance board 
effectiveness and efficiency (Jiraporn et al., 2009) by carrying out key tasks on its 
behalf. The board is responsible for supervising: the preparation of the annual 
financial reports, strategic decision making, internal control systems, risk assessment, 
auditing practices and CG systems. At least some of these tasks are delegated to sub-
committees, though the board retains overall responsibility and accountability for 
these functions (Baker & Anderson, 2010). Most CG codes recommend that boards 
appoint a minimum of three sub-committees: the audit committee, the nomination 
committee and the remuneration committee (Brown et al., 2011). Others, such as a 
finance committee, an executive committee or a risk management committee, may be 
set up as required (Baker & Anderson, 2010; Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). In each 
case, the BOD should delegate specific responsibilities and tasks to the committee  dn 
see o e tes s ooe  dn eue ttdtes oo tes   euo tes (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). 
3.7.1.9.1 Audit Committee 
Since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, the number of UK companies 
establishing audit committees has increased significantly (Farhat, 2014) as 
appreciation has grown of the centrality of these committees to effective CG (Salleh 
& Haat, 2014; Abdulsaleh, 2014; Ghafran & O‟Sullivan, 2013; Pathak et al., 2014). 
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Arguably one of the most crucial sub-committees in the BOD (Albaqali & Kukreja, 
2017), the audit committee‟s task is to enhance corporate transparency, accountability 
and reporting quality (Bhasin, 2016) and thereby support shareholder confidence 
(Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). Brennan & Solomon (2008) highlight its role in 
enhancing the accounting function, and most CG codes regard the audit committee as 
an important mechanism for evaluating internal control systems (Kasswna, 2012). 
Vera-Munoz (2005) observes that interest in the effectiveness of audit committees has 
increased significantly in past two decades. Researchers have investigated the 
committee‟s role in both developed and developing countries (e.g. Tengamnuay & 
Stapleton, 2009; Ghafran & O‟Sullivan, 2013; Abdulsaleh, 2014; Akinteye et al., 
2015), offering a range of insights into its various roles and the factors that impact its 
effectiveness.  
Abdulsaleh (2014) defines the audit committee as  
“a committee of directors of an organisation whose specific responsibility is to 
review the annual financial statements before submission to the board of 
directors. The committee generally acts as liaison between the auditor and the 
board of directors and its activities may include the review of nomination of 
the auditor, overall scope of the audit, results of the audit, internal financial 
controls, and financial information for publication”.   
Rezaee (2009, p.120), in his definition, gives a comprehensive description of what is 
expected of the committee: 
“The audit committee is a committee composed of independent, non-executive 
directors charged with the oversight functions of ensuring responsible CG, a 
reliable financial reporting process, an effective internal control structure, a 
credible audit function, an informed whistle-blower complaint process and an 
appropriate code of business ethics with the purpose of creating long-term 
shareholder value while protecting the interests of other stakeholders”.  
The view that the audit committee‟s key purpose is to monitor the integrity of the 
financial reporting process is shared by numerous authors and regulators (e.g. 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; Madhani, 2015). Isa & Farouk (2018) note that an effective 
audit committee can enhance the reliability and integrity of corporate financial 
statements, while Ali (2014) says that the committee can improve monitoring of the 
financial reporting process. Numerous authors have highlighted the importance of the 
audit committee in preventing fraud and reducing errors in companies‟ financial 
statements; Goodwin & Seow (2002), for example, reveal that Singaporean 
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corporations with effective audit committees appear more able to detect financial 
fraud and avoid financial misstatements, while Xie et al., (2003) claim that audit 
committees perform a significant role in averting irregularities in the financial 
reporting process. Salleh & Haat (2014) conclude that assigning NEDs to the audit 
committee boosts the BOD‟s ability to fulfil its obligation to ensure the reliability and 
truthfulness of corporate financial statements. By aiding the BOD in this task, the 
audit committee helps alleviate agency problems between the company and external 
shareholders (Alghamdi, 2012).  
Khelil et al., (2016) describe the audit committee and the internal audit function as the 
two main mechanisms for enhancing corporate financial transparency and protecting 
shareholders‟ interests. The relationship between the two functions is important in 
ensuring the efficiency of the company‟s oversight and risk management 
arrangements (Alzebana & Sawan, 2015); not only does the committee depend on the 
internal audit department to be its “eyes and ears” and to supply it with financial, 
managerial and operating information (Oxner & Oxner, 2006), it also depends on the 
department to recommend external auditors, negotiate audit fees and assess their work 
(Eller, 2014). For its part, the audit committee has the power to promote the 
effectiveness and independence of the internal audit by acknowledging the importance 
of its activities (Turley & Zaman, 2007; Ahmad et al., 2009) and insisting that (i) the 
internal audit report is sent straight to the audit committee instead of senior 
management (Tricker, 2015) and (ii) it, rather than directors, appoints the senior 
internal auditor (Goodwin & Yeo, 2001). The committee can also strengthen the 
internal audit function by acting as its intermediary with managers (Goodwin & Yeo, 
2001) (or the BOD or external auditors (Liao & Hsu, 2013)). A number of researchers 
emphasise that the audit committee plays a vital role in promoting effective internal 
control systems through regular monitoring (Bardhan et al., 2015).  
In terms of the committee‟s role in the external audit, the view among many regulators 
and researchers is that it should play the primary role in monitoring the effectiveness, 
independence and impartiality of external auditors (Smith, 2003) and in 
recommending their nomination or dismissal to the BOD (Bédard & Compernolle, 
2014). According to the Smith Report (2003), UK audit committees should also 
review the letter of appointment sent to the external auditor, the scope of the audit and 
the adequacy of the planning process. At the end of the audit process, the audit 
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committee should check the outcomes of the audit, the report submitted to the 
administration, and the management‟s response. Alrshah & Fadzil (2013) argue that 
the audit committee should also be responsible for supervising the relationship 
between managers and the external auditor who is reviewing the financial statements, 
and for resolving any disputes between the two. This all helps ensure the quality of the 
external audit process and enhances confidence in the final report (Bédard & 
Compernolle, 2014). However, while numerous researchers have argued that audit 
committees play a vital role in enhancing the independence, quality and objectivity of 
the external audit process, there are still those who doubt the extent of their influence 
in practice. Bédard & Compernolle (2014), for example, argue that corporate directors 
still tend to forge relationships with external auditors, and that audit committees do not 
have sufficient power to protect the independence of these external auditors. 
The audit committee‟s perceived importance is such that it has been the focus of 
numerous studies investigating the impact various characteristics have on its 
effectiveness (Shawtari et al., 2015). The following sections discuss four of these 
characteristics – the independence, size and expertise of the committee, and the 
frequency with which it meets – in more detail. 
3.7.1.9.1.1 Independence of Audit Committee Members 
Most definitions highlight independence as one of the audit committee‟s fundamental 
attributes (Mbobo & Nweze, 2016). The committee is expected to have at least three 
members, two-thirds of whom should be non-executive (Alaswad & Stanišić, 2016). 
To be considered independent, these committee members should have no financial or 
personal relationships with the firm or its executive directors (Persons, 2009), as these 
would compromise their ability to perform their supervisory role (Keay & Loughrey, 
2015). Independence allows committee members to deal with matters in an impartial 
and objective way, taking into account the interests of directors and relevant 
stakeholders (Hasan & Xie, 2013). Previous studies (Abbott et al., 2004; Klein, 2002), 
which have generally measured audit committee independence as the ratio of external 
independent directors to the total size of the committee, have found a positive 
relationship between audit committee independence and the quality of internal control 
within the company (Krishnan, 2005), and a negative association between this 
independence and the incidence of re-drafted or falsified financial reports (Persons, 
2005); in other words, independent audit committees provide better-quality financial 
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reporting (Lin et al., 2006). Abbott et al., (2000) also reveal that companies that have 
an independent audit committee are more likely to appoint external auditors who are 
specialists in the company‟s field. The findings of these studies offer strong support 
for the view that an independent audit committee contributes positively to ethical 
financial reporting and oversight (Persons, 2009). For these reasons, most researchers 
in this field recommend that audit committees should be made up entirely of non-
executive and independent directors.  
3.7.1.9.1.2 Audit Committee Size 
Much of the audit committee literature focuses on the matter of committee size. This 
is measured as the number of members required to carry out the duties of the 
committee (Pucheta-Martínez & García-Meca, 2014; Mbobo & Nweze, 2016). Utama 
& Leonardo (2014) advise that the committee should comprise at least three INEDs, 
one of whom should be appointed chairman, while the UK Combined Code (2008, 
p.17) recommends that: “The board should establish an audit committee of at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive directors. 
At least one member of the audit committee should have recent and relevant financial 
experience”. Avison & Cowton (2012), in their analysis of corporate reactions to the 
Combined Code, found that most UK companies followed these guidelines. 
Albring et al., (2014) suggest that the size of the audit committee may serve as an 
indicator of its effectiveness, and a number of researchers have argued that the larger 
the committee is, the more efficient it can be. For example, Lemonakis et al., (2018) 
claim that a larger committee is better equipped to monitor and implement the internal 
audit function‟s policies, while Bedard et al., (2004) argue that it is more likely to 
possess the strength and expertise it needs to monitor the financial reporting process 
effectively. Yin et al., (2012) suggest that is likely to have greater access to resources 
and administrative talent, allowing it to offer more effective oversight, while Soliman 
& Ragab (2014) show that larger committees are less likely engage in earnings 
management. On the other hand, Abbott et al., (2004) found no significant association 
between audit committee size and the quality of financial reporting. On balance, 
however, most research seems to suggest that audit committee size may be relevant to 
the quality of financial reporting in a company. 
In other areas of committee performance, DeZoort & Salterio (2001) conclude that 
although larger audit committees are more likely to be well-resourced than smaller 
82 
ones, coordination and communication can become more difficult. Finally, in a survey 
of 500 companies, Vafeas & Waegelein (2007) found a positive association between 
committee size and audit fee levels, suggesting that larger committees request more 
audits.  
3.7.1.9.1.3 Expertise of Audit Committee Members 
Audit committee members may come from a variety of backgrounds, but if they are to 
perform their monitoring function effectively, they must have the relevant technical 
expertise (Ghafran & O‟Sullivan, 2017). Velte (2017) explains that this includes 
knowledge and experience in the areas of accounting, auditing, financial reporting and 
internal controls. Multiple studies have provided empirical support for the value of 
having financial experts on audit committees. For example, Agrawal & Chadha 
(2005) and Abbott et al., (2004) both found a negative association between the 
incidence of financial restatement and the presence of financial expertise among 
committee members, while Abdulsaleh (2014b) found a positive association between 
financial expertise on the audit committee and financial report quality, signifying that 
the presence of such expertise enhances financial monitoring. McDaniel et al., (2002) 
and Zhang et al., (2007) also show that expert members are better equipped than their 
non-expert colleagues to oversee the quality of financial reporting, while DeZoort & 
Salterio (2001) point out that audit committee members with financial and auditing 
knowledge are better able to understand auditor judgements and to support the auditor 
in any conflict with management. They are also more likely to detect material 
misstatements. Bedard et al., (2004) found that aggressive earnings management is 
negatively associated with the presence of at least one member on the committee who 
has accounting/financial expertise. Finally, Krishnan (2005) identified a significant 
negative association between the presence of accounting/financial expertise and the 
occurrence of internal control problems. Abdulsaleh (2014b) argues that taken 
together, these outcomes suggest that having experts with accounting, auditing and 
finance experience on the audit committee is more likely to foster high-quality CG. 
3.7.1.9.1.4 Audit Committee Meetings 
The US‟s Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) (1999) suggests that frequent meetings are 
central to the audit committee‟s ability to maintain its relationship with internal and 
external auditors, as well as to its general effectiveness. Accordingly, most CG codes 
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recommend at least three or four meetings per year, with additional extraordinary 
meetings as required (Yang & Krishnan, 2005). Ali (2014) suggests that regular 
meetings allow the audit committee to play a more active and effective monitoring 
role, a view endorsed by the Smith Report (2003), which sees meetings as central to 
the audit committee‟s work. However, while Persons (2009) sees frequent meetings as 
an indicator of diligence, Hogan et al., (2014) argue that this may actually be a 
symptom of committee ineffectiveness or even a warning sign of approaching failure 
in the financial reporting process. 
Several studies have sought to investigate the relationship between the frequency of 
audit committee meetings and financial reporting quality, but again, the results have 
been mixed. Thus, while a US-based study by the BRC (1999) concluded that having 
frequent meetings helps strengthen the quality of financial reporting, neither Soliman 
& Ragab (2014) nor Baxter & Cotter (2009) found any significant association 
between meeting frequency and financial reporting quality. Those proposing a link 
between meeting frequency and CG include O‟Sullivan et al., (2008), who cite a 
positive association between meeting frequency and forward-looking information 
disclosure in corporate financial statements, and Chen & Zhou (2007), who conclude 
that this is a significant element in enhancing CG practice. These authors argue that 
the audit committee‟s ability to detect any financial offence and sort out problems in 
the financial reporting process is heavily dependent on how frequently it meets to 
consider matters affecting the corporation.  
In Libya, the LCGC (2007, 2010) requires Libyan listed companies to establish an 
audit committee of no fewer than three members, all of whom must be NEDs and at 
least one of whom must be a specialist in finance or accounting. The rules for 
appointing the members of the audit committee, their length of tenure and the 
committee‟s method of working should be determined by the BOD. The LCGC 
stipulates that the functions and responsibilities of the audit committee in Libyan 
listed companies must include the following: (i) directly supervising the internal audit 
conducted by company managers and verifying its accuracy; (ii) examining the 
internal control system of the company and producing a written report giving opinions 
and recommendations; (iii) making recommendations to the BOD regarding the 
appointment of the external auditor and sequestration, and the determining of fees; 
(iv) checking the annual financial statements before referring them to the BOD; and 
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(v) checking administrative and accounting policies and making recommendations 
where necessary to theBOD. Since there is no conclusive proof that Libyan listed 
companies comply with these requirements in practice, this was investigated in this 
research. 
3.7.1.9.2 The Nomination Committee  
Most CG codes stipulate that the BOD should establish a nomination committee to 
make recommendations regarding the appointment and replacement of board 
members (Madhani, 2015), but few studies in the CG literature have focused on 
nomination committees (Agyemang-Mintah, 2015), probably because the financial 
crisis has led researchers to direct their attention to other areas. Often the smallest 
board body, the nomination committee‟s duties and responsibilities are set by the 
BOD, which may from time to time review the work of the committee. Its main job, 
according to Eminet & Guedri (2010, p.558), is to “define the profiles of directors 
needed on the board and to suggest future director candidates”, but other important 
tasks and responsibilities include identifying potential nominees for the posts of 
chairman and CEO; advising on the suitability of candidates for board membership, 
including those nominated by investors; and advising on the suitability of candidates 
for executive positions in the company, including those nominated by investors 
(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). The committee has the authority to engage and 
pay a specialist company to help it select candidates for these positions, if it sees fit. 
More broadly, the committee is responsible for conducting a periodic review of 
current CG guidelines and advising the board of any changes required in the 
company‟s CG practice. It is also responsible for reviewing the company‟s code of 
ethics and for advising the board of any modifications that are needed to comply with 
changes in the legal framework or stock market regulations. Finally, it is responsible 
for checking the self-assessments that are submitted by board members, the 
remuneration committee and company executives to the BOD (Minichilli et al., 2007). 
The UK CG Code (2010) recommends that the nomination committee should consist 
mostly of INEDs, and that it should be headed by the board chairman or by one of the 
INEDs. The committee‟s ultimate aim should be to boost the effectiveness of the 
board by ensuring that it appoints capable and qualified directors from a diverse range 
of backgrounds (Eminet & Guedri, 2010; Walther & Morner, 2014; Kaczmarek & 
Nyuur, 2016). The assumption is that the committee will protect the independence of 
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the board by mitigating the influence of the CEO and chairman on the selection 
process and improving the separation of control and management (Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999). Its involvement in the selection process also enhances the legitimacy 
of the appointed candidates, making it easier for them to independently fulfil their 
responsibilities. For their part, nomination committee members have a strong interest 
in recruiting capable directors because these appointments reflect on their own 
reputation  (Huse, 2007).  
3.7.1.9.3 The Remuneration (Compensation) Committee 
There has been much discussion of the role played by the remuneration committee in 
the CG literature (Alkahtani, 2015). From the Greenbury Report onwards, the 
argument has been made that the remuneration of senior executives should be linked 
to performance (Solomon, 2013). Accordingly, the key responsibility of the 
remuneration committee is to review and endorse the incentives and bonuses offered 
to the CEO and other senior executives (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). It is seen 
as playing a vital role in preventing potential conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders by making recommendations to the BOD which ensure that senior 
staff are suitably and fairly rewarded for their contribution to the company‟s long-
term success (Madhani, 2015). Its responsibilities also include setting bonuses and 
retirement benefits for directors (Kanapathippillai, 2016) and reviewing the 
employment terms and conditions of senior managers (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). 
The committee is responsible for preparing and endorsing an annual report of its 
activities, which is usually published in the company‟s annual report. It is expected to 
assess its own performance on an annual basis in order to determine whether it is 
performing its functions and responsibilities effectively, and to provide minutes of its 
meetings to all members of the BOD. Like the nomination committee, it has the 
authority to engage experienced consultants to help it fulfil these responsibilities 
(Minichilli et al., 2007). 
The remuneration committee is essential to prevent executives from determining for 
themselves the level of remuneration owed to them (Mallin, 2013); hence the 
requirement that its members should be INEDs with no personal interest in the 
company (Idowu & Caliyurt, 2014). The UK Combined Code (2008, p.15) advises 
that the remuneration committee should comprise “at least three or in the case of 
smaller companies, two, independent non-executive directors”.  
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As far as the MENA countries are concerned, Naciri (2008) observes that in Saudi 
Arabia, as in many other countries in the region, there is now specific legislation 
requiring that candidates should only be appointed to sub-committees such as the 
nomination and remuneration committees if they meet specified criteria. The Egyptian 
CG code (2005) recommends that all listed companies establish a nomination and a 
remuneration committee, and that these should be mostly INEDs. 
In Libya, the LCGC (2007) recommends that nomination and remuneration 
committee members should be selected by the BOD, though it is up to the general 
assembly to issue rules and criteria for choosing these candidates, and to determine 
how long they should serve and how the committee should operate. The LCGC 
identifies the duties and responsibilities of the nomination and remuneration 
committees as being: to annually review the skills required of board members, 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the board and improving it in line with the 
company‟s interests; to check the structure of the board and prepare a set of 
recommendations thereon; to advise the board regarding prospective candidates‟ 
suitability for board membership, in accordance with approved policies and standards; 
to monitor the independence of board members each year and detect any conflicts of 
interest; and to set clear policies for the compensation and remuneration of directors 
and senior executives. Again, in the absence of any definitive evidence that Libyan 
listed companies are practically committed to this requirement, this was investigated 
in this research.  
3.7.2 Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism     
Disclosure and transparency are the twin pillars of CG (Doski, 2015). As there is 
widespread support for the view that effective measures for ensuring disclosure and 
transparency are central to achieving control of the company‟s activities (Solomon, 
2013), their importance is stressed in numerous CG codes and reports (Al-Sawalqa, 
2014).  
The issue of disclosure has received an increasing amount of interest from 
researchers, some of whom have provided their own definitions. Oliver (2004), for 
instance, defines disclosure as offering information in advance (as opposed to 
permitting users to obtain information after the fact, which is how he defines 
transparency). Bushman et al., (2004), meanwhile, define disclosure as “firms making 
87 
available specific information to people outside publicly-traded firms” (p.207). 
Abdullah et al., (2015) also difine disclosure is the “minimum information which 
promulgated regulation requires from a reporting entity” (p.330). The OECD 
Principles (2004) call for the full and timely disclosure of all relevant information to 
shareholders, including information relating to the company‟s financial position, 
performance and supervision arrangements. Nam & Nam (2004) highlight two key 
reasons why this is critical: shareholders need access to this information to protect 
their own interests and rights; and it is central to preventing managers from making 
suboptimal decisions and majority shareholders from engaging in activities that 
adversely affect minority shareholders. Focusing particularly on the disclosure of 
financial information, Archambault & Archambault (2003) describe this as a complex 
process influenced by a range of financial, economic, cultural and political factors. In 
the case of Libya, for example, the failure of commercial banks to comply with even 
compulsory disclosure requirements between 2000 and 2006 (Kribat et al., 2013) was 
largely due to the absence of accounting standards, which permitted organisations 
even in the same sector to implement accounting principles, methods, rules and 
measures in different ways (Ahmad & Gao, 2004). 
Enhanced disclosure leads to enhanced transparency – one of the most important 
goals of CG reform all over the world (Solomon, 2013). The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2006) sets out the relationship between disclosure, transparency 
and effective CG thus:  
“It is difficult for shareholders, other stakeholders and market participants to 
effectively monitor and properly hold accountable the board of directors and 
senior management when there is a lack of transparency. This happens in 
situations where the shareholders, other stakeholders and market participants 
do not receive sufficient information on the ownership structure and objectives 
of the bank with which to judge the effectiveness of the board and senior 
management in governing the bank” (p.15).  
In other words, disclosure and transparency are interrelated, and both are crucial to 
achieving effective CG (Jhunjhunwala & Sharvani, 2011). Improving the levels of 
disclosure and transparency is also likely to help reduce agency costs as the company 
allows information about its activities and financial position to flow to shareholders, 
reducing the level of information asymmetry between investors (both existing and 
potential) and directors (Solomon, 2013; Mugaloglu & Erdag, 2013).  
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The desire to increase the level of corporate transparency has been a major driver of 
initiatives to reform CG practice (Shiri et al., 2016). The UK Combined Code (2003), 
for example, recommends that transparency be enhanced by making the chairmen of 
the BOD, audit, remuneration and nomination committees available to answer 
questions at the GAM. The link between transparency and CG is also a recurring 
theme among researchers; Summers & Nowicki (2006) define transparency as a set of 
actions that together establish reliable CG, while Khiari & Karaa (2013) describe it as 
one of the best proofs of good CG because it guarantees the disclosure of both 
financial and non-financial information (Bhasin, 2009). Discussion of transparency 
generally tends to concentrate on the extent to which the offered disclosure is in line 
with users‟ requirements and whether it is compulsory or voluntary (Ho et al., 2012). 
Bushman et al., (2004) approach the concept by identifying two main dimensions of 
transparency: financial and governance. The first they define as “a relative measure of 
the availability of financial information to those outside the firm due to the disclosure, 
interpretation, and dissemination of financial information by firms, financial analysts, 
and media reporters” (Bushman et al., 2004, p.219), while the second they define as 
“a relative measure of the availability of information for outside investors to hold 
officers and directors accountable” (ibid).  
Libya‟s corporate legislation addresses the requirement for accounting disclosure in 
Article (572) of the LCL (1972), which states that the managers of joint-stock 
companies must prepare lists of income, a balance sheet and a report on the 
company‟s activities each financial year. Disclosure and transparency are also at the 
heart of Act No. (11/2010), which covers the duties and jurisdiction of the General 
Board of the LSM. Article (4) of the act stipulates that the board is responsible for 
ensuring the disclosure of all information necessary to investors and relevant to the 
issuing of negotiable instruments, while Article (3) describes its objectives as being to 
guarantee the fairness, effectiveness and transparency of transactions in the LSM. 
Pursuant to this objective, Article (7) specifies that the board‟s duties include setting 
regulations and conditions governing disclosure by companies operating in the field 
of securities. These companies are obliged to disclose any information that could 
affect their activities or financial position, including information regarding any 
changes the board believes may affect the value of securities. Finally, the LCGC 
(2007) stipulates that Libyan listed companies must disclose what has and what has 
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not been applied in respect of the CG rules. Provision therefore exists within the law, 
but there is no definitive evidence regarding the level of disclosure and transparency 
prevailing within Libyan listed companies in practice. Accordingly, this issue was 
investigated in this research.  
3.7.3 Internal and External Audit Mechanisms    
Both the internal and external audit mechanisms play an important role in enhancing 
the quality of CG systems (Abdulsaleh, 2014a). They are both fundamental to the 
formation of an effective CG structure, as is the interaction between the two (Daykin, 
2006; Alzebana & Sawan, 2015); Gil et al., (2012) conclude that in banks with good 
CG, there is strong cooperation between the two functions.  
Corporate scandals over the last decade have underlined the importance of the internal 
audit function (Eulerich et al., 2017), which is defined by Kasim (2015, p.91) as  
“an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add 
value and improve an organisation‟s operations. It helps an organisation 
accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the risk management, control, and 
governance processes”.  
Al-Matari et al., (2014) see the internal audit mechanism as contributing significantly 
to the company‟s ability to achieve its objectives, while Hutchinson & Zain (2009) 
argue that it is the main mechanism strengthening the company‟s management and 
supporting the audit committee. The internal audit function is in turn supported by this 
committee (Ahmad et al., 2009), part of whose job is to test the design and 
implementation of the company‟s internal control system and the credibility and 
fairness of its financial reports. The relationship between the internal audit function 
and the audit committee is important to both sides; one of the key responsibilities of 
the audit committee is to support the independence of the internal auditors so that they 
can carry out their duties properly, while the committee relies on the information 
provided to it by internal auditors to perform its oversight role (Al-Baidhani, 2015).  
Empirical studies of the internal audit function in MENA countries include those by 
Oussii & Takatak (2015), who reveal that in Tunisian listed companies, internal 
auditors focus only on financial auditing and internal control systems and are subject 
to restrictions that weaken their independence and limit the scope of their 
intervention, and Ebaid (2011), who shows that while most Egyptian listed companies 
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have an internal audit department, they tend to lack independence, qualified staff and 
management support. Like Oussii & Takatak, Ebaid notes that the role of the internal 
audit is generally limited to the financial audit, even though its formal duties 
theoretically extend to cover administrative and technical auditing. Finally, he 
concludes that the interaction between internal and external auditors remains weak. 
These findings suggest that the internal audit function within Egyptian listed 
companies still faces several challenges that impact negatively on its effectiveness in 
terms of CG. 
The external audit function is designed to strengthen investor confidence by making 
the company‟s financial disclosure more reliable and increasing transparency (Sikka, 
2009; Suwaidan & Qasim, 2010; Khalid et al., 2016). Hired by shareholders on a 
yearly basis, external auditors are responsible for producing an independent and 
impartial evaluation of the firm‟s processes and systems, including the annual 
financial statement detailing operational outcomes and its financial position (Alabede, 
2012). This assessment is then submitted to the shareholders (Al-Thuneibal et al., 
2011). The external auditor‟s role in maintaining good CG is broadly acknowledged 
(Alabede, 2012); most CG codes stipulate that one or more external auditors should 
be chosen to monitor the company‟s processes and whether or not they are in 
compliance with international accounting standards (Abdulsamad et al., 2018). As a 
consequence, external auditors are more highly regarded in the framework of CG than 
internal auditors.  
The LCGC (2007) stipulates that: (i) Libyan listed companies must have an effective 
internal control system; (ii) internal auditors should provide a quarterly report to the 
BOD and the audit committee describing the extent of the company‟s compliance 
with the laws and rules that regulate its activities; and (iii) the BOD should determine 
the objectives, functions and terms of reference of the internal audit in Libyan listed 
companies. With regard to the external audit, the LCGC 2007 states that Libyan listed 
companies should choose an external auditor registered in the LSM to review their 
financial statements. It stipulates that the external auditor‟s main duty should be to 
express an impartial opinion on the accuracy of the financial statement as a reflection 
of the company‟s financial position and results. The LBL (2005), meanwhile, requires 
each bank to “assign the audit of its accounts annually to two different external 
auditors”. However, there is no definitive evidence that Libyan listed companies are 
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practically committed to these requirements. Accordingly, this was investigated in this 
research.  
3.7.4 Shareholder Rights Mechanism     
Shareholders‟ rights are usually stipulated in company laws and regulations, and 
protecting these rights is considered the essence of good CG practice. The importance 
of protecting shareholder rights is highlighted in many CG codes and principles, 
including those issued by the OECD (2004) (Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011). 
Implementing procedures to protect the rights of shareholders directly increases 
confidence in the company (Klapper & Love, 2004). These procedures include 
maintaining clear records of ownership and share trading, giving shareholders regular 
and timely information about the company‟s activities, and allowing them to 
participate in GAMs and to elect and remove from office members of the BOD. 
Finally, they should be given warranties of dividend distribution (Zattoni & Judge, 
2012).  
The OECD‟s second principle (2004) states that CG should guarantee equal treatment 
for all shareholders, including minority shareholders and foreign subscribers, and that 
companies should set in place a system and procedures to ensure that shareholders 
have the same voting rights whether they are inside or outside the country where the 
company is located. All shareholders should be allowed the opportunity to obtain 
adequate compensation if their rights are violated, with a system in place that 
guarantees their right to take legal and administrative action against the BOD and the 
executive administration of the company (Solomon, 2013). Murphy & Topyan (2005) 
point to the particular importance of protecting the rights of minority shareholders, 
who may be less active within the company than majority shareholders. Chhaochharia 
& Laeven (2009) argue that a company‟s ability to offer this protection is enhanced 
by adopting good CG, while La Porta et al., (1999) look at this relationship from the 
opposite direction, suggesting that the protection of  minority shareholders‟ rights is a 
prerequisite to achieve good CG, given that “corporate governance is, to a large 
extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation by insiders” (p.4).  
A number of researchers have highlighted the issues associated with protecting 
shareholder rights in developing countries in particular. Al-Haddad et al., (2011) 
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describe this as the key problem facing corporations in these countries, while 
Ahunwan (2002) and Al-Gharaibeh et al., (2013) observe that conflicts between 
managers and shareholders are common, often exacerbated by poorly-functioning 
capital markets, information asymmetry and a lack of infrastructure. Additional 
problems arise because majority shareholders often seek to take control; as La Porta et 
al., (1999) point out, this creates agency problems not only between corporate 
managers and their shareholders, but also between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
In Libya, shareholders‟ rights in joint-stock companies listed in the LSM are protected 
by legislation such as the LCGC (2007) and Act No. (23/2010), which contain a range 
of articles addressing the same concerns as are addressed in the OECD Principles. 
Article (155), for example, refers to shareholders‟ rights to attend GAMs, vote and 
access information about the company‟s activities. Article (235) refers to the 
distribution of dividends to shareholders and share disposal rights. Again, however, 
there is no definitive evidence regarding whether these rights are protected in practice 
within Libyan listed companies. Accordingly, this issue was investigated in this 
research. 
3.8 Corporate Governance Practices in Emerging Markets 
The markets of developing countries which have grown in recent times are referred to 
here as emerging markets. Most are struggling with enormous informational deficits 
and they differ significantly from their US and UK counterparts in terms of 
accounting transparency, corruption, liquidity, taxes, volatility, governance, and 
transaction costs (Bruner et al., 2002). As Allen (2005) points out, most CG literature 
emphasises that firms must prioritise shareholders‟ interests, but this is much more 
difficult in emerging, as yet unperfected markets. Although most have institutions and 
legal systems in place to protect shareholders‟ interests, these are not yet sufficient to 
materially influence how companies are run. 
Weak CG has been identified as the most important underlying cause of economic 
crises in emerging markets. Singh & Zammit (2006), for example, cite “(i) poor CG, 
(ii) poor state of competition and (iii) the close relationship among government, 
business and banks, which leads to crony capitalism” as the major flaws within Asian 
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business practice. Oman et al., (2003, p.7) offer one explanation for the comparative 
lack of interest that has been shown in CG in developing countries: 
“In developing countries, the widespread preponderance of smaller firms that 
do not have listed shares and of large family-owned, state-owned and/or 
foreign-owned companies whose shares are also not widely traded locally is 
thus an important reason why the potential importance of corporate 
governance was long ignored”. 
However, Claessens & Yurtoglu (2012) argue that it is in the interests of emerging 
markets to promote good CG because it helps corporations access finance, reduce 
capital costs and improve both performance (in terms of returns on equity and general 
efficiency) and their treatment of stakeholders.  
3.8.1 CG Practices in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Countries 
The MENA region consists of Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, 
Oman, Lebanon, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and Syria (Piesse et al., 2012). These countries, which 
together account for approximately 4% of the global population, are broadly similar 
in terms of religion, culture and traditions, but are at different stages of economic 
growth, mainly due to the distribution of natural resources. The average annual 
income differs from country to country, but collectively, they produced a GDP of 
almost $2 trillion in 2009, or around 2% of the global total (Piesse et al., 2012). In 
terms of their approach to CG, a number of studies have indicated that countries in 
the region are increasingly adopting new or updating existing CG codes and 
regulations, and that more firms are seeking to improve their CG practice.  
One of the main studies considering CG in Algeria was conducted by Brahim & 
Nourredine (2017), who employed a questionnaire survey to investigate the state of 
CG in four joint-stock companies in the Chlef region. They found that the CG 
concept was not as widely understood or practised as it should be, which they 
attributed to the dominance of the family ownership model (which also creates 
succession problems), poor relationships between the key actors, and a legal and 
organisational environment that does not encourage CG. 
In their examination of CG practices in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Piesse et al., (2012) 
also employed a questionnaire survey to gather basic company information, this time 
followed by semi-structured interviews with senior managers. Their results revealed 
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that in both countries, the main corporate observers were foreign investors, the state 
and family shareholders. Ownership was less concentrated in Saudi Arabia than in 
Egypt, especially in family companies. The authors recommend that CG practices in 
other MENA countries should be examined closely in order to evaluate whether the 
results for Saudi Arabia and Egypt are applicable elsewhere. 
Mubarak (2012) also investigated CG in Egypt, comparing it with the situation in 
UAE. Drawing on annual reports and other documentary evidence, he compared 
listed companies from the two countries in terms of their level of compliance with the 
CG code, finding that Egyptian listed companies exhibited a lower level of 
compliance than their UAE counterparts. His results revealed that ownership had no 
major influence on compliance in either country. 
Again concentrating on Egypt, Fawzy (2003) evaluated the extent to which the 
country‟s CG standards, laws and rules are in line with the OECD‟s five principles. 
He found that Egyptian firms were still far from implementing the CG principles 
correctly. The five key principles were also at the heart of Shanikat & Abbadi‟s 
(2011) Jordan-based study. This sought to assess actual CG practice in the Jordan 
Stock Exchange in terms of the JSE‟s own framework and the five key principles. 
Drawing on interviews with key staff members in listed companies and its annual 
reports, the authors concluded that: (i) transparency and disclosure were seen as 
significant, though the quality of this disclosure was seen as more important than the 
quantity; (ii) boards were fulfilling their responsibilities because these are clearly 
defined in regulations and law.  
One of the main studies to consider CG in Tunisia was by Taktak & Triki (2012), 
who investigated the CG characteristics of Tunisian listed banks in an attempt to 
reveal how internal CG mechanisms influenced their effectiveness during the period 
2002-2009. The authors found that effectiveness was influenced by board size and 
structure and by the ownership structure. They also found that Tunisian public banks 
were less efficient than private banks. El-Mehdi (2007) also identified a significant 
relationship between CG and performance in listed companies in Tunisia. This author 
argues that firms should be looking for ways to strengthen CG to enhance 
performance, though he acknowledges the inhibiting effect of Tunisia‟s tradition of 
concentrated ownership and the limited legal/regulatory guidance available. 
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In Lebanon, when Saidi (2004) assessed management practice against the OECD 
principles, he found that Lebanese managers did not trust the legal system to protect 
their contractual rights, and that laws and procedures were being interpreted and 
applied inconsistently. Moreover, the results revealed that senior managers wasted 
10% of their time dealing with regulatory issues. The author concludes that CG is an 
integral part of public governance and that it must address malpractice and 
corruption. He points to the need for a self-governing body to monitor the 
implementation of CG within the Lebanese Stock Exchange. 
In Oman, the economy experienced a massive jolt when the Muscat Stock Exchange 
began trading in 1998, forcing it to revise its laws. The Muscat Securities Market was 
restructured to become three independent bodies: the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA), the Muscat Securities Market and the Muscat Depository and Securities 
Registration. Oman became the first Arab country to separate its legislative and 
regulatory framework (Al-Flaiti, 2010). According to Solomon (2013), the CMA 
produced the country‟s very first CG code in 2003. Al-Busaidi (2005, cited in 
Solomon, 2010) argues that Omani listed companies demonstrate a reasonable degree 
of compliance with this code.  
One of the core studies to have considered CG in Saudi Arabia was conducted by 
Falgi (2009), who investigated CG and accountability practices, the CG framework 
and the effect of economic, social and cultural factors on CG in the country. The 
study employed a combination of semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
survey. It found that CG is still in an embryonic state in Saudi Arabia, with a lack of 
accountability, a weak legal framework and little protection for shareholders. Those 
wanting to see the widespread adoption of CG practices face the additional challenge 
that BODs in the country are often controlled by major shareholders.  
Another Saudi-based study was that by Al-matari et al., (2012), who sought to 
examine the impact of board composition and size and audit committee size, 
independence and activities on listed company performance. Like Falgi, they found 
CG practice in Saudi Arabia to be at an early stage of development, and they too 
identified lack of accountability and weaknesses in the legal framework as key 
hurdles to the proper application of CG. Audit committees play an active role in CG, 
but these authors found audit committees in Saudi firms to be generally ineffective 
and lacking in qualified and independent members. 
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In another investigation of the relationship between CG mechanisms and performance 
in Saudi listed companies, Al-Faryan (2017) found a significant negative association 
between performance and the independent board member and CEO turnover 
variables. He attributed this to tok td eseo   odotned e td eue d  wee. However, as the 
negative value of independent board directors was very close to zero and the level of 
significance was only 10%, the finding should perhaps be treated with some caution.  
Finally, the Union of Arab Banks (2007) conducted a survey among key senior 
personnel in 67 banks across Oman, UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen and Qatar to assess 
the level of CG compliance in these banks as compared to international best practice.  
The results indicated that in most of the banks, shareholders enjoyed the right of 
access to secure methods of ownership registration, the ability to transfer shares, 
timely access to relevant information, the right to participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings, the authority to elect and dismiss board members and the right 
to share profits. However, the survey found that more policies were needed to 
safeguard the rights of minority shareholders. Most of the banks offered a high level 
of disclosure of material information and financial transparency, in line with 
international standards, and most had written policies regarding their code of ethics 
and CG systems. The study concludes by suggesting that greater emphasis needs to 
be placed on designing and implementing training programmes for employees on CG 
requirements and internal controls. 
3.8.2 Corporate Governance (CG) in Libya 
As a newly emerging market, Libya has so far been paid relatively little attention by 
CG researchers. This subsection highlights the findings of the few studies that have 
addressed CG practices in the Libyan environment. 
Arguably the most important of these was that conducted by Larbsh (2010), who 
sought to gain an initial understanding of CG practice in developing economies, with 
a particular focus on Libya. Data were gathered by means of 453 questionnaires 
distributed to six groups of stakeholders and ten semi-structured interviews with 
policy makers. The results of the study suggested that Libya lags far behind its 
neighbours and that its CG framework is less developed. The survey participants were 
of the view that the stakeholder model of CG is more acceptable in the context of 
Libya, and that BODs must act more responsibly and on behalf of stakeholders. The 
results also suggested that a firm‟s CG framework is shaped by both internal (the 
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influence of board members) and external (the legal system and the level of economic 
development) factors.  
The other major study was conducted by Zagoub (2011), who focused on CG practice 
in Libyan commercial banks. This study investigated the perceptions of different 
stakeholder groups regarding CG practices in these banks with the aim of 
understanding how these practices have been shaped by institutional pressures and 
whether they are broadly similar or differ from bank to bank. To this end, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders in 2009, following 
which a questionnaire survey was used to examine CG practices in three different 
banks (one state-owned, one private-owned and one part-foreign-owned). The 
questionnaire survey, which was distributed to various stakeholder groups in 2010, 
sought to investigate whether the ownership structure or any other factors influenced 
CG practices in these three banks.  
The study found that Libyan commercial banks were then still in the early stages of 
adopting CG. The CBL had only issued its LCGC in 2005 and the guidelines were 
still voluntary, with the result that the principles were being ignored by many banks, 
and there were numerous examples of poor practice. The results showed that various 
institutional pressures were shaping CG practice and reforms, including the 
requirements of the Libyan Bank Law and the CBL, but that these pressures were 
targeted only on board composition. The influence of these institutional pressures on 
CG practice therefore depended to some extent on the ownership structure of the 
bank. Overall, the study concluded that the CBL urgently needed to put greater effort 
into encouraging Libyan commercial banks to adopt good CG practices. This call 
appears to have been heard by the CBL, which updated and replaced the LCGC in 
2010 before making it mandatory in 2011. 
The preceding sections highlight that as CG has become a main requirement for 
businesses in all countries – both developed and developing – awareness of its 
importance has grown across the MENA region. In general, the literature argues that 
there is an urgent need to investigate CG mechanisms and practice in these countries. 
Numerous studies have concluded that CG practices and structures are affected by 
factors unique to each country, and that this might explain the differences in national 
frameworks. This offers a theoretical justification for the assumption that CG in 
Libya is a unique and distinct process and has its own governance framework. 
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Crucially, the few studies that have highlighted CG in the Libyan environment were 
conducted prior to the Libyan revolution of 17 February 2011. The revolution marked 
a new chapter in Libya‟s economic and political history, and since then there have 
been dramatic changes, including the establishment of the LSMA. To the best of the 
researcher‟s knowledge, the current research is the first of its kind to focus on CG and 
accountability practices in Libyan companies listed in the LSM. In exploring these 
practices, it addresses a gap in the accounting literature and adds to our limited 
understanding of Libyan stakeholders‟ perceptions of CG. 
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3.9 Summary 
This chapter started by presenting the most common definitions of CG before going 
on to discuss the main theories associated with its evolution. It paid particular 
attention to stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory as these are the guiding 
theoretical perspectives in this study. A brief discussion was then offered of the 
development of the CG concept, followed by an explanation of the insider-oriented 
and outsider-oriented systems and the economic and legal importance of CG. The 
main CG mechanisms were then discussed at length in a series of sub-sections 
focusing on the BOD and its various sub-committees, disclosure and transparency, the 
internal and external audit functions and shareholders‟ rights. The chapter ended by 
considering the literature that has been produced so far on CG practices in the 
emerging markets of Libya and other MENA countries.  
Turning to the theoretical basis of the research, the next chapter offers a detailed 
discussion of accountability practices.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of accountability has been known to humans since ancient times (Gray & 
Jenkins, 1993). It is the subject of sometimes contentious debate in all corners of the 
world where people enter into business and social relationships (Gray et al., 2014). In 
the business world, these relationships, and the issue of accountability, have been 
complicated by the separation of ownership and management. Some researchers into 
accountability have responded by adopting agency theory to clarify the relationship 
between owner and manager and to resolve the resulting conflicts of interest (Brennan 
& Solomon, 2008; Gray & Jenkins, 1993). Others, however, have employed 
alternative theoretical frameworks to extend the scope of corporate accountability to 
encompass a broader range of stakeholder groups (Parker, 2007).  
Sinclair (1995, p.219) asserts that: “Nobody argues with the need for accountability”, 
and numerous theories have highlighted its importance – indeed, the growing 
emphasis being placed on CG has been largely driven by widespread concerns about 
the accountability of agents towards owners and other stakeholders. Despite this, 
however, there is no real consensus on how the concept should be practised or even 
defined. Accountability practices may be influenced by the surrounding environment 
(Alshehri, 2012), but  despite being the focus of a wide range of studies, there has 
been relatively little research on how the concept of accountability is understood and 
practised from different perspectives (Brennan & Solomon, 2008).  
This chapter addresses the theoretical framework of accountability. Section 4.2 
begins by presenting the most common definitions of accountability, while section 
4.3 highlights the objectives of accountability in the private and public sectors. 
Section 4.4 presents a generalised model of the formal relationship of accountability. 
This is followed by section 4.5, which focuses on codes of accountability, after which 
section 4.6 discusses at length the structure of accountability in Libya. Finally, 
section 4.7 provides a brief summary of the chapter. 
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4.2 Definitions of Accountability 
Researchers have offered numerous definitions of accountability over the years 
(Shaoul et al., 2012). Sinclair (1995, p.221) argues that: “How we define 
accountability is dependent on the ideologies, motifs and language of our times”. The 
term has had different meanings for different parties in different contexts, but most 
definitions express one of three main perspectives. The first of these takes a broad 
view of the concept of accountability. Knell (2006, p.32), for example, defines 
accountability as “the requirement of those in authority, and exercising responsibility, 
to justify and explain their actions to those on whose behalf they act”. An alternative 
definition is offered by Gray & Jenkins (1993, p.55), who see it as “an obligation to 
present an account of and answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who 
entrusted those responsibilities”. These authors go on to explain that:  
“At the heart of this relationship is stewardship. Stewardship involves two 
manifest parties: first, the steward or accountor i.e. the party to whom the 
responsibilities are entrusted and who is obliged to present and answer to an 
account of its execution, and, second, the principal, or accountee i.e. the party 
entrusting the responsibility and to whom account is presented. Stewardship is 
thus established when a steward accepts resources and responsibilities 
entrusted by a principal” (ibid). 
In general terms, the accountee delegates specific tasks to the accountor, who is then 
responsible for carrying out these tasks and reporting back on their performance. This 
accountability relationship is replicated at different levels throughout the organisation, 
between owners and directors, owners and managers, and between managers and 
other employees. The accountee/accountor roles may also overlap, with groups or 
individuals playing both roles simultaneously. In the accountability relationship 
between managers and employees, for example, managers are both accountors (they 
are accountable to employees for providing them with an appropriate working 
environment) and accountees (employees are accountable to their managers for their 
work performance) (Gray et al., 1996).   
The above definitions agree that the general concept of accountability demands that 
the accountor is under an obligation to provide an account of their actions to 
interested groups (Perks, 1993). In the business environment, this account must clarify 
and justify the actions that have been carried out, taking into account the interests of 
shareholders and other relevant stakeholders (Messner, 2009). The presentation of 
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information to accountees is thus a key element within many of the definitions of 
accountability. Cramer & Sorter (1974), for example, explain that the accountor is 
responsible for reporting their actions to other concerned parties according to the 
terms set by the law, contract and custom, while Kaler (2002, p.328) defines 
accountability explicitly as  
“the providing of answers, as reporting or, more obviously, „giving an 
account‟. In terms of the corporate or business context … this is a way of 
understanding accountability that connects it to financial auditing and 
reporting as well as to accountability in general”.  
According to Perks (1993) the concept of accountability should be concerned with the 
following questions: Who is accountable? To whom? How does the process work? To 
what end? 
The second group of definitions adopts a narrower perspective of accountability. In 
the business environment, these definitions tend to focus on the principal-agent 
relationship; the agent is expected to account for their stewardship of the resources 
entrusted to them by the principal, with the information they submit being used to 
assess whether their actions are in line with the principal‟s interests. This focus on the 
relationship between shareholder (principal) and management (agent) (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Vinten, 2001) has accompanied the rise of agency theory. The 
Cadbury Report (1992, p.47) describes the principal-agent accountability relationship 
thus: 
“The formal relationship between the shareholders and the board of directors 
is that the shareholders elect the directors, the directors report on their 
stewardship to the shareholders and the shareholders appoint the auditors to 
provide an external check on directors‟ financial statements. Thus, the 
shareholders as owners of the company elect the directors to run the business 
on their behalf and hold them accountable for its progress. The issue for 
corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of 
directors to shareholders”.  
However, as corporate activities have become ever more complex and far-reaching, a 
third group of definitions has emerged. In this perspective, accountability is 
envisioned in the broadest possible terms – as a responsibility that extends beyond the 
company‟s immediate stakeholders to society as a whole, and as encompassing not 
just economic but also social and environmental performance (Pallot, 1991). As 
Sinclair (1995, p.223) asserts: “Accountability goes beyond the idea of holding to 
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account: the management of accountability is associated with an understanding of 
language and ideology, values and ethics, emotions and motivation”. 
To sum up, definitions of accountability have so far focused on the delegation of 
responsibility to managers or directors (agents) by owners (principals). They reveal 
that: (i) agents are seen as having a responsibility to perform certain acts and to give 
an account of these acts; (ii) there is a close relationship between accountability and 
responsibility (the concept of accountability has been established for the purpose of 
ensuring responsibility); (iii) there is a clear focus on the circulation of information as 
a link between all involved parties; and (iv) the content of this information depends 
on the nature of the accountability relationship.  
4.3 Accountability Objectives in the Private and Public Sectors 
Mulgan (2000) argues that the private sector pays greater attention to accountability 
than the public sector because its primary goal is to maximise shareholders‟ wealth. 
In private sector firms, the duty of accountability is mainly discharged in the financial 
reports, which allow users to evaluate “whether profit reporting is reliable and 
accurate, and whether it is useful for the purpose of investors‟ decision making so that 
resources are allocated to the most deserving companies” (Dev, 1982, p.129). The 
key objectives of accountability in private sector firms are as follows: 
 To assure the company‟s shareholders, managers, employees, consumers and 
creditors, along with society and other relevant stakeholders, that internal and 
external control systems are in place to protect their interests (Benston, 1982). 
 To monitor and control the company‟s managers; it offers a mechanism for 
measuring and evaluating their performance based on their achieved outcomes 
(Keasey & Wright, 1993).  
 To mitigate and respond to risk (Cadbury, 1992). 
 To influence the behaviour of those within the organisation; being held 
accountable for their actions can shape individuals‟ views of what is important, 
what to do and what not to do (Burchell et al., 1980; Gallhofer & Haslam, 1993). 
 To strengthen the relationships between managers (accountors) and their 
stakeholders (accountees) and to influence the future development of these 
relationships (Roberts & Scapens, 1985). 
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The picture is different in public sector organisations, firstly, because levels of 
accountability are generally inadequate and secondly, because the focus of this 
accountability tends to vary depending on the nature and function of the organisation. 
For example, an organisation may choose to prioritise the pursuit of commercial 
accountability, administrative accountability or public/political accountability. Those 
pursuing commercial accountability do so for much the same reasons and in much the 
same way as private sector firms. Administrative accountability is broadly similar to 
commercial accountability in terms of its key characteristics, though the objectives of 
administrative accountability differ between commercial institutions (e.g. state-owned 
companies that are designed to operate on a for-profit basis) and institutions designed 
to run as non-profits. Finally, public or political accountability is typically linked to 
government-voter relationships; the objective of organisations pursuing this kind of 
accountability is to ensure that elected officials are properly discharging their 
responsibilities on behalf of voters. Since officials who are exposed as failing in this 
regard may then be voted out of office, it is fair to say that public accountability also 
serves as a monitoring mechanism. In contrast to commercial and administrative 
accountability, which are well-defined, public accountability is broader in nature and 
process; it may even extend to appointed (as opposed to elected) government officials 
if the electorate decides to hold the government to account for these officials‟ actions 
(Stewart, 1984). 
Numerous authors have offered a range of reasons why organisations should aim for 
accountability (e.g. (Benston, 1982; Laughlin, 1996). Benston (1982), for example, 
points to the reputational gain, explaining that if companies want the support of the 
community in which they operate, they must accept that they are accountable to this 
community for the results of their actions and acknowledge its right to know how well 
they are adhering to laws and regulations. He then goes on to cite the economic 
benefits of accountability, explaining that accountability mechanisms such as the 
external audit enhance fairness and transparency by making important information 
available to the relevant parties and to the public at large. (Laughlin, 1996), 
meanwhile, offers another economic reason for pursuing accountability with his 
observation that it minimises the risk of the principal‟s resources being diverted by 
the agent.   
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Berry et al., (2000) explain that organisations may also embrace the principle of 
accountability as a way of signalling their conformity to local social or cultural norms, 
though as these norms vary between (or even within) cultures, so too may the nature 
of this accountability. The same authors also identify legal and political reasons why 
organisations pursue accountability, citing specifically power relationships and self-
interest. Finally, organisations may pursue accountability for professional reasons: so 
that they can be seen to be adhering to the standards and ethics established within 
their sector or field. These standards may have been developed internally or imported 
from other institutions or states. 
4.4 A Generalised Model of the Formal Relationship of Accountability 
The various definitions of accountability discussed in section 4.2 suggest that the 
accountability relationship exists between two main parties – the accountee 
(principal/owner) or their representative and the accountor (agent) – and that these 
two are linked by a contract which imposes specific responsibilities on the accountor 
(agent). From this basis, researchers have formulated a generalised model of the 
formal relationship of accountability (e.g. Gray et al., 2014). Laughlin (1996) 
supports the general applicability of the model, arguing that the relationship it depicts 
may be the most common in the formal business environment, while Gray et al., 
(2014) argue that the model, although simplified, can be developed to explore more 
complex situations and to identify all relevant relationships and rights to information 
within the accountability paradigm.  
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Figure 4.1 Generalised Model of the Accountability Relationships  
 
Source: Adapted from Gray et al., (2014) 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the model assumes a simplified two-way relationship 
between accountees (principals), who might be the company‟s shareholders, and 
accountors (agents), who might be its directors. The principals provide resources, 
usually on the basis of an implicit or explicit contract, and the agents are responsible 
for managing these resources and providing the required information about their 
actions. The contract allows the principals to manage their relationship with the 
agents and to control their actions by means of rewards and sanctions. Since the 
provisions of the contract will be based on the relevant local legislation, this means 
the contract will also reflect the prevailing social context. The contract primarily 
provides a legal foundation for the rights of all involved parties, setting out both their 
responsibilities and their rights in regard to information flows (i.e. accountability) 
(Gray et al., 2014). It is therefore of central importance within the accountability 
model.  
As can be seen from Figure 4.1, the accountee (principal) demands certain actions 
from the accountor (agent), followed by information detailing how these actions have 
been carried out. There is thus a supply and demand relationship between the two 
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sides, with the accountee (principal) supplying resources and then demanding 
information from the accountor (agent) in return. There may, however, be occasions 
where the information flow is reversed, with the accountor (agent) demanding 
specific information from the accountee (principal).    
4.5 Accountability Codes 
The formal accountability relationship between accountee (principal) and accountor 
(agent) requires a third component to ensure it remains constructive and meaningful. 
This third component is an accountability code. Gray & Jenkins (1993, p.138) define 
accountability codes as “the basis on which the relationship is struck and by which it 
is maintained and adjudicated” and “a system of signals, meanings, and customs 
which bind the principal and steward in the establishment, execution and adjudication 
of their relationship” (ibid, p.55). The accountability code governs the three most 
important components of the accountability relationship:   
 The nature of the accountability relationship between the accountee (principal) 
and the accountor (agent); 
 How specific responsibilities are apportioned and implemented; 
 How the implementation account is presented and assessed. 
Various accountability codes have been developed, with the choice of code 
influencing both the process of accountability and its scope. What the principal 
expects from the agent (and by extension, the terms of the accountability relationship) 
also varies from code to code. Laughlin (1990, p.96) explains that these expectations 
are typically “complex and can be either unwritten and implicit, or written and 
explicit”. The written, explicit expectations are clearly defined in the contract. 
According to Gray & Jenkins (1993), accountability codes can be categorised as 
either internal (established to deal with particular relationships) or external. The latter 
are pre-existing codes that have been established for general categories of 
relationship, which are then imported by an organisation for the purpose of governing 
a specific relationship. Internal accountability codes tend to be explicit, while external 
accountability codes tend to be more implicit. 
4.6 The Structure of Accountability in Libya 
Accountability structures exist at each hierarchical level within Libyan organisations; 
generally speaking, low-level managers are accountable to those at the mid-level, 
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who are in turn accountable to senior management. Ultimately, senior managers are 
accountable to a range of parties, including the general assembly, various control and 
supervisory bodies and the Libyan Audit Bureau. The following sub-sections discuss 
the accountability structures that currently exist within the Libyan banking, insurance 
and industrial sectors, and those that apply to external auditors in the country. 
4.6.1 The Banking Sector 
There are currently sixteen commercial banks operating in the Libyan environment. 
These banks have three kinds of ownership structure: state-owned, private and mixed 
ownership. Mixed ownership banks are owned jointly by some combination of the 
Libyan government (the CBL), the private sector (domestic investors) and foreign 
investors. The CBL, which is wholly state-owned, is authorised to control and 
supervise the banking sector as a whole. It is also the majority shareholder in several 
of Libya‟s commercial banks, though these banks are independently operated by their 
executive managements and have their own boards (Terterove, 2002). 
Article (53) of Law No. (1/1993) stipulates that Libya‟s commercial banks must be 
organised as joint-stock firms and administered by a BOD. Directors in commercial 
banks owned by the CBL are appointed by the Council of Ministers, while directors in 
the private banks are appointed by their shareholders, represented by the general 
assembly. Boards in these banks are responsible for managing the bank and are 
authorised to take any actions and make any policies they deem necessary to discharge 
their responsibilities and meet their objectives. The banks report to the Secretary of 
Finance (SF) and the CBL, ensuring their financial and legal accountability. 
Specialised banks were established specifically in order to accelerate economic and 
social development in the Libyan environment by offering medium- and long-term 
loans to the industrial, agricultural and real estate sectors. There are four specialised 
banks in Libya, all of which are fully state-owned. These are the National Agricultural 
Bank, the Development Bank, the Rural Bank and the Real Estate Investment Bank. 
These banks, also called lending institutions, finance specific sectors or certain 
economic activities. Structured along cooperative principles, they do not operate for 
profit, and their activities differ from those of Libyan commercial banks. The 
specialised banks are under the supervision of the CBL‟s control body (ensuring their 
legal accountability) and, as they are all fully state-owned, they are required to present 
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their financial accounts to the relevant regulatory bodies (i.e. the Libyan Audit Bureau 
and the Tax Office), ensuring their financial accountability. An additional layer of 
legal and financial accountability is required of the National Agricultural Bank, which 
is also required to report directly to the Secretary of Agriculture. 
4.6.2 The Insurance Sector 
At present, there are a number of insurance companies (state-owned and private-
owned) operating in Libya. The oldest of these is the Libyan Insurance Company, 
which was established in 1964. As an entirely state-owned company, it is accountable 
to the Secretary of the Economy and the Libyan Audit Bureau, as well as the 
insurance sector‟s own Insurance Company Control Authority.  
Libya‟s economy was largely state-owned until the 1990s, when the government 
embarked on a programme of economic reform. It paid particular attention to the 
banking and insurance sectors, issuing Law No. (102/1994) to allow the creation of 
private companies in these sectors (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). This was followed in 
the early years of the twenty-first century by its decision to partly abandon the 
socialist model and once more endorse the privatisation of economic activity by 
announcing its intention to transfer some state-owned economic activities into the 
private sector. This strategy has had a significant impact on the insurance sector, 
which has witnessed the emergence of a number of Libyan private insurance 
companies, such as the Sahara Insurance Company, the United Insurance Company, 
Libo Insurance Libya, the Trust Insurance Company and the Takaful Cooperative 
Insurance Company. As private enterprises, these companies are accountable to their 
shareholders as well as to the Insurance Company Control Authority. 
4.6.3 The Industrial Sector 
Libyan industrial companies are accountable to a range of governmental authorities 
including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Industry, the Libyan Audit 
Bureau and the Tax Office. Private companies are also accountable to their private 
sector shareholders.  
Libyan companies are financially accountable to the Secretary of the Treasury for the 
financial support allocated to them. They are also legally accountable to the same 
office for adhering to Libya‟s financial, commercial and tax laws. One of the key 
instruments adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury to impose legal accountability is 
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the Tax Office, which requires all Libyan companies to provide an initial tax 
determination on an annual basis. Under the Libyan Income Tax Law (1973), 
companies are obliged to offer the Tax Office their balance sheet, profit and loss 
account and detailed statements of expenses and dividends. The office requires 
companies to present financial statements that have been endorsed by an external 
auditor and to prove that these financial statements have been prepared in compliance 
with Libyan financial and commercial laws, Libyan tax law and standard accounting 
procedures.  
According to Saleh (2001), Libyan companies are also obliged to provide a range of 
managerial, accounting and production information to the Secretary of Industry on 
request. The Secretary has the authority to demand whatever information he wants; 
this may include financial information, which assists the Secretary in providing a clear 
picture of companies‟ financial position, and non-financial information. Companies‟ 
managerial accountability to the Secretary encompasses a range of requirements: it 
involves providing proof of how they have spent their budget (financial 
accountability), whether they have implemented agreed plans (process accountability) 
and whether they have achieved their objectives (programme accountability). 
Information is generally submitted to the Secretary in the form of annual reports, sales 
reports, production reports or the reports compiled for other relevant parties such as 
the Libyan Audit Bureau.  
4.6.4 The Accountability of Libyan External Auditors 
Gay & Simnett (2000) point to the strong relationship between accountability and the 
external auditor, which Flint (1988) echoes in his observation that the external audit 
profession is widely regarded as a monitoring and social mechanism for ensuring 
accountability. Similarly, Gray et al., (1987, p.201) assert that: “The auditing function 
is considered a necessary condition towards the development of accountability”. The 
profession is thus generally seen as the cornerstone of accountability and central to 
supporting the relationships upon which the accountability process depends. Chandler 
et al., (1993) argue that the auditing profession may have emerged as a response to 
agency problems. 
In the Libyan context, external auditors are engaged in accountability relationships 
with several bodies, chiefly the Libyan Audit Bureau, the Libyan Accountants and 
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Auditors‟ Association (LAAA) and the Tax Office, the LSM, as well as with the 
public. The fundamental components of Libyan auditors‟ accountability framework 
are the Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) (1970), the accounting and auditing 
profession‟s own code of conduct, the Income Tax Law (1973) and other relevant 
regulations. Within the LCL (1970), for example, Article (580) stipulates that: “The 
company‟s annual reports should be made available to its shareholders at least fifteen 
days before the general assembly meets, within which these reports are to be 
attested”, while Article (104) of the Libyan Income Tax Law (1973) states that: 
“Companies are required to provide the tax authority with their balance sheet, trading 
account, profit and loss account, depreciation statement, and detailed statements”. The 
legal accountability of auditors is explained in provisions such as Article (143) of the 
LCL (1970), which sets out the auditor‟s responsibility for any harm that results from 
inadequacies in their performance: “Anyone who commits an error which causes 
harm to others shall be liable to pay compensation for damages”. Article (559) of the 
same law gives the injured party the right to sue the external auditor if the latter fails 
in their duties or is found to have falsified information in the audit report.  
The accountability structure that currently exist within the Libyan environment can be 
seen in Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2 Accountability Structure in the Libyan Environment 
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4.7 Summary 
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework of accountability – a concept that 
arises in one form or another in almost all relationships. It began by presenting the 
most common definitions of accountability and highlighting that while these 
definitions may differ in scope, they share a key commonality: that is, they generally 
see accountability in terms of the accountor‟s (agent‟s) obligation to justify and 
explain how they have fulfilled the responsibilities entrusted to them by the accountee 
(principal). 
The chapter went on to discuss the objectives underlying the pursuit of accountability 
in private and public sector organisations before presenting a generalised model of the 
formal relationship of accountability. This was followed by an explanation of 
accountability codes and a discussion of the structure of accountability in the Libyan 
environment. This section, which briefly outlined the accountability structures within 
the banking, insurance and industrial sectors, as well as introducing the main legal 
components underlying the accountability framework governing external auditors, was 
designed to afford the reader an initial insight into current accountability practice in 
Libya.  
This chapter concludes the presentation of the study‟s theoretical framework. The next 
chapter offers a detailed discussion of the research methodology and method. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
5.1 Introduction 
Having reviewed the relevant literature in Chapter 3 and addressed the theoretical 
framework of accountability in Chapter 4, the thesis turns to the methodology that 
was employed in the study. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 discusses 
the research philosophy that guides social science research – specifically, the most 
common assumptions regarding the nature of social science and the nature of society 
– and sets out the philosophical standpoint of this study. Section 5.3 outlines the key 
features of the main research paradigms employed in social research and discusses the 
choice of the pragmatism paradigm for this study, while Section 5.4 describes at 
length the data collection methods that were employed. Section 5.5 discusses the 
combining of quantitative and qualitative findings. Section 5.6 explains how ethical 
considerations were addressed in the research design, after which Section 5.7 provides 
a brief summary of the chapter.  
5.2 Research Philosophy and Methodology 
Collis & Hussey (2009) point out that despite its central importance for both 
academics and business activities, there is still no agreement in the literature on how 
the concept of research should be defined. Saunders et al., (2009, p.5) define research 
as “Something that people undertake in order to find out things in a systematic way, 
thereby increasing their knowledge about the phenomenon under study”.  Central to 
this process, however it is defined, is the question of research philosophy; that is, the 
fundamental assumptions the researcher makes about the nature of knowledge 
(epistemology), the nature of reality (ontology), the nature of the relationship between 
human beings and their environment, and methodology. These assumptions reflect 
how the researcher understands the phenomenon they are investigating, but more than 
this, they will directly impact their choice of research paradigm and methodology 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
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5.2.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
Burrell & Morgan (1979) identify four sets of assumptions about the nature of social 
science, which they label ontology, human nature, epistemology and methodology. 
Within each set they identify two philosophical dimensions: objectivism and 
subjectivism. Realism, positivism, determinism and the nomothetic approach are the 
objective dimensions of ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology 
respectively, while nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism and the ideographic 
approach are their respective subjective counterparts (see Figure 5.1). Careful 
consideration of these assumptions is necessary if the researcher is to select the most 
appropriate research methodology (Ryan et al., 2007). 
Figure 5.1 Assumptions Concerning the Nature of Social Science 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.3) 
5.2.2 The Subjectivism and Objectivism Dimensions 
Bryman (2004, p.16) defines objectivism as  
“an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their 
meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors. It implies 
that social phenomena and the categories that we use in everyday 
discourse have an existence that is independent or separate from actors”.  
In contrast, subjectivism posits that social phenomena and their meanings are not 
independent of but the creation of social actors, and that as the outcomes of social 
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interaction, they are in a constant state of revision (Bryman, 2004). Pointing to the 
existence of free will, subjectivists argue that people have complete freedom to make 
their own decisions and to direct the course of their own lives (May, 2005). 
Maedche (2012, p.11) defines ontology as “a philosophical discipline, a branch of 
philosophy that deals with the nature and the organization of being”. Ontology thus 
addresses the nature of reality, while epistemology is concerned with the pursuit of 
knowledge and what we are supposed to accept as researchers (Hussey & Hussey, 
1997). Put simply, ontology is concerned with “what is”, whereas epistemology 
concentrates on understanding “what it means to know” and “what types of 
knowledge are legitimate and sufficient” (Gray, 2004).  
As explained in Section 5.2.1, the objective dimension of ontology is realism, while 
the subjective dimension is nominalism. The nominalist standpoint assumes that the 
social world is not realistic, and that its structures are nothing more than concepts, 
names and labels that are the products of individuals‟ subjective thoughts and 
awareness (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The realist standpoint, on the other hand, sees 
the social world as composed of tangible and relatively fixed structures that exist 
regardless of how they are perceived or described (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This is 
the standpoint adopted in this research. It assumes that the CG and accountability 
practices which are the focus of this investigation are a fundamental aspect of the 
Libyan business environment, and that this environment is a real world of laws, 
regulations, regulators, companies and individuals, all of which have an independent 
existence. 
Cooper et al., (1999, p.3) observe that:   
“Many people have the impression that epistemology is the most central 
area of philosophy, or even that philosophy should really be identified 
with epistemology. Certainly, there is a popular image of philosophers as 
people obsessively and almost solely concerned with determining whether 
we really know the things we ordinarily think we do”. 
Crotty (1998) defines epistemology as referring “to the theory of knowledge 
embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology”. It aims 
mainly at: (i) understanding the concepts of belief, certainty, memory, doubt, 
justification, proof and knowledge; and (ii) enquiring into the criteria for the 
application of such terms, particularly the criteria for identifying “the scope and 
limits” of human knowledge (Cooper et al., 1999). It is also concerned with 
117 
collecting, explaining and developing this knowledge (Creswell, 1998; Crotty, 1998). 
As in case of ontology, epistemological assumptions vary between the subjective and 
objective dimensions.  
The anti-positivist standpoint is associated with the subjective dimension. Burrell & 
Morgan (1979) explain that this standpoint sees the social world as relative; it 
assumes that phenomena can only be observed and understood through the 
perspectives of those engaging with them. Consequently, researchers sharing this 
view typically rely on observations and interviews to gather data from their 
participants. In contrast, the positivist standpoint, which  is associated with the 
objective dimension, “advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences 
to the study of social reality and beyond” Bryman (2004, p.11). Positivist researchers 
see knowledge as something that exists independently of individual consciousness and 
believe it can only be developed by empirically observing social reality, for example 
through experiments. They seek to understand the social world by developing 
explanations based on predicted regularities and causal relations among its elements 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
The third set of assumptions addresses the nature of the relationship between humans 
and their surrounding environment. Again, there are two standpoints on this 
relationship; voluntarism (associated with the subjective dimension), which posits that  
humans are independent and have free will, and determinism (associated with the 
objective dimension), which considers humans and their experiences as products of 
the environment in which they live (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The voluntarism 
perspective sees individuals as the controllers of their own actions and the 
environment alike (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This extends to the researcher, who is 
able to determine for themselves what they will recognise as facts and what 
interpretations they will draw from them. The researcher may thus have an impact on 
the research process and the phenomenon being investigated (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
In contrast, determinist researchers assume that they are detached from what they are 
researching, though at the same time, they see the environment as having a significant 
influence on them and their activities (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Their main interest is 
in investigating the relationships between the objects they are studying – objects 
which they regard as existing independently of their investigation (Collis & Hussey, 
2009).  
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This study aims to investigate Libyan stakeholders‟ perceptions concerning the 
current practice of CG and accountability within Libyan listed companies. As part of 
the Libyan business environment, these stakeholders are undoubtedly under its 
influence, but not to the extent that they are completely controlled, as determinists 
would argue. At the same time, they are not completely autonomous. Consequently, 
the study adopts a position between the two extremes, on the grounds that this will 
allow consideration of the influence of both situational and voluntary factors (Burrell 
& Morgan, 1979). 
Methodology has been defined as “the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying 
behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of 
these methods to the desired outcomes” (Crotty, 1998, p.3). This design, which guides 
the researcher‟s selection of methods and procedures for the collection and analysis of 
data, is significantly impacted by the other assumptions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Collis & Hussey (2009) argue that the choice of research methodology is to a large 
extent determined by the choice of paradigm. 
The ideographic perspective is associated with a subjective methodological approach. 
In this case, the researcher focuses on a small sample, employing methods such as 
case studies or interviews to obtain multiple perceptions of the phenomenon in an 
effort to understand “what is happening” (Mark Saunders et al., 2009). In contrast, 
researchers adopting the nomothetic perspective use techniques, protocols and 
procedures from the natural sciences (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), usually on a large 
sample, to measure phenomena in quantitative terms in order to test research 
hypotheses (Chua, 1986). This research follows the ideographic approach, using 
interviews to explore what stakeholders within the Libyan business environment 
perceive to be the current status of CG and accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
5.2.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
Lockwood (1956) and Dahrendorf (1959) offered two early and very different 
theorisations of society; while the first focused on the nature of social order and 
equilibrium, the second was more concerned with change, coercion and conflict 
within social structures. This dichotomy was dubbed the order-conflict debate. Table 
5.1 demonstrates the key differences between the two theories of society as described 
by Burrell & Morgan (1979). 
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Table 5.1 Order-Conflict Theories 
The “Order” or “Integrationist” View of 
Society Emphasises: 
The “Conflict” and “Coercion” View of 
Society Emphasises: 
Stability Change 
Integration Conflict 
Functional Co-ordination Disintegration 
Consensus Coercion 
Source: Adapted from Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.13) 
However, some criticised the order-conflict dichotomy as too simplistic; Cohen 
(1968), for example, argued that any theory of society should encompass elements of 
both order and conflict, as the two are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, as 
subjectivist movements (e.g. ethnomethodology, phenomenology and action theory) 
became more significant. This led Burrell & Morgan (1979) to suggest “regulation 
and radical change” as alternative dimensions (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Regulation and Radical Change Dimensions 
The Sociology of REGULATION is 
Interested in: 
The Sociology of RADICAL CHANGE is 
Interested in: 
(a) The Status Quo (b) Radical Change 
(c) Social Order (d) Structural Conflict  
(e) Consensus (f) Modes of Domination 
(g) Social Integration and Cohesion (h) Contradiction 
(i) Solidarity (j) Emancipation 
(k) Need Satisfaction (l) Deprivation 
(m) Actuality (n) Potentiality 
Source: Adapted from Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.18) 
Researchers interested in the sociology of regulation are chiefly concerned with 
providing interpretations of society that stress its fundamental unity and cohesion. 
Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.17) explain that: 
“[Sociology of regulation] is a sociology which is essentially concerned 
with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basic questions which it 
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asks tend to focus upon the need to understand why society is maintained 
as an entity. It attempts to explain why society tends to hold together 
rather than fall apart”. 
The sociology of radical change, on the other hand, is essentially interested in finding 
explanations for radical change, modes of domination, deep-seated structural conflict 
and structural contradiction. Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.17) define it as 
“a sociology which is essentially concerned with man‟s emancipation 
from the structures which limit and stunt his potential for development. 
The basic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of man, both 
material and psychic”. 
5.3 Research Paradigm 
The term “paradigm” has been employed in the field of social science research since 
the 1960s to refer to the set of philosophical beliefs that guide the researcher in their 
endeavours (Corbetta & Patrick, 2003). Saunders et al., (2009, p.118) define a 
research paradigm as “a way of examining social phenomena from which particular 
understandings of these phenomena can be gained and explanations attempted”. In 
more simplistic terms, Bryman & Bell (2007, p.25) define it as “a cluster of beliefs 
that dictates to the researcher what should be studied, how it should be studied and 
how research should be interpreted”.  
Numerous authors have emphasised the importance of choosing the right research 
paradigm. Pansiri (2009) argues that the researcher‟s choice “deeply reflects not only 
the nature and exigencies of the work to be provided but also the researcher‟s view of 
the social world” (p.84), while Corbetta & Patrick (2003) claim that scientific 
research conducted without a specific paradigm lacks either the guidance or the 
criteria to discriminate effectively between issues, techniques and methods. Similarly, 
Bryman (2004) asserts that the choice of paradigm determines the key research tools 
that will be employed, how it should be conducted and how its findings should be 
interpreted. Once chosen,  
“the research paradigm acts as a „set of lenses‟ for the researcher – it 
allows the researcher to view fieldwork within a particular set of 
established assumptions, thus merging the abstract usefulness of the 
paradigm with the practical application of conducting rigorous research” 
(Burke, 2007, p.477).  
It is therefore incumbent upon the researcher to have a clear understanding of the 
available paradigms if they are to determine which is the most appropriate for their 
121 
purposes. This is especially important, argue Easterby-Smith et al., (2002), if the 
researcher needs to create a research design that is outside the scope of their previous 
experience. 
Saunders et al., (2009) identify four key paradigms in social research: positivism, 
interpretivism, realism and pragmatism. Table 5.3 compares these paradigms in terms 
of their ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions and typical 
approaches to data collection. Each of these paradigms looks at the world in a certain 
way, and this dictates how the researcher will approach their research questions, 
hypotheses and data analysis (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Pansiri, 2009).  
 Table 5.3 Comparison of Four Research Philosophies 
 
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al., (2009, p.119) 
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5.3.1 The Positivist Paradigm 
Positivism has been defined as “an epistemological position that advocates the 
application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and 
beyond” (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p.14). This paradigm presumes that the social world 
exists objectively and externally, and that knowledge is valid only if it is based on 
observations of this external reality, which operates according to universal or general 
laws. Positivists seek to develop theoretical models that are generalisable, that can 
explain cause and effect relationships, and that lend themselves to predicting 
outcomes (Mark Saunders et al., 2009). As Henn et al., (2006, p.13) assert:  
“The logic of positivist research design is that: we seek to identify 
processes of cause and effect to explain phenomena, and to test theory; 
knowledge should be based on what can be tested by observation of 
tangible evidence; researchers should use the scientific methods which 
emphasise control, standardisation, and objectivity”.  
Quantitative methods are favoured and data collection and analysis are meant to be 
value-free; the researcher should allow subjective interpretation to play no part in the 
research process. The ultimate aim of positivist research is to reach generalisations 
which accurately represent the current understanding of the phenomenon. These 
should be capable of being concisely communicated to the public, which is expected 
to share the same basic assumptions. 
The positivist paradigm has traditionally been popular among accounting researchers 
– Ryan et al., (2007) argue that it has had a profound influence on the evolution of 
accounting, finance and economic research, while Laughlin (1995) says this approach 
is typical in mainstream accounting research. However, its appeal is not universal, 
with many scholars finding its “hard-nosed instrumentality” puzzling (Ryan et al., 
2007). Others have embraced positivism only as a starting point, employing 
quantitative indicators to describe the status quo and provide a jumping-off point for 
more in-depth, qualitative analysis (Everett et al., 2015). 
5.3.2 The Interpretivist Paradigm 
Interpretivism originated from the intellectual traditions of phenomenology and 
symbolic interactionism. The first of these is defined by Bryman (2004) as “a 
philosophy that is concerned with the question of how individuals make sense of the 
world around them and how in particular the philosopher should bracket out 
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preconceptions in his or her grasp of that world”. The second is explained by 
Saunders et al., (2009) as involving “a continual process of interpreting the social 
world around us in that we interpret the actions of others with whom we interact and 
this interpretation leads to adjustment of our own meaning and actions”.  
Interpretivism posits that “the world is different for everybody” (Saunders et al., 
2009, p.116); in other words, the social reality in which we live is highly subjective 
(Collis & Hussey, 2009). Saunders et al., (2009) emphasise that the challenge facing 
the interpretivist researcher is to enter the social world of their subject(s) and to 
understand this world from their point of view. Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.28) 
elaborate thus: 
“The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the 
world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at 
the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of 
individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of 
the participant as opposed to the observer of action”. 
The interpretivist paradigm is helpful for interpreting both social and cultural issues 
(Benton & Craib, 2001) as it seeks to understand the attitudes of the research 
participants through their own subjective frames of reference. Accordingly, it 
typically employs data collection methods that will allow the researcher to describe, 
translate and interpret events from the perspectives of these participants. 
5.3.3 The Realist Paradigm 
Realism stands between the positivist and interpretivist philosophies. Saunders et al. 
(2009, p.114) explain that the essence of the realist position is that: “What the senses 
show us as reality is the truth: that objects have an existence independent of human 
mind”. In business research, the realist approach manifests itself as either direct 
realism or critical realism (Saunders et al., 2009). These differ in that while direct 
realism posits that our five physical senses perceive the real state of the world, critical 
realism argues that what the senses convey is actually an illusion of the real world 
(Saunders et al., 2009); in other words, that what we perceive is our idea of a thing, 
rather than the thing itself (Keefe, 2015). Acknowledging the role of subjective 
interpretation, critical realism accepts the use of both quantitative and qualitative data-
gathering and analysis methods (Healy & Perry, 2000). Krauss (2005) argues that the 
realist paradigm eliminates the difference between interpretivism and positivism.   
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5.3.4 The Pragmatism Paradigm  
The individual limitations of each of the above approaches meant that none was 
sufficient by itself to address all the research questions in the present research. 
However, by combining them, it was possible to reduce the influence of these 
limitations while exploiting their strengths. A number of researchers (e.g. Pansiri, 
2006; Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009; Saunders et al., 2012) have argued that 
researchers in the social sciences should not limit themselves to a single philosophical 
position, but should be able to adopt a flexible research design that allows them to 
employ whatever tools are necessary to meet their research objectives (Carson et al., 
2001; Neuman & Benz, 1998). These calls have led to the emergence of the 
pragmatism paradigm, the central tenet of which is that: “The most important 
determinant of the epistemology, ontology and axiology [that one] adopts is the 
research question(s) – any one [positivist/interpretivist] may be more appropriate than 
the other for answering particular questions” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.109). Or as 
Creswell (2009, p.11) puts it: “Truth is what works at the time. It is not based in a 
duality between reality independent of the mind or within the mind”. 
Over the past three decades, the pragmatic paradigm has attracted a growing number 
of supporters (e.g. Tashakkori & Charles, 2009; Creswell & Clark, 2007). Patton 
(2002, p.117) points out that the most important consideration within the pragmatic 
paradigm, which should inform all methodological decisions in all social research, is 
that: “Inquirers should be able to choose what will work best for a given inquiry 
problem in a particular context without being limited or inhibited by philosophical 
assumptions”. Though aware of the logical independence of these assumptions, the 
pragmatist will nevertheless combine different approaches if this allows him to better 
address the research question, to make better decisions regarding data collection, 
analysis and interpretation and to limit bias. Traditionally, research in the field of 
accounting has been positivist and quantitative in nature, with researchers examining 
the effect of one or more variables on other variables and employing mathematical 
equations and models to prove or disprove research hypotheses. However, the last 40 
years have seen an increasing number of accounting researchers also willing to 
approach the world from an interpretivist philosophical perspective (Ryan et al., 
2007). In many cases, they have been investigating research questions that require not 
just the objective observation of the social world but also (as everyone perceives this 
125 
world differently) subjective explanation. Accordingly, many have adopted a mixed 
methods approach to their investigations. Creswell (2009, p.11) emphasises the value 
of this approach because it allows researchers to focus “on the research problems and 
then [use] pluralistic approaches to derive knowledge about the problem”. The mixed 
methods approach is thus in close accordance with the principles underlying the 
pragmatic paradigm (Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009; Creswell, 2014).  
Following Burrell & Morgan (1994), this research rejects the ontological assumption 
that the world has no real pre-defined structure. Rather, it assumes that CG in the 
LSM can only be understood imperfectly or probabilistically (as proposed by Pansiri 
(2009)) through the perspectives of the regulators and other stakeholders who 
perceive it as a real, functional aspect of the corporate environment. It argues that 
Libyan listed companies find it difficult to achieve effective CG and accountability 
because of the range of social actors involved. Epistemologically, the research aims to 
develop an understanding of a real and distinct phenomenon; thus, where possible, 
research data were collected objectively and without bias. However, as the research 
questions also required investigation of the subjective attitudes and views of 
stakeholders, this necessitated the use of qualitative data-collection methods. The 
mixed methods design employed in the study comprised a quantitative survey, 
conducted among Libyan listed companies and other stakeholder groups, and 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews with twenty stakeholders. Quantitative and 
qualitative data may be gathered and analysed consecutively, with the second 
technique being used to supplement and interpret the findings derived from the first 
(Pansiri, 2005), but in this case, time and cost constraints made it necessary to 
conduct the quantitative and qualitative studies at the same time. Nevertheless, the 
quantitative and qualitative data analyses were mutually supportive, and the 
discussion sections draw on both to answer the research questions.  
5.4 Research Methods 
This section discusses the two main methods (questionnaire survey and semi-
structured interviews) that were used to collect empirical data and meet the research 
objectives. Research processes may be categorised into two main kinds: qualitative 
and qualitative. Quantitative methods, which are considered objective in nature, are 
used to collect and analyse numerical data, while qualitative methods, which are 
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considered subjective in nature, seek to understand human and social activities by 
evaluating and reflecting on participants‟ perceptions (Collis & Hussey, 2009). As 
discussed in section 5.3.4, both quantitative and qualitative methods can be employed 
in the same research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  
In the current research, the survey allowed the collection of quantitative data to 
answer the five research questions relating to the level of compliance with CG 
mechanisms and accountability. However, the research questions also required the 
collection of data that were beyond the scope of the questionnaire; in order to gain a 
more comprehensive insight into the issues surrounding CG and accountability, it was 
necessary to conduct qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from internal and external stakeholder groups. These interviews were 
used to investigate stakeholders‟ views of current practice and how it might be 
improved (Research Question 6). The two methods were carried out concurrently, 
with the survey being employed to gather general data and the interviews being used 
to access local knowledge and develop theoretical explanations (Kelle, 2006).  
Proponents of the mixed methods research design argue that it has a number of 
advantages: it allows the researcher to offset the respective weaknesses of quantitative 
and qualitative methods; it allows the researcher to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon because evidence is gathered from multiple 
perspectives (also opening the door to a more diverse range of voices and values); 
gathering evidence from fresh perspectives may lead to new insights; it allows the 
researcher to answer research questions that cannot be answered by quantitative or 
qualitative approaches alone; and it increases the robustness and validity of the 
obtained findings (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Clark, 2011). Denzin (1978) explains 
that this is because employing a combination of methods allows the researcher to 
support their main claims with evidence from more than one source. In other words, 
the mixed methods approach facilitates triangulation (Collis & Hussey, 2013; 
Saunders et al., 2012). This was especially important in the current study, given the 
lack of secondary data in the research area. Flick (2009) defines triangulation as “the 
combination of different methods, study groups, local and temporal settings, and 
different theoretical perspectives in dealing with a phenomenon”. Hussey & Hussey 
(1997) identify four main kinds of triangulation: methodological triangulation (the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods); data triangulation (data are 
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collected at various points in time and from different sources); investigator 
triangulation (data are collected independently by different researchers and their 
results compared); and theory triangulation (theory is adopted from more than one 
discipline). 
Gill & Johnson (2010) suggest that methodological triangulation promotes validity by 
minimising reactivity and researcher bias. The current research relies on 
methodological triangulation to neutralise the influence of individual methods and 
increase confidence in the obtained outcomes.  
Table 5.4 Summary of Methods Used and their linked to Research Questions and Objectives 
Research Objectives Research Questions Methods 
To investigate stakeholders‟ 
understanding regarding the 
meaning of CG in Libyan listed 
companies. 
How is the concept of CG 
understood in the Libyan 
context? 
Main: Questionnaire  
Support: Semi-structured 
Interview 
To investigate the extent to which 
CG mechanisms are implemented 
in Libyan listed companies. 
To what extent are Libyan 
listed companies committed to 
implementing CG mechanisms? 
Main: Questionnaire  
Support: Semi-structured 
Interview 
To identify whether the legal and 
regulatory framework is adequate 
to support CG and accountability 
practices. 
Does Libya have an adequate 
legal and regulatory framework 
to support CG and 
accountability practices? 
Main: Questionnaire  
Support: Semi-structured 
Interview 
To identify the key factors 
influencing CG and 
accountability practice in Libyan 
listed companies. 
What factors influence CG and 
accountability practice in 
Libyan listed companies? 
Main: Questionnaire  
Support: Semi-structured 
Interview 
To explore current accountability 
practice in Libyan listed 
companies. 
How is accountability 
understood and practised in 
Libyan listed companies?  
Main: Questionnaire  
Support: Semi-structured 
Interview 
To gather recommendations from 
different groups of stakeholders 
for the improvement of CG and 
accountability practice in Libyan 
listed companies. 
What suggestions and 
recommendations would 
different groups of stakeholders 
make to develop CG and 
accountability practice in 
Libyan listed companies? 
Main: Semi-structured 
Interview 
5.4.1 Quantitative Method 
Social scientists have long employed the quantitative approach to measure aspects of 
the social world (Sarantakos, 1994). Quantitative methods tend to be associated with 
the deductive approach, with the research design, sample size and proposed 
measurement all being established before data gathering and analysis take place 
(Neuman, 2006). When employing quantitative methods, the fundamental concern is 
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to establish and explain any causal relationships between the variables under 
investigation (Creswell, 2007). The following sections provide more details about the 
questionnaire survey that served as the quantitative instrument in this study, including 
the design of the survey, the scaling of respondents‟ responses, the content and 
piloting of the survey, the selection of the sample, distribution, response rate, 
reliability and validity, and the statistical techniques that were employed to analyse 
the gathered data. 
5.4.1.1 Questionnaire Survey 
In generic terms, a questionnaire survey is a set of specific questions that is sent to 
participants to be answered independently (DeVaus, 2009). Saunders et al., (2012) 
explain that surveys are typically employed to gather views, attitudes and perceptions 
where the purpose of the research is explanation or description. They are particularly 
effective in that they allow the researcher to observe variability within phenomena, 
but they also have a number of other advantages. In logistical terms, they are the most 
cost-effective way of reaching large numbers of respondents, but perhaps more 
importantly, they allow these respondents to give their views anonymously. This 
means they are more likely to feel free to express their views candidly and without 
reservation (Falgi, 2009). This is perhaps the main reason why the questionnaire 
survey is the most widely adopted tool in CG research (Jackling & Johl, 2009), as 
well as in some areas of management and finance research (Saunders et al., 2009). It 
was certainly a key reason why this tool was selected for this study; as much of the 
data that were required are highly sensitive and not publicly available (e.g. 
information about boards of directors), the questionnaire survey was one of the most 
important tools for data gathering. 
Saunders et al., (2012) identify two main types of survey: the self-managed 
questionnaire survey, which is typically filled out by the respondent (questionnaires 
may be delivered and collected by post, via the internet or in person), and the 
interviewer-managed questionnaire survey. This involves a structured interview, 
either in person or via telephone, during which the interviewer notes down the 
respondent‟s answers. 
Self-managed questionnaires were the selected option in this research firstly, because 
they are the cheapest way of collecting large amounts of data; secondly, because their 
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use is widely accepted in Libya (they are often used for opinion polls in the country); 
and thirdly, because it was felt that the guarantee of anonymity would encourage 
respondents to be more open in their answers (especially given the sensitivity of the 
data being sought) and more likely to return the questionnaire, leading to a higher 
response rate (Kazi & Khalid, 2012).  
Critics of the self-managed survey (e.g. Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; 
Neuman, 2000; Sekamn, 1992; Saunders et al., 2009) point to a number of drawbacks, 
arguing that respondents‟ anonymity cannot always be protected, that it is hard to 
ensure that a particular respondent will reply, and that response rates are often low 
(especially if the survey is being distributed by email). Most importantly, the 
researcher has no opportunity to elicit additional information (e.g. for purposes of 
clarification) from the respondent, or to ensure that all the questions are answered. 
This may influence the reliability and validity of the obtained results (Garwe, 2016). 
In an effort to mitigate some of these limitations, the majority of questionnaires were 
distributed and collected by hand – participants were only emailed a questionnaire if 
the hand-delivered version had produced no response – and the participants were 
given adequate time to complete the survey before it was collected. The resulting data 
was also supplemented by the data from the semi-structured interviews. The following 
sections discuss the various stages in the implementation of the survey, from the 
design and piloting process, to the selection of a sample, distribution, data analysis 
techniques and the steps taken to assess the instrument‟s reliability and validity.   
5.4.1.1.1 Design of the Questionnaire Survey 
According to Collis & Hussey (2009), the design of a questionnaire survey must take 
into account both the objectives of the research and the available time frame. Careful 
preparation is necessary to ensure that survey questions will be clearly understood and 
interpreted the same way by all respondents and that the sequencing of these 
questions will encourage them to continue to the end of the instrument. Consideration 
must also be given at this stage to the choice of delivery method, as this is crucial to 
motivating respondents to complete and return questionnaires in a timely manner, 
enhancing the rate of response (Kumar, 2005). All of these factors are important in 
maximising the reliability and validity of the survey (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The questionnaire survey in this study was developed to gather data from four 
stakeholder groups: boards of directors, executive managers, regulators and external 
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auditors and other stakeholders. Since the aim was to elicit their views with regard to 
CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed companies, the design of the 
questionnaire was mainly based on CG and accountability literature and relevant 
previous studies such as those by Zagoub (2011), Alshehri (2012) and Wanyama 
(2006). All groups received the same questionnaire, with questionnaires being 
delivered and collected personally by the researcher. 
The two most common types of question are pre-coded or (closed) questions that 
require the respondent to choose or click on one or more specific answers (e.g. 
multiple choice, true-false), and open-ended questions which allow them to give their 
own answer (Hair, 2015). Pre-coded questions are considered the easiest type of 
question for respondents to answer, but they give no insight into the reasons 
underlying the response (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Open-ended questions, on the other 
hand, allow respondents to express their views in some detail but are more taxing to 
answer, and the resulting data are more difficult to analyse (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). Which type of question is most appropriate will depend on the 
objective of the questionnaire survey, the level of information the researcher is hoping 
to obtain, the extent to which the subject has been thought through by participants, 
and finally, the size of the sample (Collis & Hussey, 2009).  
This survey employed pre-coded questions as this type typically records a good 
response rate in the Libyan environment. Answers were measured on five-point Likert 
scales, which are widely used in social science research to measure perceptions, 
beliefs, opinions and attitudes, as indicated in participants‟ responses to a set of 
statements (DeVellis, 2003). In order to overcome any translation difficulties and to 
make sure that all the questions had the same meaning for all participants, the survey 
questions were translated into Arabic and then back into English.  
5.4.1.1.2 Scaling Respondents’ Responses 
Likert scales are widely used to measure attitudes and perceptions (Saunders et al., 
2009; Oppenheim, 2001). These scales may be nominal (items are categorised into 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups), ordinal (categorised items are 
rank ordered) or ratio (variables are represented in a mathematical number system) 
(Collis & Hussey, 2009; Bryman & Bell, 2003). Five-point nominal and ordinal scales 
were used in this research, giving respondents the opportunity to choose their answers 
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from a set of alternatives. This is easier and quicker for respondents, but it also makes 
it easier for the researcher to code and analyse the responses (Oppenheim, 2001).  
Figure 5.2 gives examples of how five-point Likert scales were used in the survey 
questions: 
Figure 5.2 Five-point Likert Scales Used in the Questionnaire 
 To obtain participants‟ level of agreement with particular statements 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.4.1.1.3 Structure and Content of the Questionnaire 
In order to facilitate comparison between the views and perceptions of the various 
stakeholder groups regarding CG and accountability practices in the Libyan 
environment, the content of the questionnaire was the same for all groups. As 
mentioned in Section 5.4.1.1.1, the questions were mainly drawn from previous 
studies in the area of CG and accountability, such as those conducted by Wanyama 
(2006) Zagoub (2011) and Alshehri (2012). Other questions were adapted from the 
relevant literature or drew on the LCGC itself. 
The questionnaire survey sought to investigate how different stakeholder groups 
perceive the key issues surrounding CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed 
companies. It contained six sections (see Appendices I and II), the first of which 
asked for the participants‟ demographic information. The second section sought to 
elicit how they felt the English term “corporate governance” should be translated into 
Arabic. It also aimed to elicit their general perceptions concerning the definition, 
importance and awareness of CG. The third section focused on respondents‟ views 
regarding Libyan listed companies‟ adoption of the key CG mechanisms, while the 
fourth investigated their views on the legal and regulatory framework of CG and 
accountability. The fifth section explored the theme of CG and accountability in more 
detail, asking respondents to indicate whether they felt that the list of possible factors 
they were given influence CG practice and accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
The final section sought their responses to a series of statements concerning the 
definition and implementation of accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
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Table 5.5 summarises the linkage between the research questions and the content of 
the questionnaire survey. 
Table 5.5 Linkage between Research Questions and Content of Questionnaire Survey 
5.4.1.1.4 Piloting the Questionnaire Survey and Evaluation of Validity 
The final step in developing a questionnaire survey is to pilot it with specific groups 
of participants (Church & Waclawski, 2001). This is crucial for identifying any 
potential problems such as poorly worded, unclear or inappropriate questions which 
Research Questions Themes 
No. of 
Statements 
Question 
Type 
How is the concept of CG understood in the 
Libyan context? 
Arabic interpretation of the term 
CG 
4 
5-point 
Likert scale 
Definition of CG 5 
Importance and awareness of CG 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent are Libyan listed companies 
committed to implementing CG mechanisms? 
Duties of the Board of Directors 5 
5-point 
Likert scale 
Responsibilities of the Board of 
Directors 
6 
Composition of the Board of 
Directors 4 
Board committees 
20 
Disclosure and transparency 8 
Internal and external audit 5 
The rights of shareholders 
7 
Does Libya have an adequate legal and 
regulatory framework to support CG and 
accountability practices? 
The legal and regulatory system of 
CG and accountability 
7 
5-point 
Likert scale 
What factors influence CG and accountability 
practice in Libyan listed companies? 
Factors influencing the practice of 
CG and accountability 
16 
5-point 
Likert scale 
How is accountability understood and 
practised in Libyan listed companies?  
Perception and practice of 
accountability  
7 
5-point 
Likert scale 
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might confuse or deter respondents and result in missing data or a low response rate 
(Pornupatham, 2006). Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (2008) emphasise that the 
pilot testing of the questionnaire survey should cover all aspects of the design from 
the layout and instructions to the covering letter and the time required to complete it, 
while (Church & Waclawski, 2001) argue that the pilot participants should be asked 
to assess the survey in terms of its relevance, clarity and specificity.  
The pilot process is important in verifying the validity of the instrument; that is, its 
“ability to provide findings that are consistent with theoretical or conceptual values” 
(DeVellis, 2003). However, by affording the opportunity to perform a trial analysis, it 
also allows the researcher to check the reliability of the instrument. Such a trial 
analysis may not only be useful in perfecting the analytical approach adopted in the 
main study, but its results may subsequently be reviewed and compared with those 
from the main study (Burgess, 2001). 
For these reasons, there were two stages to the pilot process in this study. The first 
stage was the presentation of the first draft (in English) to the researcher‟s supervisors 
in order to obtain their feedback. Copies were also distributed to PhD students in 
Henley Business School, who were asked to give their comments about the 
questionnaire survey in general. The feedback obtained from these targeted 
individuals led to numerous amendments, especially in regard to the language, and the 
reformulation of some of the questions.   
The second stage of the pilot process was conducted in Libya with the e-mail 
distribution of 22 questionnaires to six academics, six external auditors and ten board 
members working in Libyan listed companies. Twelve of the questionnaires were 
returned, giving an overall response rate of 55% – sufficient for a pilot study Fink 
(2003) indicates that at least ten participants are necessary for a pilot study to be 
useful). While some of the targeted respondents generally approved of the content of 
the survey, others suggested that changes were needed in the Arabic translation and 
content of certain questions. These comments and recommendations were taken into 
consideration in the preparation and translation of the final version of the 
questionnaire survey.  
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5.4.1.1.5 Selection of Research Sample  
The selection of participants is one of the most important stages in the research 
process as it determines the quality of the data that will be obtained. This leads 
Denscombe (2007) to recommend that researchers should take great care to find the 
best population for their investigation. Sekaran & Bougie (2016, p.236) define the 
population as “the entire group of people, events or things of interest that the 
researcher wishes to investigate”. In this research, the potential population comprised 
four key groups: boards of directors (executive chairmen, non-executive chairmen, 
executive board members and non-executive board members from Libyan listed 
companies), executive managers (executive directors, non-executive directors and 
employees in Libyan listed companies), regulators (from the LSMA and the CBL, and 
external auditors registered in the LSM) and other stakeholders (academics, financial 
analysts, stockbrokers and financial consultants). These groups, which collectively 
represent internal and external stakeholders in the LSM, were selected primarily 
because they have been identified in previous studies as being the most directly 
engaged with CG and accountability (Falgi, 2009; Okike, 2007; Solomon et al., 
2003); indeed, they are widely regarded as the cornerstone upon which listed 
companies‟ monitoring mechanisms are built (Waweru et al., 2011). 
 Board members: As part of the senior internal governance mechanism and the key 
link between management and shareholders (Al-Daoud et al., 2015; Yoo & Reed, 
2015), board members play a crucial role in CG practice through their 
involvement in the firm‟s most important strategic, financing and investment 
decision making (Abdullah, 2016). It was therefore crucial to discover their views 
on CG issues. Numerous researchers have focused on board members‟ perceptions 
(e.g. Gannon, 2013). 
 Executive managers: Particular attention was paid to those directors with resource 
allocation and policy-making power, such as financial managers and internal 
auditors. Numerous studies have shown that these individuals can have a 
significant influence on the BOD, for example, by assisting the audit committee to 
monitor the financial reporting process (Abernathy et al., 2014). Internal auditors 
in particular, who are likely to meet regularly with the audit committee, will be 
familiar with its practice. Hutchinson & Zain (2009) conclude that the internal 
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audit is the main mechanism strengthening the company‟s board and is key to 
strengthening CG practice (see Bardhan et al., 2015). 
 Company employees: This category included experienced individuals whose job 
description in some way involved CG. However, as a key stakeholder group, 
employees also have a vested interest in working towards good CG as this is more 
likely to mean that they have a say in company affairs. 
 External auditors: The external audit mechanism plays an important role in 
enhancing the quality of CG systems (Abdulsaleh, 2014). The external auditor 
judges the integrity of the company‟s financial operations and annual reports, 
strengthening investor confidence by making the company‟s financial disclosure 
more reliable and increasing transparency (Suwaidan & Qasim, 2010; Khalid et 
al., 2016). Since the external auditor‟s role in maintaining good CG is broadly 
acknowledged (Alabede, 2012), they play a prominent part in the CG framework. 
For this reason, they might be in a position to offer an objective evaluation of CG 
and accountability practices. 
 Regulators: These participants were selected because they bear the ultimate 
responsibility for compelling listed companies to practise effective CG and for 
monitoring its implementation.  
 Other stakeholders: Academics were included in the population because, while 
having limited monitoring or supervisory responsibilities compared to the other 
groups, they have exerted some influence on the development of the CG 
framework. These academics, most of whom attained their degrees in western 
countries where CG is the focus of significant attention, may be able to offer a 
more impartial and independent perspective on the complex issues surrounding 
CG.  
Where the proposed population is small, it should be possible to test all of it 
(Garaibah et al., 1981). Where this is not possible, however, it is necessary to choose 
a representative sample of the population. Sekaran & Bougie (2016, p.239) define 
sampling as  
“the process of selecting a right number of elements from the population, 
so that a study of the sample and an understanding of its properties or 
characteristics would make it possible for us to generalise such properties 
or characteristics to the population elements”.  
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Neuman (2000) recommends that researchers facing this task should employ 
judgemental sampling, as this is one way to ensure that they gain a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon. Sekamn (1992) agrees, arguing that researchers 
should use judgemental sampling even when the population is small, as this gives 
them the best chance of collecting sufficient and accurate information.  
Since the number of Libyan listed companies, regulators and external auditors is 
limited (there were fourteen listed companies and fewer than 90 regulators in Libya at 
the time of the fieldwork), it was possible to use the whole population of these groups 
for this study. Other stakeholder groups were larger, so participants were selected 
from these groups by means of judgemental sampling, with selection being based on 
their experience and understanding of the issues surrounding CG and accountability in 
the Libyan environment. 
5.4.1.1.6 Questionnaire Distribution and Response Rate 
The questionnaire surveys were distributed to Libyan companies listed in the LSM 
and to external auditors, regulators and other stakeholders in Tripoli and Misurata. In 
total, 400 questionnaires were circulated and collected by hand between June and 
August, 2015. Although delivering and collecting the questionnaires by hand was 
costly and time-consuming, it was worth it in the end as 231 of the questionnaires 
were returned – a response rate of 58%. This is high compared to Kamel‟s (2006) 
observation that questionnaires in the Middle East region usually yield a response rate 
of only 30%-50%. 
Table 5.6 demonstrates the number and percentage of individuals who responded 
from each group, by position. It shows that the RE group yielded the highest response 
rate (70%), while the BD group was the second most responsive with 61%. The EM 
and OS groups were less responsive, with rates of 50% and 57% respectively. 
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  Table 5.6 Number of Questionnaires Distributed and Returned and Response Rate 
Groups 
 
Respondent’s Position 
 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Returned 
Questionnaires 
The Response 
Rate 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
 
BD Group 
 
Executive Chairman 9 11% 4 8% 44% 
Non-Executive Chairman 6 8% 3 6% 50% 
Executive Board Member 20 25% 9 19% 45% 
Non-Executive Board Member 44 56% 32 67% 73% 
Total 
 
79 100% 48 100% 61% 
 
EM Group 
 
Executive Director 60 41% 36 49% 60% 
Non-Executive Director 25 17% 10 13% 40% 
Employee 62 42% 28 38% 45% 
Total 
 
147 100% 74 100% 50% 
 
RE Group 
 
External Auditor 52 68% 37 70% 71% 
Regulator 24 32% 16 30% 67% 
Total 
 
76 100% 53 100% 70% 
 
OS Group 
 
 
Academic 20 20% 9 16% 45% 
Financial Analyst 25 26% 13 23% 52% 
Stock Broker 35 36% 23 41% 66% 
Financial Consultant 18 18% 11 20% 61% 
Total 
 
98 100% 56 100% 57% 
Total Groups 
 
400 
 
231 
 
58% 
5.4.1.1.7 Reliability and Validity  
It is essential that measurement tools are reliable and valid if they are to produce high-
quality data (Oppenheim, 2001). In quantitative research, reliability is interpreted as 
referring to “the consistency and stability of a measurement” and “whether the results 
of a study are replicable” (Hartas, 2015, p.71). A number of methods have been used 
in quantitative research to measure reliability, including the split-half, test-retest and 
Cronbach‟s alpha methods (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Cronbach‟s alpha is generally 
considered the optimal index to measure internal consistency and is widely used to 
evaluate questionnaires that rely on scales such as Likert scales (Pallant, 2007; 
Bryman & Bell, 2007). The Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient ranges from 1 (optimal 
internal reliability) to 0 (no internal reliability). A Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient of 0.7 
or more is typically regarded as indicating internal reliability, though 0.6 is considered 
acceptable, especially in exploratory research (Hair et al., 2010). When the 
Cronbach‟s alpha test was employed to examine the internal reliability of the 
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questionnaire survey in this research, the resulting coefficient was 0.77, indicating 
that all the responses were reliable. 
Validity is arguably the most important attribute of any research; the concept 
encompasses the trustworthiness and accuracy of the instruments that are used, and 
hence the data that are generated and the results that are obtained, (Bernard, 2006). 
Bryman & Bell (2003, p.77) define validity as “the issue of whether an indicator (or 
set of indicators) that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept”. 
This means that the researcher must be sure that their research tool (whether this is 
questionnaires or interviews) accurately reflects the right meanings and addresses the 
research questions. Validity may be judged in two ways: internal validity is primarily 
concerned with the extent to which the research is able to demonstrate cause and 
effect relationships between variables, while external validity concentrates on whether 
the research sample is a fair representation of the entire population and the research 
outcomes can be generalised to the population (Fisher, 2007; Bryman & Bell, 2007).  
Since validity, unlike reliability, cannot be quantified using statistical techniques 
(DeVaus, 2009), it is even more crucial to pilot test research instruments (Saunders et 
al., 2009). The questionnaire survey in this research was based on instruments that 
had already been used in similar studies, but its validity for this particular study was 
evaluated by pilot testing it with a number of qualified referees (see Section 
5.4.1.1.4). This allowed the internal consistency of the questions, and the relationship 
between these questions and the research objectives, to be confirmed. 
5.4.1.1.8 Statistical Techniques of Questionnaire Analysis  
The data obtained from respondents were analysed using the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21, which is one of the statistical programs most 
commonly used by social science researchers (Miller et al., 2010). After the 
questionnaire responses had been coded according to group, the data were entered 
into SPSS with the assistance of a statistical specialist from the Statistical Advisory 
Centre at the University of Reading.  
Statistical data are generally analysed using parametric and non-parametric tests. 
Which tests are selected will depend on the researcher‟s underlying assumptions 
about the data that have been collected; thus, in the case of parametric tests: (i) “the 
data should be normally distributed; (ii) the variance should be the same throughout 
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the data; (iii) the data collected should be measured at least at the interval level; and 
(iv) data from different participants should be independent” (Field, 2009, p573). 
Where these assumptions do not apply, non-parametric tests are more appropriate. 
When a normality test was conducted to examine whether the data generated by the 
survey were normally distributed or not, the findings indicated that the data were non-
normally distributed. Accordingly, non-parametric tests were employed to look for 
any variances between independent samples. Newbold et al., (2003) argue that non-
parametric tests are the most appropriate for questionnaire data as these data are 
essentially ordinal and nominal. The statistical techniques used in this research were 
as follows: 
 Descriptive Statistics: this technique was used to describe and summarise the 
collected data into simplified forms, such as charts, graphs and tables. The key 
statistical techniques employed were frequencies, percentages, central tendency 
measurements (means) and dispersion (Collis & Hussey, 2009). The mean, which 
is considered the simplest way of measuring central tendency (Field, 2005), was 
the most important of these techniques, with group means being employed to 
understand how group perceptions differed across questions. The mean can be 
aggregated according to the following formula: 
  ̅  
 
 
∑  
 
   
 
Where  ̅ = mean 
  = the total number of respondents 
   = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5…………. n 
Standard deviation (SD) is a common measure of variability and can be 
aggregated as follows: 
  √
∑     ̅  
   
 
Where S = standard deviation (SD); 
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 ̅ = mean; 
  = the total number of respondents; 
   = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5………….n (Field, 2005). 
 Mann-Whitney (MW) Test: The MW test is one of the most popular non-
parametric tests. This statistical technique is useful for comparing two group 
means and examining whether there are any significant differences between two 
independent pairs of groups on an ongoing measurement (Field, 2005; Zikmund, 
2003). In this research, the MW test was employed to examine the differences 
between answers from pairs of stakeholder groups. The MW value can be 
aggregated according to the following formula: 
       
        
 
    
Where U = MW test; 
N1 = the total number of respondents in group 1; 
N2 = the total number of respondents in group 2; 
R1 = the sum of ranks of group 1 (Field, 2005). 
 Kruskal-Wallis (KW) Test: The KW test is a non-parametric test, equivalent to 
the parametric ANOVA test, for calculating the differences between population 
means (Field, 2005).  A significant p-value (≤ 0.05) means that at least one of the 
study groups varies from at least one of the others. In the present research, the 
KW test was used to investigate whether there were fundamental differences 
between the four stakeholder groups in terms of their answers to individual 
statements. Since the KW test does not report which group is different or how 
many of the groups differ from one another (Siegel & Castellan, 1988), any 
observed variations were further explored using group means. The study followed 
most other social science research in setting the confidence level at 95% and the 
significance level at 5% (Curwin & Slater, 2007). The KW value can be 
aggregated according to the following formula: 
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∑
  
 
  
       
 
   
 
Where H = KW test; 
Ri = sum of ranks for i group; 
N = combined sizes of samples for whole groups (Field, 2005). 
5.4.2 Qualitative Method 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods has become increasingly 
popular because it is seen as a way of increasing the likelihood of obtaining accurate 
and comprehensive results; Kamel (2006), for example, explains that following up 
questionnaire surveys with interviews gives the researcher the opportunity to address 
any deficiencies in the first set of data.  
The use of multiple methods is also at the heart of Klenke‟s (2008, p.7)  
comprehensive definition of qualitative research: 
“Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense 
of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. 
Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of 
empirical materials – case study, personal experience, introspective, life 
story, interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts 
that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in 
individuals‟ lives”. 
Like Klenke, Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) emphasise the ability of qualitative 
research to capture people‟s experience of phenomena; to capture and describe 
phenomena in context; and to explain why phenomena occur. These data may be 
collected using a range of qualitative methods, such as observation, interviews and 
case studies. The most widely used of these is the interview, as it offers numerous 
advantages to the researcher. 
5.4.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to explore those issues that cannot 
be covered in predetermined questions and to obtain rich information on a specific 
research topic. They are the most frequently used method for eliciting detailed, 
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comparable answers and introducing a subjective dimension into the research 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Qualitative interviews are considered particularly appropriate 
in cases where the information being sought is highly confidential or complicated 
(Hussey & Hussey, 1997), but in all cases, they are invaluable in helping the 
researcher gain a rich insight into interviewees‟ background, experiences, views, 
aspirations, values, feelings and attitudes (May, 2005).  
Qualitative interviews may be structured or semi-structured. May (2005, p.121) 
defines the difference between the two thus: 
“In moving from the structured interview to the unstructured interview, 
researchers shift from a situation in which they attempt to control the 
interview through predetermined questions and thus „teach‟ the respondent 
to reply in accordance with the interview schedule (standardization), to 
one in which the respondent is encouraged to answer a question in their 
own terms”. 
Bryman (2004, p.321) describes how the semi-structured interview works in more 
detail: 
“The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be 
covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a 
great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions may not follow on exactly 
in the way outlined in the schedule. Questions that are not included in the 
guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by 
interviewees. But, by and large, all of the questions will be asked and a 
similar wording will be used from interviewee to interviewee”. 
This flexibility makes semi-structured interviews especially useful in exploratory 
research, where they can be used to investigate not only “how” and “what”, but also 
“why” research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). As Bryman indicates, the researcher 
has a number of questions and themes that remain constant from one interview to 
another, but they are able to vary the format if necessary to respond to interviewees‟ 
answers or to explore any new areas that arise. From the interviewee‟s perspective, on 
the other hand, the semi-structured format gives them the space to express their views 
freely and to speak from their own knowledge and experience (Saunders et al., 2009). 
For these reasons, semi-structured interviews are deemed important for acquiring an 
adequate explanation and understanding of relevant events, patterns and behaviours, 
and for establishing a more precise picture of interviewees‟ perceptions (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003). 
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Semi-structured interviews are not without drawbacks, however; Collis & Hussey 
(2013) explain that the interview process can be time-consuming and expensive, and 
that protecting interviewees‟ confidentiality can be difficult, particularly if the sample 
is small. On the other hand,  identifying – and gaining access to – a large sample of 
suitable candidates can be equally difficult. Collis & Hussey (2009) also argue that 
the researcher must put considerable thought into the design of the interview 
questions to ensure that all of the interviews are conducted in the same way. Despite 
these concerns, semi-structured interviews were considered the best method for 
collecting detailed information from internal and external stakeholders and for further 
exploring the outcomes of the questionnaire survey. The interviews offered an 
opportunity for direct contact with targeted individuals in the business environment, 
allowing the researcher to capture an in-depth picture of their practice and 
knowledge. They were particularly appropriate for this study as many stakeholders in 
developing countries such as Libya are reluctant to disclose details of their experience 
in terms of CG and accountability in written surveys.  
5.4.2.1.1 Semi-Structured Interview Design 
The aim in the semi-structured interviews was to investigate the views of relevant 
stakeholder groups concerning the current status of CG and accountability practices 
within Libyan listed companies. To this end, an interview guide was compiled 
consisting of a list of themes followed by a range of questions (see Appendices V and 
VI). The questions were designed to elicit interviewees‟ views, opinions, experiences, 
attitudes and feelings on a range of issues, and to provide rich information in a way 
that was not possible with the questionnaires. They were mostly formulated by 
drawing on CG and accountability literature (both general and developing country-
specific) and the limited literature from the Libyan business environment. The general 
literature was particularly important as there is currently little available on CG and 
accountability in Libyan listed companies, even in terms of official reports.  
The interview questions were designed to cover the key aspects of CG and 
accountability, namely: the understanding of the concept of CG in Libya, the 
perceived level of compliance with CG mechanisms in Libyan listed companies; the 
legal and regulatory framework of CG and accountability; factors influencing the 
practice of CG and accountability; perceptions surrounding and current practice of 
accountability; and how CG practice and accountability might be developed in 
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Libyan listed companies. As with the survey, the same interview questions were 
directed to broad stakeholders groups (see Appendices V and VI). The interview 
guide followed broadly the same pattern as the questionnaire survey (with the 
addition of the final set of questions on improving CG and accountability practices), 
which facilitated comparison of the results from the two instruments. Table 5.7 shows 
how the interview questions correlated with the research questions. 
As with the survey, the interview schedule was piloted prior to the main study in 
order to establish its validity. Three participants (a recent PhD candidate from 
Nottingham Trent University and academic staff from Henley Business School and 
Misurata University in Libya) agreed to review the interview questions and undergo 
interviews. Their comments were taken into consideration in the preparation and 
conduct of the main study interviews. 
Table 5.7 Linkage between Research Questions and Interview Questions 
Research Questions Themes & Questions 
How is the concept of CG understood in the Libyan context? Section One: 1-3 
To what extent are Libyan listed companies committed to 
implementing CG mechanisms? 
Section Two: 4-14 
Does Libya have an adequate legal and regulatory framework to 
support CG and accountability practices? 
Section Three: 1-4 
What factors influence CG and accountability practice in Libyan 
listed companies? 
Section Four: 1-1 
How is accountability understood and practised in Libyan listed 
companies? 
Section Five: 1-4 
What suggestions and recommendations would different groups of 
stakeholders make to develop CG and accountability practice in 
Libyan listed companies? 
Section Six: 1-2 
5.4.2.1.2 Selection of Respondents and Interview Process 
Kumar (2005) argues that sampling is a less important consideration in qualitative 
research, where the main aim is usually to explore or describe the diversity in a 
situation, phenomenon or issue. In the current research, finding interviewees who were 
available and willing to be interviewed was enormously challenging. Accordingly, it 
was decided that the sampling frame should be as large as possible within certain 
constraints. Following Kamel & Elbanna (2010), interviewees were selected 
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according to a set of criteria: they had to have at least a first degree (and preferably a 
postgraduate degree), along with relevant knowledge and experience of working in 
the field of CG; and they had to be available for an hour-long interview and follow up 
discussions. Finally, since it was important for the interviewees to be as honest and 
objective as possible (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016), they had to understand and be 
sympathetic towards the purpose of the research.  
The interviewees were selected using the snowball method (García-Andreu et al., 
2015), with interviewees being asked to suggest the names of other suitable 
candidates. All nominated candidates were approached by the researcher in an effort 
to minimise the impact of any bias resulting from this sampling method. Board 
chairmen were also requested to nominate potential interviewees, including non-
executives with established reputations in their sectors. Finally, some directors were 
approached directly. In the end, twenty individuals, representing a wide range of 
internal and external stakeholder roles, agreed to be interviewed. These interviews 
were conducted during the months of July and August 2015 in Libya‟s two main 
cities, namely Tripoli (at the Libyan Stock Market) and Misurata.  
Potential interviewees were approached by telephone and those who agreed to 
participate were interviewed face to face at their place of work. The interviews started 
with thanks and a brief overview of the objectives of the research, after which 
interviewees were given a copy of the letter from the researcher‟s sponsor and a copy 
of the consent form explaining their rights. They were then assured that the outcomes 
of the interviews would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and used only for 
research purposes; this assurance was very important in encouraging interviewees to 
participate actively and speak freely. All of the interviewees agreed to be recorded. 
After the interviews, the recordings were transcribed in Arabic, with relevant 
statements then being translated into English. According to Bryman & Bell (2003), a 
one-hour interview should take approximately six hours to transcribe, but in practice, 
each hour of dialogue took almost nine hours to transcribe. Most of the interviews 
lasted between half an hour and an hour and half. As promised, the names of the 
interviewees were coded in order to ensure their anonymity. As Table 5.8 shows, for 
the purpose of coding and analysis, the interviewees were broadly classified into two 
groups based on the nature of their roles. These were the Internal Stakeholder Group 
(ISG) and the External Stakeholder Group (ESG). 
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Table 5.8 Interviewees’ Coding and Characteristics 
No Code Position Sector Qualification 
Place of 
Study 
Experience Duration 
Group 1: Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
1 BD1 Non-Executive Chairman Banking Sector PhD in Accounting Jordan 35 Years 36 minutes 
2 BD2 Executive Chairman Industrial Sector PhD in Accounting Sudan 30 Years 44 minutes 
3 BD3 Executive Chairman 
Financial Service 
Sector 
PhD in Finance Bulgaria 8 Years 57 minutes 
4 BD4 Chair of Audit Committee Banking Sector PhD in Accounting US 35 Years 35 minutes 
5 BD5 Executive Board Member Banking Sector MSc in Accounting Libya 37 Years 
1 hour 7 
minutes 
6 BD6 
Non-Executive Board 
Member 
Insurance Sector BA in Management Libya 40 Years 39 minutes 
7 BD7 Executive Board Member Investment Sector PhD in Accounting UK 35 Years 30 minutes 
8 BD8 Executive Board Member Banking Sector 
PhD in 
Management 
Libya 17 Years 47 minutes 
9 EM1 
Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
Banking Sector MSc in Accounting Libya 30 Years 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
10 EM2 
Chief of Trading 
Management 
Financial Service 
Sector 
MSc in Finance Libya 8 Years 
1 hour10 
minutes 
11 EM3 
Chief of Investment  
Management 
Investment Sector PhD in Accounting UK 12 Years 29 Minutes 
12 EM4 
Head of Internal Audit 
Management 
Service Sector PhD in Accounting Malaysia 28 Years 
1 hour 28 
minutes 
Group 2: External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
13 RE1 Regulator LSMA PhD in Accounting UK 15 Years 32 minutes 
14 RE2 Regulator 
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
PhD in 
Management 
UK 12 Years 47 minutes 
15 RE3 External Auditor Private Sector PhD in Accounting UK 30 Years 
1 hour 
10minutes 
16 RE4 External Auditor Private Sector PhD in Accounting US 33 Years 
1 hour 13 
minutes 
17 OS1 Financial Consultant 
Financial Service 
Sector 
MSc in 
Management 
UK 37 Years 54 minutes 
18 OS2 Individual Investor Private Sector 
PhD in 
Management 
UK 8 Years 
1 hour 11 
minutes 
19 OS3 Academic Education Sector PhD in Accounting Poland 15 Years 
1 hour 9 
minutes 
20 OS4 Broker Private Sector MSc in Marketing Libya 10 Years 33 minutes 
5.4.2.1.3 Thematic Analysis of Interview Data 
In contrast to quantitative data analysis, there is no standardised approach to 
qualitative data analysis (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2012). In this case, 
thematic analysis was applied as it was felt to be the most suitable for answering the 
research questions. Braun & Clarke (2006, p.79) provide a general definition of 
thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
(themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) 
147 
detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of 
the research topic”. Vaismoradi et al., (2013) break the process of thematically 
analysing interview data down into six phases, explaining what happens at each stage 
(see Figure 5.3).  
Figure 5.3 The Process of Thematically Analysing Interview Data 
Source: Adapted from Vaismoradi et al., (2013, p.402) 
A number of accounting studies have employed thematic analysis to analyse 
qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews, including those by 
Vaismoradi et al., (2013), Ferdous (2012), Magrus (2012) and Braun & Clarke 
(2006). Ghauri & Gronhaug (2010) indicate that qualitative data analysis software is 
helpful where there is a large amount of data that require coding, linking and 
explaining. Several such programs are available, but as only 20 interviews were 
conducted in this study and the amount of qualitative data generated was manageable, 
coding was done manually.  
Concepts underlined in the analysis were analysed according to the research 
framework. Besides, new concepts or themes that were highlighted in the interviews 
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were handled in a flexible way and considered in relation to the research framework. 
The outcomes of the thematic analysis are presented in Chapter 7. 
5.5 Combining the Quantitative and Qualitative Findings 
As discussed in Section 5.4, this research employs methodological triangulation in 
order to enhance the credibility of the findings. According to Blaxter et al., (2010), 
quantitative research methods concentrate on fact-finding, while qualitative research 
methods focus on gaining a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation. In other words, the results derived from qualitative methods can 
complement and add further detail to the results obtained using quantitative methods. 
An additional benefit of methodological triangulation is that where the two methods 
produce consistent results, this increases the reliability and validity of the research 
(although having said this, it is difficult in practice to harmonise the outcomes of two 
or more research methods, especially in a single study). The combined findings are 
presented in Chapter 8. 
5.6 Ethical Considerations 
Collis & Hussey (2009) highlight the importance of research ethics, especially with 
regard to consent, data confidentiality and privacy. These considerations were an 
integral part of the research design in this study. At the outset, approval for the 
research was sought from the Ethics Committee at Henley Business School, the 
University of Reading, which also approved the consent form that was given to 
interviewees. This explained the nature of the research, the research objectives and the 
rules governing the research. Similarly, the questionnaire survey was accompanied by 
a covering letter explaining the nature and objectives of the research and assuring 
participants that their anonymity would be protected, and that responses would be 
treated with the utmost confidentiality and used only for the purposes of research. 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter started by discussing the philosophical assumptions that guide social 
science research and the paradigms that are most commonly employed by researchers 
in this area. It justified the choice of the pragmatism paradigm for this study on the 
grounds that this encourages a mixed methods approach and the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. This is highly appropriate for this research as 
not only does it enable methodological triangulation (thereby increasing the reliability 
and validity of the results), but it is also likely to yield a more accurate and detailed 
picture of current CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies. This 
echoes the view of Filatotchev & Nakajima (2010), who argue that to fully understand 
CG practices, it is necessary to combine instruments such as questionnaire surveys 
and semi-structured interviews. 
As these were the two instruments chosen for this study, they were discussed at 
length. The questionnaire survey was deployed first. The chapter justified the choice 
of this instrument before explaining how it was designed, how respondents‟ responses 
were scaled, how it was piloted, how the research sample was selected, how the 
survey was distributed, the response rate, how the reliability and validity of the survey 
were evaluated, and the statistical techniques that were employed to analyse the 
gathered data. The second instrument was the semi-structured interviews; again, the 
chapter explained how the question schedule was designed, how interviewees were 
selected, how the interviews were conducted and how the resulting data were 
analysed using the technique of thematic analysis.  
This chapter having set out the methodology of the study, the next chapter begins the 
data analysis section of the thesis by presenting the results from the questionnaire 
survey. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses and discusses the results collected from the first data collection 
instrument – the questionnaire survey conducted between June and August, 2015. In 
all, 400 questionnaires were circulated and 231 questionnaires were returned during 
this period, giving a response rate of 58%. This is high compared to Kamel‟s (2006) 
observation that questionnaires in the Middle East region usually yield a response rate 
of only 30%-50%. This chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 outlines the 
structure of the survey and the composition of the responding groups, while section 
6.3 presents the descriptive statistical analysis of respondents‟ demographic 
information. Section 6.4 presents the results from the questions examining 
respondents‟ understanding of CG in the Libyan environment; specifically, how they 
thought “CG” should be translated into Arabic, how they thought CG should be 
defined, how important they thought it is in the Libyan environment, and what they 
thought of the general level of CG awareness in the country. Section 6.5 examines the 
respondents‟ views regarding Libyan listed companies‟ compliance with the key CG 
mechanisms. Section 6.6 addresses the legal and regulatory framework of CG and 
accountability in Libya, section 6.7 focuses on the factors that influence CG practice 
and accountability, and section 6.8 investigates the respondents‟ views regarding the 
concept and practice of accountability. Section 6.9 summarises the main findings of 
the chapter.  
6.2 Questionnaire Survey Topics and Respondent Groups 
The questionnaire survey sought to investigate how different stakeholder groups 
perceive the key issues surrounding CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed 
companies. It contained six sections (see Appendices I and II), the first of which 
asked for the participants‟ demographic information. The second section sought to 
elicit how they felt the English term “corporate governance” should be translated into 
Arabic. It also aimed to elicit their general perceptions concerning the definition, 
relevance and awareness of CG. The third section focused on respondents‟ views 
regarding Libyan listed companies‟ adoption of the key CG mechanisms, while the 
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fourth investigated their views on the legal and regulatory framework of CG and 
accountability. The fifth section explored the theme of CG and accountability in more 
detail, asking respondents to indicate whether they felt that the list of possible factors 
they were given influence CG practice and accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
The final section sought their responses to a series of statements concerning the 
definition and implementation of accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
For the purpose of analysis, respondents were classified into four groups according to 
their role. Figure 6.1 identifies the four categories, how many responses were returned 
by each group (and how these were distributed across the various roles within each 
group) and what percentage they formed of the overall sample. The first group was 
the Board of Directors group (group BD), which consisted of executive chairmen, 
non-executive chairmen, executive board members and non-executive board members 
from Libyan listed companies. The second group, the Executive Management group 
(group EM), contained executive directors, non-executive directors and employees in 
Libyan listed companies. The third group was the Regulators (group RE), which 
included regulators from both the LSMA and the CBL along with external auditors 
registered in the LSM. (Members of this group have the right to supervise and 
monitor Libyan listed companies.) The last group was Other Stakeholders (group OS). 
This group consisted of academics, financial analysts, stock brokers and financial 
consultants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
Figure 6.1 Questionnaire Respondent Groups 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The data obtained from respondents were analysed using the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS). As the majority of the questions in the questionnaire survey 
employed a five-point Likert scale, responses were analysed in terms of measures of 
central tendency (mean, standard deviation and median). The ordinal data were 
analysed using non-parametric tests; the Mann-Whitney test (MW) was employed to 
examine the differences between answers from pairs of stakeholder groups, while the 
Kruskal-Wallis test (KW) was used to investigate whether there were fundamental 
differences between the four stakeholder groups on individual statements. The study 
follows most other social science research in setting the confidence level at 95% and 
the significance level at 5% (Curwin & Slater, 2007). 
Stakeholder Groups  
BD Group 
21% (48) 
EM Group 
32% (74)  
RE Group 
23% (53) 
OS Group 
24% (56) 
Executive 
Chairman (4) 
Executive 
Board Member 
(9) 
Non-Executive 
Board Member 
(32) 
Non-Executive 
Chairman (3) 
 
Financial 
Analyst (13) 
Financial 
Consultant (11) 
Stock Broker 
(23) 
Employee (28) 
Non-Executive 
Director (10) 
Regulator (16) 
Academic (9) Executive 
Director (36) 
External 
Auditor (37) 
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6.3 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Respondents’ Demographic Information 
Figure 6.2 shows that the majority of respondents in the BD group (45.8%) held a 
Bachelor‟s degree, 16.7% had a PhD, 27.1% a Master‟s degree and 10.4% had a 
diploma degree. In the EM group, 67.6% of respondents had a Bachelor‟s degree, 
while 18.9% had a Master‟s degree, 4.1% had a PhD and 9.5% held a diploma degree. 
In the RE group, half of respondents (50.9%) held a Bachelor‟s degree, while 35.8% 
held a Master‟s degree and 13.2% held a PhD. Finally, 48.2% of the OS group held a 
Master‟s degree, while 35.7% held a Bachelor‟s degree and 16.1% held a PhD. To 
sum up, almost all of the respondents were educated to at least first degree level and 
were therefore likely to be able to understand the issues surrounding CG and 
accountability, as well as the latest developments in this area. 
Figure 6.2 Respondents’ Qualifications 
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates that in the BD group, more than three-quarters of the 
respondents had studied for their last degree in Libya, while 4.2% had obtained their 
last degree in another Arab country, 10.4% had received it in the UK and 4.2% had 
graduated in the US. In the EM group, 91.9% had obtained their last degree in Libya, 
1.4% had studied in another Arab country, 2.7% had studied in the UK and 1.4% had 
studied in the US. The remaining 2.7% had obtained their last degree in another 
country. In the RE group, 54.7% of respondents had obtained their last degree in 
Libya, 18.9% had studied in another Arab country, 17% in the UK, 1.9% in the US 
and 7.5% in another country. Finally, in the OS group, two-thirds of respondents had 
obtained their last degree in Libya, while 17.9% had studied in another Arab country, 
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1.8% had studied in the UK, 5.4% in the US and 7.1% in another country. The 
distribution across the four groups suggests they are likely to have developed different 
interpretations of and attitudes towards CG practice and accountability. 
Figure 6.3 Respondents’ Place of Study 
 
With regard to practical experience, Figure 6.4 shows that in the BD group, 52.1% of 
the respondents had practical experience of more than 15 years, while 18.8% had 
practical experience of between 10 and 15 years, 22.9% had practical experience of 
between 5 and 10 years and 6.3% had practical experience of between 1 and 5 years. 
In the EM group, 40.5% of respondents had more than 15 years‟ practical experience, 
29.7% had 10-15 years‟ practical experience, 17.6% had 5-10 years‟ practical 
experience and 12.2% had 1-5 years‟ practical experience. In the RE group, more than 
a third of the respondents (39.6%) had practical experience of more than 15 years, 
while 22.6% had 10-15 years‟ practical experience, 28.3% had 5-10 years‟ practical 
experience and 9.4% had 1-5 years‟ practical experience. In the OS group, nearly a 
third of respondents (32.1%) had more than 15 years‟ practical experience, 35.7% had 
10-15 years‟ practical experience, more than a quarter (28.6%) had practical 
experience of between 5 and 10 years and 3.6% had practical experience of between 1 
and 5 years.  
Comparing the groups, the 15 years and over category scored the highest percentage 
in all except the OS group, where it took second place. In contrast, the 1-5 year 
category scored the lowest percentage in all groups. The fact that nearly two-thirds of 
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the respondents from each group had practical experience of more than 10 years 
indicates that their perceptions are likely to be credible and reliable. 
Figure 6.4 Respondents’ Experience 
 
Figure 6.5 highlights that in the BD and EM groups, the highest percentage of 
respondents were from the banking sector (47.9% and 45.9% respectively). In both 
groups, the second most represented sector was insurance (20.8% and 27% of 
respondents respectively). 14.6% of respondents from the BD group and 12.2% of 
respondents from the EM group belonged to the investment sector, while 8.3% and 
12.2% respectively came from the industrial sector. The lowest percentage in both 
groups was the service sector, which accounted for 8.3% of BD respondents and 2.7% 
of EM respondents. In the RE and OS groups, the highest percentage of respondents 
came from the private sector (69.8% and 83.9% respectively). While the RE group 
also contained respondents from the banking (15.1%), insurance (9.4%) and 
investment sectors (5.6%), the only other sector represented in the OS group was 
education, with 16.15%. 
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Figure 6.5 Respondents’ Sector 
 
6.4 Understanding of CG in the Libyan Environment 
Before asking respondents for their opinions on CG practice and accountability in 
Libyan listed companies, it was necessary to find out what they understood CG to 
mean. Accordingly, this section of the questionnaire addressed the questions of how 
the English term “corporate governance” should be rendered in Arabic, how they 
thought CG should be defined, and their general views on its significance and 
awarness in Libya.  
6.4.1 Arabic Interpretation of the Term CG 
The Arabic translation of the term CG is one of the most controversial issues in Arab 
CG literature (Falgi, 2009). In the absence of any universally agreed translation, the 
respondents were given four commonly used variants and asked to identify the most 
popular. As Table 6.1 shows, there was agreement across the sample that Hawkamat 
Alsharekat is the most widely used term. This was placed first with a mean of 4.25 
and a median score of 4. Second came Aledarah Alrashedah with a mean of 3.80 and 
a median score of 4. This term is commonly used in the Libyan environment since the 
LSM adopted it as an alternative to Hawkamat Alsharekat in the 2007 LCGC. The 
third ranked term was Edart Tandheem wa Murakabat Alsharekat with a mean of 3.16 
and a median score of 3. This term was more favoured by the EM group because its 
narrow interpretation of CG as an internal mechanism for managing companies is 
more compatible with the views of this group. The table shows that the term 
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Alhakemia Almoassasatia was a neutral by all stakeholder groups (with a mean of 
2.65 and a median score of 3), possibly because of its political overtones. 
Table 6.1 Arabic Translation of the Term CG 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = 
agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
When the Kruskal-Wallis test was applied, significance levels equal to or lower than 
the critical value of 0.05 indicated that there were statistically significant differences 
between the groups in terms of their responses to Hawkamat Alsharekat, Aledarah 
Alrashedah and Alhakemia Almoassasatia, but not Edart Tandheem wa Murakabat 
Alsharekat (see Table 6.2). When the Mann-Whitney test was then carried out to 
identify any statistically significant differences between pairs of groups, the results 
indicated that there were significant differences between the EM group and each of 
the RE and OS groups with regard to the Arabic term Hawkamat Alsharekat. For the 
Arabic term Aledarah Alrashedah, there were significant differences between the BD 
and OS groups and between the EM and OS groups. There were also significant 
differences between the EM group and the RE and OS groups regarding the Arabic 
term Alhakemia Almoassasatia.     
Table 6.2 Arabic Translation of the Term CG: KW Test & MW Test 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q1a 4.13 4.05 4.34 4.22 0.004* Significant 0.217 0.057 0.254 0.001* 0.008* 0.345 
Q1b 3.54 3.73 4.12 3.80 0.017* Significant 0.329 0.083 0.001* 0.518 0.029* 0.190 
Q1c 2.98 3.30 3.29 3.16 0.216 Not Significant 0.116 0.788 0.102 0.193 0.797 0.160 
Q1d 2.60 2.99 2.50 2.65 0.039* Significant 0.152 0.499 0.768 0.004* 0.028* 0.705 
 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q1a: Hawkamat Alsharekat 231 4.25 4 0.81 1 
Q1b: Aledarah Alrashedah 231 3.80 4 1.06 2 
Q1c: Edart Tandheem wa Murakabat Alsharekat 224 3.16 3 1.33 3 
Q1d: Alhakemia Almoassasatia 223 2.65 3 1.21 4 
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6.4.2 Definition of CG 
The stakeholder groups were asked to respond to a set of five CG definitions drawn 
from the literature (see Table 6.3). The definitions, which represented both the agency 
and the stakeholder perspectives, were all accepted by the respondents. Keasey & 
Wright‟s (1993) broad definition of CG as “a set of regulations, rules, procedures and 
cultures that enable a company to perform successfully” (Q2e) was ranked the highest 
with mean and median scores of 4.03 and 4 respectively. This was followed in second 
place by Parkinson‟s (1994) definition of CG as “monitoring and supervision of a 
company management to ensure it is working in the interests of the shareholders” 
(Q2d). This gathered mean and median scores of 3.85 and 4 respectively. Cadbury‟s 
(1992) definition of CG as “the system through which a company is directed and 
controlled” (Q2a) achieved third place with mean and median scores of 3.84 and 4 
respectively. Definition Q2c views CG from the broader stakeholder perspective as 
“regulating the relationship between a company and the different stakeholders who 
are affected by and affect the activities and decisions of the company”. This was 
ranked fourth with mean and median scores of 3.82 and 4 respectively. Lastly, 
definition Q2b, which views CG from a narrower perspective (i.e. the shareholders‟ 
view), achieved the lowest rank with mean and median scores of 3.58 and 4 
respectively.  
Table 6.3 Definition of CG 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly 
agree. 
Table 6.4 shows that there were almost no statistically significant differences among 
the group means, apart from Q2b, which defines CG from an agency perspective. The 
p-value of 0.005 indicates that one or more stakeholder groups differed from the 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q2a: CG is the system through which a company is directed and controlled. 227 3.84 4 0.82 3 
Q2b: CG is used to regulate the relationship between a company and its shareholders. 226 3.58 4 0.95 5 
Q2c: CG is used to regulate the relationship between a company and the different stakeholders  
         who are affected by and affect the activities and decisions of the company. 
229 3.82 4 0.94 4 
Q2d: CG is the monitoring and supervision of a company‟s management to ensure it is 
         working in the interests of the shareholders. 
230 3.85 4 0.99 2 
Q2e: CG is a set of regulations, rules, procedures and cultures that enable a company to 
         perform successfully. 
228 4.03 4 0.96 1 
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others; the Mann-Whitney test revealed the differences to be between the BD and EM 
groups and the BD and RE groups. The finding suggests that although all three groups 
took a broad perspective of CG, the BD group was the broadest.  
Table 6.4 Definition of CG: KW Test & MW Test 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q2a 3.95 3.76 3.76 3.93 0.184 Not Significant 0.085 0.169 0.994 0.856 0.093 0.180 
Q2b 3.92 3.46 3.34 3.70 0.005* Significant 0.001* 0.005* 0.622 0.751 0.056 0.071 
Q2c 3.93 3.72 3.79 3.88 0.683 Not Significant 0.225 0.669 0.805 0.581 0.326 0.810 
Q2d 3.87 3.84 2.79 3.89 0.923 Not Significant 0.654 0.885 0.873 0.829 0.431 0.582 
Q2e 3.98 4.01 4.02 4.11 0.594 Not Significant 0.817 0.471 0.414 0.310 0.239 0.990 
6.4.3 Importance and Awareness of CG 
In order to gain an overview of CG in the Libyan environment, the respondents were 
asked to give their views about the importance of CG and the general level of CG 
awareness in Libya. Questions 3a and 3b were designed to explore the respondents‟ 
perceptions of the relevance of CG. The findings in Table 6.5 reveal that the 
stakeholder groups strongly agreed that CG systems are extremely important both for 
listed companies themselves and for shareholders (overall mean scores of 4.25 and 
4.27 respectively and overall median scores of 4 and 4 respectively). Breaking the 
sample down, Table 6.6 shows that the OS group agreed most strongly (mean scores 
of 4.55 and 4.54 respectively), while the BD and EM groups came second highest 
with mean scores of 4.17 and 4.16 respectively for Q3a and mean scores of 4.15 and 
4.27 respectively for Q3b. The RE group agreed least strongly, with mean scores of 
4.13 and 4.08 respectively. Although the Kruskal-Wallis test found no significant 
differences in the stakeholders‟ answers for either statement, the Mann-Whitney test 
identified significant differences between the EM and OS groups on Q3a and between 
the RE and OS groups on Q3b. The high level of support shown for these statements 
by the OS group may be because it is the most familiar with the LCGC. 
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Table 6.5 Importance and Awareness of CG 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly 
agree.  
Q3c was designed to investigate stakeholders‟ awareness of CG, but as Table 6.5 
shows, the sample as a whole felt that awareness of CG issues in the Libyan 
environment is inadequate (overall mean and median scores of 2.39 and 2 
respectively). Breaking the sample down into groups, Table 6.6 shows that the RE 
group disagreed with the statement the most strongly (mean score of 2.21), while the 
BD group, although still disagreeing, did so the least strongly (mean score of 2.67).  
The Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 6.6) identified statistically significant differences 
among the four groups regarding the level of public awareness of CG in the Libyan 
environment (p-value for this statement was 0.032); the Mann-Whitney test 
highlighted these as being between the BD and EM groups and the BD and RE 
groups.  The BD group was slightly more inclined than either of the other two groups 
to feel that there is slightly awareness of CG issues in the Libyan environment. 
The remaining question Q3d were designed to investigate stakeholders‟ awareness of 
CG. As shown in Table 6.5, the respondents did not believe that Libyan listed 
companies follow international developments in the area of CG (Q3d), giving this 
statement overall mean and median scores of 2.59 and 3 respectively. Again, the BD 
group disagreed least strongly, producing the highest group mean score (2.77). Table 
6.6 demonstrates the outcomes of the Kruskal-Wallis test, which indicated no 
significant differences in respondents‟ responses in relation to Q3d.  
 
 
 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q3a: CG is important for Libyan listed companies. 229 4.25 4 0.87 2 
Q3b: The implementation of CG gives confidence to shareholders. 229 4.27 4 0.81 1 
Q3c: There is sufficient awareness of CG issues in the Libyan environment. 231 2.39 2 0.95 4 
Q3d: Libyan listed companies follow international developments in the area of CG. 229 2.59 3 0.95 3 
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Table 6.6 Importance and Awareness of CG: KW Test & MW Test 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q3a 4.17 4.16 4.13 4.55 0.071 Not Significant 0.648 0.897 0.075 0.499 0.006* 0.112 
Q3b 4.15 4.27 4.08 4.54 0.056 Not Significant 0.842 0.544 0.102 0.595 0.017* 0.013* 
Q3c 2.67 2.35 2.21 2.39 0.032* Significant 0.044* 0.005* 0.094 0.158 0.940 0.206 
Q3d 2.77 2.60 2.40 2.62 0.317 Not Significant 0.286 0.063 0.471 0.264 0.921 0.308 
6.5 Compliance with CG Mechanisms 
This section sought to identify stakeholders‟ views regarding the level of commitment 
to CG mechanisms within Libyan listed companies. The mechanisms identified were 
the BOD, disclosure and transparency, internal and external auditing and 
shareholders‟ rights. 
6.5.1 The Board of Directors Mechanism 
The BOD is one of the key internal CG mechanisms ensuring that the interests of 
shareholders and managers are aligned and that management teams are operating 
effectively (Kang et al., 2007). There is a general consensus that when other CG 
mechanisms are weakened, an inefficient board can be costly to companies and, in 
turn, to society. As a result, much of the debate about CG has concentrated on the 
boards‟ activities (De Andres et al., 2005). Accordingly, the questions in this section 
of the survey were designed to explore the respondents‟ views regarding the duties, 
responsibilities and composition of the board and its committees. 
6.5.1.1 Duties of the Board of Directors 
In the first part of Q4, respondents were asked to indicate how far they agreed that the 
activities listed in statements Q4a-e constitute the duties of boards in Libyan listed 
companies. As can be seen in Table 6.7, the respondents as a whole agreed that all the 
listed duties are undertaken by boards; overall mean scores ranged from 4.16 to 3.81, 
while overall median scores were all 4. 
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Table 6.7 Duties of the Board of Directors 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.  
The statement: “The Board of Directors endorses the strategic direction and main 
objectives of the company and supervises their implementation” (Q4a) scored highest 
with overall mean and median scores of 4.16 and 4 respectively. Table 6.8 shows that 
the BD and EM groups endorsed this most strongly (group means 4.19 and 4.20 
respectively). Q4b: “The Board of Directors sets up and supervises systems of internal 
control” was awarded overall mean and median scores of 3.87 and 4 respectively, 
with the highest group mean coming from the BD group (4.06), while Q4c: “The 
Board of Directors sets out specific and clear policies, standards and procedures for 
the membership of the Board of Directors” achieved overall mean and median scores 
of 3.81 and 4 respectively – again, the highest group mean came from the BD group 
(3.96). The statement: “The Board of Directors sets out a clear written policy 
governing the relations between stakeholders in order to protect their interests and 
preserve their rights” (Q4d) was given overall mean and median scores of 3.87 and 4 
respectively, but this time, the highest group mean came from the OS group (4.00), 
indicating a high level of emphasis on this aspect of board activity. Finally, “The 
Board of Directors sets up policies and procedures to ensure that the company‟s rules 
and regulations, as well as its commitment to disclose essential information to 
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders, are respected” (Q4e) was given overall 
mean and median scores of 4.12 and 4 respectively. The highest group mean for this 
statement (4.25) came from the RE group, which represented the external auditors and 
regulators who officially monitor Libyan listed companies and their boards. This is a 
positive indication that these boards are expected to carry out their duties in 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q4a: The Board of Directors endorses the strategic direction and main objectives 
          of the company and supervises their implementation. 
231 4.16 4 0.76 1 
Q4b: The Board of Directors sets up and supervises systems of internal control. 231 3.87 4 0.80 3 
Q4c: The Board of Directors sets out specific and clear policies, standards and 
          procedures for the membership of the Board of Directors. 
231 3.81 4 0.97 5 
Q4d: The Board of Directors sets out a clear written policy governing the relations 
          between stakeholders in order to protect their interests and preserve their rights. 
231 3.87 4 0.83 4 
Q4e: The Board of Directors sets up policies and procedures to ensure that the  
          company‟s rules and regulations, as well as its commitment to disclose essential 
          information to shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders, are respected. 
231 4.12 4 0.78 2 
163 
accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the stipulations of the 
LCGC. 
As shown in Table 6.8, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests revealed no 
statistically significant differences between the groups on this question, indicating 
general satisfaction with the duties undertaken by boards in Libyan listed companies. 
 Table 6.8 Duties of the Board of Directors: KW Test & MW Test  
6.5.1.2 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
In the next part of Q4, respondents were asked to indicate how far they agreed that the 
listed responsibilities are assumed by BODs in Libyan listed companies. As shown in 
Table 6.10, the respondents expressed a high level of agreement with the 
responsibilities listed in Q4f-Q4k. Overall mean scores for the statements ranged from 
3.96 to 3.72, while overall median scores were all 4.  
Statement Q4f: “The Board of Directors has the full authority and power to monitor 
the operations of the company's management in general and monitor the executives in 
particular” was given overall mean and median scores of 3.93 and 4 respectively. 
Table 6.10 shows that the RE group was the strongest supporter of this statement 
(group mean 4.08), while the EM group was the least strong (group mean 3.77). 
Statement Q4g: “The Board of Directors carries out its duties seriously and attentively 
and ensures its decisions are based on adequate information from the executive 
departments” was given overall mean and median scores of 3.84 and 4 respectively. 
The BD group expressed the strongest agreement with this statement (group mean 
3.92), whereas the OS group gave the lowest mean score (3.66). The statement: “The 
members of the Board of Directors represent the majority of the shareholders and are 
committed to serving the company‟s interests generally” (Q4h) scored lowest in this 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q4a 4.19 4.20 4.09 4.14 0.824 Not Significant 0.722 0.562 0.991 0.354 0.704 0.593 
Q4b 4.06 3.84 3.81 3.79 0.385 Not Significant 0.223 0.059 0.213 0.607 0.877 0.739 
Q4c 3.96 3.76 3.72 3.86 0.511 Not Significant 0.285 0.143 0.744 0.699 0.516 0.339 
Q4d 3.92 3.78 3.83 4.00 0.304 Not Significant 0.424 0.333 0.407 0.938 0.124 0.110 
Q4e 4.08 4.08 4.25 4.09 0.405 Not Significant 0.709 0.199 0.994 0.109 0.771 0.248 
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section with overall mean and median scores of 3.72 and 4 respectively. In this case, 
the OS group expressed the strongest support (group mean 3.86), while the EM group 
had the lowest mean score of 3.58.  
Overall, the respondents agreed most strongly with the statement: “The Board of 
Directors determines the authority delegated to the executive management, the 
executive decision-making procedures and the authorisation period” (Q4i), placing 
this first with overall mean and median scores of 3.96 and 4 respectively. Again, the 
strongest supporter for this statement was the OS group (group mean 4.11), while the 
BD and EM groups were the least supportive, with group means of 3.85 each. 
Statement Q4j: “The Board of Directors takes into account the interests of 
stakeholders when making strategic decisions” garnered overall mean and median 
values of 3.85 and 4 respectively. The OS group expressed the strongest agreement 
with this statement (group mean 4.02), while the EM group was the least supportive 
with a mean score of 3.73. Finally, the statement: “Board members devote enough 
time to undertake their responsibilities and to prepare for the meetings of the board” 
(Q4k) garnered overall mean and median scores of 3.73 and 4 respectively. The 
strongest support came from the RE group (group mean 3.85), while the EM group 
was the least supportive (group mean 3.64). 
Table 6.9 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.  
As can be seen in Table 6.10, the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there were no 
statistically significant differences across the sample as a whole for any of the 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q4f: The Board of Directors has the full authority and power to monitor the operations of  
         the company‟s management in general and monitor the executives in particular. 
231 3.93 4 0.83 2 
Q4g: The Board of Directors carries out its duties seriously and attentively and ensures 
          its decisions are based on adequate information from the executive departments. 
231 3.84 4 0.85 4 
Q4h: The members of the Board of Directors represent the majority of the shareholders  
          and are committed to serving the company‟s interests generally. 
231 3.72 4 0.84 6 
Q4i: The Board of Directors determines the authority delegated to the executive 
         management, the executive decision-making procedures and the authorisation period. 
231 3.96 4 0.78 1 
Q4j: The Board of Directors takes into account the interests of stakeholders when making 
         strategic decisions. 
231 3.85 4 0.85 3 
Q4k: Board members devote enough time to undertake their responsibilities and to prepare  
         for the meetings of the board. 
231 3.73 4 0.93 5 
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statements, suggesting that boards in Libyan listed companies fulfil their 
responsibilities towards shareholders and stakeholders. The only significant 
differences found by the Mann-Whitney test were between the EM and RE groups (p-
value=0.038) and the EM and OS groups (p-value=0.043) for statement Q4f. These 
differences may reflect a difference in perception between internal (the EM group) 
and external stakeholders (the RE and OS groups).  
Table 6.10 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: KW Test & MW Test 
6.5.1.3 Composition of the Board of Directors 
Since the composition of the board is generally considered to have an important 
impact on its effectiveness as a CG mechanism, this was the subject of the next set of 
statements in Q4. As shown in Table 6.11, the respondents expressed general 
agreement that the statements accurately reflect conditions in Libyan listed 
companies. Overall mean scores ranged from 4.10 to 3.77 and median scores were 4 
for all the statements. 
Table 6.11 Composition of the Board of Directors 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.  
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q4f 3.85 3.77 4.08 4.05 0.103 Not Significant 0.073 0.291 0.319 0.038* 0.043* 0.974 
Q4g 3.92 3.89 3.91 3.66 0.491 Not Significant 0.448 0.717 0.134 0.772 0.364 0.228 
Q4h 3.71 3.58 3.77 3.86 0.281 Not Significant 0.060 0.772 0.371 0.217 0.065 0.780 
Q4i 3.85 3.85 4.06 4.11 0.143 Not Significant 0.973 0.193 0.078 0.144 0.053 0.545 
Q4j 3.90 3.73 3.81 4.02 0.288 Not Significant 0.515 0.494 0.706 0.679 0.062 0.275 
Q4k 3.75 3.64 3.85 3.80 0.380 Not Significant 0.279 0.748 0.753 0.142 0.146 0.932 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q4l:  Boards in Libyan listed companies have no fewer than three members and no more  
         than eleven. 
231 4.10 4 0.78 1 
Q4m: The general assemblies have criteria for appointing the board members in Libyan listed 
          companies and the period of their appointment is no longer than three years. 
231 3.79 4 0.91 3 
Q4n: The majority of board members in Libyan listed companies are non-executive members. 231 3.84 4 0.86 2 
Q4o: In Libyan listed companies, at least two board members or one third of the board 
         (whichever is greater) are independent. 
231 3.77 4 0.81 4 
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Statement Q4l: “Boards in Libyan listed companies have no fewer than three 
members and no more than eleven” scored highest with overall mean and median 
scores of 4.10 and 4 respectively. The RE and OS groups were the strongest 
supporters of this statement with group means of 4.23 each, while the EM group was 
the least supportive with a mean score of 3.93. Statement Q4m: “The general 
assemblies have criteria for appointing the board members in Libyan listed companies 
and the period of their appointment is no longer than three years” garnered overall 
mean and median scores of 3.79 and 4 respectively. This time, the strongest 
agreement was expressed by the BD group (group mean 3.88), while the EM group 
had the lowest mean score (3.66). The statement that: “The majority of board 
members in Libyan listed companies are non-executive members” (Q4n) scored 
second-highest with overall mean and median scores of 3.84 and 4 respectively. It 
was most strongly supported by the OS group (group mean 4.04) and least supported 
by the BD group (group mean 3.73). Finally, the statement that: “In Libyan listed 
companies, at least two board members or one-third of the board (whichever is 
greater) are independent” (Q4o) was given overall mean and median scores of 3.77 
and 4 respectively. The strongest support came from the BD group (group mean 3.89) 
and the weakest from the OS group (group mean 3.64).  
The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a significant difference among the groups on 
statement Q4l only; when investigated further with the Mann-Whitney test, this 
revealed that the difference lay between the EM and RE groups (p-value=0.015) and 
the EM and OS groups (p-value=0.017). As in the last question, this may reflect a 
difference in perception between internal (the EM group) and external stakeholders 
(the RE and OS groups). 
Table 6.12 Composition of the Board of Directors: KW Test & MW Test 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q4l 4.04 3.93 4.23 4.23 0.038* Significant 0.000 0.219 0.234 0.015* 0.017* 0.986 
Q4m 3.88 3.66 3.85 3.82 0.563 Not Significant 0.250 0.887 0.900 0.269 0.292 0.950 
Q4n 3.73 3.74 3.85 4.04 0.142 Not Significant 0.780 0.648 0.089 0.406 0.029* 0.169 
Q4o 3.89 3.73 3.85 3.64 0.447 Not Significant 0.209 0.631 0.203 0.333 0.860 0.325 
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6.5.1.4 Board Committees 
The next part of Q4 was designed to investigate the respondents‟ views of how board 
committees operate – including their functions and responsibilities – in Libyan listed 
companies. Accordingly, respondents were asked to indicate how far they agreed with 
statements Q4p, Q4q, Q4r, Q4s, Q4t, Q4u and Q4v.  
As shown in Table 6.13, overall, the respondents agreed with statement Q4p that: 
“Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are completely independent” (overall 
mean and median scores of 4.02 and 4 respectively). Table 6.14 shows that the RE 
group was the strongest supporter of this statement (group mean 4.17), while the EM 
group was the weakest (group mean 3.84). This variation of opinion, though not 
sufficient to register in the Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value= 0.083), was significant 
enough to show up in the Mann-Whitney test, which produced a p-value of 0.020 for 
the EM-RE pairing.  
Q4q focused on the composition of audit committees in Libyan listed companies. 
Table 6.13 shows that all respondent groups generally agreed with the statement that: 
“Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are formed from non-executive 
directors and have no fewer than three members” (overall mean and median scores of 
3.88 and 4 respectively). Table 6.14 demonstrates that the RE group expressed the 
strongest support for this statement (group mean 4.06), while the EM group expressed 
the weakest (group mean 3.61). The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed significant 
differences across the sample as a whole (p-value=0.002), which the Mann-Whitney 
test showed was due to statistically significant differences between the EM and BD 
groups (p-value=0.004), the EM and RE groups (p-value=0.001) and the EM and OS 
groups (p-value=0.014). The clear variation was thus due to the EM group‟s 
significantly lower level of support for this statement. 
The respondents agreed overall with statement Q4r that: “The general assembly in 
Libyan listed companies determine the rules for selecting the members of the audit 
committee, the duration of their membership and the committee‟s method of working 
based on the suggestions of the Board of Directors” (mean and median scores of 3.90 
and 4 respectively). Table 6.14 shows that the OS group recorded the highest group 
mean (4.02), while the EM group recorded the lowest (3.72). The Kruskal-Wallis test 
highlighted significant differences across the sample (p-value=0.035), which the 
Mann-Whitney test revealed were due to differences between the EM and BD groups 
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(p-value=0.021) and the EM and OS groups (p-value=0.015). As with the previous 
statement, the variation arose from the EM group expressing a significantly lower 
level of support than the other groups. 
Q4s addressed the functions and responsibilities of audit committees in Libyan listed 
companies. Overall, the respondents agreed with statements Q4s1, Q4s2, Q4s3, Q4s4 
and Q4s5, with overall mean scores of 3.99, 3.92, 3.94, 4.04 and 3.90 respectively and 
median scores of 4 across the board. Table 6.14 shows that the BD group expressed 
the strongest agreement for all these statements with the highest mean scores of 4.17, 
4.04, 4.04, 4.08 and 3.96 respectively. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there were 
no statistically significant differences across the sample for any of the statements (p-
values= 0.331, 0.653, 0.755, 0.872 and 0.523 respectively), and this was echoed in the 
results of the Mann-Whitney test, which identified no significant differences between 
group pairings. This suggests that audit committees in Libyan listed companies are 
discharging their functions and responsibilities effectively, as required under the 
LCGC. 
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Table 6.13 Board Committees 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.  
Q4t sought to identify whether the BOD in Libyan listed companies determines the 
functions of each committee, its period of operation and the powers granted to it. As 
shown in Table 6.13, all stakeholder groups generally agreed with this statement, 
recording overall mean and median scores of 3.90 and 4 respectively. Table 6.14 
shows that the BD group was the strongest supporter of this statement, with a group 
mean of 4.04, while the EM group was the least supportive with a group mean of 
3.82. The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated no significant differences across the sample 
(p-value=0.541), and the Mann-Whitney test found no significant differences between 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q4p: Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are completely independent. 231 4.02 4 0.83 2 
Q4q: Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are formed from non-executive  
         directors and have no fewer than three members. 
231 3.88 4 0.75 9 
Q4r: The general assembly in a Libyan listed company determines the rules for selecting 
         the members of the audit committee, the duration of their membership and the 
         committee‟s method of working based on the suggestions of the Board of Directors. 
231 3.90 4 0.79 8 
Q4s: In practice, the functions and responsibilities of the audit committee in Libyan listed  
         companies include the following: 
- - - - - 
Q4s1: Directly supervising the internal audit of the company‟s management and verifying 
           its effectiveness. 
231 3.99 4 0.75 3 
Q4s2: Examining the internal control system of the company and producing a written 
           report giving opinions and recommendations. 
231 3.92 4 0.74 5 
Q4s3: Making recommendations to the Board of Directors regarding the appointment 
           of the external auditor and sequestration, and the determining of fees. 
231 3.94 4 0.78 4 
Q4s4: Checking the annual financial statements before referring them to the Board of  
           Directors. 
231 4.04 4 0.68 1 
Q4s5: Checking administrative and accounting policies and making recommendations where  
           necessary to the Board of Directors. 
230 3.90 4 0.77 6 
Q4t: The Board of Directors determines the functions of each committee, its period of  
         operation and the powers granted to it. 
230 3.90 4 0.78 7 
Q4u: The members of nomination and remuneration committees in Libyan listed companies 
          are selected based on the suggestions of the Board of Directors. 
231 3.78 4 0.82 10 
Q4v: In practice, the duties and responsibilities of nomination and remuneration committees  
         in Libyan listed companies include the following: 
- - - - - 
Q4v1: Annually reviewing the skills required of board members. 231 3.66 4 0.84 13 
Q4v2: Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the Board of Directors and taking steps 
           to improve it in line with the company‟s interests. 
231 3.70 4 0.88 11 
Q4v3: Recommending candidates to the Board of Directors in accordance with approved 
           policies and standards. 
231 3.65 4 0.95 14 
Q4v4: Setting clear policies for the compensation and remuneration of directors and senior 
           executives.             
231 3.68 4 0.92 12 
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pairs. It may therefore be concluded that all the groups were generally satisfied with 
board performance in terms of determining the functions and duties of committees. 
Table 6.13 shows that the stakeholder groups mostly agreed with the statement that: 
“The members of nomination and remuneration committees in Libyan listed 
companies are selected based on the suggestions of the Board of Directors” (Q4u) 
(overall mean and median scores of 3.78 and 4 respectively). As can be seen Table 
6.14, the BD group expressed the strongest support for this statement (group mean 
3.90), while the EM group registered the lowest level of agreement (group mean 
3.61). The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant differences across the sample as 
a whole (p-value=0.081), but the Mann-Whitney test showed a significant difference 
between the EM and BD groups (p-value=0.028) and the EM and OS groups (p-
value=0.048). Once again, the variation may be explained by the EM group‟s lower 
level of support for the statement. 
Q4v addressed the duties and responsibilities of nomination and remuneration 
committees within Libyan listed companies. As shown in Table 6.13, all respondent 
groups agreed with statements Q4v1, Q4v2, Q4v3 and Q4v4, recording overall mean 
scores of 3.66, 3.70, 3.65 and 3.68 respectively and median scores of 4 for all 
statements. Table 6.14 shows that the OS group expressed the strongest agreement for 
all these statements with the highest mean scores of 3.79, 3.89, 3.82 and 3.95 
respectively. The Kruskal-Wallis test highlighted no significant differences across the 
sample (p-values=0.270, 0.062, 0.360 and 0.070 respectively), but the Mann-Whitney 
test identified significant differences between the OS and EM groups and the OS and 
RE groups for statements Q4v2 and Q4v4 (p-values for Q4v2=0.030 and 0.011 
respectively; for Q4v4, p-value=0.022 for both pairs). These variations may be 
explained by the fact that the OS group expressed stronger agreement than any other 
group.  
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Table 6.14 Board Committees: KW Test & MW Test 
Questions 4w1, 4w2, 4w3, 4w4, 4w5 and 4w6 were designed to investigate which 
board committees the respondents felt already exist within Libyan listed companies 
and their perceived importance. As shown in Table 6.15, 99.6% of the respondents 
said every listed company has an audit committee. This is not surprising, given that 
the majority of Libyan listed companies belong to the banking sector and are required 
by the CBL to comply with the LCGC (which stipulates that companies must have an 
audit committee). Overall, the audit committee was considered the most important, 
recording overall mean and median scores of 4.55 and 4 respectively. 77.5% of 
respondents said listed companies have a nomination committee, while 78.8% said 
they have a remuneration committee. However, these were perceived as the least 
important committees, recording overall mean scores of 3.80 and 3.84 respectively 
(though both medians were still 4). Almost three-quarters of the sample (76.1%) said 
listed companies have a risk committee. Equal importance was attached to Shariah 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q4p 4.06 3.84 4.17 4.06 0.083 Not Significant 0.169 0.350 0.638 0.020* 0.057 0.602 
Q4q 4.00 3.61 4.06 3.96 0.002* Significant 0.004* 0.976 0.555 0.001* 0.014* 0.469 
Q4r 3.98 3.72 3.94 4.02 0.035* Significant 0.021* 0.495 0.989 0.062 0.015* 0.494 
Q4s1 4.17 3.92 3.93 4.00 0.331 Not Significant 0.064 0.197 0.418 0.796 0.348 0.606 
Q4s2 4.04 3.89 3.83 3.95 0.653 Not Significant 0.260 0.408 0.902 0.885 0.372 0.501 
Q4s3 4.04 3.84 3.96 3.96 0.755 Not Significant 0.300 0.812 0.817 0.475 0.472 0.987 
Q4s4 4.08 3.99 4.06 4.05 0.872 Not Significant 0.409 0.699 0.738 0.647 0.561 0.992 
Q4s5 3.96 3.84 3.87 3.96 0.523 Not Significant 0.215 0.735 0.767 0.480 0.201 0.574 
Q4t 4.04 3.82 3.87 3.91 0.541 Not Significant 0.173 0.250 0.477 0.818 0.508 0.659 
Q4u 3.90 3.61 3.83 3.86 0.081 Not Significant 0.028* 0.509 0.883 0.098 0.048* 0.644 
Q4v1 3.58 3.60 3.70 3.79 0.270 Not Significant 0.447 0.651 0.378 0.170 0.059 0.660 
Q4v2 3.73 3.66 3.53 3.89 0.062 Not Significant 0.349 0.178 0.371 0.581 0.030* 0.011* 
Q4v3 3.67 3.60 3.51 3.82 0.360 Not Significant 0.325 0.340 0.814 0.703 0.140 0.141 
Q4v4 3.65 3.62 3.53 3.95 0.070 Not Significant 0.489 0.369 0.157 0.618 0.022* 0.022* 
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committee; with respondents giving overall mean scores of 4.12 and medians of 4 to 
both. Finally, 42.8% of respondents said listed companies have a CG committee. 
Despite this low score, however, the respondents perceived this as the second most 
important board committee, awarding it mean and median scores of 4.16 and 4 
respectively.  
Table 6.15 Perceived Importance of Board Committees 
Board Committee 
Does it exist? Is it important? 
N Yes No N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q4w1: Audit Committee 
224 99.6% 0.04% 227 4.55 4 0.75 1 
Q4w2: Nomination Committee 
222 77.5% 22.5% 224 3.80 4 0.98 6 
Q4w3:  Remuneration (Compensation) Committee 
222 78.8% 21.2% 223 3.84 4 1.00 5 
Q4w4:  Risk committee 
222 76.1% 23.9% 224 4.12 4 0.93 3 
Q4w5:  Corporate Governance (CG) Committee 
222 42.8% 57.2% 221 4.16 4 0.87 2 
Q4w6:  Shariah Committee 
222 71.2% 28.8% 225 4.12 4 0.97 4 
          Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly   
agree.  
As can be seen in Table 6.16, the OS group was the strongest supporter of all the 
committees apart from the Shariah committee, whose strongest support came from the 
BD group. The Kruskal-Wallis test highlighted that there were significant differences 
across the sample in terms of the perceived importance of all the board committees (p-
values=0.001, 0.000, 0.003, 0.029, 0.000 and 0.004), while the Mann-Whitney test 
showed significant differences across all the pairings apart from the EM-RE pair 
(these two groups expressed similar levels of agreement about all the committees). 
The OS group differed significantly from the EM, BD and RE groups in the 
importance it attached to the audit committee, and from the EM and RE groups in the 
importance it attached to all the other committees. The BD differed from the RE 
group in the importance it attached to the nomination committee (p-value=0.011), and 
from the EM group in the importance it attached to the CG committee (p-
value=0.036). This suggests there may be a massive difference between board 
members and executive directors when it comes to their awareness of the importance 
of the CG committee. Finally, significant differences were observed between the BD 
group and the EM and RE groups (p-values=0.004 and 0.011 respectively) on the 
importance of the Shariah committee. This suggests that this group may have more 
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awareness and understanding of this committee‟s role than the other stakeholder 
groups. 
   Table 6.16 Perceived Importance of Board Committees: KW Test & MW Test 
6.5.2 Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism 
Numerous authors (e.g. Solomon, 2013; Berglof & Pajuste, 2005; Monks & Minow, 
2004) have emphasised the importance of disclosure and transparency as an indicator 
of strong CG. Q5 was therefore designed to elicit stakeholders‟ views about the level 
of disclosure and transparency within Libyan listed companies.  
Table 6.17 shows that the stakeholder groups agreed with the statement that: “Libyan 
listed companies have written disclosure policies, endorsed by the Board of Directors, 
to ensure that disclosure arrangements comply with the requirements of the regulatory 
authorities” (Q5a) (overall mean and median scores of 3.51 and 4 respectively). Table 
6.18 indicates that the EM group recorded the highest mean score (3.70), while the 
RE group recorded the lowest (3.28). Although the Kruskal-Wallis test found no 
significant differences across the sample as a whole (p-value=0.099), the Mann-
Whitney test revealed that there were significant differences between the EM group 
and both the BD and the RE groups regarding this statement (p-values=0.049 and 
0.040 respectively). 
Q5b focused on whether directors in Libyan listed companies disclose any personal 
interest they may have in other companies and any transactions that might affect the 
company. According to Table 6.17, the respondents as a whole were neutral towards 
this statement (overall mean and median scores of 2.92 and 3 respectively). Table 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q4w1 4.59 4.45 4.32 4.87 0.001* Significant 0.612 0.301 0.004* 0.538 0.001* 0.000* 
Q4w2 3.91 3.66 3.49 4.16 0.000* Significant 0.095 0.011* 0.197 0.299 0.002* 0.000* 
Q4w3 3.91 3.67 3.64 4.20 0.003* Significant 0.147 0.114 0.161 0.858 0.001* 0.001* 
Q4w4 4.23 3.97 3.96 4.38 0.029* Significant 0.089 0.148 0.486 0.920 0.009* 0.023* 
Q4w5 4.25 3.94 3.96 4.56 0.000* Significant 0.036* 0.105 0.135 0.726 0.000* 0.001* 
Q4w6 4.42 3.89 3.93 4.36 0.004* Significant 0.004* 0.011* 0.523 0.808 0.010* 0.030* 
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6.18 indicates that the EM group expressed the strongest support (group mean 3.19), 
while the OS group registered the lowest level of agreement (group mean 2.64). The 
Kruskal-Wallis test found significant differences across the sample (p-value=0.042), 
with the Mann-Whitney test revealing significant differences between the EM group 
and both the RE and OS groups (p-values=0.027 and 0.009 respectively). The 
variation shows that the RE and OS groups were much less inclined than the EM 
group to believe that directors in Libyan listed companies comply fully with 
disclosure and transparency requirements.  
Q5c sought to investigate whether Libyan listed companies disclose the meetings of 
the BOD in their annual reports. As shown in Table 6.17, the respondents generally 
agreed with this statement, with overall mean and median scores of 3.67 and 4 
respectively. The EM group expressed the strongest support (group mean 3.72), while 
the RE group expressed the weakest (group mean 3.56). The Kruskal-Wallis test 
found no significant differences within the sample (p-value=0.504), and nor did the 
Mann-Whitney test (p-values > 0.05). This suggests that the respondents were 
generally satisfied with Libyan companies in this regard. 
Overall, the respondents also agreed with the statement that: “Libyan listed companies 
disclose the results of the annual audit assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
internal control procedures” (Q5d), awarding it mean and median scores of 3.68 and 4 
respectively. Table 6.18 indicates that the OS group recorded the highest support for 
this statement, with a mean score of 3.98, while the BD group recorded the lowest 
support with a mean score of 3.44. Although all the groups were generally in 
agreement, the Kruskal-Wallis test found significant differences (p-value=0.014), 
which the Mann-Whitney test identified as being between the BD group and both the 
EM and the OS groups (p-values=0.036 and 0.001 respectively). In other words, the 
BD group agreed less strongly with the statement than the other groups.  
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Table 6.17 Disclosure and Transparency 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.  
Q5e addressed whether Libyan listed companies disclose both financial and non-
financial data in their annual reports. Once again, the sample as a whole agreed with 
this statement (overall mean and median scores of 3.56 and 4 respectively). Table 
6.18 shows that the OS group expressed the strongest support (group mean 3.77), 
while the BD group registered the lowest level of agreement with a mean score of 
3.29. The Kruskal-Wallis test identified statistically significant differences across the 
sample (p-value=0.005); investigated further, the Mann-Whitney test revealed that 
significant differences existed between the BD group and both the EM and OS groups 
(p-values=0.008 and 0.003 respectively), and between the RE group and both the EM 
and OS groups (p-values=0.042 and 0.018 respectively). The variation suggests that 
the EM and OS groups were more inclined than the other two groups to believe that 
Libyan listed companies disclose both financial and non-financial data in their annual 
reports. 
Q5f sought to investigate whether Libyan listed companies disclose what has and 
what has not been applied in respect of the rules on CG. As shown in Table 6.18, the 
respondents in general agreed with this statement, with overall mean and median 
scores of 3.48 and 4 respectively. Table 6.18 shows that the OS group was the 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q5a: Libyan listed companies have written disclosure policies, endorsed by the Board of 
         Directors, to ensure that disclosure arrangements comply with the requirements of 
         the regulatory authorities. 
231 3.51 4 0.93 4 
Q5b: Directors in Libyan listed companies disclose any personal interest they may have in 
         other companies and any transactions that might affect the company. 
231 2.92 3 1.10 8 
Q5c: In their annual reports, Libyan listed companies disclose the meetings of the Board of  
         Directors. 
229 3.67 4 0.81 2 
Q5d: Libyan listed companies disclose the results of the annual audit assessing the 
         efficiency and effectiveness of internal control procedures. 
231 3.68 4 0.81 1 
Q5e: Libyan listed companies disclose both financial and non-financial data in their annual 
         reports. 
231 3.56 4 0.83 3 
Q5f: Libyan listed companies disclose what has and what has not been applied in respect  
        of the rules on CG. 
231 3.48 4 0.98 5 
Q5g: Libyan listed companies disclose their policies and programmes concerning the local 
         community and the environment. 
230 2.95 3 1.08 7 
Q5h: Libyan listed companies use their websites to promote disclosure and transparency as 
         well as to provide appropriate information for investors and others. 
231 3.23 3 1.01 6 
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strongest supporter of this statement, with a mean score of 3.66, while the BD group 
was the least supportive with a mean score of 3.31. The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated 
that there were no significant differences across the sample as a whole (p-
value=0.311), and the Mann-Whitney test found no significant differences between 
pairs (p-values > 0.05). The similarity of responses suggests that the respondents were 
all aware of the LCGC‟s stipulation that Libyan listed companies should disclose in 
their annual reports what has and what has not been applied and why.  
Table 6.17 shows that the respondents were generally neutral regarding the statement: 
“Libyan listed companies disclose their policies and programmes concerning the local 
community and the environment” (Q5g), awarding it overall mean and median scores 
of 2.95 and 3 respectively. Table 6.18 indicates that the EM group registered the 
highest support for this statement, with a mean score of 3.29, while the RE group was 
the least supportive with a mean score of 2.70. The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated 
significant differences across the sample (p-value=0.009), and the Mann-Whitney test 
revealed these differences to be between the EM and BD groups (p-value=0.012) and 
between the EM and RE groups (p-value=0.001), confirming that the EM group 
agreed more strongly with the statement than the other two groups.  
Q5h sought to investigate whether Libyan listed companies use their websites to 
promote disclosure and transparency as well as to provide appropriate information for 
investors and others. As shown in Table 6.17, the sample was once again generally 
neutral towards the statement with overall mean and median scores of 3.23 and 3 
respectively. The EM group was again the most supportive (group mean 3.38), but 
this time, it was the RE group that showed the least support (group mean 2.98). The 
Kruskal-Wallis test highlighted no significant differences across the sample as a 
whole (p-value=0.125), but the Mann-Whitney test revealed that the difference 
between the EM and RE groups was statistically significant (p-value=0.017).  
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Table 6.18 Disclosure and Transparency: KW Test & MW Test 
6.5.3 Internal and External Audit Mechanisms 
In Q6, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a 
series of statements relating to internal and external audit practice in Libyan listed 
companies. The first of these statements – “Internal control systems in Libyan listed 
companies are effective” (Q6a) – drew a neutral response, with respondents awarding 
it overall mean and median scores of 3.30 and 3 respectively (see Table 6.19). Table 
6.20 shows that the OS group registered the highest support for this statement with a 
mean score of 3.54, while the RE group was the least supportive with a mean score of 
3.08. Although the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated no significant differences across the 
sample as a whole (p-value=0.117), the Mann-Whitney test found that the difference 
between these two groups was statistically significant (p-value=0.040). The RE 
group‟s relative lack of support for the statement is telling, given that this group 
represents the external auditors and regulators who are best placed to determine 
whether these internal control systems are effective.  
The respondents in general agreed with the statement that: “Internal auditors provide a 
quarterly report to the Board of Directors and the audit committee describing the 
extent of the company‟s compliance with the laws and rules that regulate its 
activities” (Q6b), awarding it overall mean and median scores of 3.72 and 4 
respectively. Once again, Table 6.20 indicates that the OS group was the most 
supportive of this statement (group mean 3.86) and the RE group was the least 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q5a 3.40 3.70 3.28 3.59 0.099 Not Significant 0.049* 0.730 0.181 0.040* 0.832 0.130 
Q5b 2.96 3.19 2.81 2.64 0.042* Significant 0.416 0.336 0.171 0.027* 0.009* 0.503 
Q5c 3.58 3.72 3.56 3.70 0.504 Not Significant 0.146 0.665 0.231 0.412 0.902 0.558 
Q5d 3.44 3.72 3.62 3.98 0.014* Significant 0.036* 0.189 0.001* 0.635 0.161 0.103 
Q5e 3.29 3.68 3.42 3.77 0.005* Significant 0.008* 0.536 0.003* 0.042* 0.650 0.018* 
Q5f 3.31 3.42 3.53 3.66 0.311 Not Significant 0.684 0.353 0.089 0.523 0.129 0.447 
Q5g 2.79 3.29 2.70 2.98 0.009* Significant 0.012* 0.584 0.661 0.001* 0.053 0.343 
Q5h 3.21 3.38 2.98 3.27 0.125 Not Significant 0.417 0.137 0.905 0.017* 0.490 0.141 
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supportive (group mean 3.49). Again, the Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant 
differences in the sample as a whole (p-value=0.199), but the Mann-Whitney test 
indicated a significant difference between the RE and OS groups (p-value=0.042).  
Q6c sought to investigate whether the BOD determines the objectives, functions and 
terms of reference of the internal audit in Libyan listed companies. The respondents 
expressed overall agreement with the statement (overall mean and median scores of 
3.81 and 4 respectively), with the OS group being the most supportive (group mean 
3.91) and the BD group being the least supportive (group mean 3.67). The Kruskal-
Wallis test revealed no significant differences in the sample as a whole (p-
value=0.237), but the Mann-Whitney test indicated that the variation between the BD 
and OS groups was statistically significant (p-value=0.041). 
Table 6.19 Internal and External Audit 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.  
Table 6.19 shows that respondents generally agreed with the statement that: “Libyan 
listed companies choose an external auditor registered in the Libyan Stock Market 
(LSM) to review their financial statements” (Q6d), awarding this overall mean and 
median scores of 3.91 and 4 respectively. Table 6.20 shows that the RE group agreed 
most strongly with this statement (group mean 4.25), while the EM group agreed least 
strongly (group mean 3.57). The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated significant differences 
across the sample as a whole (p-value=0.000); when investigated further, the Mann-
Whitney test revealed that these were between the BD and EM groups (p-
value=0.040) and the BD and RE groups (p-value=0.024), and between the EM and 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q6a: Internal control systems in Libyan listed companies are effective. 231 3.30 3 1.06 5 
Q6b: Internal auditors provide a quarterly report to the Board of Directors and the audit 
         committee describing the extent of the company‟s compliance with the laws and 
         rules that regulate its activities. 
231 3.72 4 0.87 3 
Q6c: The Board of Directors determines the objectives, functions and terms of reference of 
         the internal audit in Libyan listed companies. 
231 3.81 4 0.81 2 
Q6d: Listed companies choose an external auditor registered in the Libyan Stock Market 
         (LSM) to review their financial statements. 
231 3.91 4 0.85 1 
Q6e: The external auditor undertakes no additional work for the company under review 
         (e.g. providing consulting or administrative services). 
230 3.58 4 0.99 4 
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RE groups (p-value=0.000) and the EM and OS groups (p-value=0.000). The findings 
suggest major differences between nearly all of the groups. 
Finally, Q6e sought to investigate whether external auditors undertake any additional 
work for the company they are reviewing (e.g. providing consulting or administrative 
services). As shown in Table 6.19, the respondents generally agreed that external 
auditors undertake no such work, awarding the statement overall mean and median 
scores of 3.58 and 4 respectively. While the OS group expressed the strongest 
agreement (group mean 3.82), the EM group expressed the weakest (group mean 
3.37). The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there were significant differences across 
the sample as a whole (p-value=0.032), which the Mann-Whitney test revealed to be 
caused by the difference between these two groups (p-value=0.004).  
  Table 6.20 Internal and External Audit: KW Test & MW Test 
 
6.5.4 Shareholders’ Rights Mechanism 
Q7 investigated the respondents‟ point views regarding the rights accorded to 
shareholders in Libyan listed companies. The first statement in this question sought to 
investigate whether the respondents perceived these companies‟ statutes and internal 
regulations as containing the necessary procedures to ensure all shareholders‟ rights 
are upheld. Table 6.21 shows that the respondents agreed with the statement, 
awarding it overall mean and median scores of 3.97 and 4 respectively, while Table 
6.22 indicates that the OS group recorded the highest support (group mean 4.02) and 
the BD group recorded the lowest (group mean 3.92). Given the similarity between 
the groups‟ responses, it is not surprising that neither the Kruskal-Wallis nor the 
Mann-Whitney tests found any significant differences (p-values > 0.05). 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q6a 3.33 3.27 3.08 3.54 0.117 Not Significant 0.659 0.226 0.258 0.394 0.144 0.040* 
Q6b 3.79 3.73 3.49 3.86 0.199 Not Significant 0.790 0.171 0.401 0.225 0.273 0.042* 
Q6c 3.67 3.80 3.83 3.91 0.237 Not Significant 0.364 0.304 0.041* 0.858 0.197 0.270 
Q6d 3.85 3.57 4.25 4.11 0.000* Significant 0.040* 0.024* 0.179 0.000* 0.000* 0.226 
Q6e 3.67 3.37 3.55 3.82 0.032* Significant 0.082 0.757 0.247 0.199 0.004* 0.162 
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The respondents also agreed with statement Q7b that: “Shareholders in Libyan listed 
companies are entitled to attend the general assembly‟s meetings, participate in its 
deliberations and vote on its decisions” (overall mean and median scores of 4.15 and 
4 respectively). The strongest support for this statement was expressed by the BD, 
EM and OS groups, with mean scores of 4.25, 4.20 and 4.23 respectively, but much 
less support was expressed by the RE group (group mean 3.91). This was confirmed 
by the Mann-Whitney test, which indicated statistically significant differences 
between the RE group and the other groups for this statement.  
The statement: “Shareholders in Libyan listed companies have the right to ask for any 
information, as long as this does not breach financial regulations or damage the 
interests of the company” (Q7c) attracted general agreement, with overall mean and 
median scores of 4.03 and 4 respectively. The strongest agreement was recorded by 
the BD group, with a mean score of 4.19, while the weakest support was expressed by 
the RE group with a mean score of 3.85. Neither the Kruskal-Wallis nor the Mann-
Whitney tests showed any significant differences between the groups for this 
statement (p-values > 0.05). 
Q8d sought to investigate whether information is provided to shareholders without 
discrimination, regardless of whether they are majority or minority shareholders. 
Table 6.21 reveals that respondents generally agreed with the statement (overall mean 
and median scores of 3.78 and 4 respectively), while Table 6.22 indicates that the 
strongest support came from the BD group (group mean 4.00) and the weakest came 
from the RE group (group mean 3.57). The Mann-Whitney test revealed that the 
difference between these two groups was statistically significant (p-value=0.030), 
though the Kruskal-Wallis test found no significant differences across the sample as a 
whole (p-value=0.193). 
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Table 6.21 The Rights of Shareholders  
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
The respondents generally agreed with the statement that: “General assembly meeting 
agendas take into consideration the issues that shareholders want to discuss” (Q7e), 
awarding it overall mean and median scores of 3.86 and 4 respectively. The strongest 
agreement was expressed by the OS group, with a mean score of 3.96, while the RE 
group was the least supportive of this statement with a mean score of 3.76. The 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests showed that there were no significant 
differences among the stakeholder groups (p-values > 0.05), all of whom recorded 
similar responses. 
A similar pattern emerged in Q7f, which sought to investigate whether boards have 
clear policies regarding the distribution of dividends, and whether these are accessible 
to shareholders during the general assembly meeting. The respondents generally 
agreed that this is the case, awarding the statement overall mean and median scores of 
3.91 and 4 respectively. Once again, the strongest support for this statement came 
from the OS group (group mean 4.04), the weakest came from the RE group (group 
mean 3.83), and neither the Kruskal-Wallis nor the Mann-Whitney tests found any 
significant differences (p-values > 0.05).  
Finally, Q7g sought to investigate whether the respondents perceived shareholders‟ 
legal rights as being respected and guaranteed by Libyan listed companies. Table 6.21 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q7a: The statutes of Libyan listed companies and their internal regulations contain the 
          necessary procedures to ensure all shareholders‟ rights are upheld. 
231 3.97 4 0.78 4 
Q7b: Shareholders in Libyan listed companies are entitled to attend the general assembly‟s 
          meetings, participate in its deliberations and vote on its decisions. 
231 4.15 4 0.75 1 
Q7c: Shareholders in Libyan listed companies have the right to ask for any information, as  
         long as this does not breach financial regulations or damage the interests of the company. 
231 4.03 4 0.83 2 
Q7d: Information is provided to shareholders without discrimination, regardless of whether 
         they are majority or minority shareholders. 
231 3.78 4 0.90 7 
Q7e: General assembly meeting agendas take into consideration the issues that shareholders 
         want to discuss. 
230 3.86 4 0.82 6 
Q7f: There is a clear policy from the Board of Directors regarding the distribution of 
         dividends, and shareholders have the right to see this policy during the general  
         assembly meeting. 
231 3.91 4 0.81 5 
Q7g: Shareholders‟ legal rights are respected by Libyan listed companies. 230 4.00 4 0.73 3 
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reveals overall agreement (overall mean and median scores of 4.00 and 4 
respectively), while Table 6.22 shows once again that the OS group agreed most 
strongly (group mean 4.11), the RE group agreed least strongly (group mean 3.89) 
and no significant differences were identified by the Kruskal-Wallis or Mann-
Whitney tests (p-values > 0.05). 
The results from Q7 are remarkable in that they suggest that stakeholder groups are 
generally very satisfied with the measures that have been put in place to protect 
shareholders‟ rights in Libyan listed companies. The finding may be considered a 
positive indicator and may promote better relations between Libyan listed companies 
and their shareholders.  
Table 6.22 The Rights of Shareholders: KW Test & MW Test 
 
6.6 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability 
In Q8, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a 
number of statements relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
legal/regulatory framework for CG and accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
The question also sought to establish respondents‟ views regarding the extent to 
which companies comply with this framework. 
Q8a and Q8b sought to investigate whether respondents perceived Libya‟s laws and 
regulations as effective, sufficient and providing a suitable environment for CG and 
accountability practices. Table 6.23 indicates that the respondents in general disagreed 
with both statements, giving Q8a overall mean and median scores of 2.44 and 2 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q7a 3.92 3.96 3.98 4.02 0.826 Not Significant 0.535 0.448 0.398 0.755 0.721 0.961 
Q7b 4.25 4.20 3.91 4.23 0.079 Not Significant 0.899 0.032* 0.816 0.042* 0.740 0.026* 
Q7c 4.19 4.04 3.85 4.04 0.495 Not Significant 0.330 0.135 0.667 0.453 0.706 0.321 
Q7d 4.00 3.84 3.57 3.71 0.193 Not Significant 0.369 0.030* 0.245 0.140 0.655 0.406 
Q7e 3.79 3.89 3.76 3.96 0.509 Not Significant 0.503 0.982 0.196 0.493 0.464 0.202 
Q7f 3.85 3.92 3.83 4.04 0.515 Not Significant 0.764 0.776 0.270 0.532 0.335 0.170 
Q7g 4.00 4.01 3.89 4.11 0.539 Not Significant 0.901 0.782 0.244 0.656 0.318 0.195 
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respectively and Q8b scores of 2.49 and 2 respectively. The EM group was the most 
supportive of the framework in both cases (mean scores 2.84 and 2.85 respectively), 
while the least supportive in both cases was the RE group (mean scores 2.11 and 2.26 
respectively). The Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 6.24) found significant differences 
within the sample for both Q8a and Q8b (p-values=0.000 and 0.007 respectively). 
When these differences were investigated using the Mann-Whitney test, an identical 
pattern emerged for both statements, with significant differences being identified 
between the RE group and the remaining three groups (p-values < 0.05). The 
variations suggest that regulators and external auditors, whose job it is to enforce the 
laws and regulations that govern Libyan listed companies, are significantly less 
satisfied with their adequacy and effectiveness than those stakeholder groups that 
have less direct involvement in this respect. 
Table 6.23 shows that respondents were generally neutral towards statement Q8c: 
“Legislative bodies and the LSMA play an effective role in the supervision and 
control of CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed companies” (overall mean 
and median scores of 3.18 and 3 respectively). The strongest support for this 
statement was recorded by the EM group (group mean 3.37), while the weakest 
support was expressed by the RE group (group mean 2.85). The Kruskal-Wallis test 
revealed that there were significant differences across the sample as a whole (p-
value=0.022), which the Mann-Whitney test identified as being between the RE group 
and both the EM and OS groups (p-values=0.002 and 0.021 respectively). The 
findings suggest a degree of dissatisfaction, especially among regulators, with the 
performance of both the Libyan legislative bodies and the LSMA. Possible 
explanations include the perceived failure of these bodies to modernise the law to 
bring it into line with the requirements of CG and accountability, and the lack of 
controls forcing Libyan listed companies to comply with the legal/regulatory 
framework. 
Table 6.23 shows that respondents were also neutral towards statement Q8d: “Libyan 
listed companies adhere to the laws and regulations in force in the LSM” (overall 
mean and median scores of 3.30 and 3 respectively). The EM and OS groups 
expressed the strongest agreement with this statement, with mean scores of 3.39 each, 
while the weakest agreement was recorded by the RE group with a mean score of 
3.13. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests found no significant differences 
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among the groups (p-values > 0.05), indicating a general consensus that there are 
weaknesses in Libyan listed companies‟ compliance with the LSM‟s laws and 
regulations. 
   Table 6.23 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability  
   Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
The respondents in general agreed with the statement that: “The Libyan Corporate 
Governance Code (LCGC) should be mandatory for all Libyan listed companies” 
(Q8e), recording overall mean and median scores of 4.15 and 4 respectively. The 
strongest agreement for this statement was recorded by the OS group, with a mean 
score of 4.30, while the weakest support was expressed by the RE group with a mean 
score of 3.98. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests identified no significant 
differences within the sample (p-values > 0.05). The RE group‟s response may appear 
surprising at first, but this group felt that rather than concerning themselves with 
enforcing the LCGC, the first priority of the LSM and Libyan legislators should be to 
amend the country‟s legal framework to bring it into line with CG requirements.  
Q8f sought to investigate whether the respondents saw the need for an independent 
body to be established to oversee CG issues in Libya. They expressed overall 
agreement with this statement, awarding it overall mean and median scores of 4.13 
and 4 respectively. The RE group agreed most strongly (group mean 4.25), while the 
BD group was the least supportive (group mean 4.00), but neither the Kruskal-Wallis 
nor the Mann-Whitney tests revealed any significant differences (p-values > 0.05). 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q8a: The laws and regulations in Libya are effective and sufficient and provide a suitable 
         environment for CG practices. 
231 2.44 2 1.04 7 
Q8b: The laws and regulations in Libya are effective and sufficient and provide a suitable 
          environment for accountability practices. 
231 2.49 2 1.05 6 
Q8c: Legislative bodies and the LSMA play an effective role in the supervision and  
         control of CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed companies.  
231 3.18 3 1.04 5 
Q8d: Libyan listed companies adhere to the laws and regulations in force in the LSM. 231 3.30 3 1.00 4 
Q8e: The Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) should be mandatory for all Libyan 
          listed companies. 
231 4.15 4 0.84 1 
Q8f: There is an urgent need for the establishment of an independent body to oversee CG 
          issues in Libya. 
231 4.13 4 0.80 2 
Q8g: Libyan listed companies that do not comply with the LCGC should be de-listed. 230 3.80 4 0.98 3 
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Several respondents commented in the questionnaire that an independent body is 
needed to encourage good CG practice in listed and non-listed companies alike. 
According to one member of the RE group, 
“Although the LSMA is an independent body that oversees Libyan listed 
companies, in fact, it has not yet carried out this function because it lacks 
enforcement mechanisms on the one hand and cooperation with legal bodies 
on the other. Establishing an independent body to oversee CG practices within 
unlisted companies would help raise awareness about the concept and 
importance of CG in the Libyan environment”.  
Table 6.23 shows that the respondents agreed overall with the statement that: “Libyan 
listed companies that do not comply with the LCGC should be de-listed” (Q8g), 
recording overall mean and median scores of 3.80 and 4 respectively. The strongest 
support for this statement was recorded by the OS group, with a mean score of 4.04, 
while the weakest support was expressed by the BD group with a mean score of 3.60. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test found that there were significant differences within the 
sample as a whole (p-value=0.045), which the Mann-Whitney test identified as being 
between the OS group and both the BD and EM groups (p-values=0.011 and 0.031 
respectively). It is surprising that the OS group felt that Libyan listed companies that 
do not comply with the LCGC or do not provide reasons for their non-compliance 
should be de-listed from the LSM. The BD group‟s low level of agreement may be 
because these respondents recognised that this proposal is unlikely to be implemented, 
given the limited number of Libyan listed companies. 
Table 6.24 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability: KW Test & MW Test 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q8a 2.77 2.84 2.11 2.77 0.000* Significant 0.749 0.002* 0.935 0.000* 0.617 0.001* 
Q8b 2.75 2.85 2.26 2.82 0.007* Significant 0.582 0.020* 0.735 0.001* 0.881 0.007* 
Q8c 3.19 3.37 2.85 3.25 0.022* Significant 0.453 0.073 0.814 0.002* 0.580 0.021* 
Q8d 3.23 3.39 3.13 3.39 0.412 Not Significant 0.374 0.705 0.277 0.201 0.770 0.165 
Q8e 4.23 4.11 3.98 4.30 0.264 Not Significant 0.233 0.182 0.951 0.759 0.129 0.118 
Q8f 4.00 4.14 4.25 4.13 0.506 Not Significant 0.372 0.148 0.534 0.527 0.707 0.294 
Q8g 3.60 3.69 3.90 4.04 0.045* Significant 0.643 0.105 0.011* 0.229 0.031* 0.320 
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6.7 Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
This section sought to investigate which factors the respondents perceived as having 
the most influence on the practices of CG and accountability in Libyan listed 
companies. As shown in Table 6.25, the respondents saw most of the listed factors as 
having an impact, but the factor they regarded as the most influential was the 
country‟s current economic and political situation (overall mean and median scores of 
4.28 and 4 respectively). The strongest support for this statement (Q9p) came from 
the OS group, with a mean score of 4.50, while the EM group recorded the weakest 
agreement with a mean score of 4.18.  
There was also general agreement that the weak investment climate in the LSM 
(Q9h), the limited number of listed companies in the LSM (Q9m), the limited CG 
training programmes available for directors (Q9f), weak accountability mechanisms 
(Q9g) and the lack of knowledge about CG in listed companies (Q9d) all adversely 
affect CG practices and accountability (overall mean scores of 4.21, 4.10, 4.07, 4.02 
and 3.93 respectively). As shown in Table 6.26, statement Q9h drew the strongest 
support from the OS group (group mean 4.59) and the weakest from the BD group 
(group mean 3.96). The OS group was also the strongest supporter of statements Q9m 
(group mean 4.43), Q9f (group mean 4.21) and Q9g (group mean 4.25), but in these 
three cases, the weakest support came from the EM group (group means 3.86, 3.91 
and 3.90 respectively). With regard to Q9d, the BD group expressed the strongest 
agreement, with a mean score of 3.96, while the RE group registered the weakest 
agreement with a mean score of 3.74.  
The respondents agreed overall that the LSMA is inefficient (Q9i), international 
accounting and auditing standards are not widely adopted (Q9n), the mechanisms 
protecting the rights of stakeholders are weak (Q9e), there are weaknesses in the 
administrative and legal environment for listed companies (Q9c) and there is 
administrative and financial corruption in some Libyan listed companies (Q9a). The 
statements were awarded overall mean scores of 3.87, 3.84, 3.83, 3.81 and 3.79 
respectively. Table 6.26 shows that statement Q9i was most strongly supported by the 
RE group (group mean 3.98), while the EM group expressed the weakest agreement 
(group mean 3.77). The pattern was repeated for statement Q9n, where the RE group 
recorded the highest mean score (4.09) and the EM group recorded the lowest (3.53). 
In contrast, the BD group recorded the strongest agreement with statements Q9e 
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(group mean 4.13) and Q9a (group mean 3.96), while the least supportive group for 
both these statements was the RE group (group means 3.72 and 3.36 respectively). 
The BD and EM groups both expressed the strongest agreement (group mean 3.92) 
with statement Q9c, while the OS group expressed the weakest (group mean 3.66).  
The respondents agreed to some extent that the implementation of CG in listed 
companies takes a long time (Q9l), companies face political interference in their 
economic activities (Q9o) and boards in Libyan listed companies lack diversity (Q9k), 
awarding these statements overall mean scores of 3.58, 3.55 and 3.44 respectively. 
Table 6.26 reveals that the OS group agreed most strongly with Q9l (group mean 
3.73), while the RE group expressed the weakest agreement (group mean 3.38). In the 
case of statement Q9o, the BD group was the strongest supporter (group mean 3.75), 
while in statement Q9k, the strongest supporter was the EM group (group mean 3.62). 
In both cases, the RE group was the least supportive (mean scores of 3.19 and 3.11 
respectively).  
Finally, Table 6.25 indicates that the respondents were neutral and disagreed towards 
statements Q9j (“The principles of CG are incompatible with the interests of joint 
stock companies”) and Q9b (“There is weakness in terms of the independence of the 
external auditor”), awarding these overall mean scores of 3.29 and 2.45 respectively 
and median scores of 3 and 2 respectively. Table 6.26 shows that the BD group 
recorded the strongest agreement with both statements (group means 3.50 and 2.55 
respectively), while the RE group was the least supportive of both (group means 3.13 
and 2.36 respectively). 
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Table 6.25 Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability  
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
As shown in Table 6.26, the Kruskal-Wallis test found that there were no significant 
differences across the sample as a whole for statements Q9c, Q9d, Q9e, Q9f, Q9g, 
Q9i, Q9j, Q9k, Q9l and Q9p (p-values > 0.05). However, in relation to statements 
Q9a, Q9b, Q9h, Q9m, Q9n and Q9o there were significant differences in the attitudes 
of stakeholder groups (p-values < 0.05). 
The outcomes of the Mann-Whitney test, as shown in Table 6.26, demonstrate that 
there were significant differences between the attitudes of the RE group and all other 
stakeholder groups regarding Q9a (p-values < 0.05). In statement Q9b there were 
statistically significant differences between the BD group and both the RE and OS 
groups, and between the EM group and both the RE and OS groups (p-values < 0.05). 
With respect to Q9e, there were significant differences between the BD group and 
both the EM and RE groups (p-values=0.014 and 0.017 respectively). In statements 
Q9f, Q9g and Q10p there were significant differences between the EM and OS groups 
(p-values=0.033, 0.015 and 0.035 respectively), while in Q9h there were statistically 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q9a: There is administrative and financial corruption in some Libyan listed companies. 231 3.79 4 1.12 11 
Q9b: There is weakness in terms of the independence of the external auditor. 230 2.45 2 1.12 16 
Q9c: There are weaknesses in the administrative and legal environment for listed companies. 231 3.81 4 1.01 10 
Q9d: There is a lack of knowledge about CG in listed companies. 231 3.93 4 1.05 6 
Q9e: The mechanisms protecting the rights of stakeholders are weak. 229 3.83 4 0.93 9 
Q9f: There are limited training programmes for directors with respect to CG. 231 4.07 4 0.93 4 
Q9g: Accountability mechanisms in general are weak. 230 4.02 4 0.87 5 
Q9h: There is a weak investment climate in the LSM. 231 4.21 4 1.00 2 
Q9i: The Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA) is inefficient. 231 3.87 4 1.01 7 
Q9j: The principles of CG are incompatible with the interests of joint stock companies. 231 3.29 3 1.06 15 
Q9k: Boards of Directors in Libyan listed companies lack diversity. 230 3.44 4 1.01 14 
Q9l: The implementation of CG in listed companies takes a long time. 230 3.58 4 0.97 12 
Q9m: There is a limited number of listed companies in the LSM. 228 4.10 4 0.79 3 
Q9n: International accounting and auditing standards are not widely adopted. 230 3.84 4 1.03 8 
Q9o: There is political interference (government intervention) in the economic activities of 
          Libyan listed companies. 
229 3.55 4 1.07 13 
Q9p: The economic and political situation in Libya adversely affects CG practice. 230 4.28 4 0.91 1 
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significant differences between the OS group and both the BD and EM groups (p-
values=0.001 and 0.000 respectively), and between the EM and RE groups (p-
value=0.038). In statement Q9k there was a significant difference between the EM 
and RE groups (p-value=0.031), while in statement Q9m there were significant 
differences between the OS group and both the EM and RE groups (p-values=0.000 
and 0.011 respectively), and between the BD group and the EM group (p-
value=0.012). Statement Q9n produced statistically significant differences between 
the EM group and the BD, RE and OS groups (p-values=0.047, 0.001 and 0.009 
respectively). Finally, there were significant differences between the RE group and 
both the BD and EM groups for statement Q9o (p-values=0.010 and 0.014 
respectively). Generally, the significant differences were caused by the BD and OS 
groups expressing stronger support for the statements than the other two groups; in 
other words, they were more inclined to see these factors as having an impact on CG 
and accountability.  
The analysis indicates a general consensus that the most influential factor in terms of 
CG practices and accountability in Libyan listed companies is the country‟s current 
economic and political situation. Equally notable, however, is the respondents‟ 
general disagreed towards the statement suggesting that external auditors lack full 
independence, given that their registration with the LSM means they meet the 
required standards to support their independence. 
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Table 6.26 Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability: KW Test & MW Test  
6.8 Accountability Practices 
This section sought to investigate the respondents‟ attitudes towards accountability in 
Libyan listed companies. Table 6.27 indicates that they agreed in general with Knell‟s 
(2006) definition of accountability as the expectation that those in authority must be 
able to clarify and justify the actions taken on behalf of stakeholders (Q10a). They 
gave this definition overall mean and median scores of 4.05 and 4 respectively on the 
grounds that it is understandable to all stakeholders regardless of their level of 
education. Table 6.28 shows that the BD and OS groups were the strongest supporters 
of Knell‟s definition, with mean scores of 4.15 and 4.23 respectively, while the EM 
group expressed the weakest agreement for this statement with a mean score of 3.89. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that there were significant differences within the 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q9a 3.96 3.88 3.36 3.93 0.021* Significant 0.418 0.009* 0.928 0.018* 0.484 0.013* 
Q9b 2.55 2.50 2.36 2.41 0.000* Significant 0.754 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.177 
Q9c 3.92 3.92 3.70 3.66 0.412 Not Significant 0.606 0.315 0.140 0.500 0.196 0.641 
Q9d 3.96 3.89 3.74 3.93 0.677 Not Significant 0.652 0.526 0.624 0.279 0.354 0.918 
Q9e 4.13 3.75 3.72 3.79 0.054 Not Significant 0.014* 0.017* 0.067 0.919 0.602 0.554 
Q9f 4.13 3.91 4.09 4.21 0.173 Not Significant 0.167 0.928 0.553 0.142 0.033* 0.651 
Q9g 4.02 3.90 3.93 4.25 0.143 Not Significant 0.408 0.898 0.208 0.468 0.015* 0.180 
Q9h 3.96 4.05 4.25 4.59 0.001* Significant 0.828 0.052 0.001* 0.038* 0.000* 0.281 
Q9i 3.88 3.77 3.98 3.89 0.370 Not Significant 0.419 0.453 0.789 0.086 0.236 0.623 
Q9j 3.50 3.23 3.13 3.36 0.344 Not Significant 0.121 0.106 0.422 0.678 0.600 0.388 
Q9k 3.48 3.62 3.11 3.48 0.160 Not Significant 0.488 0.165 0.896 0.031* 0.359 0.154 
Q9l 3.63 3.58 3.38 3.73 0.309 Not Significant 0.730 0.215 0.659 0.255 0.368 0.070 
Q9m 4.17 3.86 4.02 4.43 0.000* Significant 0.012* 0.332 0.171 0.084 0.000* 0.011* 
Q9n 3.88 3.53 4.09 3.98 0.004* Significant 0.047* 0.210 0.645 0.001* 0.009* 0.400 
Q9o 3.75 3.64 3.19 3.61 0.034* Significant 0.461 0.010* 0.448 0.014* 0.816 0.055 
Q9p 4.27 4.18 4.19 4.50 0.165 Not Significant 0.303 0.404 0.454 0.841 0.035* 0.074 
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sample (p-value=0.038), which the Mann-Whitney test confirmed were between the 
EM group and both the BD and OS groups (p-values=0.047 and 0.005 respectively). 
Respondents were generally disagreed with the statement Q10b: “Accountability is 
practised and discharged in all Libyan listed companies” (overall mean and median 
scores of 2.45 and 2 respectively). As can be seen in Table 6.28, the RE group 
expressed the weakest agreement regarding this statement, with a mean score of 2.24, 
while the EM group was the most supportive with a mean score of 2.65 The Kruskal-
Wallis test indicated that there were significant differences within the sample with 
respect to this statement (p-value=0.000), which the Mann-Whitney test highlighted 
as being between the EM group and the BD, RE and OS groups (p-values=0.003, 
0.000 and 0.000 respectively), and between the BD and RE groups (p-value=0.006). 
Likewise, the respondents were generally neutral towards the statement that: “Libyan 
listed companies commit to accountability as one way of fulfilling their 
responsibilities towards Libyan society” (Q10c), giving this overall mean and median 
scores of 3.07 and 3 respectively. As shown in Table 6.28, the most supportive was 
the EM group, with a mean score of 3.47, while the least supportive was the RE group 
with a mean score of 2.49. The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there were 
statistically significant differences among the groups (p-value=0.000), which the 
Mann-Whitney test revealed to be between the RE group and the BD, EM and OS 
groups (p-values=0.001, 0.000 and 0.007 respectively), and between the BD group 
and the EM group (p-value=0.046). 
Statements Q10d and Q10e also attracted only a neutral response from the sample; 
they indicated only moderate agreement with the statement that: “The existence of 
effective mechanisms of accountability in the LSM inspires confidence in investors 
and stakeholders alike” (overall mean and median scores of 3.20 and 3 respectively), 
and they were not satisfied that: “All relevant parties (stakeholders) with Libyan listed 
companies practise accountability upon these companies” (overall mean and median 
scores of 2.91 and 3 respectively). Table 6.28 shows that the EM group was the most 
supportive of both statements, with mean scores of 3.43 and 3.19 respectively, while 
the RE group was the least supportive with mean scores of 2.76 and 2.49 respectively. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there were statistically significant differences 
within the sample for both statements (p-values=0.009 and 0.002 respectively). In 
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both cases, the Mann-Whitney test indicated that there were significant differences 
between the RE group and the BD, EM and OS groups (p-values < 0.05). 
Table 6.27 Accountability Practices 
Note: A five-point Likert Scale was adopted where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
Q10f sought to investigate whether Libyan listed companies‟ BODs, executive 
managers and employees are considered accountable for the consequences of their 
actions. Table 6.27 reveals that the respondents were neutral towards this statement, 
recording overall mean and median scores of 3.48 and 3 respectively. The BD group 
showed the strongest support, with mean score of 3.66, while the RE group was the 
least supportive with a mean score of 3.36. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test found no 
significant differences across the sample (p-value=0.345), and the Mann-Whitney test 
showed no differences among the pairs (p-values > 0.05). 
Finally, the respondents were neutral towards the statement: “Adopting a good CG 
makes Libyan listed companies to discharge their accountability” (Q10g), giving it 
overall mean and median scores of 2.97 and 3 respectively. As shown in Table 6.28, 
the EM group was the most supportive of this statement, with a mean score of 3.24, 
while the RE group was the least supportive with a mean score of 2.64. The Kruskal-
Wallis test showed that there were statistically significant differences within the 
sample (p-value=0.033), which the Mann-Whitney test confirmed was due to the 
difference between the EM and RE groups (p-value=0.005). 
Statement N Mean Median SD Rank 
Q10a: Those in authority must be accountable and able to clarify and justify the actions taken 
            on behalf of stakeholders.  
231 4.05 4 0.86 1 
Q10b: Accountability is practised and discharged in all Libyan listed companies. 231 2.45 2 1.03 7 
Q10c: Libyan listed companies commit to accountability as one way of fulfilling their  
           responsibilities towards Libyan society. 
230 3.07 3 1.02 4 
Q10d: The existence of effective mechanisms of accountability in the LSM inspires confidence  
            in investors and stakeholders alike. 
231 3.20 3 1.13 3 
Q10e: All relevant parties (stakeholders) with Libyan listed companies practise accountability 
           upon these companies. 
231 2.91 3 0.99 6 
Q10f: Libyan listed companies‟ boards of directors, executive managers and employees are 
           accountable for the consequences of their actions. 
231 3.48 3 0.99 2 
Q10g: Adopting a good CG makes Libyan listed companies to discharge their accountability.   231 2.97 3 1.12 5 
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Table 6.28 Accountability Practices: KW Test & MW Test 
 
Overall, the findings of Q10 indicate that accountability practices are not yet 
established in Libyan listed companies. All stakeholders are not exercising their right 
to hold companies‟ boards of directors and executive managers to account for their 
actions, even though they are well aware of the concept of accountability. Things are 
unlikely to change, however, as long as environmental turbulence continues; the 
attendant disruption to the legislative environment, along with the lack of monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms, will continue to have a negative impact on 
accountability practices within Libyan listed companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-values 
Result 
Mann-Whitney Test - P-values 
BD EM RE OS 
BD-EM BD-RE BD-OS EM-RE EM-OS RE-OS 
Q10a 4.15 3.89 4.00 4.23 0.038* Significant 0.047* 0.481 0.436 0.290 0.005* 0.160 
Q10b 2.49 3.31 2.24 2.45 0.000* Significant 0.003* 0.006* 0.063 0.000* 0.000* 0.305 
Q10c 3.13 3.47 2.49 3.07 0.000* Significant 0.046* 0.001* 0.976 0.000* 0.085 0.007* 
Q10d 3.27 3.43 2.76 3.23 0.009* Significant 0.551 0.020* 0.941 0.001* 0.489 0.025* 
Q10e 2.96 3.19 2.49 2.89 0.002* Significant 0.264 0.028* 0.792 0.000* 0.120 0.028* 
Q10f 3.66 3.62 3.36 3.65 0.345 Not Significant 0.971 0.225 0.554 0.202 0.492 0.095 
Q10g 3.04 3.24 2.64 2.86 0.033* Significant 0.362 0.091 0.404 0.005* 0.057 0.337 
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6.9 Summary 
The questionnaire survey was adopted as the first method of data collection in order to 
investigate the views of different stakeholder groups regarding current CG and 
accountability practices within Libyan listed companies. These groups comprised 
board members, executive managers, regulators and external auditors, and other 
stakeholders. Descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical tools (Kruskal-
Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests) were used to analyse the gathered data.  
The questionnaire outcomes revealed a strong consensus among all groups that the 
best Arabic translation of CG is Hawkamat Alshrekat. Nor was there a single view on 
how CG should be defined; all of the presented definitions – both those expressing the 
agency perspective and those expressing the stakeholder perspective – were accepted 
by the respondents, though the latter were generally endorsed more enthusiastically. 
In terms of importance and awareness of CG, all the stakeholder groups agreed that 
CG is important for Libyan listed companies, though many respondents felt that 
awareness of CG in these companies is inadequate.  
On the whole, the various stakeholder groups found Libyan listed companies‟ 
compliance with the key CG mechanisms satisfactory; they were particularly satisfied 
with the BOD mechanism and how it discharges its duties and responsibilities. There 
was a general understanding and awareness of the rules regarding board composition 
and the formation and functions of subcommittees, but while all groups considered 
the audit committee the most important, only 42.8% said listed companies should 
have a CG committee (even though it was ranked the second most important). 
Disclosure and transparency, while seen as sufficient to meet local requirements, were 
not seen as up to international standards. This may be due to the absence of 
accountability mechanisms in the Libyan environment, which has impacted negatively 
on the development of disclosure and transparency in listed companies in particular. 
The respondents generally agreed with the majority of statements concerning the 
internal and external audit mechanisms, but they were less convinced of the 
effectiveness of internal control systems in Libyan listed companies (especially the 
regulators‟ group). They were more satisfied with the measures that have been put in 
place to protect shareholders‟ rights. 
The questionnaire outcomes indicated stakeholders‟ dissatisfaction with the legal and 
regulatory framework of CG and accountability. This is not surprising, given that 
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some Libyan laws and regulations are not in line with the requirements of CG and 
therefore do little to support CG and accountability practices. The turbulent economic 
and political situation was seen as having the greatest adverse influence on CG 
practice and accountability within Libyan listed companies, though other 
acknowledged factors included the weakness of the investment climate and 
accountability mechanisms, the limited number of Libyan listed companies, the lack 
of CG training for directors and the general lack of knowledge about CG. Other 
factors such as the lack of independence of external auditors and any incompatibility 
between CG principles and the interests of these companies were seen as much less 
significant. Lastly, although all the respondents were well aware of the concept of 
accountability, they felt that achieving this in practice is made more difficult by the 
uncertain legislative environment and the absence of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. The consequence of this is that stakeholders do not act on their right to 
hold listed companies‟ BODs and executive managers accountable for their actions.   
This chapter having outlined the key findings from the questionnaire survey, the next 
chapter analyses the data gathered from the interviews, which were the second data 
collection instrument. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 5, the second data collection method adopted in this study 
was semi-structured interviews. These were employed to explore and investigate the 
views of the two stakeholder groups regarding the current practice of CG and 
accountability in Libyan listed companies. This chapter presents the findings from 
these interviews. It begins by summarising the aim of the interviews before going on 
to discuss the participants‟ understanding of CG within the Libyan environment. This 
section (section 7.3) presents the interviewees‟ views on how the English term should 
be rendered in Arabic, their own definitions of CG, and why they think it is important 
for Libya. Section 7.4 explores the current level of compliance with CG mechanisms 
in Libyan listed companies, as perceived by the interviewees, while section 7.5 
discusses their views of the legal and regulatory framework of CG and accountability. 
Section 7.6 investigates what the interviewees saw as the main factors influencing the 
practice of CG and accountability. Section 7.7 analyses their views regarding the 
concept and practice of accountability, while section 7.8 briefly summarises the 
findings presented in the chapter. 
7.2 Interview Questions  
The semi-structured interview questions were designed to cover the same main topics 
as the questionnaire survey, plus the issue of how CG and accountability practices 
might be developed in Libya listed companies. This facilitated comparison between 
the findings of the two tools, while also allowing further insight into the results 
yielded by the survey. The same questions were directed to both stakeholder groups 
(see Appendices V and VI). The twenty interviewees, who were chosen for their 
qualifications and experience within Libyan listed companies, were classified into two 
groups based on the nature of their roles: the internal stakeholders group (ISG) and 
the external stakeholders group (ESG) (see Table 5.8). The interviews, which were 
conducted in July and August 2015, lasted roughly 30-90 minutes each and were 
recorded (with the permission of the interviewee). The names of the interviewees 
were coded in order to ensure their confidentiality. 
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7.3 Understanding of CG in the Libyan Environment 
In order to investigate their understanding of CG, the interviewees were asked to say 
what they think is the correct Arabic interpretation of the term, to give their own 
definition of CG and to explain why it is important for Libyan listed companies and 
the Libyan environment in general. Their responses are discussed in the following 
sub-sections. 
7.3.1 Arabic Interpretation of the Term CG 
7.3.1.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
Although the Arabic term Hawkamat Alsharekat is the most common way of 
rendering the English term CG, there are several other Arabic translations in use, such 
as Aledarah Alrashedah, meaning good governance, Edart Tandheem Wa-Murakabat 
Alsharekat, which means organising and controlling companies, and Ahakemia 
Almoassasatia, which refers to institutional governance. It might be argued that the 
range of Arabic translations available, each conveying a slightly different 
understanding of the concept, is more likely to lead to misconceptions or at least 
opposing interpretations of CG, and there was indeed some divergence of opinion 
here; even within the ISG group, eleven of the twelve agreed on Hawkamat 
Alsharekat as the most appropriate translation while one dissented. One non-executive 
chairman affirmed that:  
“The term Hawkamat Alsharekat is the most suitable to express the 
English meaning of CG. Although still novel in the Libyan 
environment, the use of this term has become noticeable, especially in 
the banking sector, because of the commitment to implement CG in 
this sector” (BD1). 
The one ISG member (BD6) who opposed the use of this phrase felt that Aledarah 
Alrashedah is closer in meaning to the English term CG. 
7.3.1.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
The ESG interviewees were more divided, with six out of eight supporting Hawkamat 
Alsharekat as the most suitable translation and two declaring that Aledarah 
Alrashedah is closer to the English term. Speaking for the former, one member of the 
LSMA explained that: 
“The principles of CG are in general not new in the Libyan 
environment, but what is new is that these principles have been 
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collected and issued by the LSM in the form of a code named the 
Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC). The use of the term 
Hawkamat Alsharekat to express the English term CG has become the 
most common in the Libyan environment for this reason” (RE1). 
The supporters of Aledarah Alrashedah, on the other hand, argued that this term is 
more appropriate because when the LSM issued the LCGC for Libyan listed 
companies, they called it Regulations for Good Governance. They also pointed out 
that the emphasis in Aledarah Alrashedah is on the implementation of successful 
management standards as a way of improving company performance, and that the 
term is associated with a free economy and ensuring the rights of stakeholders. In 
contrast, Hawkamat Alsharekat is associated with a centralised economy and 
extensive state control. One individual investor in the LSM observed:  
“In my view, the Arabic term Aledarah Alrashedah is the most 
appropriate to express the English term CG, as this term conveys the 
sense of mature management overcoming routine problems in the 
company by encouraging effective participation in decision making by 
relevant stakeholders” (OS2). 
The lack of consensus about how the English term CG should be rendered in Arabic 
may be partly attributable to the fact that it has only recently been introduced into the 
Libyan environment. However, the issue needs to be addressed without delay, as 
allowing a range of terms to be used increases the risk that stakeholders will develop 
an imperfect understanding of what CG actually means. Thus, the finding is 
consistent with Boutros-Ghali‟s (2002, p.1) conclusion that: 
“There are many challenges to promoting the principles of CG in the 
Arabic world. The first challenge I have found is that there is no 
Arabic equivalent for the word governance. We tried to find one 
Arabic word that translates the English word or its concept, but it was 
difficult. The problem is not just semantic; because when we do not 
have a word to express a concept, the concept does not exist in our 
daily life”.  
7.3.2 Definition of CG 
As indicated above, the term CG is fairly new within Libyan listed companies, having 
first appeared in 2007 when the LSM issued its LCGC for boards of directors. This 
question therefore sought to elicit from the interviewees how they would define CG, 
the aim being to investigate whether they understood the purpose of CG as being to 
protect the interests of shareholders only (i.e. taking a narrow perspective) or all 
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relevant stakeholders (i.e. taking a broad perspective). Figure 7.1 shows how the 
definitions offered by the interviewees were distributed across the two categories. 
Narrow perspectives tended to concentrate on internal corporate considerations, 
regulatory considerations and the interests of shareholders, while broader perspectives 
took into account the interests of other stakeholders and ethical considerations.  
Figure 7.1 Broad and Narrow Definitions of CG 
 
Note: ISG = Internal Stakeholders Group; ESG = External Stakeholders Group. 
 
Figure 7.1 shows that sixteen out of twenty interviewees (80%) followed Solomon 
(2013) and Keasey & Wright (1993) in adopting a broad perspective on CG. One 
board chairman defined CG in very expansive terms:  
“In my opinion, CG is a set of procedures and rules governing 
relations inside and outside the company to prevent the occurrence of 
any financial or administrative corruption, and to ensure the 
achievement of the desired objectives and protect the interests and 
rights of shareholders and stakeholders within the limits of ethical and 
professional values” (BD1). 
Almost as broad was the view expressed by an audit committee chairman, who 
pointed to the importance of CG in helping companies improve performance:  
“I personally consider CG to be a set of regulations, rules and 
procedures that enable listed companies to perform successfully and to 
protect the rights of stakeholders in general” (BD4). 
An external auditor noted that this expansion of the remit of CG, from shareholder 
protection to the protection of all stakeholders, is relatively recent:  
“CG is a modern phenomenon that relates to the setting of controls and 
procedures and regulations to protect the rights and interests of 
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shareholders primarily, but in recent times, the importance of 
corporate governance has been expanded to include protection of the 
rights and interests of stakeholders” (RE4). 
Only four out of twenty interviewees (20%) followed Parkinson (1994) and Cadbury 
(1992) in seeing CG from a narrow, shareholder-based perspective. The deputy 
minister of the Ministry of the Economy was one of this group, explaining that: 
“CG is a set of rules and procedures that regulate the relations within a 
company through accurate determination of responsibilities and duties 
to ensure it is working in the interests of the shareholders” (RE2). 
Others taking this agency-oriented view saw CG primarily as a legal/regulatory 
system for the governance and monitoring of internal relations between the general 
assembly, board and executive management. An individual investor was echoing this 
narrow perspective when he noted that: 
“I think that the meaning of CG differs depending on the legal 
framework of the state; each country adapts the principles of CG to 
bring them into line with its laws and legislation” (OS2). 
That such a high percentage (80%) of interviewees would define CG from a broad 
stakeholder perspective was not unexpected, given that Libya is an Islamic state 
whose constitution, laws and regulatory framework all encourage its citizens to see 
themselves as accountable to a broad variety of stakeholders and society as a whole.  
7.3.3 Importance of CG 
This question sought to investigate interviewees‟ views on the importance of CG in 
Libyan listed companies. All interviewees agreed that implementing CG mechanisms 
is important for all Libyan companies in general and for Libyan listed companies in 
particular. Table 7.1 summarises the various reasons why and shows how many 
interviewees agreed with each reason. 
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Table 7.1 Reasons for Implementing CG in Libyan Listed Companies 
No Reasons ISG ESG N % 
 Interviewees 12 8 20  
1 Protecting stakeholders‟ rights   9 7 16 80% 
2 Increasing confidence and companies‟ success  4 4 8 40% 
3 Determining the responsibilities of the board and executive management  4 3 7 35% 
4 Raising companies‟ performance and profitability 3 2 5 25% 
5 Increasing disclosure and transparency  2 2 4 20% 
6 Preventing financial and administrative corruption  3 0 3 15% 
7 Achieving accountability 2 1 3 15% 
8 Attracting foreign investment  1 1 2 10% 
9 Achieving companies‟ goals  1 1 2 10% 
10 Improving the functioning of institutions  1 0 1 5% 
11 Protecting companies from risk 1 0 1 5% 
12 Regulating the relationships between management and stakeholders 0 1 1 5% 
13 Contributing to growth and evolution of companies 0 1 1 5% 
14 Assistant factor for modifying and updating Libyan laws and regulations   1 0 1 5% 
7.3.3.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
The majority of ISG interviewees strongly believed that the presence of an effective 
system of CG will contribute positively to Libyan listed companies. As can be seen in 
Table 7.1, the most frequently cited reason for adopting a good CG system was the 
protection of stakeholders‟ rights; nine out of twelve interviewees (75%) felt that by 
serving as a tool to regulate and control relationships, good CG protects all 
stakeholders. An executive chairman from one board explained why this protection is 
so important in Libya: 
“From my perspective, of course, Libyan companies should not differ 
from other companies in the world. I think that there is an urgent need 
for CG practices in Libyan companies, whether listed or unlisted. CG 
is particularly important in Libyan listed companies because the LSM 
is still an emerging market, and because of the turbulence of the past. 
Commitment to the principles of CG is required to ensure the rights of 
stakeholders, determine who takes on which responsibilities and tasks 
and separate the terms of reference within these listed companies” 
(BD7).  
The next most popular reason for adopting a good CG system was to raise confidence 
among all relevant parties and boost companies‟ success. Four out of twelve 
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interviewees (33%) in this group argued that a good CG system is important because 
it plays a significant role in identifying the duties and responsibilities of executive 
management and the BOD. One non-executive board chairman explained that:  
“In fact, the importance of CG in the Libyan case particularly is the 
separation of competencies and determination of responsibilities and 
duties. It is extremely important to move away from individual 
decisions, especially, for example, when one or two people are 
appointed to be executives and board members at the same time. As a 
result, the principle of separation of the terms of reference has been 
ignored within Libyan listed companies and consequently, decisions 
are sometimes personalised, and characterised by bias” (BD1).   
7.3.3.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
Seven ESG interviewees (88%) asserted that the main reason for adopting a good CG 
system within Libyan listed companies is to protect the rights of relevant 
stakeholders. The deputy minister of the Ministry of the Economy confirmed that:  
“CG regulates relationships within companies and outside, especially 
where the ownership is separated from management, and the general 
assembly appoints the board of directors. CG is important because it 
determines the rules that govern the relationship between the owners 
and management of these companies in order to protect the rights and 
interests of stakeholders” (RE2).  
Four out of eight interviewees (50%) in this group saw the implementation of CG 
within Libyan listed companies as contributing significantly to raising investors‟ 
confidence and consequently companies‟ success. An individual investor (OS2) 
explained that any perception that CG is inadequate in listed companies would lead to 
a loss of confidence and the withdrawal of major investors from the market. Such a 
loss of confidence would be especially damaging in an emerging market like Libya. 
7.4 Compliance with CG Mechanisms 
CG mechanisms such as the BOD, disclosure and transparency, internal and external 
auditing and shareholder rights are the pillars on which the governance system is 
built. The two stakeholder groups were asked for their views on the current level of 
commitment being shown to these mechanisms within Libyan listed companies.  
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7.4.1 The Board of Directors Mechanism  
The BOD is one of the key internal CG mechanisms (especially in emerging markets) 
ensuring that the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned and that 
management teams are operating effectively. 
7.4.1.1 Composition of the Board of Directors 
7.4.1.1.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
All ISG interviewees confirmed that boards in Libyan listed companies have no fewer 
than three members and no more than eleven, the majority of whom are non-
executive, as stipulated by the LCGC. This was borne out in their descriptions of their 
own boards, which varied in size from company to company, depending on the type 
and volume of activity, but which were made up mostly of non-executives. For 
example, one board chairman explained that in his company the board 
“consists of seven members including the chairman of the board and 
three control members, the majority of whom are non-executive 
members, as well as independent members representing one-third of 
the board” (BD3). 
Similarly, a non-executive chairman from a mixed ownership bank explained that: 
“In my experience as a board member at this bank, the board of 
directors contains nine Libyan members including the chairman of the 
board and two foreign members representing the French partner. The 
majority of the board members are non-executives, and two are 
independent” (BD1). 
Most ISG interviewees confirmed that board membership in their bank is for a fixed 
period only: 
“Article 18 of the statute of the bank states that the board of directors 
should consist of five members including the chairman of the board 
and deputy chairman of the board, and that members may serve for 
three years” (EM1). 
When asked how these members are selected, seven ISG interviewees said that the 
general assembly is responsible for selecting and appointing board members 
according to pre-set technical and professional criteria. In state-owned banks, 
however, the job of selection may fall to the CBL, as explained by one CEO: 
“The selection and appointing of board members in the bank is done 
by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), as it owns the largest percentage 
of shares (84%). The CBL takes into account specific conditions for 
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selecting the board of directors. The most important are technical and 
practical efficiency, specialist knowledge and experience at the top of 
the banking field” (EM1).  
Three out of twelve interviewees in this group also highlighted the importance of 
geographic factors in the selection process, explaining that banks with branches across 
Libya need to ensure that these branches also have a voice on the board. According to 
one interviewee, 
“The general assembly is solely responsible for selecting the 
membership of the board because it represents the shareholders. It 
takes into account technical and practical efficiency, specialist 
knowledge and experience. But geographic distribution is also taken 
into account when selecting board members, as this bank has many 
branches operating in all the cities of Libya” (BD8). 
On a less positive note, two ISG interviewees argued that it would be unfair to ignore 
the fact that some board members within listed companies have been appointed out of 
nepotism or favouritism, because they have personal or tribal connections with 
members of the general assembly.  
7.4.1.1.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
Eight of the ESG said that the size of boards in Libyan listed companies is determined 
by law. An external auditor explained that: 
“As stipulated in the LCGC 2007 and the LCGC 2010, boards of 
directors in Libyan listed companies consist of at least three members 
and no more than eleven members, including the chairman” (RE3). 
Six ESG interviewees confirmed that membership is for a fixed period, though two 
interviewees from the regulatory side suggested that some board chairmen remain 
board members even after their tenure has expired. On the subject of how board 
members are appointed, five ESG interviewees asserted that this is done according to 
set criteria and taking into consideration previous experience and specialist 
knowledge, but the other three in this group noted the continuing influence of 
personal relationships on the appointment process. One interviewee declared that: 
“In practice, there is no doubt that favours and personal relationships 
play a significant role in the selection of some board members within 
Libyan listed companies, although experience and efficiency also play 
a part. But the unfair selection process means that executive directors 
are not held accountable for any deficiencies in their implementation 
of CG” (OS3).   
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These interviewees were adamant that general assemblies must move away from 
favouritism and appoint board members whose qualifications will support the 
company‟s activities and long-term aims.  
7.4.1.2 Duties and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
7.4.1.2.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
All ISG interviewees mentioned that the duties and responsibilities of the BOD are 
precisely defined in Libyan listed companies. One audit committee chairman 
explained that:   
“Article 23 of the statute of the bank stipulates that the board of 
directors is responsible for the bank‟s management in order to achieve 
the objectives of the bank with the exception of the terms of reference 
of the general assembly. The LCGC issued by the CBL and the LSM 
also determines the duties and responsibilities of the board of 
directors. What is more, Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) No. 
(23/2010) sets out the duties and responsibilities of the board of 
directors” (BD4). 
Asked which are the most important of these duties and responsibilities, nine out of 
twelve interviewees in this group explained that some are stipulated by law. A board 
member at one listed company explained that:  
“For example, amongst the duties and responsibilities of the board of 
directors are setting up the public policy of the company, devoting 
enough time to its responsibilities, holding at least four board meetings 
a year, as required by law, determining the authority to be delegated to 
the executive management, monitoring and evaluating the work of the 
executive departments in the company and providing the estimated 
budget to the general assembly for endorsement” (BD6). 
However, two of the ISG interviewees felt that the board‟s duties and responsibilities 
are not always set out in sufficient detail. One of these interviewees argued that: 
“Although these duties and responsibilities exist in terms of the job description, they 
need to be more detailed to help avoid any conflicts of competencies between the 
members of the board of directors” (BD5). The same interviewee also felt that some 
board members within Libyan listed companies do not devote sufficient time and 
effort to discharge their duties and responsibilities towards the board properly. 
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7.4.1.2.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
Notably, all the ESG interviewees declared that the duties and responsibilities of the 
BOD are accurately defined in almost all Libyan listed companies. A monitor from 
the LSMA asserted that:  
“I can honestly say there is a clear determination of duties and 
responsibilities in Libyan listed companies, because on the one hand, 
all listed companies have their establishment decision and statute, 
which define the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors, 
and on the other hand, the Libyan Corporate Governance Code 
(LCGC), whether issued by the LSM or the CBL, also determines 
perfectly the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors within 
listed companies” (RE1). 
Six out of eight interviewees in this group were happy to list the duties and 
responsibilities that should be discharged by board members. According to one of 
these,  
“The board‟s duties and responsibilities may be restricted as follows: 
setting goals and strategic plans for the company, the development and 
supervision of internal control systems in the company, setting up 
written policies to define the relationships between the company and 
stakeholders and finally, determining the powers of the executive 
management and supervising its performance” (OS3). 
However, one regulator argued that although the statutes of Libyan listed companies 
set out the duties and responsibilities of the BOD, “in practice, these roles conflict 
and powers overlap within some Libyan listed companies, which leads to problems in 
implementation as well as in decision making in general” (RE2). An external auditor 
also explained that problems arise because some board members lack the knowledge 
and experience to understand their duties and responsibilities properly. 
“In my experience as an external auditor …, I can say that some 
Libyan listed companies have board members who are still not aware 
of their duties and responsibilities as they have weak knowledge and 
qualifications which are not even good enough to hold a low position 
in executive management” (RE3).  
7.4.1.3 Board Sub-Committees 
7.4.1.3.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
When asked which sub-committees are appointed in Libyan listed companies, the 
ISG interviewees cited the audit committee as the most common, followed by the 
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nomination and remuneration committee and the risk and Shariah committees 
(especially in the banking sector); very few listed companies appoint a temporary 
executive committee, investment committee or CG committee.   
Audit and nomination/remuneration committees are recommended by the LCGC, and 
their importance was confirmed by the ISG interviewees, eight of whom regarded the 
audit committee as the most important of their board‟s sub-committees and five of 
whom ranked the nomination/remuneration committee as the second most important. 
The audit committee was ranked top because it “reviews the annual financial 
statements and reports before submission to the board of directors. Moreover, the 
audit committee examines the internal control system in the company and makes 
recommendations to the board of directors in this regard” (EM3).  
When asked how the members of these sub-committees are selected, ten ISG 
interviewees explained that the process is not significantly different from that used to 
select board members. One board member stated that: 
“There are clear policies specifying how the members of these 
committees should be selected. This is usually done by the board of 
directors proposing candidates for approval by the general assembly. 
They take into account specific standards such as specialist 
knowledge, experience in the relevant field, the prospective member‟s 
interests and compatibility with the committee‟s activity and their 
compatibility with other committee members. Someone on each 
committee must have a financial background, and there must be a 
representative from the board of directors” (BD8). 
The majority of ISG interviewees confirmed that the audit committee in their listed 
company consists of non-executive directors and has no fewer than three members. 
However, one of the ISG interviewees declined to answer this question, while another 
interviewee (an executive director) indicated that:  
“Although experience and efficiency are factors in the selection of 
sub-committee members, some members of these sub-committees are 
selected out of personal interests, or for reasons of nepotism and 
favouritism, with negative consequences for the performance of these 
sub-committees” (EM4). 
The majority of ISG interviewees asserted that the duties and responsibilities of sub-
committees are clearly defined in Libyan listed companies, with seven of the twelve 
listing at least some of these tasks and responsibilities. One board chairman explained 
that:   
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“The board of directors in the bank set out the duties and 
responsibilities of each committee in its establishment decision, 
including the purpose of each committee, the timing of its meetings, 
the activities it oversees, the powers granted to it and its 
implementation mechanisms. Additionally, the duties and 
responsibilities of these sub-committees can be identified in the bank 
through the job description and the LCGC, whether issued by the CBL 
or the LSM. Among the tasks and responsibilities of these sub-
committees is providing a report whenever work is completed” (BD1).  
An executive director at one listed bank described the main tasks of his audit 
committee as including  
“overseeing the internal audit department, checking the internal 
control system of the bank, checking the audit plan with the external 
auditor, reviewing the external auditor‟s notes, reviewing the financial 
statements before submission to the board of directors for approval” 
(EM1).   
7.4.1.3.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
The ESG interviewees also confirmed that almost all Libyan listed companies have 
an audit committee. Six of the eight mentioned the nomination/remuneration 
committee and risk committee, four mentioned the Shariah committee, and just two 
mentioned CG committee, explaining that these are most likely to be found in banks 
belonging to the Central Bank of Libya (the CBL is committed to applying the 
LCGC, which stipulates the establishment of a CG committee).  
Six out of eight interviewees in this group thought that the audit committee is the 
most important board sub-committee because it serves as a fundamental link between 
the internal auditor and the external auditor appointed to review the financial 
statements of the company. However, one interviewee from the regulatory side 
argued that: 
“The mechanism for selecting members of the audit committee in 
some Libyan listed companies needs to be reconsidered; for example, 
when you see that members are being selected who do not have the 
accounting background to review financial statements, there is no 
point in these members having frequent meetings with either internal 
or external auditors. In these circumstances, the committee will not 
achieve the goal for which it was established” (RE4).  
Talking about the most important functions of the nomination/remuneration 
committee, a regulator with the LSMA said this committee‟s duties include 
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“annually reviewing the skills required of board members, 
recommending candidates to the board of directors in accordance with 
approved policies and standards and setting clear policies for the 
compensation and remuneration of directors and senior executives” 
(RE1). 
Although the nomination/remuneration committee was ranked the second most 
important sub-committee by the group, four ESG interviewees also asserted the 
importance of the Shariah committee, especially in the Libyan banking and insurance 
sectors. One of these interviewees justified the importance of this committee thus:  
“Shariah committees in Libyan listed banks and insurance companies 
usually deal with issues related to financing or investment, giving tips 
and advice regarding the quality of this financing or investment and its 
compatibility with the provisions of Islamic Shariah” (OS3).   
In terms of the selection process for sub-committees, six ESG interviewees said this 
is similar to the process used to appoint members to the BOD. Echoing interviewees 
from the ISG, one board member explained that:  
“Of course, the sub-committees are selected based on their 
compatibility with the board of directors, taking into consideration 
criteria such as financial expertise, technical and practical skill and 
experience in the relevant field. In addition, a member of the board of 
directors should be selected to sit on each sub-committee” (OS4).  
However, also echoing members of the ISG, two ESG interviewees claimed that 
nepotism continues to taint the selection procedure in some companies. As one 
interviewee put it: “Although experience and technical proficiency are still criteria 
when selecting sub-committee members, a few are appointed because they have close 
ties with members of the general assembly or the board” (RE1).  
Almost all the ESG interviewees said that audit committees within Libyan listed 
companies are made up of non-executive directors and have no fewer than three 
members. The majority felt that the duties and responsibilities of all sub-committees 
are clearly defined, though one regulator explained that it is up to the BOD to 
determine “the functions of each sub-committee in terms of the number of members, 
its period of operation and the powers granted to it, so that it can perform its functions 
to the fullest” (RE2). The same interviewee highlighted that while the general 
purpose of each committee is stipulated in the establishment decision, committee 
members may choose which mechanisms they will employ to carry out this purpose. 
This led a consultant with the LSM to complain that:  
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“Although the majority of these duties and responsibilities are set out 
in the laws, regulations and the establishment decision, they are not 
determined in detail, but expressed in general items” (OS1).   
7.4.2 Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism 
Disclosure and transparency are considered crucial principles within the CG system; 
numerous authors (e.g. Solomon, 2013; Monks & Minow, 2004) have stressed the 
importance of disclosure and transparency mechanism as an indicator of good CG. 
This section presents the interviewees‟ responses regarding the perceived level of 
compliance with disclosure and transparency mechanism within Libyan listed 
companies. It also explores their views on how disclosure and transparency might be 
developed in these companies.   
7.4.2.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
When asked whether the level of disclosure and transparency within Libyan listed 
companies is adequate, eight of the ISG interviewees claimed that it is merely 
satisfactory. Six interviewees argued that this is because current disclosure and 
transparency practices are designed only to meet local – not international – 
requirements.  One executive board member asserted that: 
“The level of disclosure and transparency in our listed companies is 
generally satisfactory by local standards, such as the requirement for 
annual reports to disclose both financial and non-financial data, details 
of board meetings and the names of committee members. However, 
compared to international requirements, and to [the level of] disclosure 
in similar emerging markets, it needs improvement” (BD7).  
The other four ISG interviewees perceived disclosure and transparency practices 
within Libyan listed companies to be inadequate for a range of reasons, including the 
lack of accountability mechanisms in the Libyan environment and the weakness of 
the professional culture. One board member outlined his concerns thus: 
“I would say that the disclosure and transparency practices within the 
company are not satisfactory and not in line with the CG requirements, 
whether local or international. In practice, there is some ambiguity in 
the information (lack of transparency) required by each user. Perhaps 
amongst the causal factors are the weak professional culture, which 
allows the hiding or manipulating of information, deliberate delay in 
making it public, and poor quality information in financial reports. If 
the report does not meet the requirements of a financial analyst or 
financial statement reader, there is a clear lack of transparency” (BD8). 
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Another interviewee (BD2) attributed the low level of disclosure and transparency to 
the lack of Libyan Accounting Standards, while an executive manager cited a lack of 
understanding on the part of boards: 
“There is an obvious weakness in companies‟ transparency, because 
board members are the only parties who have the right to be informed 
about the company‟s important information due to their position, but 
unfortunately, some board members do not have a clear understanding 
of the meaning of disclosure and transparency” (EM2).  
When ISG interviewees were asked whether Libyan listed companies disclose their 
CG practices in their annual reports, seven out of twelve indicated that listed 
companies are required to provide a summary of this information under the LCGC. 
One board member pointed out that: 
“As the bank already adheres to CG mechanisms, according to the 
CBL‟s requirements, it does give some information about CG 
practices in the financial reports, but not in detail; it discloses which 
CG principles have been implemented and which have not, and the 
reasons why not” (BD5). 
However, the other five members of the ISG were less positive, arguing that Libyan 
listed companies still lack commitment to the principle of disclosure, with the result 
that practice generally remains unsatisfactory. One board member attributed this to 
the relative novelty of the LCGC‟s formal approach to the issue: 
“Of course, the fundamental reason for non-compliance in this case is 
due to the novelty of this type of disclosure in the Libyan environment. 
However, disclosure about CG practices is sometimes done through 
general assembly meetings by answering questions and inquiries 
relating to CG issues” (BD7). 
When asked what is being done to develop disclosure and transparency within Libyan 
listed companies, six of the ISG interviewees identified a few steps that have already 
been taken. Some of these steps have been taken at the macro level by the LSM, such 
as its decision to issue disclosure forms to raise the level of disclosure in financial 
reports (pointed out by BD2), and its creation of an online resource: 
“The LSM has established models for the evaluation of disclosure and 
transparency inside Libyan listed companies to encourage these 
companies to improve disclosure and transparency. A website (portal) 
has been established by the LSM where Libyan listed companies can 
download disclosure forms which they then submit for approval by the 
market” (BD3).  
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Other interviewees described the steps that have been taken by their own institution. 
For example: “The financial reports currently contain all information, whether 
financial or non-financial, relating to all activities of the company, but the second 
essential step has been to start preparing combined balance sheets that were 
previously non-existent in the company” (BD7). Another interviewee (BD8) 
described his bank‟s establishment of a “compliance management” team, one of 
whose functions is to disclose all relevant information to shareholders.  
Only one ISG member was dismissive of the steps taken so far to improve disclosure 
and transparency practices, arguing that: 
“Disclosure and transparency practices are still weak and do not meet 
CG requirements, and therefore, these companies need to take serious 
steps to raise the level of disclosure; they need to disclose all the 
information needed by any user, and to improve the quality and timing 
of this disclosure” (EM4).  
7.4.2.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
When ESG interviewees were asked about the level of disclosure and transparency 
within Libyan listed companies, five described it as just about satisfactory. Two 
interviewees followed the ISG interviewees in ascribing this mainly to the fact that 
current requirements only meet local standards. One of the interviewees explained 
that: 
“From my previous experience with Libyan listed companies I would 
say that the level of disclosure and transparency is satisfactory only to 
the extent that it fulfils the local criteria, which relate mainly to the 
disclosing of financial and non-financial information in the annual 
reports” (OS2). 
Another interviewee argued that although current levels of disclosure meet domestic 
requirements, but they are not in line with as stipulated the LCGC. He attributed this 
to the limited financial awareness and lack of professionalism of those charged with 
ensuring disclosure in the financial statements, adding that: “The accounting 
measurement also plays a significant role in the effectiveness of disclosure and 
transparency in the bank” (OS3). At the macro level, one regulator pointed to the lack 
of an oversight body in Libya to determine exactly what should be disclosed, as well 
as weak public awareness and lack of interest among stakeholders. The result is that 
Libyan listed companies disclose what they deem appropriate to comply with the law 
213 
regarding the income statement, cash flow statement and statement of financial 
position, while regarding the disclosure of anything else as voluntary. 
Three of the ESG interviewees were highly critical of the level of disclosure and 
transparency within listed companies, describing it as very low. One external auditor 
ascribed this to “the lack of awareness among executive directors concerning the right 
meaning of disclosure and transparency” (RE4). Asked whether Libyan listed 
companies disclose their CG practices in their annual reports, five of the ESG 
interviewees pointed out that under the LCGC, Libyan listed companies are in fact 
only required to offer a brief summary. One individual investor explained: 
“There is disclosure in the financial reports on the extent of CG 
practices in Libyan listed companies, especially in the companies that 
belong to the banking sector, because all banks already adhere to CG 
mechanisms according to the requirements of the Central Bank of 
Libya. Other Libyan listed companies do not disclose CG practices in 
their financial reports in detail, other than to disclose what has been 
applied and what has not been applied in terms of CG mechanisms” 
(OS2). 
Given the limited nature of the LCGC‟s requirement, it is perhaps not surprising that 
three of the ESG interviewees perceived a lack of commitment to this mechanism 
among Libyan listed companies. One consultant observed that: “There is disclosure 
of CG practices in the annual report, but there is an issue with the accuracy of this 
disclosure” (OS1).  
Against a background of general concern, five of the ESG interviewees did highlight 
some small steps that have been taken to develop disclosure and transparency. One 
regulator with the LSMA declared that: “There have been attempts to develop 
disclosure in Libyan listed companies,” though he was quick to add that: “The higher 
costs associated with disclosure are the main reason for the delay in bringing it into 
line with international disclosure requirements” (RE1). Encouragingly, however, one 
academic with previous experience in the LSM revealed that: 
“I know the Libyan Association of Accountants and Auditors (LAAA) 
is currently seeking to develop disclosure and transparency within 
Libyan listed companies and unlisted companies alike, to which end it 
has been preparing a proposal for Libyan Accounting Standards, 
including standards of disclosure and transparency” (OS3). 
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An external auditor in the group also referred to the LSM‟s disclosure forms as being 
designed to “increase the level of disclosure and transparency for investors and other 
stakeholders alike” (RE3). 
The other three ESG interviewees were less encouraging, arguing that there is 
virtually no system in place to develop disclosure and transparency, either in the 
Libyan environment in general or in the LSM in particular. They cited a number of 
reasons for this; one interviewee offered the following summary:  
“The most important is weak public awareness about what disclosure 
and transparency means within Libyan listed companies. Moreover, 
there is clear weakness in the performance of the Libyan Stock Market 
Authority (LSMA) in respect of its supervision of and control over 
Libyan listed companies and the extent of their compliance with CG 
mechanisms, including the disclosure and transparency mechanism” 
(RE4). 
7.4.3 The Internal and External Audit Mechanisms 
7.4.3.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
When ISG interviewees were asked whether the duties and responsibilities of the 
internal audit are clearly defined within Libyan listed companies, almost all confirmed 
that these are set out in internal audit regulations, job descriptions and the company 
statute. Thus, one executive chairman explained that the internal audit‟s tasks include: 
“monitoring compliance with laws and regulations, as well as financial and 
administrative (comprehensive) monitoring within the company” (BD2), while 
another interviewee described its duties as being to provide “a quarterly report to the 
board of directors, assessment of internal control systems; further to this, the audit 
committee describes the extent of the company‟s compliance with the laws and rules 
that regulate its activities” (BD6).  
However, these descriptions are fairly broad, and it is perhaps not surprising that four 
of the group wanted the internal audit‟s duties and responsibilities to be set out in 
more specific terms. One executive director observed that the lack of a clearly defined 
and directed focus can have negative consequences: 
“Although these duties and responsibilities are defined, they lack 
detail. Furthermore, because the scope of the internal audit is more 
comprehensive and also covers administrative and technical matters, it 
ends up ignoring the routine work” (EM4). 
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Others argued that even where the internal audit‟s duties are clearly defined, this does 
not guarantee that the work will be done well. One board member who was 
dissatisfied with the performance of his company‟s internal audit put this down to the 
inefficiency of those involved: 
“There are some shortcomings in the implementation of these duties 
even though they defined and written accurately. The reason for this is 
the weak performance of some of those in the internal audit, even 
though every board meeting emphasises the importance of the internal 
audit and its role in monitoring the performance of the bank” (BD8). 
Another interviewee (an audit committee chairman) split the blame for poor 
performance between departmental ineptitude and the bank‟s internal structures: 
“In fact, there is a weakness in the performance of the internal audit 
department as a result of lack of experience and the lack of a clear 
mechanism for internal auditors to submit their report to the board of 
directors” (BD4). 
Asked whether the internal control system in their institution is efficient, four ISG 
interviewees felt that it is generally effective, one declined to answer and seven were 
critical, claiming that the system is unsatisfactory and that neither internal nor 
external auditors monitor it properly. One interviewee ascribed this to lack of 
experience and weakness on the part of the audit committee, adding that this was the 
main reason the Bank Law was enacted “requiring each bank to assign the audit of its 
accounts annually to two different external auditors” (BD4). 
Discussing how these external auditors are appointed, eleven ISG interviewees 
asserted that listed companies have strict selection criteria. One board chairman listed 
these: 
“In the bank, the external auditor is selected by the general assembly 
from files provided by the external auditors themselves. Two auditors 
are selected in accordance with technical and professional standards, 
such as he must be registered in both the LSM and the CBL, be 
completely independent, have experience in the banking field, be 
practically and technically proficient and have the time to complete the 
audit of the financial statements in the bank” (BD1). 
However, one executive director was critical that here, too, personal relationships can 
play a part in the selection process: 
“Honestly, I can tell you that personal relationships between general 
assembly members and external auditors still play a major role in the 
selection and appointment process…. This is part of the culture of 
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sharing interests that was widespread under the former regime before 
the Libyan revolution” (EM3).  
Almost all of this group saw the main duty of the external auditor as being to express 
an impartial opinion on the company‟s financial statements. They also regarded him 
as primarily responsible for specifying the criteria adopted in the audit process. One 
interviewee explained that the external auditor‟s responsibilities are set down in law: 
“The duties and responsibilities of the external auditor are clearly 
defined by law, specifically in Article No. 49 of Law No. (116/1973), 
which provides for the establishment of the Libyan Association of 
Accountants and Auditors (LAAA). One of his fundamental duties is 
to express an impartial opinion about the fairness of the financial 
statements and the extent to which they represent the financial position 
and operational results of the bank. The audit committee in the bank 
reviews the report issued by the external auditor immediately on 
completion, and if there is any mistake or omission, the external 
auditor is accountable for the shortcoming. The same Article stipulates 
that among the responsibilities of the external auditor is to conduct 
himself professionally and personally according to the principles of 
honour and honesty, and to implement all the tasks imposed on him by 
law and professional ethics and customs” (EM1). 
7.4.3.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
Seven ESG interviewees argued that the duties and responsibilities of the internal 
audit within Libyan listed companies are defined not just in their job description or 
the company statute but also in law – specifically, Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) 
No. (23/2010) and the LSM‟s LCGC. Despite this, interviewees in this group, like 
their colleagues in the ISG, complained of a lack of detail, with one academic 
observing that: “Although these duties and responsibilities are determined, they need 
to be more detailed, and the work of the internal audit should not be limited to the 
financial audit” (OS3).    
Almost all ESG interviewees were generally satisfied with how internal auditors 
discharge their duties, though three identified some shortcomings. The deputy 
minister from the Ministry of the Economy listed some of the problems, explaining 
how perceived inadequacies within the internal audit function affect shareholders: 
“There are a number of reasons for this: firstly, the insufficiency of 
some internal auditors who are engaged in the work of internal audit at 
these listed companies. Secondly, in practice, internal audit 
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departments are dominated and influenced by executive directors 
within these companies. Thirdly, as a result of the above points, 
general assemblies tend to ignore the internal auditor‟s report in their 
meetings, instead depending on the external auditor‟s report because it 
is independent and far from the influence of the board of directors in 
the company. Finally, the internal audit function is generally limited to 
the financial audit, despite the fact that its formal duties also include 
an administrative and technical audit” (RE2). 
Another regulator also observed that there is a clear gap between what is required in 
the job description and what is done in reality by internal auditors within listed 
companies. 
Only three ESG interviewees believed that internal control systems within Libyan 
listed companies are generally effective, while the remaining five regarded them as 
inadequate, mainly because internal and external auditors alike fail to monitor these 
systems with sufficient rigour. One financial consultant asserted that: 
“External auditors repeatedly note in their reports that internal control 
systems are weak because no one is monitoring whether the laws and 
regulations are being enforced. These laws and regulations would 
strengthen the internal control systems in Libyan listed companies if 
they were enforced effectively” (OS1).   
Five members of the ESG echoed ISG members in asserting that listed companies 
follow a set of criteria when selecting external auditors. One individual investor 
described the criteria employed by his company: 
“The LSM states that any external auditor registered in the market and 
according to the conditions for registration shall have the right to 
review financial statements for Libyan listed companies. This 
mechanism was imposed by the LSM to limit the external audit 
function to the professionally competent, as only those competent in 
the field can be registered. Apart from registration with the LSM, the 
criteria also cover technical proficiency, experience, fees and the 
duration of the audit. External auditors then submit their tenders to the 
general assembly, which evaluates their files against these criteria” 
(OS2). 
The other three ESG members were less confident about the integrity of the selection 
process, suggesting that in some cases, general assemblies deliberately disregard these 
criteria and allow personal interests to influence their choice. This raises real 
questions about the independence of the external auditor in these companies. One 
interviewee on the regulatory side was highly critical of this state of affairs: 
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“In practice, some general assemblies within these listed companies 
are inefficient in themselves, which negatively affects how they select 
and appoint external auditors, basing the choice primarily on mutual 
interest. As a result, the external auditor‟s report does not represent 
the true financial position of the company” (RE2). 
Almost all ESG interviewees agreed with the ISG that the external auditor‟s main 
duty is to express an impartial opinion on the accuracy of the financial statement as a 
reflection of the company‟s financial position and results. However, some felt that this 
duty is at times compromised by a lack of awareness and understanding on the part of 
some external auditors. 
 A regulatory member at the LSMA described one example of an external auditor 
apparently not understanding the true nature of his responsibility: 
“Yesterday, I was in a board meeting at one of the listed companies. 
The external auditor had been summoned to clarify some vague issues 
and was speaking with great pleasure when he said he was working 
closely with the bank and there was a lot of confidence between them. 
The executive director in this company then stated that the external 
auditor had offered them consultancy services. I made a note of this 
and later on I asked him to turn this „consultancy‟ into advice; I had to 
make it clear it is the responsibility of the external auditor to preserve 
his independence” (RE1).  
According to one academic with previous experience in the LSM, although the duties 
and responsibilities of the external auditor have been identified in law (116/1973), 
shortcomings within the legislation mean that the clarification of these 
responsibilities and the development of the external audit function have largely been 
matters of professional regulation. However, external auditors‟ lack of accountability 
to the LAAA has limited the impact of such professional regulation and frustrated 
attempts to raise standards within the profession.  
7.4.4 Shareholders’ Rights Mechanism 
7.4.4.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
When ISG interviewees were asked to say to what extent they thought the rights of 
shareholders are protected in Libyan listed companies, seven interviewees asserted 
that these rights are guaranteed under the law and in practice. One executive board 
member declared that: 
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“The LCGC issued by the LSM refers clearly to shareholders‟ rights. 
Further to this, the Libyan Commercial Law No. (23/2010) stipulates 
that shareholders have the right to review the minutes of meetings of 
the general assembly, and that they must receive their invitation to 
attend the general assembly meeting no less than fifteen days 
beforehand so they can study the items on the agenda. This law states 
that shareholders have the right to receive the annualised dividend 
according to a specific policy. Shareholders have the right to vote on 
appointments to the board of directors and on any decisions in which 
they have an interest, and to cumulative voting according to their share 
of the capital. In practice, all the aforementioned shareholders‟ rights 
are guaranteed and protected by Libyan listed companies” (BD8). 
Five interviewees felt that although shareholders may have rights under the law, these 
are not always protected in practice. One of interviewees cited problems with 
dividend distribution in particular, explaining that some Libyan listed companies in 
the public sector “do not care about setting clear policy regarding the distribution of 
dividends” (BD5).   
7.4.4.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
Two ESG interviewees asserted that shareholders‟ rights are protected and respected, 
both legally and in practice. One interviewee from the regulatory side explained that: 
“For example, shareholders in Libyan listed companies have the right 
to ask for any information, as long as this does not breach financial 
regulations or damage the interests of the company. Further to this, 
shareholders in these listed companies are entitled to attend the general 
assembly‟s meetings, participate in its deliberations and vote on its 
decisions. Also, general assembly meeting agendas must take into 
consideration the issues that shareholders want to discuss. GA 
meetings are usually held in accordance with the laws and regulations, 
especially since the revolution of 17 February 2011 as there have been 
many appeals regarding GA meetings, so companies are careful to 
announce the date of the GA meeting in order to avoid any possible 
appeals or failure to obtain the required quorum” (RE1).  
This time, however, six interviewees argued that while all shareholder rights are 
absolutely protected in terms of company law and regulation, some listed companies 
fail to respect these rights in practice. One regulator claimed that: 
“In fact, some boards in Libyan listed companies have a hold over the 
general assembly. Consequently, their decisions are biased and not 
impartial, which leads to the erosion of minority shareholders‟ rights. 
For example, dividends are withheld for the purposes of investment 
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without compelling reason or explanation of where specifically this 
investment is going. Furthermore, the unreliability of the media in the 
Libyan environment in general and within Libyan listed companies in 
particular means that there are often delays in informing the members 
of the general assembly (specially the minority shareholders) about the 
date of general assembly meetings” (RE2). 
7.5 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability 
The legal and regulatory framework organises the work of companies and gives them 
their powers, duties and responsibilities. The OEDC Principles (2004) stress the 
importance of the legal and regulatory framework when they state: “The framework 
of CG relies primarily on the legal and regulatory environment”. This section 
examines the interviewees‟ views regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
legal/regulatory framework currently governing CG and accountability in Libya‟s 
listed companies. 
7.5.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
When asked whether Libyan laws and regulations create an environment that 
encourages the implementation of CG and accountability in listed companies, 
virtually all ISG interviewees appeared dissatisfied with the current framework. They 
felt that Libyan laws and regulations provide a weak environment that does little to 
encourage the implementation of CG and accountability. One board member argued 
that: 
“There is no doubt that the laws and regulations should be the 
backbone of every system as well as playing a fundamental role in 
supporting CG and accountability practices. However, in the economic 
system (free economic system) recently adopted by the Libyan state, 
the existing laws and regulations are fairly weak, and therefore there is 
an urgent need to reconsider some of these laws and regulations in 
terms of amendment or development to bring them into line with the 
requirements of CG and accountability in the Libyan environment. 
Weak enforcement laws and poor follow-up by monitoring and 
supervisory bodies have also negatively influenced CG and 
accountability practices in Libya” (BD7). 
Another interviewee also cited inconsistent enforcement by the relevant authorities as 
leading to a lack of accountability. This interviewee went so far as to suggest that 
things have changed little since pre-revolutionary times, when even those who 
contributed dramatically to a company‟s bankruptcy or who were involved in fraud 
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could be rewarded with “a high position or appointment to a large institution” (EM2). 
Others stressed that there is an urgent need for well-qualified experts, especially in 
commercial law and with knowledge, awareness and experience of the Libyan 
business environment, to update the legal and regulatory system and bring it into line 
with CG requirements. 
When asked about the role of existing Libyan legislative bodies such as the LSMA, 
all ISG interviewees said that one of the core functions of these bodies is to monitor 
the compliance of Libyan listed companies with the principles of CG. However, ten 
of the group pointed out that the LSMA has not yet been able to carry out this role 
because it is still awaiting ratification of its authority by the parliament. Furthermore, 
despite being entrusted with the vital tasks of monitoring Libyan listed companies, 
developing CG standards and endorsing external auditors in the LSM, it still lacks 
any meaningful monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. One executive director 
expressed his frustration thus: 
“The best way to express it is that the LSMA was stillborn; it has not 
yet started its tasks, nor has its authority been ratified, despite the fact 
that it has been established since 2014 and it has a board of directors” 
(EM2).  
As far as other regulatory bodies are concerned, five ISG interviewees saw the CBL, 
the Audit Bureau and bodies within the insurance and banking sectors as playing a 
monitoring/supervisory role, although they were generally unimpressed with the 
performance of these bodies, “especially concerning the monitoring of compliance 
with laws and regulations” (BD2). Seven ISG interviewees listed possible reasons for 
this lacklustre performance, including one board chairman who explained:  
“Although the legislative bodies in the Libyan environment have 
qualified staff, what is lacking is enforcement and continuous 
supervision of institutions. Another main reason for their weak 
performance is that government entities are intervening at the heart of 
their work, which negatively affects the performance of these 
authorities” (BD6). 
Ten of the twelve ISG interviewees felt that the LCGC should be compulsory rather 
than voluntary, at least until public awareness of the concept and importance of CG 
and its role in raising performance has grown. One audit committee chairman was 
confident that this idea is universally supported by stakeholders: 
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“There is no doubt that if you ask any stakeholder in this market about 
this idea then most certainly, he would support the LCGC being made 
mandatory for all Libyan listed companies – to promote transparency, 
protect the rights of shareholders and stakeholders alike and reduce the 
financial and administrative corruption currently afflicting most 
companies in the Libyan environment. To do this requires the effective 
implementation of CG to achieve true accountability. Finally, I would 
also like to point out here that I would prefer to see one of the 
legislative authorities issue a law specifically relating to CG rather 
than the LCGC already issued by the market itself” (BD4). 
However, the other two ISG interviewees cautioned that any such change would be 
very difficult in Libya‟s current political and economic circumstances, arguing that it 
should be left to the LSMA to make the code mandatory when its authority is finally 
ratified. In contrast to his colleagues, one executive director argued that rather than 
making the LCGC mandatory first, this should come after public awareness has been 
raised and the environment changed: 
“The LCGC at present should be voluntary for Libyan listed 
companies until a governance environment has been created which 
encourages CG practices, for example by increasing awareness of the 
concept of CG and amending laws and regulations that are not in line 
with the requirements of the CG system” (EM2).  
Just one interviewee, an executive chairman, argued that the Libyan Commercial Law 
(LCL) No. (23/2010) is already sufficient to support the implementation of CG within 
Libyan listed companies, and that the legislators‟ main task should be to assemble the 
provisions currently scattered across Libyan law into one piece of legislation. He 
argued that: 
“Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) No. (23/2010) contains the rules of 
CG scattered throughout its articles. If the Libyan supervisory and 
regulatory authorities can force Libyan listed companies to comply 
with what is in LCL No. (23/2010), this is enough to apply the rules of 
CG” (BD7). 
7.5.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
When the ESG interviewees were asked whether Libyan laws and regulations create 
an environment that encourages CG and accountability practices in listed companies, 
almost all expressed dissatisfaction with the current legislative framework. Several 
spoke of an urgent need to modify and develop laws and regulations to respond to 
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both the Libyan economic system and CG requirements. One interviewee from the 
regulatory side explained that: 
“Laws issued by the Libyan legislature have many articles which 
reflect the principles and rules of CG, but there are also articles that 
impede CG practices in the Libyan environment. There are ambiguities 
because these laws were issued in an earlier era under the socialist 
system of the time…. under Libya‟s new, free economic system, there 
is an urgent need to amend some of these laws in line with the 
requirements of CG” (RE2). 
Almost all ESG interviewees agreed that the main tasks of the relevant legislative 
bodies are to monitor and enforce the compliance of Libyan listed companies with CG 
practices and to provide recommendations for the development of legislation. 
However, when asked about the efficiency of the LSMA in this regard, seven of this 
group noted that it is unable to perform the first of these tasks because it lacks the 
power to force Libyan listed companies to improve their CG and accountability 
practices. As far as the other bodies are concerned, three interviewees felt that the 
supervisory bodies within the bank and insurance sectors are generally satisfactory, 
while one interviewee declined to answer this question. However, four interviewees 
were dissatisfied with the performance of these authorities, arguing that they are too 
dependent on the laws and regulations of neighbouring countries and insufficiently 
concerned with fashioning regulation to fit the Libyan culture and economy.  This led 
one of the interviewees to conclude that these authorities themselves need to be 
reviewed “in terms of either the persons in charge or their regulation mechanisms” 
(OS4). An external auditor, meanwhile, criticised their “timidity”: 
“Let me say that theoretically, the legislative bodies are the only 
means to ensure the implementation of CG principles. It should also be 
noted that the importance of these bodies is not only in the enactment 
of laws and legislation, but in the enforcement and following up of 
these laws effectively. However, in practice, they are timid, and 
although Libya has plenty of legal expertise available, this is not being 
deployed as it should be” (RE4). 
On the question of whether the LCGC should be made compulsory, the ESG 
interviewees were unanimous that the code should be mandatory and monitored by a 
specific authority, such as the LSMA, which should have the right to impose penalties 
on listed companies failing to comply. The general feeling was that the code should 
be imposed through legislation rather than regulation to maximise the chances of it 
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being implemented effectively within listed companies. One member of the LSMA 
cited Sweden as an example of a country that has gone down the legislative route: 
“The legal system will play a fundamental role in the improvement 
and development of CG and accountability practices if the LCGC 
becomes a specific law obliging Libyan listed companies to implement 
CG. CSR reports are currently not required in many countries of the 
world, but Sweden has enacted legislation requiring mention of CSR 
in annual financial reports. Let me tell you in brief, if it is not imposed 
by law or legislation, then it will not be done efficiently or effectively 
in the Libyan environment” (RE1). 
One interviewee (OS1) underlined the importance of making the LGCG compulsory, 
arguing that it is a good way to help companies become more successful. He 
suggested that any companies wanting to be listed in the LSM should be compelled to 
implement the principles of CG. The general feeling was that if CG is not imposed by 
law, it will not be practised efficiently in the Libyan environment generally and in 
Libyan listed companies in particular. 
7.6 Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
This part of the interview sought to investigate which factors the interviewees 
perceived as having the most influence on the practice of CG and accountability in 
Libyan listed companies. 
7.6.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
Eleven ISG interviewees generally agreed that a lack of knowledge and awareness 
about the concept and importance of CG at all company levels is the most significant 
factor. One board chairman (BD1) suggested that this may be because the CG culture 
has yet to become established in most Libyan institutions, either at the top or bottom 
of the hierarchy. He also pointed to a lack of training programmes for members of the 
general assembly, boards of directors and executive directors (even when they are 
directly concerned with CG practice), explaining that GA members and board 
members rarely participate in conferences, seminars or workshops on CG.   
Eight ISG interviewees highlighted the weakness of the legislative environment as the 
second most influential factor on the grounds that this underlies the generally poor 
performance of Libya‟s supervisory and regulatory bodies. One interviewee argued 
that: 
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“There are many causes, including the failure to develop laws and 
legislation suited to the principles of CG, although they are in line 
with the socialist system which was previously adopted by the Libyan 
state. Also, the weak performance of the regulatory and monitoring 
bodies in the Libyan environment and the LSMA in particular” (BD8).  
One board member (BD5) cited both weak, outdated laws and regulations that have 
not been updated in line with the requirements of CG and accountability, and poor 
monitoring and enforcement by the relevant authorities. He accused the government 
of deliberately failing to support supervisory bodies, even though they are expected to 
monitor state institutions and bring about improvements in CG and accountability 
practices in the LSM. 
Another factor, cited by seven ISG interviewees, was that companies are currently not 
accountable for their failure to implement CG. One audit committee chairman (BD4) 
explained that this lack of accountability is partly legal in origin (existing legislation 
is incompatible in some respects with the requirements of CG, and there are no laws 
to enforce compliance), but that social factors also play a part (see 7.7.1 and 7.7.2).  
7.6.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
All eight ESG interviewees perceived the lack of awareness of the concept of CG in 
Libyan listed companies as the most significant factor, although one interviewee from 
the regulatory side (RE1) qualified this by saying that many senior executives are 
aware of the concept but fail to communicate its importance to general assemblies 
and boards of directors. Like the ISG, interviewees in this group also cited lack of 
participation in CG-related conferences, seminars and workshops by GA members 
and boards.   
Six ESG interviewees identified the weakness of the legislative environment as the 
second most significant factor affecting CG and accountability practices. One 
regulator argued that: 
“Confusion accompanied the determination of our economic identity 
under the former regime, and this led to the creation of a culture in 
which laws and regulations were not seen as fixed. This has made it 
more difficult to enforce the laws and regulations that support CG 
practices and accountability in the Libyan environment” (RE2). 
Another four ESG interviewees observed that Libyan listed companies are not 
currently accountable for any shortcomings in their implementation of CG. One 
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external auditor (RE3) attributed this to the poor performance of the monitoring and 
regulatory bodies, who fail to punish companies violating the regulations and abuse 
the powers conferred upon them.  
In summary, there was a consensus across both groups regarding the factors having 
the greatest impact on CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies. A 
lack of knowledge and awareness about the concept and importance of CG at all 
company levels was seen as the most significant factor, followed by the weakness of 
the legislative environment and the lack of accountability. 
7.7 The Concept and Current State of Accountability 
The aim in this part of the interview was to investigate the interviewees‟ views on the 
concept of accountability and the extent to which they thought accountability is 
currently being practised in Libyan listed companies. 
7.7.1 Internal Stakeholders Group (ISG) 
Almost all the ISG interviewees agreed that those who are in a position of authority 
and who are entrusted with powers and responsibilities must be able to explain and 
justify the actions they take on behalf of stakeholders. An executive director from a 
listed company explained that: 
“There is no particular definition of the term accountability, but in 
general, it can be defined as holding those at the higher levels and 
decision makers responsible for the results of their actions, within the 
limits of their responsibilities” (EM2). 
When asked whether the stakeholders of Libyan listed companies demand 
accountability from these companies, the majority of ISG interviewees stressed that 
in practice, such demands tend only to be made by major shareholders, who are able 
to have some measure of accountability through general assembly meetings. Other 
stakeholders tend to know too little about companies‟ performance and activities to 
even start demanding accountability. The executive chairman of one listed company 
explained that the CBL plays a key role in ensuring accountability to shareholders:  
“From my experience of attending general assembly meetings I have 
noticed that shareholders are now concentrating on the powers granted 
to executives and holding them accountable. For example, in the 
banking sector, the major shareholder is the CBL, which is specifically 
requesting accountability from all banks. The CBL has established an 
entity within each bank called the compliance management team, 
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whose task is to monitor the extent to which the bank complies with 
the principles of CG and to hold it accountable for any shortcomings 
in this regard” (BD7). 
When asked whether Libyan listed companies and their boards are accountable for the 
consequences of their actions, virtually all ISG interviewees emphasised that this 
accountability is enshrined in Libyan Commercial Law No. (23/2010), which holds 
boards of directors responsible for any breach of the duties set out in the law. Five 
ISG interviewees stressed that the BOD is accountable first and foremost to the 
general assembly for any negligence or omission in its performance, and for 
committing any unlawful actions or actions that do not serve the interests of the bank. 
An executive chairman of a listed company explained that the GA has more than one 
mechanism at its disposal for ensuring this accountability: 
“In reality, accountability can be discharged during the general 
assembly meetings, especially if the external auditor offers substantial 
remarks in the annual audit report which need convincing 
justifications. Another example, the monitoring committee in the 
company – that has been established by the GA – among its main tasks 
is to monitor the performance of the board of directors. It prepares a 
report for the GA, which holds the board of directors accountable for 
any shortcomings mentioned in this report” (BD2). 
On the other hand, seven ISG interviewees argued that accountability is almost non-
existent in the Libyan business environment, with listed companies and their directors 
not being held accountable for their actions and decisions because of the prevailing 
“culture of courtesy”. These interviewees argued that the importance placed on social 
relationships, in Libyan society in general and in business transactions in particular, is 
a key barrier to the implementation of accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
All the ISG interviewees understood the close link between CG and accountability; 
accountability cannot be implemented effectively unless there is an integrated CG 
system that determines the duties and responsibilities of those involved, and this 
system will not work unless the principle of accountability is strictly upheld. As one 
executive director observed, accountability is one of the fundamental pillars of CG 
(EM4). Where accountability is lacking, CG performance will not only be weak, it 
will be very difficult to improve it. The two concepts are thus two sides of the same 
coin. 
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7.7.2 External Stakeholders Group (ESG) 
Virtually all of the ESG interviewees shared the same view regarding the concept of 
accountability. One (RE2) defined it as each individual being responsible for his 
actions and for explaining and justifying the actions and decisions taken under his 
authority. He saw this accountability as extending to members of the general 
assembly, the BOD, executive directors and other stakeholders.  
As in the previous group, almost all ESG interviewees suggested that only major 
shareholders demand any kind of accountability for failure or negligence on the part 
of the board or executive directors, as other stakeholders generally lack understanding 
of the concept of performance assessment and the real meaning of accountability. The 
exception was one external auditor, who expressed frustration that general assemblies 
often choose to ignore evidence of incompetence or even wrongdoing: 
“From the reality of my job as an external auditor at the LSM, in 
practice, even when my reports mention illegal acts taking place, there 
is often no response or expectation of accountability, as general 
assemblies do not care about holding negligent officials accountable, 
even when the external auditor makes the same observations every 
year” (RE2). 
Almost all ESG interviewees confirmed that boards are accountable for their actions 
under the law, but six of the eight were critical of current levels of accountability. 
They cited several reasons for this, including outdated legislation, the LSMA‟s 
inability to enforce accountability within the LSM because of its unratified status, and 
the clear influence of social factors. A financial consultant in this group echoed others 
in the ISG by highlighting the impact of social ties in undermining attempts to enforce 
accountability in listed companies: 
“In practice, the implementation of accountability mechanisms is still 
weak due to legal and social factors. Let me describe the reality of 
accountability in the Libyan environment and how it relates to the 
social aspect. When an official makes a mistake, he is considered 
accountable under the law, but the legal environment is so weak and 
social factors are so important, they overturn this accountability” 
(OS1). 
Almost all ESG interviewees agreed that accountability requires a good CG system. 
One interviewee (RE1) described the CG system and accountability as 
complementary. The CG system aims to achieve accountability as this is a step 
towards realising the objective of the company – to protect the rights and interests of 
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all relevant stakeholders. Accountability is more easily achieved when responsibilities 
and terms of reference are clearly identified; where these are ill-defined, it may be 
difficult to determine who should be held responsible for performance.  
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7.8 Summary 
This chapter reported the findings obtained from the second data collection instrument 
– the semi-structured interviews. Twenty interviews were conducted with a range of 
stakeholders (twelve internal and eight external) to elicit their views regarding current 
CG and accountability practices within Libyan listed companies. The interviews were 
conducted in Tripoli (at the Libyan Stock Market) and Misurata. 
Most of the interviewees agreed on Hawkamat Alsharekat as the most appropriate 
Arabic translation of CG, reflecting the fact that this term has become widely used in 
the banking sector. Nor is it surprising that a high percentage (80%) of interviewees 
defined CG from a broad stakeholder perspective, given that Libya is an Islamic state 
whose constitution, laws and regulatory framework all encourage its citizens to see 
themselves as accountable to society at large. Consistent with this broad definition 
was the view expressed by 75% of the ISG and 88% of the ESG that the most 
important reason for adopting a good CG system is the protection of stakeholders‟ 
rights. 
Asked about the mechanics of compliance, the interviewees unanimously confirmed 
that boards in Libyan listed companies have between three and eleven members, the 
majority of whom are non-executive, as stipulated by the LCGC. The majority of 
both groups asserted that the general assembly is responsible for selecting and 
appointing board members according to pre-set technical and professional criteria 
(geographic factors may also be taken into account), though two ISG interviewees 
and three ESG interviewees countered this by arguing that some board members 
within listed companies are only appointed because they have personal or tribal 
connections with members of the general assembly.  
Virtually all the interviewees asserted that the duties and responsibilities of the board 
are clearly set out in almost all Libyan listed companies, and only three interviewees 
(two in the ISG and one in the ESG) suggested that some board members do not 
devote sufficient time and effort to discharging these duties and responsibilities 
properly. This may be due to a lack of knowledge and experience.  
Most of the interviewees said that sub-committee members are selected in much the 
same way as board members, and that their duties and responsibilities are also clearly 
defined. Three-quarters regarded the audit committee as the most important of their 
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board‟s sub-committees because it serves as the main link between the internal and 
external auditors. Almost all asserted that audit committees within Libyan listed 
companies are made up of non-executive directors and have no fewer than three 
members.  
The level of disclosure and transparency within Libyan listed companies was also 
described as no more than satisfactory by both ISG and ESG interviewees. They 
ascribed this mainly to the fact that current disclosure and transparency practices are 
designed to meet local – not international – requirements, but they also suggested that 
many executive directors have a poor understanding of the concepts of disclosure and 
transparency.  
Just over half of both groups were critical of current internal and external audit 
mechanisms, claiming that internal control systems are inadequate mainly because 
internal and external auditors alike fail to monitor these systems with sufficient 
rigour. This is despite the fact that the duties and responsibilities of the internal audit 
are clearly defined in companies‟ internal audit regulations, job descriptions and 
statutes (virtually all interviewees agreed), and listed companies follow a set of 
criteria when selecting external auditors (most agreed). Almost all ISG interviewees 
agreed with the ESG that the external auditor‟s main duty is to express an impartial 
opinion on whether the financial statement accurately reflects the company‟s financial 
position and results.  
In discussions about shareholders‟ rights, seven of the ISG interviewees felt that these 
are protected and respected, both legally and in practice; the ESG interviewees, 
however, felt that this is only true for major shareholders, and that minority 
shareholders have much less protection. Additionally, almost all expressed 
dissatisfaction with the current legal and regulatory framework, which they saw as 
too weak and as doing little to encourage the implementation of CG and 
accountability. They were unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the performance of 
Libya‟s regulatory bodies in monitoring companies‟ compliance with CG and 
accountability principles. 
The two groups were strikingly similar in what they judged to be the main factors 
impacting CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies. Both groups 
saw a lack of understanding at all levels of the concept and importance of CG as the 
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prime factor, followed by the weakness of the legislative environment, and then the 
fact that companies are not held accountable for their CG shortcomings. This last is 
due partly to gaps in the legislation, and partly to the influence of the prevailing 
cultural norms. All the interviewees observed that the expectation of accountability is 
limited to major shareholders, and even these receive only a limited measure of 
accountability during general assembly meetings. Virtually all of the interviewees 
commented that accountability mechanisms are largely non-existent in Libya, even in 
listed companies, making it very difficult to adopt an integrated CG system within the 
Libyan environment. 
The following discussion chapter brings together the above findings from the semi-
structured interviews and those obtained from the questionnaire survey and compares 
them with the findings from the literature review.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
COMPARISON OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND SEMI-
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESULTS 
8.1 Introduction 
The current study set out to investigate CG and accountability practice in Libyan 
listed companies. It seeks to understand how various Libyan stakeholders perceive 
CG and accountability, their assessment of current CG and accountability practice in 
these companies and whether they think the legal and regulatory framework of CG is 
adequate. This chapter brings together the results from the questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews and compares them with the findings from the literature review 
in order to answer the research questions identified in Chapter One: 
 How is the concept of CG understood in the Libyan context? 
 To what extent are Libyan listed companies committed to implementing CG 
mechanisms? 
 Does Libya have an adequate legal and regulatory framework to support CG and 
accountability practices? 
 What factors influence CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed 
companies? 
 How is accountability understood and practised in Libyan listed companies?  
8.2 Understanding of CG in the Libyan Environment 
The first research question: “How is the concept of CG understood in the Libyan 
context?” was addressed by asking stakeholders to identify what they saw as the best 
Arabic interpretation of the term, to give their own definition of CG and to explain 
why it is important for Libyan listed companies and the Libyan environment in 
general. 
8.2.1 Arabic Interpretation of the Term CG 
The term CG has only recently appeared in the Arabic literature, and there is still 
much debate about how it should be translated (Falgi, 2009). The questionnaire results 
indicated strong agreement among all stakeholder groups that Hawkamat Alshrekat is 
the most appropriate Arabic translation of CG in the Libyan environment, and this 
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was broadly supported by the interview findings, with the majority of both the internal 
stakeholder group (ISG) and the external stakeholder group (ESG) agreeing that this 
is the best choice to express the English meaning of CG. The respondents thus echoed 
Zagoub (2016) in seeing this as the closest Arabic equivalent. In this respect, Libya 
echoes Saudi Arabia, where Hawkamat Alshrekat is also the most widely accepted 
translation (Alshehri, 2012). The few interviewees that disagreed preferred the term 
“Aledarah Alrashedah” as the most appropriate for both general and specialist users. 
The divergence of opinion about how the English term CG should be rendered in 
Arabic may be partly attributable to the fact that it has only recently been introduced 
into the Libyan environment. However, the range of Arabic translations available, 
each conveying a slightly different understanding of the concept, increases the risk of 
misconceptions or opposing interpretations of CG gaining a hold in the Libyan 
environment. 
8.2.2 Definition of CG 
The aim of this question was to investigate whether the questionnaire respondents and 
interviewees understood the purpose of CG as being to protect the interests of 
shareholders only or all relevant stakeholders. A number of definitions were provided 
in the questionnaire survey; narrow (agency-oriented) perspectives tended to 
concentrate on internal corporate considerations, regulatory considerations and the 
interests of shareholders, while broader (stakeholder-oriented) perspectives took into 
account the interests of other stakeholders and ethical considerations. All of the 
definitions offered in the questionnaire were accepted by the stakeholder groups, 
suggesting a good level of understanding of the CG concept across the sample as a 
whole. Most highly favoured by both internal and external stakeholders was Keasey 
& Wright‟s (1993) broad definition of CG as the regulations, rules, procedures and 
cultures that enable a company to perform successfully. Other, more agency-oriented, 
definitions such as those offered by Parkinson (1994) and Cadbury (1992) were less 
popular with both internal and external stakeholders.  
The division of opinion emerged more clearly in the interviews, with 80% of 
interviewees defining CG in broad terms. For example, one of these interviewees 
defined the purpose of CG as being to prevent financial or administrative corruption, 
to ensure the achievement of company objectives and to protect the interests and 
rights of shareholders and stakeholders. Only 20% of interviewees defined CG as 
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primarily a system for governing relations between the general assembly, board and 
executive management.  
The general view among interviewees and questionnaire respondents – that the most 
important function of CG is the protection of stakeholders‟ rights – is consistent with 
what Allen (2005) found in his investigation of CG practice in emerging markets. 
Allen concluded that where the market is undeveloped, resources are more likely to be 
fairly allocated if firms consider the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders. 
The finding also supports Iqbal & Mirakhor‟s (2004) argument that governance in 
Islamic economies tends to be stakeholder-oriented, with structures and processes 
being designed to protect the rights of all those who are exposed to risk as a 
consequence of the company‟s activities.   
8.2.3 Importance and Awareness of CG 
There was general consistency in the results obtained from the questionnaire survey 
and semi-structured interviews, with both internal and external stakeholder groups 
seeing CG as extremely important for listed companies and their shareholders. 
Interviewees from both internal and external stakeholder groups asserted that the 
main reason for adopting a CG system is to protect stakeholders‟ rights. Calder 
(2008) argues that this guarantee of legal protection means that companies with good 
CG enjoy greater investor confidence. This leads on to the second reason highlighted 
by interviewees: adopting a good CG system raises confidence among all relevant 
parties and boosts companies‟ success. The result is consistent with Abor & Adjasi‟s 
(2007) conclusion that developing states are increasingly adopting CG because of its 
ability to generate investor confidence. The corollary of this – that perceived CG 
failings might lead to a loss of confidence – was also noted by one interviewee, who 
feared that this could lead to the withdrawal of major investors from the market. Such 
a loss of confidence would be especially damaging in an emerging market like Libya. 
The present results seem to be in line with those of previous studies (e.g. La Porta et 
al., 2000; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Mallin, 2013; Solomon, 2013; Al-Malkawi et al., 
2014; Mjahid et al., 2014).  
Despite the universal acknowledgement of its importance, however, all stakeholder 
groups felt that awareness of CG issues within the Libyan environment is inadequate, 
even among those most closely involved with listed companies such as board 
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members, executive directors and investors. This lack of awareness means that there 
is little demand from society for CG practice to improve. It was also observable 
during the fieldwork for this study, with many of those who were approached to 
participate declining on the grounds that they felt they knew too little about CG 
issues. It has been suggested that the LSM and other regulatory and supervisory 
authorities should make more effort to spread the culture of CG among all 
stakeholders. This could be achieved by training employees at all functional levels 
(including executive managers), along with general assemblies and BODs, through 
workshops, training courses, conferences and seminars focusing on CG issues. The 
aim should be to raise public awareness of the concept and importance of CG in 
Libyan listed companies. 
To summarise, there was broad agreement among the internal and external 
stakeholder groups that “Hawkamat Alshrekat” is the most appropriate Arabic 
translation for the term CG. Most understood the concept in broad terms and saw its 
most important function as being to protect the interests of all relevant stakeholders. 
There was general understanding of its high importance for firms and shareholders but 
concern that awareness of CG issues is currently inadequate among Libyan listed 
companies. 
8.3 Compliance with CG Mechanisms in Libyan Listed Companies 
The second research question: “To what extent are Libyan listed companies 
committed to implementing CG mechanisms?” was addressed by investigating 
stakeholders‟ views on the current level of commitment being shown to the BOD 
mechanism, disclosure and transparency, internal and external auditing and 
shareholder rights within Libyan listed companies. 
8.3.1 The Board of Directors Mechanism 
The Cadbury Report (1992) pays particular attention to the BOD as it considers this 
one of the most important mechanisms for achieving CG best practice. A number of 
themes were discussed, including the board‟s composition, duties, responsibilities and 
sub-committees. 
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8.3.1.1 Composition of the Board of Directors 
According to the LCGC (2007), boards in Libyan listed companies should have 
between three and eleven members, the majority of whom should be non-executives 
and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is greater) should be independent. 
Both the questionnaire and the interview outcomes confirmed that Libyan listed 
companies generally comply with this stipulation, though ISG and ESG interviewees 
explained that board size varies from company to company, depending on the type 
and volume of activity.  
From the point of view of CG, this adherence to the board size requirement is 
encouraging. Nam & Lum‟s (2005) finding that the most efficient board size for CG 
purposes is fewer than twelve members seems to support the LCGC‟s eleven-member 
maximum, though the findings of other authors suggest that boards at the top end of 
this scale may be more effective in their oversight role than their smaller counterparts 
(Al-Mosharrafa, 2015). Boards with ten or eleven members are more likely to 
encompass a wider range of skills, allowing them to make better decisions and 
monitor CEO performance more closely (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Al-Matari et al., 
2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). Albu & Girbina (2015) argue that large boards are 
generally better able to monitor the actions of senior managers and that their CG 
practices are likely to be more advanced. This is partly because these boards are more 
likely to be made up of a mix of executive and non-executive directors, which 
strengthens their ability to monitor and influence these managers (Kula, 2005; Lee, 
2008; Al-Sahafi et al., 2015; Al-Faryan, 2017).The value of NEDs is acknowledged in 
many CG codes in the requirement that boards should have at least as many NEDs as 
executive directors (Muravyev et al., 2014). It is also echoed by numerous 
researchers, including Yoo & Reed (2015), who argue that having a large percentage 
of NEDs on the board ensures that shareholders‟ interests and rights are protected, and 
Volonté (2015), who claims that NEDs are better able to offer this protection than 
executive directors. Both Lemonakis et al., (2018) and Garefalakis et al., (2017) 
conclude that NEDs can help boards be more independent, efficient and effective. 
Both the questionnaire responses and the interview outcomes indicated that general 
assemblies in Libyan listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC‟s 
requirements that they – as the shareholders‟ representatives – should be solely 
responsible for appointing board members, and that these appointments should be for 
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no longer than three years. Interviewees from both internal and external stakeholder 
groups asserted that board members are selected according to pre-set criteria for 
technical and practical efficiency, specialist knowledge and experience, as set down in 
the code. Practice, at least in theory, thus appears to be consistent with the principle 
that board efficiency is best protected by appointing the right balance of executives 
and NEDs, and of practically experienced and suitably qualified directors (Fratini & 
Tettamanzi, 2015). The finding also appears consistent with Mallin‟s (2007) 
observation that the criteria for selecting and appointing board members are typically 
stipulated in national CG codes and regulations. The most talented and qualified 
people are more likely to be recruited if there are mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the right candidates are appointed. However, evidence also emerged that these criteria 
are sometimes abandoned in favour of personal relationships, with candidates being 
appointed because they have personal or tribal connections with members of the 
general assembly. 
8.3.1.2 Duties and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors  
The questionnaire respondents as a whole strongly agreed that all the duties listed in 
Table 6.7 are undertaken by the boards of Libyan listed companies. These duties 
include endorsing the strategic direction and main objectives of the company and 
supervising their implementation; setting up and supervising systems of internal 
control; setting out specific and clear policies, standards and procedures for board 
membership; setting out clear written policies to protect the rights and interests of 
stakeholders; and setting up policies and procedures to ensure that the company‟s 
rules and regulations, as well as its commitment to disclose essential information to 
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders, are respected.  
They also strongly agreed that boards in Libyan listed companies are responsible for 
monitoring the operations of the company‟s management in general and executives in 
particular; for carrying out their duties seriously and attentively; and for ensuring that 
their decisions are based on adequate information from executives (see Table 6.9). 
They saw boards as responsible for determining what authority is to be delegated to 
executive managers and for how long, and for setting out executive decision-making 
procedures. Finally, they agreed that boards must take the interests of stakeholders 
into account when making strategic decisions. 
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The interview results supported the questionnaire findings, with both ESG and ISG 
interviewees declaring that the board‟s duties and responsibilities are clearly set out in 
almost all Libyan listed companies. One interviewee listed these duties and 
responsibilities as being: to set goals and strategic plans for the company, to develop 
and supervise internal control systems, to set up written policies to define the 
relationships between the company and stakeholders, and to determine the powers of 
the executive management and supervise its performance. Just two interviewees felt 
that board members need more detailed job descriptions; one argued that this is 
necessary to avoid “conflicts of competencies” between board members. 
Like Keay & Loughrey (2015) and Bankewitz (2016), the respondents saw the BOD‟s 
mnadate as being to protect shareholders‟ rights and interests by monitoring the 
performance of and offering advice to senior management. They echoed the Cadbury 
Report (1992), Dahya et al., (2002), the OECD (2004), the UK Combined Code 
(2006), Monks & Minow (2008), the UK CG Code (2010) and Al-Matari et al., 
(2012) in suggesting that the main duties and responsibilities of the board are to set 
the direction of the company through targeted aims, policies, plans and strategies over 
the short and long term. The results are also in line with Mallin‟s (2007) argument 
that the primary role of the BOD is to set the company‟s objectives and monitor its 
progress towards achieving its goals, and with Clarke‟s (2007) finding that the 
board‟s three main roles are control, strategic and institutional.  
The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are carrying out 
their duties in accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the 
stipulations of the LCGC (2007). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups were broadly 
satisfied that board members are devoting sufficient time and effort to discharge these 
duties and responsibilities properly.  
8.3.1.3 Board Sub-Committees 
Brown et al., (2011) note that most CG codes recommend a minimum of three sub-
committees: the audit committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration 
committee. Others, such as a finance committee, an executive committee or a risk 
management committee, may be set up as required (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). The 
LCGC (2007) advises all Libyan listed companies to set up sub-committees, marking 
out the audit committee and the nomination/remuneration committee as the most 
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important. Risk committees, CG committees and Shariah committees are advised as 
needed.  
Both questionnaire respondents and interviewees saw the audit committee as the most 
important board sub-committee. The significance of the audit committee means it 
features prominently in the LCGC and, since the majority of Libyan listed companies 
are in the banking sector and are required by the CBL to comply with the LCGC, it is 
not surprising that they should all have an audit committee. The importance attributed 
to the committee echoes the views expressed by researchers like Mallin (2010), who 
calls it one of the most crucial sub-committees in the BOD, and Solomon (2010, 
p.186), who describes it as “a cornerstone of effective corporate governance”.  
Alaswad & Stanišić (2016) found that audit committees are generally required to have 
at least three members, two-thirds of whom should be non-executive, while Utama & 
Leonardo (2014) advise that they should comprise at least three INEDs, one of whom 
should be appointed chairman. Both the questionnaire survey respondents and the 
interviewees all agreed that audit committees in Libyan listed companies have at least 
three members and are made up of NEDs. There was also a general consensus that 
these committees are independent, which as numerous researchers (e.g. Abbott et al., 
2000; Lin et al., 2006; Al-Matari et al., 2012) have pointed out means the companies 
concerned are more likely to appoint external auditors who are specialists in the field 
and more likely to provide better-quality financial reporting. Independent audit 
committees have been shown to have a positive influence on financial reporting and 
oversight (Persons, 2009).  
Both survey respondents and interviewees explained that committee members are 
appointed in much the same way as board members; that is, candidates are usually put 
forward by the board for approval by the general assembly. Candidates are judged 
against specific criteria, including their knowledge of and experience in the relevant 
field (at least one committee member must have a financial background), their 
interests and their compatibility with other committee members. This seems 
consistent with the UK Combined Code‟s (2008) stipulation that at least one INED on 
the committee should have “recent and relevant financial experience”, and with the 
recommendations of numerous researchers, including Ghafran & O‟Sullivan (2017), 
who point out that relevant experience and knowledge are essential if committee 
members are to perform their monitoring function effectively, and Velte (2017), who 
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calls for this knowledge to be in accounting, auditing, financial reporting or internal 
controls. McDaniel et al., (2002) and Zhang et al., (2007) explain that expert members 
are better equipped than their non-expert colleagues to oversee the quality of financial 
reporting and improve its effectiveness, while DeZoort & Salterio (2001) observe that 
audit committee members with financial and auditing knowledge are better able to 
understand auditor judgements and to support the auditor in any conflict with 
management. They are also more likely to detect material misstatements. Despite this, 
however, a few interviewees claimed that candidates are sometimes appointed not 
because they have relevant expertise to offer but because they have close ties with 
members of the general assembly or the board. 
The questionnaire respondents and interviewees all agreed that the functions and 
responsibilities listed in Table 6.13 are undertaken in practice by audit committees in 
Libyan listed companies. There was general agreement that the audit committee‟s 
main functions are to supervise the internal audit and verify its effectiveness, and to 
examine the company‟s internal control system and produce a written report giving 
opinions and recommendations. The respondents thus seemed to echo Bardhan et al., 
(2015) in seeing the audit committee as playing a vital role in monitoring internal 
control systems. The relationship between the audit committee and the internal audit 
has been emphasised by Alzebana & Sawan (2015), who highlight its importance in 
achieving good CG, and by Oxner & Oxner (2006), who explain that the audit 
committee depends on the internal audit for access to the information it needs. The 
committee‟s role in validating the efficiency of the company‟s internal control system 
has been identified by a number of authors (Abbott et al., 2004; Bardhan et al., 2014; 
Rich & Zhang, 2014). 
There was similar consensus on the committee‟s other responsibilities, which were 
identified as: making recommendations to the BOD regarding the appointment of the 
external auditor and his/her fees; checking the annual financial statements before 
referring them to the BOD; and checking administrative and accounting policies and 
making recommendations to the board where necessary. These findings are also 
consistent with the roles and responsibilities identified by previous researchers (see 
Smith, 2003; Burke et al., 2008; Rezaee, 2009; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Abdulsaleh, 
2014). The committee was seen as playing a central role in monitoring the financial 
reporting process and enhancing information flows between owners and managers 
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(Beasley et al., 2009; Samaha et al., 2015). This finding seems to be in line with 
Alrshah & Fadzil‟s (2013) conclusion that the audit committee is responsible for 
supervising the relationship between managers and the external auditor and for 
resolving any disputes between the two. This all helps ensure the quality of the 
external audit process and enhances confidence in the final report (Bédard & 
Compernolle, 2014).  
The findings suggest that Libyan listed companies are taking heed of the Greenbury 
Report (1995) and the Combined Code (2008, p.9), which recommends that:  
“There should be a nomination committee, which should lead the 
process for board appointments and make recommendations to the 
board. The nomination committee should make available its terms of 
reference explaining its role and the authority delegated to it by the 
board”. 
The nomination/remuneration committee was ranked the second most important board 
sub-committee by the interviewees, who echoed Mallin (2013) in arguing that this 
committee plays a significant role in resolving board-related issues. Strikingly, 
however, the questionnaire respondents perceived this as the least important sub-
committee. In accordance with the LCGC‟s recommendation, almost all Libyan listed 
companies have such a committee. The majority of internal and external stakeholders 
in both the survey and the interviews confirmed that the members of the 
nomination/remuneration committee, like those of the audit committee, are 
nominated by the board, which also determines the functions of the committee, its 
period of operation and the powers granted to it.  
The job of the committee is to make recommendations regarding the appointment and 
replacement of board members (Madhani, 2015). The respondents‟ view that the 
committee is responsible for identifying potential candidates echoes Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein (2007) and Minichilli et al., (2007), who describe the identification of 
nominees for the posts of chairman and CEO and advising on the suitability of 
candidates for board membership as the most important of the committee‟s duties. 
There was general agreement among questionnaire respondents and interviewees that 
all the duties and responsibilities listed in Table 6.14 are undertaken in practice by 
these committees. These include annually reviewing the skills required of board 
members (Kaczmarek & Nyuur (2016) argue that the committee‟s ultimate aim 
should be to boost the effectiveness of the board by ensuring that it appoints capable 
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and qualified directors from a diverse range of backgrounds), identifying the strengths 
and weaknesses of the board and taking steps to improve it in line with the company‟s 
interests. The committee is also responsible for setting clear policies for the 
compensation and remuneration of directors and senior executives, thereby helping 
avert potential conflicts of interest arising between managers and shareholders 
(Madhani, 2015; Kanapathippillai et al., 2016), and for reviewing the employment 
terms and conditions of senior managers (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). 
The findings suggest that Libyan listed companies are taking heed of the Greenbury 
Report (1995) and the Combined Code (2008, p.9), which recommends that: “There 
should be a nomination committee, which should lead the process for board 
appointments and make recommendations to the board. The nomination committee 
should make available its terms of reference explaining its role and the authority 
delegated to it by the board”. The respondents‟ view that the committee is responsible 
for identifying potential candidates echoes Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2007) and 
Minichilli et al., (2007), who describe the identification of nominees for the posts of 
chairman and CEO and advising on the suitability of candidates for board 
membership as the most important of the committee‟s duties. Finally, the view that 
the committee should be responsible for setting remuneration policy has also been 
highlighted by Solomon (2013) and by Mallin (2007), who argues that this is 
necessary to avoid executives setting their own pay. 
Unlike the nomination/remuneration committee, the questionnaire respondents and 
interviewees were equally supportive of both risk and Shariah committees, perhaps 
because these are seen as enhancing legitimacy, especially in the banking and 
insurance sectors. Only 42.8% of the questionnaire respondents said their company 
has a CG committee, even though they perceived this as the second most important 
board sub-committee. There was less support among the interviewees, none of whom 
said their company has a CG committee. This may be due to the lack of awareness of 
both the nature and essential role of this committee.  
8.3.2 Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism  
Adequate disclosure is necessary to reduce the information asymmetry that results 
from managers being far more knowledgeable about a company‟s activities and 
situation than other relevant stakeholders (Mallin, 2013). However, the findings 
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suggest that at present, stakeholders in Libyan listed companies are generally 
unconcerned about this information asymmetry. 
The questionnaire respondents considered current disclosure levels to be sufficient 
within Libyan listed companies. They were satisfied that annual reports generally 
include the results of the annual audit assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
internal control procedures, information about board meetings, financial and non-
financial information and details of what has and what has not been applied in respect 
of CG rules. It is notable that the EM group were the most supportive of current 
performance, though this may be because this group is the main author of this 
disclosure. The fact that these disclosure topics comply with the recommendations of 
the LCGC (2007) supports Cheung et al.,‟s (2010) argument that companies tend to 
structure their disclosure around the requirements of the relevant regulatory 
authorities and corporate legislation. On the other hand, the questionnaire respondents 
gave no firm evidence that companies disclose information about their policies and 
programmes concerning the local community and the environment, or about the 
personal interests and transactions of directors. They were also neutral on the question 
of whether Libyan listed companies use their websites to promote disclosure and 
transparency and to provide information for investors and others. In other words, there 
was no evidence that listed companies in Libya deploy voluntary disclosure as a way 
of reassuring or enlisting the support of influential stakeholders, as posited by 
Tauringana & Chithambo (2015) and Liao et al., (2015). 
The findings from the interviews offered more detailed insights, confirming that the 
level of disclosure and transparency in Libyan listed companies is barely satisfactory 
for a range of reasons, most of which originate in a general lack of interest in 
disclosure among stakeholders. The interviewees argued that disclosure requirements 
in Libya lag behind those even of other emerging markets, with the result that listed 
companies concentrate their disclosure on basic information such as the income 
statement and statement of financial position. Thirteen interviewees (a mixture of 
internal and external stakeholders) argued that this is because current disclosure and 
transparency practices are designed only to meet local – not international – 
requirements. Blame was placed on the inertia of the LAAA, which could play a 
much greater role in lobbying for disclosure and transparency requirements to be 
strengthened, but the interviewees also criticised the weakness of Libya‟s regulatory 
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and oversight bodies in general for failing to determine exactly what should be 
disclosed. A few attributed the poor disclosure levels to the lack of accountability 
mechanisms in the Libyan environment, citing the lack of Libyan Accounting 
Standards and the non-adoption of international standards. These interviewees 
followed Black et al., (2008) in seeing a link between the low levels of financial 
disclosure and the absence of international accounting standards.  
There was more parity between the interview results and the questionnaire outcomes 
on the question of whether Libyan listed companies disclose their CG practices in 
their annual reports. Following the majority of questionnaire respondents, twelve (out 
of twenty) interviewees from the internal and external stakeholder groups pointed out 
that under the LCGC, Libyan listed companies are in fact only required to offer a brief 
summary of which CG principles have been implemented and which have not, and the 
reasons why not. Melis et al., (2015) and Ntim & Soobaroyen (2013) argue that most 
companies disclose information about their CG practices in order to enhance their 
reputation and thus their legitimacy. Interpreted from the perspective of legitimacy 
theory, the empirical finding in this study suggests that listed companies are at present 
mainly motivated to offer CG disclosure because they wish to be seen as complying 
with the LCGC. 
8.3.3 The Internal and External Audit Mechanisms  
The questionnaire respondents and interviewees both saw it as the board‟s job to 
determine the objectives, functions and terms of reference of the internal audit, and 
the internal auditor‟s job to provide a quarterly report to the BOD and the audit 
committee describing the extent of the company‟s legal and regulatory compliance. 
This suggests that, like Al-Matari et al., (2014) and Al-Matarneh (2011), they saw (at 
least in principle) the internal audit as an important pillar within the company‟s CG 
structure and that they recognised that both the BOD and the audit committee must 
undertake control tasks to ensure the credibility of the financial reporting process. It 
also seems to support Hutchinson & Zain‟s (2009) conclusion that the internal audit is 
the main mechanism strengthening the company‟s board and supporting the audit 
committee. Internal audit reports are an important channel of communication between 
internal auditors, the board and the audit committee and are thus an important 
contributor to successful management (Ljubisavljević & Jovanović, 2011) and key to 
strengthening CG practices.  
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However, the questionnaire respondents were ambivalent on the question of whether 
internal control systems in Libyan listed companies are actually effective. Even more 
troubling, more than half of the interviewees were openly critical of these systems, 
arguing that they are inefficient because internal and external auditors alike fail to 
monitor them with sufficient rigour. This seems inconsistent with Eighme & Cashell‟s 
(2002) claim that the internal audit plays a significant role in enhancing the efficiency 
of the company‟s internal control system, and with the Cadbury Report‟s (1992) view 
of the internal audit mechanism as an effective tool for monitoring controls and 
measures within a company. The RE group‟s criticism of the efficiency of internal 
control systems within Libyan listed companies is particularly telling, given that this 
group represents the external auditors and regulators who are best placed to determine 
whether these internal control systems are effective. Where there was criticism of the 
performance of individual internal audit departments, this was attributed to a lack of 
experience on the part of some internal auditors or to executive directors exerting too 
much influence. There were also complaints that the internal audit function is 
generally limited to the financial audit, despite the fact that its formal duties also 
include an administrative and technical audit. 
The respondents generally shared stakeholder theory‟s view that the external audit 
function is a key control mechanism whose job it is to help reduce information 
asymmetry between shareholders, investors and managers by enhancing the integrity 
and truthfulness of the company‟s financial statements (Beasley et al., 2009). The 
general consensus among questionnaire respondents and interviewees was that listed 
companies appoint LSM-registered external auditors to review their financial 
statements, indicating confidence in the integrity of the selection process. It was 
repeatedly emphasised that listed companies follow a set of criteria when selecting 
external auditors. These criteria were imposed by the LSM to ensure that only the 
technically proficient and experienced can be appointed, but they are also an 
assurance of the auditor‟s independence. This emphasis on independence was 
confirmed by the questionnaire respondents when they expressed disagreement with 
the suggestion that Libyan external auditors lack full independence, and support for 
the view that auditors should provide no consultancy or administrative services for 
companies they are auditing. The result suggests that the questionnaire respondents 
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shared Alrshah et al.,‟s (2016) view that external auditors who provide such services 
risk undermining their independence by becoming too close to management. 
The link between independence and proficiency is made explicit in the OECD‟s 
(2004) recommendation that the auditor should be “independent, competent and 
qualified”. The Cadbury Report (1992) asserts that the external audit is the 
cornerstone of a company‟s CG because it offers an objective consideration of the 
manner in which the financial statements are prepared and presented to users; the 
respondents in this study echoed the Cadbury Report in seeing the main task of the 
external auditor as being to report on whether these financial statements reflect a true 
and fair view. This requires both professional competence and impartiality (Mansouri 
et al., 2009). Notably, the RE group was the most inclined to regard registration with 
the LSM as proof that an external auditor possesses both of these qualities.  
On the whole, however, the questionnaire respondents and interviewees were critical 
of the role currently being played by the internal and external audit and were 
unconvinced of the effectiveness of internal control systems in Libyan listed 
companies. Virtually everyone agreed that the duties and responsibilities of the 
internal audit are clearly defined (in companies‟ internal audit regulations, job 
descriptions and statutes), and most agreed that listed companies appoint external 
auditors according to a set of criteria that should guarantee their professional 
competence and independence. Despite this, however, the general view was that 
neither internal nor external auditors do enough to ensure that internal control systems 
are functioning effectively. The evidence suggests that although listed companies in 
Libya have taken a number of practical steps to comply with the LCGC‟s 
requirements regarding the internal and external audit mechanisms, their commitment 
does not yet extend as far as consistent monitoring and enforcement. 
8.3.4 Shareholder Rights Mechanism   
The importance of protecting shareholder rights is highlighted in many CG codes and 
principles, including those issued by the OECD (2004) (Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011). In 
the present study, the questionnaire respondents agreed that all the shareholder rights 
listed in Table 6.21 are protected and heeded by Libyan listed companies. These 
include the right to attend the general assembly‟s meetings, participate in its 
deliberations and vote on its decisions (including the election and de-selection of 
board members); the right to put items onto the GAM agenda; and the right to ask for 
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any information as long as this does not breach financial regulations or damage the 
interests of the company. All of these rights are granted equally to all shareholders, 
whether majority or minority, in accordance with the OECD‟s second principle (2004) 
of equal treatment for all shareholders (Mjahid et al., 2014).  
According to the questionnaire respondents, shareholders also have the right to expect 
that companies will keep accurate records of share trading and give them regular and 
timely information about their activities. The importance of keeping shareholders 
informed is emphasised by Mallin (2010), who argues that their ability to participate 
in GAMs is contingent on their being properly prepared. The finding suggests that 
shareholders in Libyan listed companies enjoy similar rights to shareholders in other 
MENA countries; the UAB‟s (2007) survey of banking sectors in Jordan, Oman, 
Yemen, Qatar, the UAE and Egypt found that shareholders in four out of the six 
countries (the exceptions were Qatar and Yemen) had the right to participate and vote 
in GAMs and to access information.  
The questionnaire respondents asserted that boards must have a clear policy regarding 
the distribution of dividends and that shareholders have the right to see this policy 
during the GAM. Again, this is in line with the recommendations of the OECD 
(2004). Zattoni & Judge (2012) also argue that shareholders should be given 
warranties of dividend distribution. The respondents were confident that shareholders‟ 
legal rights are respected by Libyan listed companies.  
A slightly different picture emerged from the interviews, however; while the majority 
of ISG interviewees felt that shareholder rights are protected and respected by 
companies, both legally and in practice, the ESG interviewees were less positive, with 
some suggesting that minority shareholders tend to suffer because of the ownership 
structure in Libyan listed companies, most of which are state-owned. The RE group in 
particular was less confident than the other groups that the rights of minority 
stakeholders are adequately protected. The scepticism of these regulators and external 
auditors might be attributable to their role within the sector; these groups are 
particularly well placed to understand the practical difficulties involved in ensuring 
that the needs and wishes of all shareholders are properly accommodated within the 
time constraints of a GAM.  
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The finding that minority shareholders may enjoy less protection in Libyan listed 
companies because of the ownership structure echoes the findings of studies 
conducted in other developing economies. La Porta et al., (1999), for example, found 
that where ownership is concentrated, controlling shareholders tend to dominate the 
decision making, leaving minority shareholders largely powerless. This is also noted 
by Alkahtani (2015), who found that minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia are often 
unable to exercise their rights, even though provisions exist within the country‟s 
legislation to challenge violations of these rights, and by Mallin (2007), who found 
that minority shareholders‟ rights in Malaysia suffer under pressure from majority 
shareholders seeking to retain company control. Finally, Solomon (2010) found 
Jordan to have an insider-dominated CG system and no consideration for minority 
shareholders‟ rights, along with a stock exchange lacking in accountability and 
transparency. Interestingly, these findings do not support legitimacy theory‟s 
assumption that listed companies will protect the rights of minority shareholders 
because this enhances their own reputation (Melis et al., 2015). Tackling the 
inequality between majority and minority shareholders in Libyan listed companies is 
important both for improving company-minority shareholder relations and for the 
LSM as a whole, but the problem must first be addressed by the country‟s regulatory 
and monitoring authorities.                                             
Overall, the findings demonstrate that Libyan listed companies are broadly committed 
to implementing CG mechanisms, but that there are significant weaknesses in terms 
of practice. Listed companies‟ commitment is most evident in their adherence to the 
LCGC‟s (2007) requirements regarding the composition, roles and responsibilities of 
boards and sub-committees, but they are also engaging with the requirement for 
disclosure and transparency, albeit to local rather than international standards. Listed 
companies have also taken practical steps towards meeting the LCGC‟s requirements 
regarding the internal and external audit mechanisms, but the general view among 
stakeholders is that these mechanisms are currently not robust enough to ensure strong 
internal control systems. Finally, in terms of the shareholders‟ rights mechanism, 
majority shareholders are seen to enjoy much greater protection, both legally and in 
practice, than minority shareholders. 
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8.4 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability  
This section seeks to answer the third research question: “Does Libya have an 
adequate legal and regulatory framework to support CG and accountability 
practices?” The findings suggest not – the questionnaire respondents all expressed 
dissatisfaction with Libya‟s legal and regulatory framework and its ability to foster 
the implementation of CG and accountability practice. Interestingly, this 
dissatisfaction was strongest among the RE group (Mann-Whitney tests confirmed 
statistically significant differences between this group and the remaining three), 
whose job it is to enforce these laws and regulations. La Porta et al., (1998, 1999) 
stress the importance of legal enforcement in improving CG practice, but this finding 
suggests that regulators are frustrated by what they see as a lack of support from 
Libya‟s supervisory/regulatory bodies and the LSMA. It is perhaps not surprising then 
that the questionnaire respondents felt unable to agree that listed companies actually 
comply with the LSM‟s laws and regulations. 
The interviewees – both internal and external stakeholders – were equally dissatisfied 
with the current framework and critical of what they saw as poor enforcement by 
monitoring and supervisory bodies, though as one interviewee from the regulatory 
group pointed out, part of the problem is that Libya‟s legal system has not yet been 
fully updated to take account of the country‟s new, free-market economic model. 
These weaknesses within the legal environment may partly explain inconsistencies in 
CG practice among listed companies, given that: “The framework of CG relies 
primarily on the legal and regulatory environment” (OECD, 2004). The finding 
supports Okpara‟s (2011) argument that an inadequate legal system and lack of 
adherence to the regulatory framework are the main barriers to CG implementation in 
developing countries. It echoes the findings of Brahim & Nourredines (2017), who 
describe the legislative environment in Algeria as also doing little to encourage CG 
practice, and seems to support Alajlan‟s (2004) argument that Arab markets in general 
are poorly regulated, and that the laws governing listed companies are not consistently 
enforced. 
The interviewees were consistent with the questionnaire respondents in expressing 
strong dissatisfaction with the performance of the LSMA and other regulatory bodies 
in terms of their supervision of and control over CG and accountability practices in 
Libyan listed companies. These bodies were accused of failing to update legislation 
251 
or to force Libyan listed companies to comply with the legal/regulatory framework. 
Interviewees repeatedly complained that the LSMA still has no meaningful 
enforcement mechanisms, despite the importance of the tasks entrusted to it (one 
interviewee went so far as to call it “stillborn”), and there were calls for the other 
regulatory bodies to be reviewed “in terms of either the persons in charge or their 
regulation mechanisms”. One ISG interviewee asserted that the main reason these 
bodies perform poorly is government interference, while an ESG interviewee (a 
regulator) accused them of being timid. This interviewee emphasised that the 
importance of these bodies lies not just in their ability to enact legislation, but in their 
ability effectively to enforce these laws. His assertion seems to support Berglöf & 
Claessens‟ (2004) argument that enforcement is widely considered even more 
important than the issuance of the law itself and is seen as crucial to achieving 
effective CG and accountability. 
There was general agreement among questionnaire respondents that the LCGC should 
be mandatory for all Libyan listed companies, though, perhaps surprisingly, the RE 
group was the least enthusiastic in its agreement. This group felt that rather than 
concerning themselves with enforcing the LCGC, the first priority of the LSM and 
Libyan legislators should be to amend the country‟s legal framework to bring it into 
line with CG requirements. On the question of what should happen to listed 
companies that do not comply with the LCGC, most questionnaire respondents felt 
they should be de-listed, though in this case, it was the BD and EM groups that were 
the least supportive. However, it may simply be that these respondents recognised the 
impracticability of this proposal, given the limited number of Libyan listed 
companies. The overwhelming majority of both ISG and ESG interviewees also 
wanted to see the LCGC being made compulsory, providing that this is done via 
legislation rather than regulation. These interviewees felt that the code is most likely 
to be implemented by listed companies if they are being monitored by a single 
authority with the power to impose penalties for non-compliance. 
The idea that an independent body should be established to oversee CG issues in 
Libya was supported by both questionnaire respondents and interviewees – both 
groups saw it as necessary to encourage good CG practice in listed companies. One 
ESG interviewee justified the need for such an independent authority by citing the 
relative weakness of the LSMA, explaining that the delay in ratification and its lack 
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of enforcement powers may have led companies to underestimate the importance of 
CG implementation. This recognition of the role played by outside agencies is echoed 
in the OECD Principles (2004), which emphasise the importance of monitoring, 
regulatory and supervisory authorities in ensuring that laws are enforced. It is also 
noted by Saidi (2004) in his Lebanon-based study. This author concludes that an 
independent body is urgently needed to oversee the implementation of the OECD‟s 
Principles in the Lebanese business environment. 
In conclusion, the answer to the third research question seems to be that Libya does 
not currently have a legal/regulatory framework that supports CG and accountability. 
Internal and external stakeholders alike expressed dissatisfaction both with the 
framework itself, which they saw as weak and outdated, and with the performance of 
Libya‟s regulatory and supervisory bodies in monitoring listed companies‟ 
compliance with CG and accountability principles. The finding appears consistent 
with Owusu & Vaaland‟s (2016) conclusion that developing countries tend to have 
inadequate legal and regulatory systems for CG, and with Klapper & Love‟s (2004) 
suggestion that a strong legal and regulatory framework is fundamental to establishing 
a good CG system. 
8.5 Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
The literature illustrates that the factors influencing CG practice vary from country to 
country. Accordingly, the fourth research question: “What factors influence CG and 
accountability practice in Libyan listed companies?” sought to investigate which 
factors internal and external stakeholders in this study perceived as having the most 
influence in the Libyan environment.  
The questionnaire respondents identified Libya‟s current economic and political 
situation as the factor having the greatest influence on CG and accountability practice, 
providing support for Abdou‟s (2015) argument that political factors are having a 
direct and significant adverse impact on the quality of CG in Libyan institutions. In 
terms of the remaining factors that were identified, there are interesting similarities 
between the findings of this study and those of other studies conducted in other 
emerging economies. For example, the identification of the weak investment climate 
in the LSM (and the limited number of listed companies) as the second most 
influential factor echoes concerns that have been expressed about the Romanian Stock 
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Market (Loana et al., 2009). In Libya‟s case, companies may be holding back from 
listing because they are still coming to grips with the recent transition to a free-market 
economy. Similarly, the general perception that CG practice is being hampered 
because directors lack knowledge about CG but have too little access to training 
mirrors Dahawy‟s (2007) finding that Egyptian stakeholders need more training 
courses and workshops to raise awareness and improve the implementation of CG in 
that country. Finally, the questionnaire respondents echoed Braendle et al., (2013) in 
identifying weak accountability mechanisms as a key obstacle to the development of 
CG practice. Writing about the Iranian context, Braendle et al., explain that these 
mechanisms are not widely understood, nor is the concept of accountability itself 
encouraged, in Iran‟s business environment.  
The findings from the semi-structured interviews, while not consistent with the 
questionnaire responses, are arguably more illuminating because they give an insight 
into respondents‟ reasoning. The first difference was the overwhelming consensus 
across both internal and external stakeholder groups that the factor having the greatest 
impact on CG and accountability practice in Libyan listed companies is not the 
economic and political climate but the lack of knowledge and awareness about the 
concept of CG at all company levels. This may be attributed to the general absence of 
a CG culture in Libya and to the lack of training programmes for GA and board 
members and executive directors within Libyan listed companies. The finding 
supports Iswaissi & Falahati (2017), who also identified CG training within Libyan 
commercial banks as inadequate, and serves as further evidence that the Union of 
Arab Banks (UAB, 2007) is right to press for extensive CG training for all relevant 
parties in the Arab banking sector. In fact, such training is necessary for listed 
companies in general across the MENA region; Alzahrani  (2013) points to a similar 
lack of awareness about CG in Saudi listed companies, while Braendle et al., (2013) 
describe lack of knowledge about CG as the foremost barrier to the improvement of 
CG practice in the Iranian environment.   
Both the ISG and ESG interviewees saw the weakness of the regulatory/legislative 
system as the second most influential factor affecting CG and accountability practice. 
This weakness was attributed to two main causes: outdated regulation that has not yet 
been modified to bring it into line with CG and accountability requirements, and poor 
performance by the regulatory and monitoring authorities, particularly the LSMA. 
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One ESG interviewee also blamed this lack of leadership and enforcement from the 
regulatory bodies for the fact that Libyan listed companies are not held accountable 
for their failure to implement CG. This lack of accountability was identified as 
another significant factor by the interviewees, who argued that the relevant authorities 
must devote more attention to strengthening accountability mechanisms if they want 
to ensure that CG reforms are implemented in Libyan listed companies.  
The importance of enforcement is emphasised in a number of other studies, including 
those by Okike (2007) and Wong (2009). These authors point to other governments 
(e.g. Nigeria) that have demonstrated a determination to improve CG by issuing new 
corporate legislation and CG codes for listed companies, but who have largely failed 
in their aim because enforcement of this legislation has been weak. The view that the 
enforcement of a law is at least as important as its original enactment is repeated by 
Shleifer & Wolfenzon (2002) and by Berglöf & Claessens (2004), who argue that law 
enforcement is as central to achieving effective protection for all shareholders as law 
creation. Similarly, La Porta et al., (1999) conclude that both the presence and the 
enforcement of laws and regulations protecting minority shareholders are fundamental 
determinants in the development of stock markets.  
To sum up, the interviews yielded richer, more complex insights than the 
questionnaires into what internal and external stakeholders perceived as the main 
factors influencing CG and accountability practice in Libya‟s listed companies. The 
interviewees identified the lack of knowledge and awareness about the concept of CG 
at all company levels as the most significant factor inhibiting the advance of CG, 
followed by the weakness of the Libyan legislative environment and the lack of 
accountability within listed companies. Collectively, these are creating a poor 
environment for CG and accountability in Libya.  
8.6 Perceived Current State of Accountability  
The fifth research question: “How is accountability understood and practised in 
Libyan listed companies?” sought to investigate the stakeholders‟ views on the 
concept of accountability and the extent to which they thought accountability is 
currently being practised in Libyan listed companies. 
The questionnaire respondents strongly agreed with Knell‟s (2006, p.32) definition of 
accountability as “the requirement of those in authority to exercise responsibility to 
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justify and explain their actions to those on whose behalf they act”. This definition 
seemed to be the most easily understood by all relevant stakeholders, irrespective of 
educational level. However, the respondents were less enthusiastic about the other 
statements in this part of the questionnaire, returning neutral responses to the 
suggestions that effective accountability mechanisms inspire confidence in investors 
and stakeholders that Libyan listed companies are committed to accountability as one 
way of fulfilling their responsibilities towards society, and that stakeholders do indeed 
hold these companies accountable. It is noteworthy that regulators and external 
auditors were the least supportive of the latter two statements, given that it is their job 
to monitor Libyan listed companies‟ actions and hold them accountable.  
The suggestion that accountability is practised within Libyan listed companies 
attracted disagreement from both internal and external stakeholders. Again, the RE 
group was the least supportive of the statement, while the EM group was the most 
supportive (which may be explained as this group being reluctant to criticise itself). 
This perceived lack of accountability, as discussed in Section 8.5, may be attributed to 
the weakness of the legislative environment and the absence of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. The result is that relevant stakeholders do not take 
advantage of their right to hold Libyan listed companies accountable for their actions. 
The RE group was also unconvinced that boards, executive managers and employees 
are considered accountable, but while it was neutral towards this statement, the other 
groups expressed agreement. This divergence in opinion may be due to the fact that as 
the only group looking at listed companies from the outside, the RE group is the only 
one able to assess them objectively. Finally, on the question of whether good CG 
makes listed companies more likely to practise accountability, the respondents as a 
whole were neutral. 
The findings from the interviews revealed differences between internal and external 
stakeholders on the question of how the term accountability should be defined; while 
one ISG interviewee declared that it is about “holding those at the higher levels and 
decision makers responsible for the results of their actions, within the limits of their 
responsibilities”, an ESG interviewee saw accountability in broader terms as “each 
individual being responsible for his actions and for explaining and justifying the 
actions and decisions taken under his authority”. This definition echoes the broad 
perspective taken by Messner (2009), who argues that in the business environment, 
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accountability is about clarifying and justifying the actions that have been carried out 
in the interests of shareholders and other relevant stakeholders. Both definitions 
suggest that the interviewees had a clear understanding of the concept of 
accountability as a key mechanism for ensuring that relevant stakeholders receive 
important information, as providing a link between all involved parties and as central 
to improving CG practice within listed companies. 
The overwhelming majority of ISG and ESG interviewees confirmed that only major 
shareholders demand any kind of accountability for failure or negligence on the part 
of the board or executive directors. This is usually done via GAMs, though one of the 
external auditors expressed frustration that general assemblies often choose to ignore 
evidence of incompetence or wrongdoing, even when it persists over several years. 
Almost all of the interviewees agreed that boards and executive managers are in 
theory accountable for their actions under the law, but more than half (seven out of 
twelve ISG and six out of eight ESG interviewees) said that in practice, directors and 
executive managers are rarely held accountable for their actions and decisions. 
Owners may want greater accountability from managers, but this is generally resisted 
(Perks, 1993). Accountability can only be guaranteed so long as owners‟ rights are 
enforced (Tricker, 1984), but this rarely happens in Libyan listed companies. The 
interviewees attributed this lack of enforcement mainly to the influence of the 
prevailing cultural norms and social ties and to the LSMA‟s unratified status. A 
similar lack of accountability has been identified in other developing countries; 
Wanyama (2006) and Falgi (2009), for example, found accountability practices in 
Uganda and Saudi Arabia respectively to be largely ineffectual, while Onyinyechi & 
Okafor (2016) found very low levels of accountability in the Nigerian public sector. 
These authors point to a lack of comprehensiveness, accessibility, relevance, 
reliability, quality and timeliness in the disclosure of even financial information. 
The overwhelming majority of interviewees understood the complementary nature of 
the connection between CG and accountability: that on the one hand, accountability 
cannot be achieved without a robust and integrated CG system, and that on the other, 
this system will be of no use unless accountability mechanisms are strictly upheld. 
One of the ISG interviewees described the two concepts as two sides of the same coin. 
This result is consistent with Sinclair‟s (1995) conclusion that there is a real link 
between CG and accountability; he suggests that the growing emphasis being placed 
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on CG has been largely driven by widespread concerns about the accountability of 
agents towards owners and other stakeholders. Proponents of stakeholder theory claim 
that it leads to greater accountability (Baydoun et al., 2013), but the finding that 
internal and external stakeholders perceive CG and accountability as linked suggests 
that legitimacy theory may offer a better explanation of CG and accountability 
practices in the Libyan environment. Legitimacy theory posits that actors seek to be 
perceived as accountable in order to acquire legitimacy. In the context of Libya, as 
more listed companies signal their compliance with accountability and CG practices, 
the practices themselves also gain in legitimacy.  
We might thus summarise the answer to the fifth research question as being that while 
stakeholders are well aware of the concept of accountability, they do not perceive it as 
operating in practice within Libyan listed companies. Only major shareholders tend to 
demand accountability, and even these receive only a limited measure of 
accountability during GAMs. This issue needs to be addressed by the relevant 
monitoring and supervisory bodies, who must be given support at the highest level to 
clarify their role in enhancing CG and accountability practice within listed companies. 
A good start would be the early ratification of the LSMA so that it can play a more 
proactive role in raising CG and accountability performance. Furthermore, the remit 
of these bodies should include not only monitoring the compliance of Libyan listed 
companies in regard to the implementation of CG and accountability but also 
recommending legislative changes where necessary.  
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8.7 Summary 
This chapter compared and contrasted the results from the questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews with the findings from the literature review. Addressing each of 
the research questions in turn, it discussed the participants‟ views regarding how CG 
is understood in the Libyan environment, the extent to which listed companies are 
complying with CG mechanisms, the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
legal/regulatory framework currently governing CG and accountability, the factors 
influencing CG and accountability practice, and the current level of accountability in 
the Libyan environment. Throughout the chapter, these findings were put into the 
broader context, with discussion of how they compare with the findings of other 
studies, including those conducted in other emerging and developing economies, and 
how they align with international CG principles. The next chapter summarises these 
findings in order to offer recommendations for improving CG and accountability 
practices in Libya‟s listed companies. It then outlines the key contributions made by 
the study before acknowledging its main limitations and identifying areas for future 
research.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
As CG has become a main requirement for businesses in all countries – both 
developed and developing – awareness of its importance has grown across the MENA 
region. Despite this, however, there have been relatively few attempts so far to 
investigate CG mechanisms and practice in these countries, though the urgent need 
for such investigation has been highlighted by several authors. This research aims to 
respond to this need by investigating CG and accountability practice in one MENA 
country – Libya. It employs a mixed methods research design comprising a 
quantitative survey followed by semi-structured, qualitative interviews to explore how 
CG and accountability are perceived by internal and external stakeholders in Libyan 
listed companies. The use of a mixed methods design allows for methodological and 
data triangulation, enhancing the reliability of the findings; the semi-structured 
interviews were conducted after the questionnaire survey in order to confirm the 
earlier quantitative findings, to promote data quality and provide a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. It is hoped that the study will 
contribute to the current literature by enriching our understanding of how CG and 
accountability are perceived and practised in one developing country (Libya) and by 
offering evidence from a state with a unique legal, cultural and political framework. 
The chapter is organised into six sections. The first section begins by summarising the 
major research findings, after which Section 9.3 presents the stakeholders‟ 
suggestions for developing CG practices and accountability in Libyan listed 
companies. Section 9.4 outlines the key contributions made by the study, while 
Section 9.5 acknowledges its main potential limitations. Finally, Section 9.6 suggests 
avenues for future research. 
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9.2 Review of Research Findings   
This section summarises the findings obtained from the questionnaire survey and 
semi-structured interviews for the first five research objectives.  
Research Objective 1: To investigate stakeholders’ understanding regarding the 
meaning of CG in Libyan listed companies. 
The findings reveal that both the questionnaire respondents and interviewees were 
generally aware of and understood the concept of CG. Most agreed on Hawkamat 
Alshrekat as the best Arabic translation, and the majority took a broad view of the 
concept, seeing its main function as being to protect the interests not just of 
shareholders but of all relevant stakeholders. Everyone agreed on the importance of 
CG, with the general perception being that a robust CG system is crucial to inspire 
confidence among investors and other stakeholders and is therefore central to listed 
companies‟ success. Despite this, however, the perception in all stakeholder groups 
was that awareness of CG issues within the Libyan environment is currently 
inadequate, even among board members, executive directors and investors.  
Research Objective 2: To investigate the extent to which CG mechanisms are 
implemented in Libyan listed companies. 
The questionnaire and interview findings confirm that Libyan listed companies 
generally comply with the LCGC‟s (2007) requirements regarding board size and 
composition: most boards have between three and eleven members, the majority of 
whom are non-executives and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is 
greater) are independent. The results also indicate that general assemblies in Libyan 
listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC‟s requirements regarding the 
appointment of board members and their length of tenure. Interviewees were at pains 
to point out that board members are selected according to pre-set criteria for technical 
and practical expertise, as set down in the code, though a few observed that these 
criteria are sometimes intentionally ignored, with candidates instead being appointed 
only because they have a personal relationship with someone in the general assembly. 
The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are generally 
carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with internal regulations 
and laws, as well as the stipulations of the LCGC (2007). These duties include 
endorsing the strategic direction and main objectives of the company and supervising 
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their implementation; setting up and supervising systems of internal control; setting 
out specific and clear policies, standards and procedures for board membership; 
setting out clear written policies to protect the rights and interests of stakeholders; and 
setting up policies and procedures to ensure that the company‟s rules and regulations, 
as well as its commitment to disclose essential information to shareholders, creditors 
and other stakeholders, are respected. The BOD‟s perceived responsibilities include 
monitoring the operations of the company‟s management in general and executives in 
particular; ensuring that its decisions are based on adequate information from 
executives; determining what authority is to be delegated to executive managers and 
for how long; setting out executive decision-making procedures; and taking the 
interests of stakeholders into account when making strategic decisions. 
The evidence also suggests that listed companies are on the whole committed to 
meeting the LCGC‟s (2007) requirements regarding the composition, roles and 
responsibilities of board sub-committees. The findings indicate that the audit 
committee is perceived as the most important board sub-committee within Libyan 
listed companies. Both internal and external stakeholder groups confirmed that these 
committees are independent and have at least three members, all of whom are NEDs. 
As with board appointments, audit committee members are usually recommended by 
the board and submitted to the general assembly for approval. Also like prospective 
board members, candidates for the audit committee are assessed against pre-set 
criteria. In this case, they are expected to have relevant experience and knowledge – at 
least one committee member must come from a financial background. The 
respondents confirmed that the audit committee‟s duties include supervising and 
verifying the efficiency of the internal audit, monitoring the company‟s internal 
control system and producing written reports with opinions and recommendations for 
the board. It is responsible for making recommendations to the BOD regarding the 
appointment of the external auditor and his/her fees, checking the annual financial 
statements before referring them to the BOD, and checking administrative and 
accounting policies and making recommendations to the board where necessary. 
The interviewees ranked the nomination/remuneration committee as the second most 
important board sub-committee, though the questionnaire respondents perceived this 
as the least important. The majority of respondents (both survey and interview) 
confirmed that the members of this committee are nominated by the board, which 
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determines its functions, powers and period of operation. There was general 
agreement that the duties and responsibilities undertaken by the 
nomination/remuneration committee include annually reviewing the skills required of 
board members, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the board and taking 
steps to improve it in line with the company‟s interests, recommending candidates to 
the BOD and setting clear policies for the compensation and remuneration of directors 
and senior executives.  
As far as other board committees are concerned, the interviewees and questionnaire 
respondents showed equal levels of support both for risk committees and for Shariah 
committees. However, the interviewees were less convinced than the questionnaire 
respondents of the importance of CG committees.  
On the issue of disclosure and transparency, the findings were mixed; the 
questionnaire respondents were generally content with current practice, but the 
interviewees perceived the level of disclosure and transparency in Libyan listed 
companies as barely satisfactory. They complained that disclosure requirements in 
Libya lag behind those even of other emerging markets, with the result that listed 
companies limit their disclosure to basic financial information such as the income 
statement and statement of financial position. In terms of CG disclosure specifically, 
both interviewees and questionnaire respondents pointed out that under the LCGC 
(2007), Libyan listed companies are only required to disclose which CG principles 
have been implemented and which have not, and the reasons why not. The view was 
also expressed that at present, disclosure and transparency practices in Libya are 
designed only to meet local requirements.  
There was also criticism – but in this case, from both the questionnaire respondents 
and the interviewees – of the effectiveness of the internal and external audit 
mechanisms in Libyan listed companies. Virtually everyone agreed that the duties and 
responsibilities of the internal audit are clearly defined, and most agreed that external 
auditors are generally appointed according to a set of criteria that should guarantee 
their professional competence and independence, but despite this, the general view 
was that neither internal nor external auditors do enough to ensure that listed 
companies‟ internal control systems function effectively. The evidence suggests that 
while these companies have taken practical steps to comply with the LCGC‟s 
requirements regarding the internal and external audit mechanisms, they are not 
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committed enough to ensure that these mechanisms are consistently monitored and 
enforced. 
The questionnaire respondents were confident that listed companies properly protect 
and observe the rights of shareholders, including their right to attend GAMs, 
participate in its deliberations and vote on its decisions; to put items onto the GAM 
agenda; and to ask for any information as long as this does not breach financial 
regulations or damage the interests of the company. There was less of a consensus 
among the interviewees, however; although the majority of ISG interviewees felt that 
shareholder rights are protected and respected by companies, the ESG interviewees 
were less positive, with the RE group in particular believing that majority 
shareholders enjoy much greater protection, both legally and in practice, than 
minority shareholders. 
Research Objective 3: To identify whether the legal and regulatory framework is 
adequate to support CG and accountability practices. 
The findings obtained from the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews indicate 
that Libya does not currently have a legal/regulatory framework that supports CG and 
accountability practices. Internal and external stakeholder groups alike expressed 
dissatisfaction both with the framework itself, which they saw as weak and outdated, 
and with the performance of Libya‟s regulatory and supervisory bodies in monitoring 
listed companies‟ compliance with CG and accountability principles. Interestingly, 
this dissatisfaction was strongest among the RE group, whose job it is to enforce these 
laws and regulations. 
Research Objective 4: To identify the key factors influencing CG and accountability 
practice in Libyan listed companies. 
The questionnaire respondents identified Libya‟s current economic and political 
situation as the factor having the greatest influence on CG and accountability practice 
in listed companies. The weak investment climate in the LSM (and the limited 
number of listed companies) was seen as the second most influential factor, followed 
by directors‟ lack of awareness and knowledge about CG, and the weakness of 
Libya‟s accountability mechanisms.  
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The findings from the semi-structured interviews, while different from those yielded 
by the questionnaires, demonstrate consistency across the internal and external 
stakeholder groups. These findings are arguably more significant than the 
questionnaire responses as they give a more detailed insight into the respondents‟ 
views.  The interviewees were almost unanimous in identifying the lack of knowledge 
and awareness about the concept of CG at all company levels as the biggest factor 
inhibiting the advance of CG. This lack of awareness originates in the general absence 
of a CG culture in Libya and the lack of training programmes for GA members, board 
members and executive directors within Libyan listed companies. The weakness of 
the legislative environment was seen as the second most influential factor, with 
interviewees citing outdated regulation and poor monitoring/enforcement by the 
regulatory authorities as key difficulties. Finally, both the internal and external 
stakeholder groups pointed to lack of accountability as another significant factor, 
explaining that companies are not sanctioned by these regulatory authorities if they 
fail to implement CG. 
Research Objective 5: To explore current accountability practice in Libyan listed 
companies.  
The results obtained from the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews suggest 
that both internal and external stakeholders are well aware of the concept of 
accountability, but that they perceive it as largely non-existent within Libyan listed 
companies. In practice, the expectation of accountability is limited to major 
shareholders, and even these receive only a limited measure of accountability during 
general assembly meetings. The lack of accountability within the Libyan environment 
makes it more difficult for companies to adopt CG because the two concepts are 
closely connected: accountability cannot be achieved without an integrated CG 
system, and this system will not work unless the principle of accountability is strictly 
upheld.  
9.3 Stakeholders’ Recommendations for Improving CG and Accountability 
Practices in the Libyan Environment 
This section aims to address the sixth research objective by presenting the suggestions 
and recommendations made by the two broad stakeholder groups for developing CG 
practice and accountability in Libyan listed companies. 
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 Efforts should be made to spread the culture of CG among all stakeholders. This 
could be achieved by training employees at all functional levels (including 
executive managers), along with GA members and BODs, through workshops, 
training courses, conferences and seminars on CG and accountability. The aim 
should be to raise public awareness of the concept and importance of CG in Libyan 
listed companies. 
 The legal and regulatory environment should be reviewed periodically and updated 
where necessary to ensure it is in line with the principles of CG.  
 State intervention is needed to support the LSM to overcome its problems and help 
it make the necessary changes within the market. A strong and successful LSM is 
crucial to encourage more Libyan companies to seek listed status, which in turn 
will lead to more companies implementing CG and accountability. 
 General assemblies in Libyan listed companies should appoint board members 
according to fair and objective criteria, as stipulated in the LCGC, in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest. 
 The investment climate within the LSM could be improved by simplifying some of 
the current investment conditions. The base of the LSM should also be expanded 
by creating a mechanism to increase the number of listed companies and by 
opening branches in other Libyan cities. 
 Legislation must be enacted explicitly requiring all Libyan companies to apply CG. 
 The monitoring and supervisory bodies must have support at the highest level so 
that they can perform their functions with full independence. Their remit should 
include not only monitoring the compliance of Libyan listed companies in regard 
to the implementation of CG and accountability, but also recommending legislative 
changes where necessary to enhance CG and accountability practices within these 
companies. 
 Permanent committees should be established within the relevant supervisory, 
regulatory and executive bodies for the purpose of updating and amending 
legislation that is not in line with CG requirements. 
 Mechanisms must be put in place to strengthen the link between accountability and 
performance in Libyan listed companies and to combat corruption.  
 The LAAA must be supported in its efforts to produce Libyan accounting and 
auditing standards. It is a prerequisite for the implementation of CG that 
companies adopt standards commensurate with the international accounting and 
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auditing standards. The LAAA should be encouraged to develop partnerships with 
international audit firms. 
 Greater weight should be given to both the internal and external audit functions, as 
these are essential for identifying whether CG and accountability are being 
implemented. 
 Internal auditors should have a professional association to promote their 
independence. They should not be seen simply as a function or activity within the 
institution. 
 The LSMA must be ratified so that it can perform its role effectively and contribute 
to the development of CG within the LSM. 
 The educational curriculum in Libya‟s universities must be updated to bring it into 
line with the CG requirements in developed countries. 
 The LSM needs to update its technology so that investors and other stakeholders 
can readily access the information they need to make strategic decisions about their 
investments. 
 The government should support the LSM to keep abreast of developments in 
similar emerging markets. It should also allow the LSM to open the way for 
foreign investors to enter the market (e.g. through partnerships) in order to increase 
the investment base. 
9.4 Contribution of the Research  
This research makes a number of significant contributions to the CG literature in 
general and to the Libya-based CG literature in particular. Firstly, it addresses a gap 
in the accounting literature by exploring the practices of listed companies in a 
developing country – a context that is still poorly understood. The vast majority of 
previous studies have examined CG and accountability in developed countries, but 
given the influence that local legal, economic, social and political factors have on CG 
practice, the findings of these studies may not be transferable to developing 
economies (Iswaissi & Falahati, 2017). By offering new evidence from a context that 
is legally, culturally, politically and socially distinct from those examined in most 
studies, and by representing a range of stakeholder perspectives, the research may 
help deepen our understanding of the concepts of CG and accountability. 
Consideration of the Libyan context is especially important as CG practice in the 
country is still in the early stages of development, and little is known about how CG 
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and  accountability are understood and enacted. Larbsh (2010) and Zagoub (2011) 
made early attempts to investigate CG practice in Libyan commercial banks, but the 
current research is the first to investigate the extent to which Libyan listed companies 
in general comply with the LSM‟s voluntary LCGC (2007) and accountability 
practice. Its results are therefore valuable not only because they help reduce the 
literature gaps regarding CG in listed companies and stock market emergence in the 
MENA states, but also because they provide practical, up-to-date information for 
shareholders and other relevant stakeholders in Libya.  
An understanding of current CG standards in Libya is crucial if governance in the 
country is to be strengthened and it is to be able to attract the domestic and foreign 
investment it needs to sustain development. The weakness and instability of the 
Libyan economy are widely attributed to poor CG and accountability practices in 
listed Libyan companies, so the second contribution of the research is to aid national 
economic development by giving these companies the information they need to 
improve their CG. As noted above, the research is the first attempt to investigate the 
extent to which Libyan listed companies are complying with the requirements of the 
LCGC (2007). The fact that the findings indicate that these companies are complying 
only partially with the requirements of the LCGC (2007) suggests that the code may 
need to be made compulsory if it is to meet the needs of the state. Most importantly, 
if voluntary regulation is turned into binding legislation, listed companies must be 
made aware that compliance with the code has become mandatory.   
The third contribution of the research is to highlight the adverse effect that 
weaknesses in the Libyan legal and regulatory system are having on attempts to 
develop a CG framework in the country. The study shows that Libyan laws and 
regulations provide a weak environment that does little to encourage CG and 
accountability practices. The findings have important implications for legislative and 
regulatory bodies such as the LSM and the CBL; they suggest that key priorities 
should be to amend the country‟s legal framework to bring it into line with CG 
requirements, and to enhance the quality and consistency of attempts at enforcement. 
They also have policy implications for regulators, external auditors and legislators 
seeking to review and update the CG system to meet international requirements. The 
findings serve as an empirical basis to inform future policy change, but they also 
have theoretical implications for a number of academic debates, including that 
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concerning the impact of the legal/CG framework on corporate performance (see La 
Porta et al., 1998). 
Fourthly, this research contributes to the literature by revealing those factors that have 
the most significant inhibiting effects on CG and accountability practices within 
Libyan listed companies. It takes steps towards identifying ways of enhancing CG and 
accountability practices, contributing to the CG literature with its discussion of the 
enabling factors which may have a positive influence on these practices in Libyan 
listed companies. Again, the findings offer empirical evidence upon which policy 
makers and practitioners can draw to improve CG standards in the Libyan 
environment. They may also serve as a foundation for future investigation by other 
researchers.  
Finally, at the theoretical level, this research contributes to the continuing debate 
about which approach is the most appropriate for explaining and evaluating CG and 
accountability practices in developing countries. As discussed in Chapter 3, critics 
have argued that the stakeholder perspective is more appropriate than the shareholder 
perspective when discussing developing (particularly MENA) countries, and the few 
studies that focus on the Libyan context have all adopted this approach (Iswaissi & 
Falahati, 2017). The particular aptness of the stakeholder perspective in the Libyan 
context is confirmed in this research, with both the survey and interview findings 
indicating that CG is generally perceived from the perspective of stakeholders as 
protecting the interests of all stakeholders, with relatively little emphasis being placed 
on protecting the interests of shareholders. The findings underline the necessity of 
implementing a robust CG framework to protect the interests of all these groups.  
9.5 Limitations of the Study 
Although the present thesis makes a valuable contribution to knowledge by 
investigating CG and accountability practices in Libyan listed companies, it should be 
acknowledged that as with any other study in social research, it has certain 
limitations. The first is the generalisability of the results; caution is necessary when 
generalising from the results, as the small sample size (only 400 questionnaires were 
circulated, 231 of which were returned and analysed, and just 20 individuals were 
interviewed) means that the findings might not accurately reflect the full range of 
views held by stakeholders in the Libyan environment.  
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Gathering data from the broadest possible range of stakeholders was made 
additionally difficult because many of those targeted (especially general assembly 
members, board members and sub-committee members) were unavailable to 
participate; many work part-time and do not have permanent offices in their 
companies, while others were too busy to schedule meetings and interviews. This 
made it more difficult to find a balanced number of participants for each stakeholder 
group. 
It is also possible that the answers given by the questionnaire respondents and 
interviewees were not an accurate reflection of their true opinions. Faced with a 
survey or an interviewer, some respondents are reluctant to provide a negative 
impression of their institution, so give an “ideal” answer. Alternatively, they may 
omit questions for fear of betraying a lack of understanding. In the case of 
questionnaire surveys, there is also the risk that participants will quickly get bored and 
start giving random answers instead of thinking carefully about their responses. 
Finally, this investigation of CG and accountability practice is limited to Libyan listed 
companies; it does not include unlisted companies, some of which exhibit signs of CG 
and accountability practice. Furthermore, since Libya is a huge state, the investigation 
concentrates only on the main cities of Tripoli, Misurata and Khoms. It is in these 
cities that most of Libya‟s listed companies are headquartered.  
9.6 Avenues for Future Research 
Comparatively few studies have explored CG in Libya, making it a vital area for 
future research. This study investigates Libyan listed companies‟ compliance with CG 
mechanisms, the barriers to compliance, and the legal and regulatory framework of 
CG and accountability in the country, but there are numerous ways in which the 
research could be extended, especially given the dynamic nature of Libya‟s business 
environment.  
 Future studies should investigate the effects of compliance with the CG 
mechanisms on companies‟ performance. More particularly, comparative studies 
between listed and unlisted companies are recommended to develop the CG 
environment and ensure better implementation of CG in the Libyan context. 
Comparative studies might also examine the CG codes adopted by neighbouring 
countries with similar economies so that Libya can draw on their experiences to 
270 
improve its own CG and overcome the main obstacles affecting governance 
practices in Libyan listed companies. 
 Some of the key CG mechanisms should be examined in depth and separately to 
increase understanding of their significance in the Libyan environment; the role of 
the audit committee in CG, the impact of board composition on the implementation 
of CG, the impact of board characteristics on firm performance, and the role of the 
legal and regulatory framework in enhancing and developing CG and 
accountability practices are all worthy of close attention. The study‟s finding that 
Libya‟s legislative environment remains weak also requires further investigation. 
 The current research reveals that majority shareholders are seen to enjoy much 
greater protection than minority shareholders. Accordingly, future research should 
focus on shareholders‟ rights, especially those of minority shareholders, to ensure 
that these are protected in the LSM. 
 Future research should also investigate the relationship between CG and ownership 
structure, with a specific focus on the variables that affect disclosure levels in 
Libyan listed companies. 
  It is recommended that further investigation be conducted of the role played by 
Libya‟s monitoring and regulatory bodies in ensuring the compliance of Libyan 
listed companies with CG and accountability requirements. These bodies are 
perceived by stakeholders as one of the most important monitoring mechanisms in 
the LSM. 
 The study demonstrates that the current level of disclosure and transparency in 
Libyan listed companies only satisfies local requirements, and that accountability 
practices are virtually non-existent. Further research is therefore recommended to 
illuminate how disclosure levels influence accountability practices in these 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
271 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Abbott, L., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The Effects of Audit Committee Activity 
and Independence on Corporate Fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55–68. 
Abbott, L., Parker, S., & Peters, G. (2004). Audit Committee Characteristics and 
Restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(1), 69–87. 
Abdelfattah, T. (2018). The Second Wave of Corporate Governance in Egypt: 
Challenges Ahead. In D. Jamali, V. Bodolica, & Y. Lapina (Eds.), Corporate 
Governance in Arab Countries: Specifics and Outlooks (pp. 70–87). Ukraine: 
Virtus Interpress. 
Abdou, M. (2015). Towards a New Solution of Minority Shareholder Protection in 
Libya : Letting the Minority Shareholders Have a Voice. Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Glasgow, UK. 
Abdullah, H., & Valentine, B. (2009). Fundamental and Ethics Theories of Corporate 
Governance. Middle Eastern Finance and Economics, 4(4), 88–96. 
Abdullah, M., Evans, L., Fraser, I., & Tsalavoutas, I. (2015). IFRS Mandatory 
Disclosures in Malaysia: The Influence of Family Control and the Value 
Irrelevance of Compliance Levels. Accounting Forum, 39(4), 328–348. 
Abdullah, S. (2016). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and the Performance of 
Malaysian Listed Firms. Journal of Corporate Ownership & Control, 14(1), 
384–398. 
Abdulsaleh, A. (2014a). Corporate Governance Role of Audit Committees in the 
Banking Sector: Evidence from Libya. International Journal of Social 
Management, Economics and Business Engineering, 8(2), 592–597. 
Abdulsaleh, A. (2014b). Towards an Effective Audit Committee Role in Corporate 
Governance in Libyan Banks: Composition Criteria and Membership 
Requirements. European Journal of Business and Management, 6(38), 157–166. 
Abdulsamad, A., Yusoff, W., & Lasyoud, A. (2018). The Influence of the Board of 
Directors‟ Characteristics on Firm Performance: Evidence From Malaysian 
Public Listed. Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review, 2(1), 6–13. 
Abernathy, J., Beyer, B., Masli, A., & Stefaniak, C. (2014). The Association between 
Characteristics of Audit Committee Accounting Experts, Audit Committee 
Chairs, and Financial Reporting Timeliness. Advances in Accounting, 30(2), 
283–297. 
Abor, J., & Adjasi, C. (2007). Corporate Governance and the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Sector: Theory and Implications. Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, 7(2), 111–122. 
Abu-Azza, W. (2012). Perceived effectiveness of the Internal Audit Function in 
Libya: A Qualitative Study using Institutional and Marxist Theories. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Southern Queensland, Australia. 
272 
Act No. (11/2010). Concerning the Duties and Jurisdiction of the General Board of 
the LSM. The Libyan Stock Market (LSM), Tripoli - Libya. 
Agrawal, A., & Chadha, S. (2005). Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 48(2), 371–406. 
Aguilera, R., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H., & Jackson, K. (2008). An Organisational 
Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and 
Complementarities. Organization Science, 19(3), 475–492. 
Agyemang-Mintah, P. (2015). The Nomination Committee and Firm Performance: An 
Empirical Investigation of UK Financial Institutions during the Pre/Post 
Financial Crisis. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 11(3), 176–
190. 
Ahmad, N., Othman, R., Othman, R., & Jusoff, K. (2009). The Effectiveness of 
Internal Audit in Malaysian Public Sector. Journal of Modern Accounting and 
Auditing, 5(9), 53–62. 
Ahmad, S., & Gao, S. (2004). Changes , Problems and Challenges of Accounting 
Education in Libya. Accounting Education, 13(3), 365–390. 
Ahmed, K., Hossain, M., & Adams, M. (2006). The Effects of Board Composition 
and Board Size on The Informativeness of Annual Accounting Earnings. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(5), 418–431. 
Ahunwan, B. (2002). Corporate Governance in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 
37(3), 269–287. 
Al-Baidhani, A. (2015). The Effects of Corporate Governance on Bank Performance. 
Workiung Paper, Putra Business School, Universiti Putra Malaysia. 
Al-Busaidi, H. (2005). The Role of Corporate Governance System in Improving the 
Functioning of Company Boards in Oman-Perceptions of the Directors 
Dissertation. Masters of Business Administration Dissertation, Cardif 
University, UK. 
Al-Faryan, M. (2017). The Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
and the Performance of Saudi Listed Firms. Corporate Ownership & Control, 
14(2), 338–349. 
Al-Flaiti, S. (2010). Corporate Governance in the Sultanate Oman. Oman: Dar 
Osman. 
Al-Gharaibeh, M., Zurigat, Z., & Al-Harahsheh, K. (2013). The Effect of Ownership 
Structure on Dividends Policy in Jordanian Companies. Interdisciplinary Journal 
of Contemporary Research in Business, 4(9), 769–796. 
Al-Haddad, W., Alzurqan, S., & Al-Sufy, F. (2011). The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on the Performance of Jordanian Industrial Companies : An 
Empirical study on Amman Stock Exchange. International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science, 1(4), 55–69. 
Al-Janadi, Y., Rahman, R. A., & Haj Omar, N. (2013). Corporate Governance 
273 
Mechanisms and Voluntary Disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Research Journal of 
Finance and Accounting, 4(4), 25–35. 
Al-Malkawi, H., Pillai, R., & Bhatti, M. (2014). Corporate Governance Practices in 
Emerging Markets: The Case of GCC Countries. Economic Modelling, 38, 133–
141. 
Al-Manaseer, M., Al-Hindawi, R., Al-Dahiyat, M., & Sartawi, I. (2012). The Impact 
of Corporate Governance on the Performance of Jordanian Banks. European 
Journal of Scientific Research, 67(3), 349–359. 
Al-Matari, E., Al-Swidi, A., & Fadzil, B. (2014). The Effect of the Internal Audit and 
Firm Performance : A Proposed Research Framework. International Review of 
Management and Marketing, 4(1), 34–41. 
Al-Matari, Y., Al-Swidi, A., & Fadzil, F. (2012). Corporate Governance and 
Performance of Saudi Arabia Listed Companies. British Journal of Arts & Social 
Sciences, 9(I), 1–30. 
Al-Matari, Y., Al-Swidi, A., Fadzil, F., & Al-Matari, E. (2012). Board of Directors, 
Audit Committee Characteristics and Performance of Saudi Arabia Listed 
Companies. International Review of Management and Marketing, 2(4), 241–251. 
Al-Matarneh, G. (2011). The Extent of Adherence of Jordanian Auditors in 
Implementing the International Standard on Auditing ISA 700. International 
Management Review, 7(1), 22. 
Al-Mosharrafa, R. (2015). Relative Consequences Due to Absence of Corporate 
Governance in Nationalized and Private Commercial Banks in Bangladesh. 
Journal of Economics and International Finance, 7(2), 42–50. 
Al-Sahafi, A., Rodrigs, M., & Barnes, L. (2015). Does Corporate Governance Affect 
Financial Performance in the Banking Sector ? International Journal of 
Economics, Commerce and Management, 3(3), 1–26. 
Al-Sawalqa, F. (2014). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Voluntary Disclosure 
Compliance : The Case of Banks in Jordan. International Journal of Academic 
Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 4(2), 369–384. 
Al-Thuneibal, A., Issa, R., & Baker, R. (2011). Do Audit Tenure and Firm Size 
Contribute to Audit Quality: Empirical Evidence from Jordan. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 26(4), 317–334. 
Al Daoud, K., Ismail, K., & Lode, N. (2015). The Impact of Internal Corporate 
Governance on the Timeliness of Financial Reports of Jordanian Firms: 
Evidence Using Audit and Management Report Lags. Mediterranean Journal of 
Social Sciences, 6(1), 430–442. 
Alabede, J. (2012). The Role , Compromise and Problems of the External Auditor in 
Corporate Governance. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 3(9), 114–
126. 
Alafi, A., & Bruijn, E. (2010). A Change in the Libyan Economy: Towards a more 
Market-Oriented Economy. Lueneburg Germany: Paper Presented to 
274 
Management of Change Conference. 
Alajlan, W. (2004). Ownership Patterns and the Saudi Market. In Corporate 
Governance. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 9, 161–186. 
Alaswad, S., & Stanišić, M. (2016). Role of Internal Audit in Performance of Libyan 
Financial Organizations. International Journal of Applied Research, 2(2), 352–
356. 
Albaqali, Q., & Kukreja, G. (2017). The Factors Influencing Auditor Independence : 
The Perceptions of Auditors in Bahrain. Corporate Ownership & Control, 14(2), 
369–382. 
Albrecht, W., Albrecht, C., & Albrecht, C. (2004). Fraud and Corporate Executives: 
Agency, Stewardship and Broken Trust. Journal of Forensic Accounting, 5(1), 
109–130. 
Albring, S., Robinson, D., & Robinson, M. (2014). Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise, Corporate Governance, and the Voluntary Switch from Auditor-
Provided to Non-Auditor-Provided Tax Services. Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 30(1), 81–94. 
Albu, C., & Girbina, M. (2015). Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes in 
Emerging Economies. How do Romanian Listed Companies “Comply-or-
Explain”? Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 15(1), 85–107. 
Alferjani, M. (2013). A Study of Materiality Auditing: Case Study from Libya. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Deakin University, Australia. 
Alferjani, S. (2010). An Empirical Analysis of Libyan Business Environment and 
Foreing Direct Investment. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Durham University, UK. 
Alghamdi, S. (2012). Investigation into Earnings Management Practices and the Role 
of Corporate Governance and External Audit in Emerging Markets: Empirical 
Evidence from Saudi Listed Companies. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Durham 
University, UK. 
Ali, A. (2014). Corporate Governance: The Role and Effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee in Bahrain. International Journal of Business and Management, 9(3), 
131–137. 
Alison, P. (2006). Libya: Reforming the Impossible? Review of African Political 
Economy, 33(108), 219–235. 
Alkahtani, A. (2015). The Influence of Corporate Governance on Protecting Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights in the Saudi Stock Market: A Comparative Study. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Westminester, UK. 
Allen, F. (2005). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 21(2), 164–177. 
Alrshah, A., Fadzil, F., & Alrshah, M. (2016). Corporate Governance as Enabler of 
Audited Financial Statements Reliability: Mediating Role of Auditor Quality. In 
275 
3th International Conference on Global Social Entreprenurship (pp. 256–267). 
Alshehri, A. (2012). An Investigation into the Evolution of Corporate Governance 
and Accountability in Saudi Arabia. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
London, Kings College, UK. 
Alzahrani, Y. (2013). The Corporate Governance in Saudi Listed Companies. 
International Journal of Humanities and Management Sciences, 1(4), 243–245. 
Alzebana, A., & Sawan, N. (2015). The Impact of Audit Committee Characteristics 
on the Implementation of Internal Audit Recommendations. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 24, 61–71. 
Alzoubi, S., & Selamat, H. (2012). The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on Constraining Earning Management: Literature Review and 
Proposed Framework. International Journal of Global Business, 5(1), 17–35. 
Amran, A., Lee, S., & Devi, S. (2014). The Influence of Governance Structure and 
Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility toward Sustainability Reporting 
Quality. Business Strategy and the Environment, 23(4), 217–235. 
Andreasson, S. (2011). Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South 
Africa: Anglo-American Divergence, the King Reports, and Hybridization. 
Business and Society, 50(4), 647–673. 
Ansoff, H. (1965). Corporate Strategy: An Analytic Approach to Business Policy for 
Growth and Expansion. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Archambault, J., & Archambault, M. (2003). A Multinational Test of Determinants of 
Corporate Disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 38(2), 173–194. 
Arena, C., Bozzolan, S., & Michelon, G. (2015). Environmental Reporting: 
Transparency to Stakeholders or Stakeholder Manipulation? An Analysis of 
Disclosure Tone and the Role of the Board of Directors. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 22(6), 346–361. 
Avison, L., & Cowton, C. (2012). UK Audit Committees and the Revised Code. 
Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 12(1), 
42–53. 
Ayuso, S., & Argandoña, A. (2009). Responsible Corporate Governance: Towards a 
Stakeholder Board of Directors? Working paper, University of Navarra. 
Ayuso, S., Rodríguez, M., García-Castro, R., & Ariño, M. (2014). Maximising 
Stakeholders‟ Interests: An Empirical Analysis of the Stakeholder Approach to 
Corporate Governance. Business & Society, 53(3), 414–439. 
Bait El-Mal, M., Smith, C., & Taylor, M. (1973). The Development of Accounting in 
Libya. International Journal of Accounting, Education and Research, 8(2), 83–
101. 
Baker, H., & Anderson, R. (2010). Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
276 
Baker, R., & Owsen, M. (2002). Increasing the Role of Auditing in Corporate 
Governance. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 13(5–6), 783–795. 
Bankewitz, M. (2016). Board Advisory Tasks: The Importance to Differentiate 
between Functional and Firm-Specific Advice. American Journal of 
Management, 16(1), 54–69. 
Bardhan, I., Lin, S., & Wu, S. (2015). The Quality of Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting in Family Firms. Accounting Horizons, 29(1), 41–60. 
Barghathi, Y., Collison, D., & Crawford, L. (2017). Earnings Management in Libyan 
Commercial Banks: Perceptions of Stakeholders. International Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 13(2), 123–149. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2006). Enhancing Corporate Governance 
for Banking Organisations: Bank for International Settlements. Basel, 
Switzerland. 
Basuony, M., Mohamed, E., & Al-Baidhani, A. (2014). The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Bank Financial Performance: Evidence from the Arabian 
Peninsula. Corporate Ownership & Control, 11(2), 178–191. 
Baxter, P., & Cotter, J. (2009). Audit Committees and Earnings Quality. Accounting 
& Finance, 49(2), 267–290. 
Baydoun, N., Ryan, N., & Willett, R. (2013). Corporate Governance in Five Arabian 
Gulf Countries. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(1), 7–22. 
Beasley, M., Carcello, J., Hermanson, D., & Neal, T. (2009). The Audit Committee 
Oversight Process. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(1), 65–122. 
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S., & Courteau, L. (2004). The Effect of Audit Committee 
Expertise, Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(2), 13–35. 
Bédard, J., & Compernolle, T. (2014). The External Auditor and the Audit 
Committee. In W. David Hay, R. Knechel, & W. Marleen (Eds.), Routledge 
Companion to Auditing. 
Bendickson, J., Muldoon, J., Liguori, E., & Davis, P. (2016). Agency Theory: The 
Times, they are a-Changin. Management Decision, 54(1), 174–193. 
Benomran, N., Che Haat, M., Hashim, H., & Mohamad, N. (2015). Influence of 
Corporate Governance on the Extent of Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Reporting. Journal of Environment and Ecology, 6(1), 48–68. 
Benston, G. (1982). Accounting and Corporate Accountability. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 7(2), 87–105. 
Benton, T., & Craib, I. (2001). Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Social Thought. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Berglöf, E., & Claessens, S. (2004). Enforcement and Corporate Governance. Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 3409, The World Bank. 
277 
Berglof, E., & Pajuste, A. (2005). What Do Firms Disclose and Why? Enforcing 
Corporate Governance and Transparency in Central and Estren Europe. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 21(2), 178–197. 
Bernard, H. (2006). Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (4th ed). Oxford: AltaMira Press. 
Berry, T., Otahata, Q., & Saleh, M. (2000). Towards a Critical Understanding of 
Organasational Accountability: An Institution and Social Costruction 
Perspective. 
Bezemer, P., Peij, S., Maassen, G., & Van-Halder, H. (2012). The Changing Role of 
the Supervisory Board Chairman: the Case of the Netherlands (1997–2007). 
Journal of Management & Governance, 16(1), 37–55. 
Bhasin, M. (2009). Corporate Governance and Transparency Scenario: An Empirical 
Study of Asia. International Review of Business Research, 5(6), 269–297. 
Bhasin, M. (2016). Strengthening Corporate Governance Through an Audit 
Committee : An Empirical Study. Wulfenia Journal Klagenfurt, Australia, 23(2), 
1–27. 
Black, B., Gorga, É., & Carvalho, D. (2008). An Overview of Brazilian Corporate 
Governance. Cornell Law Faculity Publications, (101), 1–48. 
Blaxter, L., Hughes, C., & Tight, M. (2010). How to Research (4th ed). Maidenhead: 
Open University Press. 
Bliss, M. (2011). Does CEO Duality Constrain Board Independence? Some Evidence 
from Audit Pricing. Accounting and Finance, 51(2), 361–380. 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees. (1999). Report and recommendations of the blue ribbon committee 
on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. New York. 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J., Fischer, K., & Guedhami, O. (2005). Privatization and Bank 
Performance in Developing Countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(8–9), 
2015–2041. 
Boutros-Ghali, Y. (2002). Corporate Governance Practices in Egypt: The Road 
Ahead. In J. Sullivan, J. Rogers, C. Kuchta-Helbling, & A. Shkolnikov (Eds.), In 
Search of Good Directors: A Guide to Building Corporate Governance in the 
21st Century (Third Edit). Washington: Center for International Private 
Enterprise. 
Bouwman, C. (2011). Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping 
Directors. Review of Financial Studies, 24(7), 2358–2394. 
Bozec, R. (2005). Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9–10), 1921–1960. 
Braendle, U., Omidvar, A., & Tehraninasr, A. (2013). On the Specifics of Corporate 
Governance in Iran and the Middle East. Corporate Ownership and Control, 
10(3), 49–62. 
278 
Brahim, Z., & Nourredine, F. (2017). Corporate Governance among Small and 
Medium Size Enterprises in Algeria: Impediments to the Practice of Corporate 
Governance System. Asian Journal of Economic Modelling, 5(2), 154–166. 
Branco, M., & Rodrigues, L. (2008). Factors Influencing Social Responsibility 
Disclosure by Portuguese Companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(4), 685–
701. 
Braswell, M., Daniels, B., Landis, M., & Chang, A. (2012). Characteristics of Diligent 
Audit Committees. Journal of Business & Economics Research, 10(4), 191–206. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. 
Brennan, N. (2006). Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an 
Expectations Gap ? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 
577–594. 
Brennan, N., & Solomon, J. (2008). Corporate Governance, Accountability and 
Mechanisms of Accountability: An Overview. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 21(7), 885–906. 
Brewer, M., Gough, O., & Shah, N. (2011). Reconsidering Disclosure and Liability in 
the Transatlantic Capital Markets. DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, 
9(2), 257–293. 
Briano-Turrent, G., & Rodríguez-Ariza, L. (2016). Corporate Governance Ratings on 
Listed Companies: An Institutional Perspective in Latin America. European 
Journal of Management and Business Economics, 25(2), 63–75. 
Brickley, J., Coles, J., & Jarrell, G. (1997). Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO 
and Chairman of the Doard. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3), 189–220. 
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011). Corporate Governance, Accounting 
and Finance: A Review. Accounting & Finance, 51(1), 96–172. 
Bruce, A., Buck, T., & Main, B. (2005). Top Executive Remuneration: A View from 
Europe. Journal of Management Studies, 42(7), 1493–1506. 
Bruner, R., Conroy, R., Estrada, J., Kritzman, M., & Li, W. (2002). Introduction to 
“Valuation in Emerging Markets.” Emerging Markets Review, 3(4), 310–324. 
Bryman, A. (2004). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2003). Business Research Methods. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2007). Business Research Methods. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The Roles of 
Accounting in Organizations and Society. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 5(1), 5–27. 
279 
Burgess, T. (2001). A General Introduction to the Design of Questionnaires of Survey 
Research. Leeds: University of Leeds. 
Burke, F., Guy, D., & Tatum, K. (2008). Audit Committees: A Guide for Directors, 
Management, and Consultants (Fifth Edit). United States of America: CCH. 
Burke, M. (2007). Making Choices: Research Paradigms and Information 
Management. Practicle Applications of Pholosophy in IM Research. Library 
Review, 56(6), 476–484. 
Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1994). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life. London: Heinemann. 
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., & Smith, A. (2004). What Determines Corporate 
Transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 207–252. 
Bushman, R., & Smith, A. (2001). Financial Accounting Information and Corporate 
Governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1), 237–333. 
Cadbury, A. (2002). Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View. 
Oxford. 
Cadbury Report. (1992). Report of the Audit Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance: The Code of Best Practice. London. 
Calder, A. (2008). Corporate Governance: A Practical Guide to the Legal 
Frameworks and International Codes of Practice. London and Philadelphia: 
Congan Page Publishers. 
Carson, D., Gilmore, A., & Perry, C. (2001). Qualitative Marketing Research. 
London: Sage Publications. 
CBL Online. (2016). http://cbl.gov.ly/eng/. Accessed 12/11/2016. 
Certo, S., Daily, C., & Dalton, D. (2001). Signaling Firm Value through Board 
Structure: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 26(2), 33–50. 
Chahine, S., & Safieddine, A. (2011). Is Corporate Governance Different for the 
Lebanese Banking System? Journal of Management and Governance, 15(2), 
207–226. 
Chambers, N., Harvey, G., Mannion, R., Bond, J., & Marshall, J. (2013). Towards a 
Framework for Enhancing the Performance of NHS Boards: A Synthesis of the 
Evidence about Board Governance, Board Effectiveness and Board 
Development. Health Services and Delivery Research, 1(6), 1–137. 
Chan, K., & Li, J. (2008). Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on Outside 
Top Executives as Expert-Independent Directors. Corporate Governance, 16(1), 
16–31. 
280 
Chan, M., Watson, J., & Woodliff, D. (2014). Corporate Governance Quality and 
CSR Disclosures. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(1), 59–73. 
Chancharat, N., Krishnamurti, C., & Tian, G. (2012). Board Structure and Survival of 
New Economy IPO Firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
20(2), 144–163. 
Chandler, R., Edwards, J., & Anderson, M. (1993). Changing Perceptions of the Role 
of the Company Auditor, 1840–1940. Accounting and Business Research, 
23(92), 443–459. 
Cheffins, B. (2001). History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolution: The 
UK Perspective. Business History, 43(4), 87–118. 
Chen, J., & Roberts, R. (2010). Toward a More Coherent Understanding of the 
Organization–Society Relationship: A theoretical Consideration for Social and 
environmental accounting Research. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(4), 651–665. 
Chen, K., & Zhou, J. (2007). Audit Committee, Board Characteristics, and Auditor 
Switch Decisions by Anderson„s Clients. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
24(4), 1085–1117. 
Cheung, Y., Jiang, P., & Tan, W. (2010). A Transparency Disclosure Index 
Measuring Disclosures: Chinese Listed Companies. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 29(3), 259–280. 
Chhaochharia, V., & Grinstein, Y. (2007). Corporate Governance and Firm Value: 
The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules. Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1789–
1825. 
Chhaochharia, V., & Laeven, L. (2009). Corporate Governance Norms and Practices. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18(3), 405–431. 
Choo, F., & Tan, K. (2007). An “American Dream” Theory of Corporate Executive 
Fraud. Accounting Forum, 31(2), 203–215. 
Christensen, J., Kent, P., Routledge, J., & Stewart, J. (2015). Do Corporate 
Governance Recommendations Improve the Performance and Accountability of 
Small Listed Companies? Accounting & Finance, 55(1), 133–164. 
Christopher, J. (2010). Corporate Governance: A Multi-Theoretical Approach to 
Recognizing the Wider Influencing Forces Impacting on Organizations. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 21(8), 683–695. 
Christopher, J. (2012). Governance Paradigms of Public Universities: An 
International Comparative Study. Tertiary Education and Management, 18(4), 
335–351. 
Chua, W. (1986). Radical Developments in Accounting Thought. Accounting Review, 
61(4), 601–632. 
Church, A., & Waclawski, J. (2001). Designing and Using Organaizational Surveys: 
A Seven-Step Process. Davers: Jossey-Bass. 
281 
Claessens, S. (2006). Corporate Governance and Development. The World Bank 
Research Observer, 21(1), 91–122. 
Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. (2012a). Corporate Governance and Development: An 
Update. A Global Corporate Governance Forum, 1–95. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com 
Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. (2012b). Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: 
A Survey. Emerging Markets Review, (15), 1–77. 
Clarke, T. (2004). Theories of Corporate Governance. The Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance. New York: Oxon, Taylor & Francis 
Group. 
Clarke, T. (2007). International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach. 
Routledge. 
Clarkson, M. (1995). A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 92–117. 
Cohen, S. (1968). Modern Social Theory. London: Heinemann. 
Collis, J., & Hussey, R. (2009). Business Research: A Practical Guide for 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Collis, J., & Hussey, R. (2013). Business Research: A Practical Guide for 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance. (2003). Financial Reporting Council. 
London, England. 
Cooper, D., Mohanty, J., & Sosa, E. (1999). Epistemology: The Classic Readings. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Corbetta, P., & Patrick, B. (2003). Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Cornforth, C. (2004). The Governance of Cooperatives and Mutual Associations: A 
Paradox Perspective. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 75(1), 11–
32. 
Cotter, J., & Silvester, M. (2003). Board and Monitoring Committee Independence. 
ABACUS, 39(2), 211–232. 
Cramer, J., & Sorter, H. (1974). Objectives of Financial Statements. New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Creswell, J. (2007). Qualitative Enquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches (2nd ed). London: Sage Publications. 
Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (3rd ed). London: Sage Publications. 
Creswell, J., & Clark, V. (2007). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods. London: 
Sage Publications. 
282 
Creswell, J., & Clark, V. (2011). Esigning and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. 
USA: Sage Publications. 
Crotty, M. (1998). The Foundations of Social Research Meaning and Perspective in 
the Research Process. London: Sage Publications. 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & García-Sánchez, I. (2015). The Role 
of Independent Directors at Family Firms in Relation to Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosures. International Business Review, 25(5), 890–901. 
Curwin, J., & Slater, R. (2007). Quantitative Methods for Business Decisions (7th 
ed.). London: Thomson Learning. 
Cutting, B., & Kouzmin, A. (2000). The Emerging Patterns of Power in Corporate 
Governance–Back to the Future in Improving Corporate Decision Making. 
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 15(5), 477–507. 
Da Silveira, D., & Saito, R. (2009). Corporate Governance in Brazil: Landmarks, 
Codes of Best Practices, and Main Challenges. ICFAI Journal of Corporate 
Governance, 8(2), 20–39. 
Dabor, A., Isiavwe, D., Ajagbe, M., & Oke, A. (2015). Impact of Corporate 
Governance on Firm Performance. International Journal of Economics and 
Management, 3(6), 634–653. 
Dahawy, K. (2007). Developing Nations and Corporate Governance: The Story of 
Egypt. The International Financial Corporation (IF) The Global Corporate 
Governance Forum. Cairo, Egypt. 
Dahya, J., Karbhari, Y., & Xiao, J. (2002). The Supervisory Board in Chinese Listed 
Companies: Problems, Causes, Consequences and Remedies. Asia Pacific 
Business Review, 9(2), 118–137. 
Dahya, J., & Mcconnell, J. (2002). The Cadbury Committee , Corporate Performance 
, and Top Management Turnover, LVII(1), 461–483. 
Daily, C., Dalton, D., & Cannella, A. (2003). Corporate Governance: Decades of 
Dialogue and Data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371–382. 
Dalwai, T., Basiruddin, R., Abdul Rasid, S., Kakabadse, N., & Fleur, M. (2015). A 
Critical Review of Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance: GCC Banking Sector Perspective. Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, 15(1), 18–30. 
Dartey-Baah, K., & Amponsah-Tawiah, K. (2011). Exploring the Limits of Western 
Corporate Social Responsibility Theories in Africa. International Journal of 
Business and Social Sciences, 2(18), 126–137. 
Davies, M., & Schlitzer, B. (2008). The Impracticality of an International “One Size 
Fits All” Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 23(6), 532–544. 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47. 
283 
Daykin, T. (2006). The Role of Internal Auditing in Sustainable Development and 
Corporate Social Reporting. The Institute of Internal Auditors Research 
Foundation. 
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate Boards in OECD Countries: 
Size, Composition, Functioning and Effectivness. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 13(2), 197–210. 
Deegan, C. (2004). Financial Accounting Theory. McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd, 
NSW. 
Deegan, C., Rankin, M., & Voght, P. (2000). Firms‟ Disclosure Reactions to Major 
Social Incidents: Australian Evidence. Accounting Forum, 24(1), 101–130. 
Deli, D., & Gillan, S. (2000). On the Demand for Independent and Active Audit 
Committees. Journal of Corporate Finance, 6(4), 427–445. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Ross, L. (1996). Stock Market Growth and Financial 
Intermediaries: Stylized Facts. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 291–
321. 
Denscombe, M. (2007). The Good Research Guide: for Small-Scale Social Research 
Projects. England: Open University Press. 
Denzin, N. (1978). The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological 
methods New York: McGraw-Hill. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative 
Research. London: Sage Publications. 
Dev, S. (1982). Financial Accounts - What they Do and Do not Reveal. In K. Midgley 
(Ed.), Management Accountability and Corporate Governance (pp. 129–140). 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
DeVaus, D. (2009). Research Design in Social Research. London: Sage Publications. 
DeVellis, R. (2003). Scale Development: Theory and Applications. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Dewing, I., & Russell, P. (2004). Regulation of UK Corporate Governance: Lessons 
from Accounting, Audit and Financial Services. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 12(1), 107–115. 
DeZoort, F., & Salterio, S. (2001). The Effects of Corporate Governance Experience 
and Financial-Reporting and Audit Knowledge on Audit Committee Members‟ 
Judgments. Auditing, 20(2), 31–47. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. (1994). Boards and Company Performance-Research 
Challenges the Conventional Wisdom. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2(3), 151–160. 
Doski, S. (2015). The Necessity of Issuing a Corporate Governance Code for the 
Kurdistan Region. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 18, 1–19. 
284 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., & Lowe, A. (2002). Management Research: An 
Introduction. London: Sage Publications. 
Ebaid, I. (2011). Internal Audit Function: An Exploratory Study from Egyptian Listed 
Firms. International Journal of Law and Management, 53(2), 108–128. 
Eighme, J., & Cashell, J. (2002). Internal Auditors‟ Roles in Overcoming the 
Financial Reporting Crisis. Internal Auditing, 17(6), 3–17. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57–74. 
El-Faitouri, R. (2014). Board of Directors and Tobin‟s Q: Evidence from UK Firms. 
Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2(4), 82–99. 
El-Firjani, E., Menacere, K., & Pegum, R. (2014). Developing Corporate Accounting 
Regulation in Libya Past and Future Challenges. Journal of Accounting in 
Emerging Economies, 4(1), 22–56. 
El-Mehdi, I. (2007). Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Performance in Tunisia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 
1429–1441. 
El-Shukri, A. (2007). Non-Financial Performance Measurement in The Libyan 
Commercial Banking Sector: Four Grounded Theory Case Studies. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, UK. 
Eller, C. (2014). Can Using the Internal Audit Function as a Training Ground for 
Management Deter Internal Auditor Fraud Reporting? Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. 
Eminet, A., & Guedri, Z. (2010). The Role of Nominating Committees and Director 
Reputation in Shaping the Labor Market for Directors: An Empirical 
Assessment. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(6), 557–574. 
Ermongkonchai, P. (2010). Managerial Perceptions on Employee Misconduct and 
Ethics Management Strategies in Thai Organizations. International Journal of 
Business and Management, 5(8), 124–137. 
Etzioni, A. (1998). A Communitarian Note on Stakeholder Theory. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 8(4), 679–691. 
Eulerich, M., Henseler, J., & Köhler, A. (2017). The Internal Audit Dilemma-the 
Impact of Executive Directors Versus Audit Committees on Internal Auditing 
Work. Managerial Auditing Journal, 32(9), 854–878. 
Everett, J., Neu, D., Rahman, A., & Maharaj, G. (2015). Praxis, Doxa and Research 
Methods: Reconsidering Critical Accounting. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 32, 37–44. 
Falgi, K. (2009). Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: A Stakeholder Perspective. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, UK. 
Fama, E. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political 
285 
Economy, 88(2), 288–307. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325. 
Faraj, S., & El-Firjani, E. (2014). Challenges Facing IASs/IFRS Implementation by 
Libyan Listed Companies. Universal Journal of Accounting and Finance, 2(3), 
57–63. 
Farhat, A. (2014). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Case of UK. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Portsmouth, UK. 
Fawzy, S. (2003). Assessment of Corporate Governance in Egypt. The Egypt Center 
for Economic Studies (ECES), Cairo. 
Ferdous, C. (2012). Compliance with Codes of Corporate Governance in Developing 
Economies: the Case of Bangladesh. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Birmingham, UK. 
Fernandes, S., & Lourenço, I. (2018). Determinants of Compliance with Mandatory 
Disclosure: Research Evidence. Corporate Ownership and Control, 15(2), 91–
98. 
Field, A. (2005). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (2nd ed). London: Sage 
Publications. 
Field, A. (2009). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. London: Sage Publications. 
Filatotchev, I., & Nakajima, C. (2010). Internal and External Corporate Governance: 
An Interface between an Organization and its Environment. British Journal of 
Management, 21(3), 591–606. 
Filatotchev, I., & Nakajima, C. (2014). Corporate Governance, Responsible 
Managerial Behavior, and Corporate Social Responsibility: Organizational 
Efficiency Versus Organizational Legitimacy? Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 28(3), 289–306. 
Fink, A. (2003). The survey handbook (2nd ed). London: Sage Publications. 
Fisher, C. (2007). Researching and Writing a Dissertation: A Guidebook for Business 
Students. England: Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
Flick, U. (2009). An Introduction to Qualitative Research (4th ed). London: Sage 
Publications. 
Flint, D. (1988). Philosophy and Principles of Auditing: An Introduction. London: 
MacMillan. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (2008). Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences (7th ed). New York: Worth Publishers. 
Fratini, F., & Tettamanzi, P. (2015). Corporate Governance and Performance : 
Evidence from Italian Companies. Open Journal of Business and Management, 
3(2), 199–218. 
286 
Freeman, R. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: Pitman 
Press. 
Freeman, R., & Reed, D. (1983). Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective 
in Corporate Governance. California Management Review, 25(3), 88–106. 
Freeman, R., Wicks, A., & Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder Theory and “„The 
Corporate Objective Revisited.‟” Organization Science, 15(3), 364–369. 
Gallhofer, S., & Haslam, J. (1993). Approaching Corporate Accountability: 
Fragments from the Past. Accounting and Business Research, 23(9), 320–330. 
Gannon, G. (2013). Human Resources Programming and its Impact on Leadership 
within Governing Boards of Ontario Community Colleges. Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Toronto, Canada. 
Garaibah, F., Dahmash, N., Alhassan, Y., Ameen, K., & Abo Jabrah, H. (1981). 
Scientific Research Methods for Social and Psychological Science (University). 
Amman. 
García‐ Andreu, H., Ortiz, G., & Aledo, A. (2015). Causal Maps and Indirect 
Influences Analysis in the Diagnosis of Second-Home Tourism Impacts. 
International Journal of Tourism Research, 17(5), 501–510. 
Garefalakis, A., Dimitras, A., & Lemonakis, C. (2017). The Effect of Corporate 
Governance Information (CGI) on Banks‟ Reporting Performance. Investment 
Management and Financial Innovations, 14(2), 63–70. 
Garratt, B. (2010). The Fish Rots from the Head: The Crisis in our Boardrooms: 
Developing the Crucial Skills of the Competent Director. London, England: 
Profile Books. 
Garwe, E. (2016). Increase in the Demand for Private Higher Education: Unmasking 
the “Paradox.” International Journal of Educational Management, 30(2), 232–
251. 
Gay, G., & Simnett, R. (2000). Auditing and Assurance: Services in Australia. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Georgiou, A., Koussis, N., & Violaris, I. (2012). Corporate Governance Research 
Applied at a Private University. Higher Education, Skills and Work-Based 
Learning, 2(1), 74–94. 
Ghafran, C., & O‟Sullivan, N. (2017). The Impact of Audit Committee Expertise on 
Audit Quality: Evidence from UK Audit Fees. British Accounting Review, 49(6), 
578–593. 
Ghauri, P., & Gronhaug, K. (2010). Research Methods in Business Studies (4th ed). 
England: Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
Gil, E., Hernandez, S., & Perez, D. (2012). Internal audit and financial reporting in 
the Spanish banking industry. Managerial Auditing Journal, 27(8), 728–758. 
Gill, J., & Johnson, P. (2010). Research Methods for Managers. London: Sage 
287 
Publications. 
Gomez-Mejia, L., Wiseman, R., & Dykes, B. (2005). Agency Problems in Diverse 
Contexts: A Global Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 42(7), 1507–
1517. 
Gomez, P., & Korine, H. (2008). Entrepreneurs and Democracy: A Political Theory 
of Corporate Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodwin, J., & Seow, J. (2002). The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
on the Quality of Financial Reporting and Auditing: Perceptions of Auditors and 
Directors in Singapore. Accounting & Finance, 42(3), 195–223. 
Goodwin, J., & Yeo, T. (2001). Two Factors Affecting Internal Audit Independence 
and Objectivity: Evidence from Singapore. International Journal of Auditing, 
5(2), 107–125. 
Gray, A., & Jenkins, B. (1993). Codes of Accountability in the New Public Sector. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6(3), 52–67. 
Gray, D. (2004). Doing Research in the Real World: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. London: Sage Publications. 
Gray, R., Adams, C., & Owen, D. (2014). Accountability, Social Responsibility and 
Sustaainability: Accounting for Society and the Environment. United Kingdom: 
Pearson Education Limited. 
Gray, R., Owen, D., & Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and Accountability: Changes 
and Challenes in Corporate Social and Environment Reporting. London: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Gray, R., Owen, D., & Maunders, K. (1987). Corporate Social Reporting: Accounting 
and Accountability. London: Prentice-Hall International. 
Greenbury Report. (1995). Directors’ Remuneration (Report of a Study Group 
Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury). Gee Professional Publishing, London. 
Guthrie, J., & Parker, L. (1989). Corporate Social Reporting: A Rebuttal of 
Legitimacy Theory. Accounting and Business Research, 19(76), 343–352. 
Haan, J., & Vlahu, R. (2016). Corporate Governance of Banks: A Survey. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 30(2), 228–277. 
Habtoor, O., & Ahmad, N. (2017). The Influence of Royal Board of Directors and 
other Board Characteristics on Corporate Risk Disclosure Practices. Corporate 
Ownership and Control, 14(2), 326–337. 
Hair, J. (2015). Essentials of Business Research Methods (2nd ed). New York: 
Routledge. 
Hair, J., Anderson, R., Ronal, T., & Black, W. (2010). Multivariate Data Analysis: A 
Global Perspective (7th ed). London: Pearson Education. 
Halal, A., Gabasi, B., & Firdause, N. (2014). An Analysis of Corporate Governance 
288 
and its Impact on the Firm‟s Performance in Libya: (A Study in ENI Oil and Gas 
Companies). Journal of Business and Management, 16(7), 61–70. 
Hamidi, D., & Gabrielsson, J. (2014). Developments and Trends in Research on 
Board Leadership: A Systematic Literature Review. International Journal of 
Business Governance and Ethics, 9(3), 243–268. 
Hamuda, K., & Sawan, N. (2014). Perceptions of Auditor Independence in Libyan 
Audit Market. International Business Research, 7(2), 120–128. 
Haniffa, R., & Cooke, T. (2002). Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations. A Journal of Accounting, Finance and Business Studies, 
38(3), 317–349. 
Hartas, D. (2015). Educational Research and Inquiry: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Hasan, I., & Xie, R. (2013). Foreign Bank Entry and Bank Corporate Governance in 
China. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 49(2), 4–18. 
Hassan, A., Karbhari, Y., Isa, A., & Razak, N. (2017). Board Attributes and 
Performance of Government-Linked Companies (Glcs): Evidence From an 
Emerging Economy. Corporate Ownership and Control, 14(3), 74–83. 
Hawashe, A. (2014). An Evaluation of Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of 
Commercial Banks: Empirical Evidence from Libya. Unpiblished PhD Thesis, 
University of Salford, UK. 
Hawashe, A. (2015). Commercial Banks‟ Attributes and Annual Voluntary 
Disclosure: the case of Libya. International Journal of Accounting and Financial 
Reporting, 5(2), 208–233. 
Hayes, S., Gortemaker, H., & Wallage, P. (2014). Principles of Auditing: An 
Introduction to International Standards on Auditing (3rd ed.). The UK: Financial 
Times Prentice Hall. 
Healy, M., & Perry, C. (2000). Comprehensive Criteria to Judge Validity and 
Reliability of Qualitative Research within the Realism Paradigm. Qualitative 
Market Research: An International Journal, 3(3), 118–126. 
Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Foard, N. (2006). A Short Introduction to Social 
Research. London: Sage Publications. 
Hill, C., & Jones, T. (1992). Stakeholder-Agency Theory. Journal of Management 
Studies, 29(2), 131–154. 
Hillman, A., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: 
Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives. Academy of 
Management Review, 28(3), 383–396. 
Hilmer, F. (1998). Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company 
Performance (2nd ed.). Melbourne: Information Australia. 
Ho, P., Aripin, N., & Tower, J. (2012). Corporate Governance Failure to Influence the 
289 
Communication of Key Financial Data over Turbulent Times. Journal of Applied 
Management Accounting Research, 10(10), 35–52. 
Hogan, C., Schmidt, J., & Thompson, A. (2014). Audit Committee Responsibilities 
and Implications for Legal Liability. Working paper, University of Texas, USA. 
Holland, J. (2002). Financial Institutions and Corporate Governance : A Dynamic 
Model of Corporate Governance. London: Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants. 
Hoque, Z. (2006). Methodological Issues in Accounting Research: Theories and 
Methods. London: Spiramus Press Ltd. 
Hu, H., & Alon, I. (2014). Are Chinese CEOs Stewards or Agents? Revisiting the 
Agency–Stewardship Debate. Emerging Market Firms in the Global Economy. 
Emerald Group Publi. In In: Are Chinese CEOs Stewards or Agents? Revisiting 
the Agency–Stewardship Debate. (pp. 255–277). Emerging Market Firms in the 
Global Economy. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Hummels, H. (1998). Organizing Ethics: A Stakeholder Debate. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 17(13), 1403–1419. 
Huse, M. (2007). Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side of 
Corporate Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge Unevesity Press. 
Hussain, S., & Mallin, C. (2002). Corporate Governance in Bahrain. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 10(3), 197–210. 
Hussey, J., & Hussey, R. (1997). Business Research: A Practical Guide for 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students. New York: Palgrave. 
Hutchinson, M., & Zain, M. (2009). Internal Audit Quality, Audit Committee 
Independence, Growth Opportunities and Firm Performance. Corporate 
Ownership and Control, 7(2), 50–63. 
Idowu, S., & Caliyurt, K. (2014). Corporate Governance: An International 
Perspective. London: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Ijiri, Y. (1983). On the Accountability-Based Conceptual Framework of Accounting. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2(2), 75–81. 
Imam, M., & Malik, M. (2007). Firm Performance and Corporate Governance 
through Ownership Structure: Evidence from Bangladesh Stock Market. 
International Review of Business Research, 3(4), 88–110. 
IMF. (2008). The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Country Report No. 
08/302). Washington. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). (2005). Corporate Governance: Why 
Corporate Governance. Washington. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). (2008). A Corporate Governance Survey of 
Listed Companies and Banks Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
Hawkamah Institute. Washington. 
290 
Iqbal, Z., & Mirakhor, A. (2004). Stakeholders Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economic System. Islamic Economic Studies, 11(2), 43–64. 
Isa, M., & Farouk, M. (2018). A Study of the Effect of Diversity in the Board and the 
Audit Committee Composition on Earnings Management for Low and High 
Leveraged Banks in Nigeria. Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing 
Studies, 4(1), 14–39. 
Isik, O., & Ince, A. (2016). Board Size, Board Composition and Performance: An 
Investigation on Turkish Banks. International Business Research, 9(2), 74. 
Issa, A. (2017). The Factors Influencing Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Australian Journal of Basic and Applied 
Sciences, 11(10), 1–19. 
Iswaissi, H., & Falahati, K. (2017). Challenges to Corporate Governance Practices: 
Case Study of Libyan Commercial Banks. Corporate Governance and 
Sustainability Review, 1(1), 33–41. 
Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and firm performance: evidence from 
India‟s top companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(4), 
492–509. 
James, H. (1996). The Greenbury Report on Directors‟ Remuneration. International 
Journal of Manpower, 17(1), 4–9. 
Jansson, E. (2005). The Stakeholder Model: The Influence of the Ownership and 
Governance Structure. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(1), 1–13. 
Jaswal, B. (2015). Corporate Governance: An Overview. International Journal of 
Business Management and Scientific Research, 9, 34–39. 
Jensen, M. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution , Exit , and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of 
Finance, 48(3), 831–880. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 
305–360. 
Jhunjhunwala, S., & Sharvani, B. (2011). Corporate Governance Disclosure and 
Transparency Framework. Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 4(1), 62–
73. 
Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. (2009). Ineffective Corporate Governance: Director 
Busyness and Board Committee Memberships. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
33(5), 819–828. 
Johnson, R., & Onwuegbuzie, A. (2004). Mixed Methods Reseaerch: A Research 
Paradigm Whose Time Come. Educational Research, 33(7), 14–26. 
Jones, T., & Wicks, A. (1999). Convergent Stakehodler Theory. The Academy of 
Management Review, 24(2), 206–221. 
291 
Jouha, F. (2015). Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Financial and Market. 
South East Asia Journal of Contemporary Economics and Law, 6(1), 1–6. 
Judge, W., Douglas, T., & Kutan, A. (2008). Institutional Antecedents of Corporate 
Governance Legitimacy. Journal of Management, 34(4), 765–785. 
Jungmann, C. (2007). The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and 
Two-Tier Board Systems – Evidence from the UK and Germany. European 
Company and Financial Law Review, 3(4), 426–474. 
Kaczmarek, S., & Nyuur, R. (2016). Review of the Literature on Board Committees: 
Taking Stock and Looking Ahead. International Journal of Business Governance 
and Ethics, 11(2), 89–115. 
Kakabadse, N., & Kakabadse, A. (2003). Polylogue as a Platform for Governance: 
Integrating People, the Planet, Profit and Posterity. Corporate Governance, 3(1), 
5–38. 
Kaler, J. (2002). Responsibility, Accountability and Governance. Business Ethics: A 
European Review, 11(4), 327–334. 
Kambil, A., Long, V., & Kwan, C. (2006). The Seven Disciplines for Venturing in 
China. MIT Sloan Management Review, 47(2), 85. 
Kamel, H., & Elbanna, S. (2010). Assessing the Perceptions of the Quality of 
Reported Earnings in Egypt. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25(1), 32–52. 
Kamel, M. (2006). Earnings Quality Evaluation with Special Reference to the 
Earnings Management of Egyptian IPOs. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cardiff 
University, UK. 
Kanapathippillai, S., Johl, S., & Wines, G. (2016). Remuneration committee 
Effectiveness and Narrative Remuneration Disclosure. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, 40, 384–402. 
Kang, H., Cheng, M., & Gray, S. (2007). Crporate Governance and Board 
Composition: Diversity and Independence of Australian Boards. Corporate 
Governance: A International Review, 15(2), 194–207. 
Kasim, E. (2015). Effect of Implementation of Good Corporate Governance and 
Internal Audit of the Quality of Financial Reporting and Implications of Return 
of Shares. International Journal of Scientific & Technology Research, 4(9), 89–
98. 
Kasswna, R. (2012). The Role of the Audit Committee in Raising the Efficiency of 
the Internal Control System to Combat Money Laundering in Jordanian Banks. 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 1(88), 102 – 117. 
Kazi, A., & Khalid, W. (2012). Questionnaire Designing and Validation. Journal of 
the Pakistan Medical Association, 62(5), 514–516. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S., & Wright, M. (1997). Introduction: The Corporate 
Governance Problem – Competing Diagnoses and Solutions. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
292 
Keasey, K., Thompsons, S., & Wright, M. (1997). Coeporate Governance: 
Responsibilities, Risks & Remuneration. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Keasey, K., & Wright, M. (1993). Issues In Corporate Accountability and 
Governance: An Editorial. Accounting and Business Research, 23(91A), 291–
303. 
Keay, A., & Loughrey, J. (2015). The Framework for Board Accountability in 
Corporate Governance. Legal Studies, 35(2), 252–279. 
Keefe, J. (2015). The Return of Idealism and the Rejection of Common Sense. In G. 
Graham (Ed.), Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(pp. 67–91). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kelle, U. (2006). Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Research 
Practice: Purposes and Advantages. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(4), 
293–311. 
Kelly, G., Kelly, D., & Gamble, A. (1997). Stakeholder Capitalism. London: 
MacMillan. 
Kendrick, M. (2000). Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code 
(The Turnbull Report). Risk Management: An International Journal, 2(4), 65–
69. 
Khalid, M., Alam, M., & Said, J. (2016). Empirical Assessment of Good Governance 
in the Public Sector of Malaysia. Economics & Sociology, 9(4), 289–304. 
Khelil, I., Hussainey, K., & Noubbigh, H. (2016). Audit Committee–Internal Audit 
Interaction and Moral Courage. Managerial Auditing Journal, 31(4/5), 403–433. 
Khiari, W., & Karaa, A. (2013). Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality: 
Taxonomy of Tunisian Listed Firms Using the Decision Tree Method Based 
Approach. Journal of Applied Economics and Business Research, 3(2), 95–117. 
Kilani, K. . (1998). The Evolution and Status of Accounting in Libya. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Hull, UK. 
Kim, D., & Kim, D. (2015). The Impact of Corporate Governance on Employment 
Relations in South Korea: The Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Perspectives. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 26(3), 338–360. 
King, T., & Wen, M. (2011). Shareholder Governance, Bondholder Governance, and 
Managerial Risk-Taking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(3), 512–531. 
Klapper, L., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and 
Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 703–
728. 
Klein, A. (1998). Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure. The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 41(1), 275–304. 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375 – 400. 
293 
Klenke, K. (2008). Qualitative Research in the Study of Leadership. The UK: 
Emerald Group Publishing. 
Knell, A. (2006). Corporate Governance: How to Add Value to your Company. 
Oxford: Elsevier. 
Koehn, J., & Vecchio, S. (2004). Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The CPA 
Journal, 74(2), 36–40. 
Krambia-Kapardis, M., & Psaros, J. (2006). The Implementation of Corporate 
Governance Principles in an Emerging Economy: A Critique of the Situation in 
Cyprus. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(2), 126–139. 
Krauss, S. (2005). Research paradigms and meaning making: A primer. The 
Qualitative Report, 10(4), 758–770. 
Kribat, M., Burton, B., & Crawford, L. (2013). Evidence on the Nature, Extent and 
Determinants of Disclosures in Libyan Banks‟ Annual Reports. Journal of 
Accounting in Emerging Economies, 3(2), 88–114. 
Krishnan, J. (2005). Audit Committee Quality and Internal Control: An Empirical 
Analysis. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 649–675. 
Kula, V. (2005). The Impact of the Roles , Structure and Process of Boards on Firm 
Performance : Evidence from Turkey. Corporate Governance, 13(2), 265–276. 
Kumar, R. (2005). Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners. 
London: Sage Publications. 
La Porta, L., Lopez, D., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113–1155. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate Ownership 
Around the World. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517. 
La Porta, R., Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Legal Determinants of 
External Finance. Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131–1150. 
Labelle, R. (2002). The Statement of Corporate Governance Practices (SCGP), A 
Voluntary Disclosure and Corporate Governance Perspective. Working paper, 
University of Montreal, Canada. 
Laffont, J. (1989). The Economics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: 
London MIT Press. 
Laga, M. (2013). Obstacles of Adoption and Implemention of IFRS in Libya. 
European Journal of Business and Economics, 7(1), 1–3. 
Lam, T., & Lee, S. (2008). CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Evidence from Hong 
Kong. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 
8(3), 299–316. 
Lappalainen, J., & Niskanen, M. (2012). Financial Performance of SMEs: Impact of 
Ownership Structure and Board Composition. Management Research Review, 
294 
35(11), 1088–1108. 
Larbsh, M. (2010). An Evaluation of Corporate Governance Practice in Libya: 
Stakeholders’ Perspectives. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham 
Trent, UK. 
Laughlin, R. (1990). A Model of Financial Accountability and the Church of England. 
Financial Accountability and Management, 6(2), 93–114. 
Laughlin, R. (1995). Empirical Research in Accounting: Alternative Approaches and 
a Case for “Middle-Range” Thinking. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 8(1), 63–87. 
Laughlin, R. (1996). Principels and Higher Principles: Accounting for Accountability 
in the Caring Professions. In Munro, R and Mouritsen, J. Accountability: Power, 
Ethos and the Technologies of Managing. London: International Thomsom 
Business Press. 
Law No. (1/1993). Libyan Government. Tripoli - Libya. 
Law No. (1/2005). Libyan Banking Law (LBL). Libyan Government. 
Law No. (11/2010). Establishment of the Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA). 
Libyan Government, Tripoli - Libya. 
Lawrence, J., & Stapledon, G. (1999). Do Independent Directors Add Value? 
Melbourne: The University of Melbourne. 
Lazonick, W., & O‟Sullivan, M. (2000). Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New 
Ideology for Corporate Governance. Economy and Society, 29(1), 13–35. 
LBL No. (46/2012). Libyan Government. Tripoli, Libya. 
Lee, H. (2008). The Association between Audit Committee and Board of Director 
Effectiveness and Changes in the Nonaudit fee Ratio. Applied Financial 
Economics, 18(8), 629–638. 
Lekvall, P. (2012). Board Committees in Nordic Corporate Governance - a Road to 
Increased Efficiency or Diluted Accountability? In International conference 
“Improving Financial institutions: the proper balance between regulation and 
governance” (pp. 1–5). Helsinki. 
Lemonakis, C., Malandrakis, I., Garefalakis, V., & Balla, V. (2018). Corporate 
Governance and Internal Audit : A Review on Performance Indicators. 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Economics and Business Law, 7(1), 98–119. 
Lepineux, F. (2005). Stakeholder Theory, Society and Cohesion. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 5(2), 99–110. 
Letza, S., Sun, X., & Kirkbride, J. (2004). Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: A 
Critical Review of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 12(3), 242–262. 
Liao, C., & Hsu, A. (2013). Common Membership and Effective Corporate 
295 
Governance: Evidence from Audit and Compensation Committees. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 21(1), 79–92. 
Liao, L., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. (2015). Gender Diversity, Board Independence, 
Environmental Committee and Greenhouse Gas Disclosure, 47(4), 409–424. 
Lin, C., & Chuang, C. (2011). Principal-Principal Conflicts and IPO Pricing in an 
Emerging Economy. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(6), 
585–600. 
Lin, J., Li, J., & Yang, J. (2006). The Effect of Audit Committee Performance on 
Earnings Quality. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(9), 921–933. 
Ljubisavljević, S., & Jovanović, D. (2011). Empirical Research on the Internal Audit 
Position of Companies in Serbia. Economic Annals, 56(191), 123–141. 
Loana, D., Gherghina, R., Ciocirlan, D., Vuta, M., Stefanescu, A., & Dudian, M. 
(2009). Corporate Governance Practices‟ Implementation in Romania - 
Achievements , Deficiencies , Action Items. In The 47th Congress of the 
European Regional Science Association, ERSA, Paris (pp. 1–21). 
Low, D., Roberts, H., & Whiting, R. (2015). Board Gender Diversity and Firm 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35(A), 381–401. 
LSM. (2004). Trading Annual Report. Tripoli. 
Maassen, G., & Van Den Bosch, F. (1999). On the Supposed Independence of Two-
Tier Boards: Formal Structure and Reality in the Netherlands. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 7(1), 31–37. 
MacAvoy, P., & Millstein, I. (2003). The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Madhani, P. (2015). Study of Relationship between Board Committees and Corporate 
Governance Practices of Indian Firms. Sona Global Managemeny Review, 9(3), 
1–20. 
Maedche, A. (2012). Ontology Learning for the Semantic Web. Univesity of 
Karlsruhe, Germany: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Maghur, A. (2004). Privatization: The Environment for Reform and Legal Aspects. 
London: Kogan Page Limited. 
Magrus, A. (2012). Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries: The 
Case of Libya. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Gloucestershire, UK. 
Mahadeo, J., & Soobaroyen, T. (2016). A Longitudinal Study of the Implementation 
of the Corporate Governance Code in a Developing Country. Business & Society, 
55(5), 738–777. 
Mahmud, M. (1997). Accounting and the Economic Development of Oil and Gas in 
Libya: Historical Review, Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Investigation. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, UK. 
296 
Mahmud, M., & Russell, A. (2003). An Empirical Investigation of the Development 
of Accounting Education and Practice in Libya, and of Strategies for Enhancing 
Accounting Education and Accounting Practice in Libya. Research in 
Accounting Emerging Economies, 5, 197–236. 
Malcolm, P., & Losleben, E. (2004). Cultural of the World: Libya. New York: 
Marshall Cavendish International. 
Mallin, C. (2007). Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mallin, C. (2010). Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mallin, C. (2013). Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mangena, M., & Chamisa, E. (2008). Corporate Governance and Incidences of 
Listing Suspension by the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa: An 
Empirical Analysis. The International Journal of Accounting, 43(1), 28–44. 
Manos, R., Murinde, V., & Green, C. (2007). Leverage and Business Groups: 
Evidence from Indian Firms. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 443–
465. 
Mansouri, A., Pirayesh, R., & Salehi, M. (2009). Audit Competence and Audit 
Quality: Case in Emerging Economy. International Journal of Business and 
Management, 4(2), 17–25. 
Marciukaityte, D., Szewczyk, S., & Varma, R. (2009). Voluntary vs. Forced Financial 
Restatements: The Role of Board Independence. Financial Analysts Journal, 
65(5), 184–202. 
Mashat, A. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Accountability: 
The Case of Libya. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, UK. 
Masoud, N. (2013). Libya‟s Step towards Change. Journal of World Economic 
Research, 2(4), 75–81. 
Masoud, N. (2013). The Impact of Stock Market Performance upon Economic 
Growth. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 3(4), 788–
798. 
May, T. (2005). Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process. Berkshire: Open 
University Press. 
Mbobo, M., & Nweze, A. (2016). The Perception of Stakeholders on the 
Effectiveness of Audit Committees in Nigerian Banks. International Journal of 
Innovative Research & Development, 5(7), 295–306. 
McDaniel, L., Martin, R., & Maines, L. (2002). Evaluating Financial Reporting 
Quality: The Effects of Financial Expertise vs. Financial Literacy. The 
Accounting Review, 77(1), 139–167. 
McKnight, P., & Weir, C. (2009). Agency costs, Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
and Ownership Structure in Large UK Publicly Quoted Companies: A Panel 
297 
Data Analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), 139–
158. 
Meca, E., & Ballesta, J. (2009). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A 
Meta-Analysis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(5), 594–
6103. 
Melis, A., Gaia, S., & Carta, S. (2015). Directors‟ Remuneration: A Comparison of 
Italian and UK Non-Financial Listed Firms‟ Disclosure. British Accounting 
Review, 47(1), 66–84. 
Messner, M. (2009). The Limits of Accountability. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 34(8), 918–938. 
Metz, H. (2004). Libya. Montana: Kessinger Publishing. 
Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. 
Miller, P., Strang, J., & Miller, P. (2010). Addicition Research Methods. London: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Minichilli, A., Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2007). Board Evaluations: Making a Fit 
between the Purpose and the System. Corporate Governance, 15(4), 609–623. 
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A., & Zona, F. (2009). Making Boards Effective: An 
Empirical Examination of Board Task Performance. British Journal of 
Management, 20(1), 55–74. 
Mitchell, R., Agle, B., & Wood, D. (1997). Toward a Theory of Stakeholder 
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of who and what Really 
Counts. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 853–886. 
Mizuno, M., & Tabner, I. (2009). Corporate Governance in Japan and the UK: Codes, 
Theory and Practice. Pacific Economic Review, 14(5), 622–638. 
Mjahid, A., Ekoganissukoharsono, P., & Nuzula, N. (2014). A Comparative Study of 
Good Corporate Governance Codes between Indonesia and United Arab 
Emirates . Journal of Business and Management, 16(7), 79–86. 
Moerland, P. (1995). Alternative Disciplinary Mechanisms in Different Corporate 
Systems. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 26(1), 17–34. 
Mohamad-Nor, M., Shafie, R., & Wan-Hussin, W. (2010). Corporate Governance and 
Audit Report Lag. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and 
Finance, 6(2), 57–84. 
Monks, R. (2002). Redesigning Corporate Governance Structures and Systems for the 
21st Century. paper delivered to the 5th International Conference on Corporate 
Governance and Direction at the Centre for Board Effectiveness. 
Monks, R., & Minow, N. (2004). Corporate Governance (3th ed.). Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
298 
Monks, R., & Minow, N. (2008). Corporate Governance (4th ed). London: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Moscu, R. (2015). Study on Correlation between CEO Duality and Corporate 
Performance of Companies Listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. Journal of 
Social and Economic Statistics, 4(1), 46–53. 
Mubarak, A. (2012). Accounting Reporting in Banks: The Case in Egypt and the UAE 
before and after the Financial Crisis. Journal of Accounting and Auditing: 
Research & Practice, 1–15. 
Mulgan, R. (2000). Accountability: An Ever-expanding Concept? Public 
Administration, 78(3), 555–573. 
Mulili, B., & Wong, P. (2011). Corporate Governance Practices in Developing 
Countries: The Case for Kenya. International Journal of Business 
Administration, 2(1), 14–27. 
Muniandy, B., & Hillier, J. (2014). Board Independence, Investment Opportunity Set 
and Performance of South African Firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35(A), 
108–124. 
Muravyev, A., Berezinets, I., & Ilina, Y. (2014). The Structure of Corporate Boards 
and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 34, 247–261. 
Murphy, A., & Topyan, K. (2005). Corporate Governance: A Critical Survey of Key 
Concepts, Issues, and Recent Reforms in the US. Employee Responsibilities and 
Rights Journal, 17(2), 75–89. 
Muth, M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship Theory and Board Structure: A 
Contingency Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6(1), 
5–28. 
Naciri, A. (2008). Corporate Governance around the World. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Nam, S., & Lum, C. (2005). Survey of Banks’ Corporate Goveranance in Indonesia, 
Republic of Korea, Malasia and Thiland. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank 
Institute. 
Nam, S., & Nam, I. (2004). Corporate Governance in Asia: Recent Evidence from 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Tripoli: Asian 
Development Bank Institute. 
Nestor, S., & Thompson, J. (2000). Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD 
Economies: Is Convergence Under Way? OECD Publishing. 
Neuman, I., & Benz, C. (1998). Qualitative-Quantitative Research Methodology: 
Exploring the Interactive Continuum. Educational Leadership Faculty 
Publications, Southern Illinois University Press. 
Neuman, W. (2000). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (4th ed). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
299 
Neuman, W. (2006). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Neville, E. (2011). The Role of Boards in Small and Medium Sized Firms. Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 11(5), 527–540. 
Newbold, P., Carlson, W., & Thorne, B. (2003). Statistics for Business and 
Economics (5th ed). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Nicholson, G., & Kiel, G. (2007). Can Directors Impact Performance? A Case-Based 
Test of Three Theories of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(4), 585–608. 
Noor, M., & Fadzil, F. (2013). Board Characteristics and Performance from 
Perspective of Governance Code in Malaysia. World Review of Business 
Research, 3(3), 191–206. 
Ntim, C., & Soobaroyen, T. (2013). Black Economic Empowerment Disclosures by 
South African Listed Corporations: The Influence of Ownership and Board 
Characteristics. Journal of Business Ethics, 116(1), 121–138. 
Ntim, C., Soobaroyen, T., & Broad, M. (2017). Governance Structures, Voluntary 
Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher Education 
Institutions. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 30(1), 65–118. 
Nyrop, R. (1973). Area Handbook for Libya. Washington: US Government Printing 
Office. 
O‟Sullivan, M., Percy, M., & Stewart, J. (2008). Australian Evidence on Corporate 
Governance Attributes and their Association with Forward-Looking Information 
in the Annual Report. Journal of Management and Governance, 12(1), 5–35. 
OECD. (2004). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris. 
Okike, E. (2007). Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Status Quo. Corporate 
Governance, 15(2), 173–193. 
Okpara, J. (2011). Corporate Governance in a Developing Economy: Barriers, Issues, 
& Implications for Firms. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society, 11(2), 184–199. 
Oman, C., Fries, S., & Buiter, W. (2003). Corporate Governance in Developing, 
Transition and Emerging Market Economies. Development Centre Policy Brief 
No. 23, OECD: Paris. 
Onyinyechi, O., & Okafor, M. (2016). Efficiency and Accountability of Public Sector 
Revenue and Expenditure in Nigeria (1970-2014). European Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance Research, 4(23), 23–42. 
Oppenheim, A. (2001). Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement. London: Continuum. 
Otman, W., & Karlberg, E. (2007). The libyan economy: Economic diversification 
and international repositioning. New York: Springer. 
300 
Oussii, A., & Takatak, N. (2015). Internal Audit Function in Tunisian Listed 
Companies : An Explanatory Study. Research Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, 6(19), 92–103. 
Ovidiu-Niculae, B., Lucian, C., & Cristiana, P. (2012). A Multi-Theory Approach of 
the Strategic Role of Boards. Studies in Business and Economics, 7(2), 43–51. 
Owusu, R., & Vaaland, T. (2016). Achieving Local Content in Extractive Industries 
of African Countries. In 12th International Scientific Conference on Economic 
and Social Development (pp. 74–82). Bangkok. 
Oxford Business Group. (2008). The Report: Libya 2008. Oxford. 
Oxner, T., & Oxner, K. (2006). Boom Time for Internal Audit Professionals: Thanks 
to the Profession‟s Growing Stature, Internal Auditors are Enjoying Higher 
Salaries and Greater Career Opportunities, The IIA‟s Latest Job Market Survey 
Reports. Internal Auditor, 63(3), 50–57. 
Oyejide, T., & Soyibo, A. (2001). Corporate Governance in Nigeria, Accra, Ghana, 
29 – 30. Paper Presented at the Conference on Corporate Governance,Accra, 
Ghana. 
Pallant, J. (2007). SPSS survival manual: a step by step guide to data analysis using 
SPSS version 15 (3rd ed). Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Pallot, J. (1991). The Legitimate Concern with Fairness: A Comment. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 16(2), 201–208. 
Pande, S., & Ansari, V. (2014). A Theoretical Framework for Corporate Governance. 
Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 7(1), 56–72. 
Pansiri, J. (2005). Pragmatism: A Methodological Approach to Researching Strategic 
Alliances in Tourism. Tourism and Hospitality Planning and Development, 2(3), 
1097–1113. 
Pansiri, J. (2006). Doing Tourism Research Using the Pragmatism Paradigm: An 
Empirical Example. Tourism and Hospitality Planning and Development, 3(3), 
223–240. 
Pansiri, J. (2009). Evolution of a Doctoral Thesis Research Topic and Methodology: 
A Personal Experience. Tourism Management, 30(1), 83–89. 
Parker, D. (2007). Financial and External Reporting Research: The Broadening 
Corporate Governance Challenge. Accounting and Business Research, 37(1), 39–
54. 
Parker, L. (2005). Social and Environmental Accountability Research: A View from 
the Commentary Box. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 18(6), 
842–860. 
Parkinson, J. (1994). Corporate Power and Responsibilities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pass, C. (2006). The Revised Combined Code and Corporate Governance: An 
301 
Empirical Survey of 50 Large UK Companies. Managerial Law, 48(5), 467–478. 
Patrick, E., Paulinus, E., & Nympha, A. (2015). The Influence of Corporate 
Governance on Earnings Management Practices : A Study of Some Selected 
Quoted Companies in Nigeria. American Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Management, 1(5), 482–493. 
Patton, M. . (2002). Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (3rd ed). London: 
Sage Publications. 
Pease, G., & McMillan, K. (1993). The Independent Non-Executive Director. 
Melbourne: Longman Cheshire Pty Ltd. 
Perks, W. (1993). Accounting and Society. London: Chapman & Hall. 
Persons, O. (2005). Relation between the New Corporate Governance Rules and the 
Likelihood of Financial Statement Fraud. Review of Accounting and Finance, 
4(2), 125–148. 
Persons, O. (2009). Audit Committee Characteristics and Earlier Voluntary Ethics 
Disclosure among Fraud and No-Fraud Firms. International Journal of 
Disclosure and Governance, 6(4), 284–297. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (2003). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. Stanford: Stanford Business Books. 
Piesse, J., Strange, R., & Toonsi, F. (2012). Is there a Distinctive MENA Model of 
Corporate Governance? Journal of Management and Governance, 16(4), 645–
681. 
Pillai, R., & Al-Malkawi, H. (2017). On the Relationship between Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from GCC Countries. Research in 
International Business and Finance, 44, 394–410. 
Plaza-Ubeda, J., Burgos-Jimenez, J., & Carmona-Moreno, E. (2010). Measuring 
Stakeholder Integration: Knowledge, Interaction and Adaptational Behavior 
Dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics, 93(3), 419–442. 
Popli, G., & Popli, R. (2015). Corporate Governance and the Role and Responsibility 
of Board of Directors in India with Special Focus on Independent Directors. In 
XVI Annual Conference Proceedings (pp. 135–163). 
Pornupatham, S. (2006). An Empirical Examination of Earnings Management, Audit 
Quality and Corporate Governance in Thailand: Perceptions of Auditors and 
Audit Committee Members. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Walse, UK. 
Porter, M., & Yergin, D. (2006). National Economic Strategy: An Assessment of the 
Competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. General Planning Council of 
Libya, Cera, UK. 
Prabowo, M., & Simpson, J. (2011). Independent Directors and Firm Performance in 
Family Controlled Firms: Evidence from Indonesia. Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature, 25(1), 121–132. 
302 
Prakinson, J. (1994). Corporate Power and Responsibilty: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pratten, J., & Mashat, A. (2009). Corporate Social Disclosure in Libya. Social 
Responsibility Journal, 5(3), 311–327. 
Prencipe, A., Bar-Yosef, S., & Dekker, H. (2014). Accounting Research in Family 
Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges. European Accounting Review, 
23(3), 361–385. 
Privatisation, & Agency. (2010). Annual Performance Report (in Arabic). Tripoli. 
Prowse, S. (1998). Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Lessons from East 
Asia. World Bank Group. The World Bank Group. 
Pucheta-Martínez, M. García-Meca, E. (2014). Institutional Investors on Boards and 
Audit Committees and their Effects on Financial Reporting Quality. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 22(4), 347–363. 
Pye, A. (2001). Corporate Boards, Investors and their Relationships: Accounts of 
Accountability and Corporate Governing in Action. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 9(3), 186–195. 
Rayton, B., & Cheng, S. (2004). Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom : 
Changes to the Regulatory Template and Company Practice from 1998-2002. 
Working Paper, University of Bath, UK. 
Rechner, P., & Dalton, D. (1991). CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A 
Longitudinal Analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155–160. 
Reed, A. (2002). Corporate Governance Reforms in India. Journal of Business Ethics, 
37(3), 249–268. 
Renders, A., & Gaeremynck, A. (2012). Corporate Governance, Principal-Principal 
Agency Conflicts, and Firm Value in European Listed Companies. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 20(2), 125–143. 
Resolution No. (134/2006). Establishment of the Libyan Stock Market (LSM). Libyan 
Goverment. 
Resolution No. (41/2006). The CBL. Libyan Government. 
Reverte, C. (2009). Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
Ratings by Spanish Listed Firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 88(2), 351–366. 
Rezaee, Z. (2009). Corporate Governance and Ethics. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Rich, K., & Zhang, J. (2014). Does Audit Committee Monitoring Matter in the 
Government Sector? Evidence from Municipal Internal Control Quality. Journal 
of Governmental & Nonprofit Accounting, 3(1), 58–80. 
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., & Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond Agency Conceptions of the 
Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom. 
British Journal of Management, 16(1), 5–26. 
303 
Roberts, J., & Scapens, R. (1985). Accounting Systems and Systems of 
Accountability - Understaning Accounting Practices in their Organisational 
Contexts. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(4), 433–456. 
Robertson, J. (2007). Power and Politics After Financial Crises: Rethinking Foreign 
Opportunism in Emerging Markets. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Romano, R. (2009). Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future? Yale Journal on 
Regulation, 26(2), 229–341. 
Romano, R., Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008). The Promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance. Columbia Law Review, 108(8), 1803–1882. 
Rouf, A. (2011). Corporate Characteristics, Governance Attributes and the Extent of 
Voluntary Disclosure in Bangladesh. African Journal of Business Management, 
5(19), 7836–7845. 
Ruf, B., Muralidhar, K., Brown, R., Janney, J., & Paul, K. (2001). An Empirical 
Investigation of the Relationship between Change in Corporate Social 
Performance and financial performance: A Stakeholder Theory Perspective. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 32(2), 143–156. 
Ryan, B., Scapens, R., & Thoebald, M. (2007). Research Methods Methodology in 
Finance and Accounting. London: High Holborn House. 
Saidi, N. (2004). Corporate Governance in MENA Countries: Improving 
Transparency and Disclosure. The Second Middle East and Nort Africa: Reginal 
Corporate Governance Forum, Beirut. 
Saleh, M. (2001). Accounting Information Disclosure and Accountability, Cases from 
Libya. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Sheffield Hallam University, UK. 
Salleh, N., & Haat, M. (2014). Audit Committee and Earnings Management: Pre and 
Post MCCG. International Review of Management and Business Reasearch, 
3(1), 307–318. 
Salterio, S., Conrod, J., & Schmidt, R. (2013). Canadian Evidence of Adherence to 
“Comply or Explain” Corporate Governance Codes: An International 
Comparison. Accounting Perspectives, 12(1), 23–51. 
Samaha, K., Khlif, H., & Hussainey, K. (2015). The Impact of Board and Audit 
Committee Characteristics on Voluntary Disclosure : A Meta-Analysis. “Journal 
of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,” 24, 13–28. 
Sarantakos, U. (1994). Social Research. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2009). Research Methodology for Business 
Students. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2012). Research Methods for Business 
Students (6th ed.). Harlow: Pearson Higher Ed. 
Schneider, A., & Scherer, A. (2015). Corporate Governance in a Risk Society. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 126(2), 309–323. 
304 
Schwab, K. (2010). The Global Competitiveness Report 2010 - 2011. 
Sekamn, U. (1992). Research Methods for Business, A Skill Building Approach (2nd 
ed). USA: John Wiley & Sons. 
Sekaran, U., & Bougie, J. (2016). Research Methods For Business: A Skill Building 
Approach. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Shalba, A. (2016). An Investigation of the Roles and Responsibilities of the Board of 
Directors in the Libyan Banking Sector. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Nottingham Trent, UK. 
Shanikat, M., & Abbadi, S. (2011). Assessment of Corporate Governance in Jordan: 
An Empirical Study. Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 
5(3), 93–106. 
Shankman, N. (1999). Reframing the Debate between Agency and Stakeholder 
Theories of the Firm. Journal of Business Ethics, 19(4), 319–334. 
Shaoul, J., Stafford, A., & Stapleton, P. (2012). Accountability and Corporate 
Governance of Public Private Partnerships. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
23(3), 213–229. 
Sharma, N. (2013). Theoretical Framework for Corporate Disclosure Research. Asian 
Journal of Finance & Accounting, 5(1), 183–196. 
Shawtari, F., Mohammed, M., Rashid, H., & Salem, M. (2015). Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms and Unmanaged Earnings: Empirical Evidence from 
Malaysian Government Linked Companies. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and 
Composition, 11(2), 98–111. 
Shernanna, H. (2012). Critical Perspectives on the Efficient Implementation of 
Privatisation Policies in Libya: Assessing Financial, Economic, Legal, 
Administrative and Social Requirements. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Durham 
University, UK. 
Shiri, M., Salehi, M., & Radbon, A. (2016). A Study of Impact of Ownership 
Structure and Disclosure Quality on Information Asymmetry in Iran. The 
Journal for Decision Makers, 41(1), 51–60. 
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO Involvement in the Selection of New 
Board Members : An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829–
1853. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of 
Finance, 52(2), 737–783. 
Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002). Investor Protection and Equity Markets. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 66(1), 3–27. 
Short, H. (1999). Corporate Governance: Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel - A 
Review. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 7(1), 57–67. 
Shrivastav, S., & Kalsie, A. (2016). The Relationship between CEO Duality and Firm 
305 
Performance : An Analysis Using Panel Data Approach. The IUP Journal of 
Corporate Governance, 15(2), 37–58. 
Siegel, S., & Castellan, J. (1988). Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences 
(2nd ed). London; New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Sinclair, A. (1995). The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(2–3), 219–237. 
Singh, A., & Zammit, A. (2006). Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and 
Economic Crises: Should the US Business Model Replace the Asian Way of 
“Doing Business”? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(4), 
220–233. 
Smith, R. (2003). Audit committees: Combined Code Guidance. London: Financial 
Reporting Council Limited. 
Smith Report. (2003). Audit Committee: A Report and Proposed Guidance. London, 
England. 
Soliman, M., & Ragab, A. (2014). Audit Committee Effectiveness , Audit Quality and 
Earnings Management : An Empirical Study of the Listed Companies in Egypt. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(2), 155–166. 
Solomon, J. (2007). Corporate Governance and Accountability. London: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Solomon, J. (2010). Corporate Governance and Accountability. London: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Solomon, J. (2013). Corporate Governance and Accountability. London: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Solomon, J., Lin, S., Norton, S., & Solomon, A. (2003). Corporate Governance in 
Taiwan: Empirical Evidence from Taiwanese Company Directors. Corporate 
Governance, 11(3), 235–248. 
Solomon, J., & Solomon, A. (2004). Corporate Governance and Accountability. 
Chichester: John Wiley. 
Steel, R. (1967). North Africa. New York: Wilson Co. 
Steger, T. (2014). What have we not Researched? And why not? – Some Reflections 
on the “Blind Spots” of Corporate Governance and Board Research. 
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 9(2), 121–135. 
Sternberg, E. (1997). The Defects of Stakeholder Theory. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 5(1), 3–10. 
Sternberg, E. (2004). Corporate Governance: Accountability in the Market Place 
(2nd ed.). London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Stewart, J. (1984). The Role of Information in Public Accounting. In Hopwood, A & 
Tomkins, C. Issues in Public Sector Accounting. Oxford: Philip Allan. 
306 
Stiles, P., & Taylor, B. (1993). Benchmarking Corporate Governance: The Impact of 
the Cadbury Code. Long Range Planning, 26(5), 61–71. 
Suchman, M. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610. 
Summers, J., & Nowicki, M. (2006). Pricing Transparency or Smoke Screen? Journal 
of the Healthcare Financial Management Association, 60(12), 134–136. 
Suwaidan, M., & Qasim, A. (2010). External Auditors‟ Reliance on Internal Auditors 
and its Impact on Audit Fees. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25(6), 509–525. 
Swartz, N. (2006). Small Firms Seek Different SOX Rules. The Information 
Management Journal, 40(1), 6–7. 
Taktak, S., & Triki, M. (2012). The Effect of Board and Ownership Structure on the 
Efficiency of Banks in Tunisia: The Stochastic Frontier Approach. International 
Journal of Business and Management, 7(16), 139–150. 
Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative 
and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Tauringana, V., & Chithambo, L. (2015). The Effect of DEFRA Guidance on 
Greenhouse Gas Disclosure. British Accounting Review, 47(4), 425–444. 
Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2009). Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: 
Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Tengamnuay, K., & Stapleton, P. (2009). The Role of the Audit Committee in 
Thailand: A Mature Monitoring Mechanism or an Evolving Process? Journal of 
Management & Governance, 13(3), 131–161. 
Terterov, M., & Wallace, J. (2002). Doing business with Libya (2nd ed.). London: 
Kogan Page Limited. 
Terterove, A. (2002). The Libyan Economy and International Trade Relations. In 
Terterov, M, and Wallace, J. (eds), Doing Business with Libya. London: Kogan 
Page Limited. 
The Combined Code. Combined Code, Principles of Corporate Governance (2006). 
London: The London Stock Exchange Limited. 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
Financial Reporting Council (2016). The UK. 
The LCGC. Issuing the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) for the Banking 
Sector (2005). The Central Bank of Libya, Tripoli - Libya. 
The LCGC. Issuing the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) for Libyan 
Listed Companies (2007). The Libyan Stock Market, Tripoli - Libya. 
The LCGC. Issuing the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) for the Banking 
Sector (2010). The Central Bank of Libya, Tripoli - Libya. 
307 
The Libyan Commercial Law (LCL). Issuing the Libyan Commercial Law (1953). 
Libyan Encyclopaedias of Financial Legislation, Tripoli - Libya. 
The Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) (1970). The Libyan Government. 
The Libyan Commercial Law (LCL). Amending Version of LCL of 1953 (1972). 
Libyan Encyclopaedias of Financial Legislation, Tripoli - Libya. 
The Libyan Commercial Law (LCL). Amending Version of LCL of 1953 (2010). 
Libyan Encyclopaedias of Financial Legislation, Tripoli - Libya. 
The Libyan Income Tax Law (1973). The Libyan Government. 
The World Bank. (2009). Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Arab Republic 
of Egypt. Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). 
Thomsen, S., & Conyon, M. (2012). Corporate Governance: Mechanisms and 
Systems. London: McGraw Hill. 
Thunvall, J., & Holmlund, T. (2014). E-Business Acquisition Under IFRS 3: An 
Analysis on a Revised Standard. 
Tourani-Rad, A., & Ingley, C. (2010). Handbook on Emerging Issues in Corporate 
Governance. Hackensack: World Scientific Publishing Company. 
Tricker, B. (2015). Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd 
ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tricker, R. (1984). Corporate Governance: Practices, Procedures and Powers in 
British Companies and Their Boards of Directors. Aldershot: Gower Press. 
Tse, T. (2011). Shareholder and Stakeholder Theory: After the Financial Crisis. 
Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 3(1), 51–63. 
Tulung, J., & Ramdani, D. (2018). Independence, Size and Performance of the Board: 
An Emerging Market Research. Corporate Ownership and Control, 15(2), 201–
208. 
Turley, S., & Zaman, M. (2007). Audit Committee Effectiveness: Informal Processes 
and Behavioural Effects. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 20(5), 
765–788. 
Turnbull, S. (1997a). Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5(3), 180–205. 
Turnbull, S. (1997b). Stakeholder Governance: A Cybernetic and Property Rights 
Analysis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5(1), 11–23. 
Turner, A. (2009). The Turner Review: a Regulatory Response to the Global Banking 
Crisis. London; Financial Services Authority. 
Udayasankar, K. (2008). The Foundations of Governance Theory: A Case for the 
Resource Dependence Perspective. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(4), 164–
172. 
308 
Union of Arab Banks (UAB). (2007). Survey Results: Corporate Governance Survey 
of the Arab Banking Sector. 
Utama, S., & Leonardo, F. (2014). Evidence on Audit Committee Composition and 
Audit Committee Effectiveness among Listed Companies in the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. Jurnal Akuntansi Dan Keuangan Indonesia, 1(2), 128–142. 
Vafeas, N., & Waegelein, J. (2007). The Association between Audit Committees, 
Compensation Incentives, and Corporate Audit Fees. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 28(3), 241–255. 
Vaismoradi, M., Turunen, H., & Bondas, T. (2013). Content Analysis and Thematic 
Analysis : Implications for Conducting a Qualitative Descriptive Study. Nursing 
and Health Sciences, 15, 398–405. 
Vandewalle, D. (2012). A History of Modern Libya (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge 
Unevesity Press. 
Varottil, U. (2014). Microfinance and the Corporate Governance Conundrum. 
Berkeley Business Law Journal, 9(1), 242–292. 
Velte, P. (2017). The Link between Audit Committees, Corporate Governance Quality 
and Firm Performance : A Literature Review. Corporate Ownership & Control, 
14(4), 15–31. 
Vera-Munoz, S. (2005). Corporate Governance Reforms: Redefined Expectations of 
Audit Committee Responsibilities and Effectiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 
62(2), 115–127. 
Vinten, G. (2001). Corporate Governance and the Sons of Cadbury: Corporate 
Governance. The International Journal of Business in Society, 1(4), 4–8. 
Volonté, C. (2015). Boards: Independent and Committed Directors? International 
Review of Law and Economics, 41, 1–39. 
Wahba, H. (2015). The Joint Effect of Board Characteristics on Financial 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Egypt. Review of Accounting and 
Finance, 14(1), 20–40. 
Walker, D. (2005). Resorting Trust after Resent Accountability Failures: Governing 
the Corporation. London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Walker Review. (2009). A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other 
Financial Industry Entities. London, England. 
Walt, N., & Ingley, C. (2003). Board Dynamics and the Influence of Professional 
Background, Gender and Ethnic Diversity of Directors. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 11(3), 218–234. 
Walther, A., & Morner, M. (2014). Opening the Black Box of Nomination 
Committees: A Case Study of Non-Executive Director Selections in German 
Supervisory Boards. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 
9(2), 136–154. 
309 
Wanyama, S. (2006). Corporate Governance and Accountability in Uganda: An 
Analysis of Stakeholder Perspectives. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Dundee, UK. 
Ward, D., & Filatotchev, I. (2010). Principal–Principal–Agency Relationships and the 
Role of External Governance. Managerial and Decision Economics, 31(4), 249–
261. 
Waweru, N., Kamau, R., & Uliana, E. (2011). Audit Committees and Corporate 
Governance in a Developing Country. International Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 7(4), 337–358. 
Weir, C., Laing, D., & Mcknight, P. (2002). Internal and External Governance 
Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29(5,6), 579–611. 
Wheelen, T., & Hunger, D. (2004). Strategic Management and Business Policy 
Concepts. Pearson Education Limited. 
Wong, D. (2009). An Assessment of Corporate Governance Reforms in the 
Philippines: 2002-2009. Philippine Management Review, 16, 24–57. 
Wright, J. (1981). Libya: A Modern History. London: Croom Helm. 
Wright, P., Mukherji, A., & Kroll, M. (2001). A Reexamination of Agency Theory 
Assumptions: Extensions and Extrapolations. Journal of Socio-Economics, 
30(5), 413–429. 
Xie, B., Davidson, W., & DaDalt, P. (2003). Earnings Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295–316. 
Yang, J., & Krishnan, J. (2005). Audit Committees and Quarterly Earnings 
Management. International Journal of Auditing, 9(3), 201–219. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation for Firms with a Small Board of 
Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211. 
Yin, F., Wanli, S., & Huaili, L. (2012). Determinants of Audit Committee Meeting 
Frequency: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 27(4), 425–444. 
Yoo, J., & Reed, R. (2015). The Effects of Top Management Team External Ties and 
Board Composition on the Strategic Choice of Late Movers. Long Range 
Planning, 48(1), 23–34. 
Zagoub, A. (2011). Corporate Governance in Libyan Commercial Banks. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, UK. 
Zagoub, A. (2016). Concept and Practices of Corporate Governance in Libyan 
Commercial Banks: A Stakeholders Perspective. Journal of Economics and 
Business Studies, 2–13. 
Zakari, M. (2014). Challenges of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
310 
Adoption in Libyan. International Journal of Accounting and Financial 
Reporting, 4(2), 390–412. 
Zattoni, A., & Judge, W. (2012). Corporate Governance and Initial Public Offerings: 
An International Perspective. UK: Cambridge university Press. 
Zhang, Y., Zhou, J., & Zhou, N. (2007). Audit Committee Quality, Auditor 
Independence and Internal Control Weaknesses. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 26, 300–327. 
Zikmund, W. (2003). Business Research Methods. Thomson: South- Western. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
312 
 
 
 
Appendix I: Questionnaire Survey – Internal Stakeholders (English) 
 
 
 
An Investigation into Corporate Governance (CG) and 
Accountability Practices: Evidence from Libyan Listed Companies    
 
 
 
Ismail Salem Elshahoubi 
PhD Student 
Henley Business School 
 
 
     
 
Supervised by: 
 
Professor Jill Atkins 
Professor of Accounting 
Director of Research for BISA 
Henley Business School 
 
 
 
2015 
313 
Section One: Demographic Information    
A) Please indicate your job by ticking () in the appropriate place (please choose one): 
  Executive director    Executive Chairman 
  Non-executive director     Non-executive Chairman 
  Company employee    Executive Board Member 
  (Other) Please specify………    Non-executive Board Member 
 
B) Please tick () in the appropriate place according to your level of academic qualification: 
  Master    PhD 
  (Other) Please specify…..........    Bachelor 
 
C) Please tick () in the appropriate place according to the place where you studied: 
  The US    Libya 
  The UK    Other Arab countries  
     (Other) Please specify……… 
 
D) Please tick () in the appropriate place according to the number of years of experience: 
 
 From 1 year up to less than 5 
years  
  
 Less than one year 
 
 More than 15 years 
  
 From 5 years up to less than 10 
years 
 
 
  
 From 10 years up to less than 15 
years 
 
E) Please tick () in the sector which your company belongs to: 
  Industrial sector    Banking sector 
  Service sector    Insurance sector  
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Section Two: Corporate Governance (CG)   
Please indicate to what extent you agree that the following Arabic terms are suitable 
translations for the English term Corporate Governance by choosing a score from (1) 
strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q1: 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Hawkamat Alsharekat 1 
5 4 3 2 1 Aledarah Alrashedah 2 
5 4 3 2 1 Edart Tandheem wa Murakabat Alsharekat 3 
5 4 3 2 1 Alhakemia Almoassasatia 4 
 
 
Definition of Corporate Governance (CG) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following definitions by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.  
Q2: 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is the system through which a company is directed and 
controlled. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is used to regulate the relationship between a company and 
its shareholders. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is used to regulate the relationship between a company and 
the different stakeholders who are affected by and affect the 
activities and decisions of the company. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is the monitoring and supervision of a company‟s 
management to ensure it is working in the interests of the 
shareholders. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is a set of regulations, rules, procedures and cultures that 
enable a company to perform successfully. 
5 
 
 
Importance and Awareness of Corporate Governance (CG) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q3: 
 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is important for Libyan listed companies. 1 
5 4 3 2 1 The implementation of CG gives confidence to shareholders. 2 
5 4 3 2 1 There is sufficient awareness of CG issues in the Libyan 
environment. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies follow the international developments in 
the area of CG. 
4 
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 Compliance with Corporate Governance (CG) Mechanisms  Q4 
 The Board of Directors Mechanism 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements concerning 
the duties, responsibilities and composition of the board of directors and its 
committees by choosing a score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.1 
   Duties of the Board of Directors  
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors endorses the strategic direction and main 
objectives of the company and supervises their implementation. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets up and supervises systems of internal 
control. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets out specific and clear policies, 
standards and procedures for the membership of the Board of 
Directors. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets out a clear written policy governing 
the relations between stakeholders in order to protect their interests 
and preserve their rights. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets up policies and procedures to ensure 
that the company‟s rules and regulations, as well as its 
commitment to disclose essential information to shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders, are respected. 
5 
      Responsibilities of the Board of Directors  
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors has the full authority and power to monitor 
the operations of the company‟s management in general and 
monitor the executives in particular. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors carries out its duties seriously and 
attentively and ensures its decisions are based on adequate 
information from the executive departments. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 The members of the Board of Directors represent the majority of 
the shareholders and are committed to serving the company's 
interests generally. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors determines the authority delegated to the 
executive management, the executive decision-making procedures 
and the authorisation period. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors takes into account the interests of 
stakeholders when making strategic decisions. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Board members devote enough time to undertake their 
responsibilities and to prepare for the meetings of the board. 
6 
      The Composition of the Board of Directors  
5 4 3 2 1 Boards in Libyan listed companies have no fewer than three 
members and no more than eleven. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The general assemblies have criteria for appointing the board 
members in Libyan listed companies and the period for their 
appointment is no longer than three years. 
2 
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5 4 3 2 1 The majority of board members in Libyan listed companies are 
non-executive members. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 In Libyan listed companies, at least two board members or one 
third of the board (whichever is greater) are independent. 
4 
      The Board of Directors’ Committees  
5 4 3 2 1 Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are completely 
independent. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are formed from 
non-executive directors and have no fewer than three members. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 The general assembly in a Libyan listed company determines the 
rules for selecting the members of the audit committee, the 
duration of their membership and the committee‟s method of 
working based on the suggestions of the Board of Directors. 
3 
     In practice, the functions and responsibilities of the audit 
committee in Libyan listed companies include the following: 
4 
5 4 3 2 1  A. Directly supervising the internal audit of the company‟s     
management and verifying its effectiveness. 
 
5 4 3 2 1  B.  Examining the internal control system of the company and 
producing a written report giving opinions and recommendations. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 C.   Making recommendations to the Board of Directors regarding 
the appointment of the external auditor and sequestration, and the 
determining of fees. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 D.  Checking the annual financial statements before referring them     
to the Board of Directors. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 E. Checking administrative and accounting policies and making 
recommendations where necessary to the Board of Directors. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors determines the functions of each 
committee, its period of operation and the powers granted to it. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 The members of nomination and remuneration committees in 
Libyan listed companies are selected based on the suggestions of 
the Board of Directors. 
6 
     In practice, the duties and responsibilities of nomination and 
remuneration committees in Libyan listed companies include the 
following: 
7 
5 4 3 2 1 A.  Annually reviewing the skills required of board members.  
5 4 3 2 1 B. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the Board of   
Directors and taking steps to improve it in line with the company‟s 
interests. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 C. Recommending candidates to the Board of Directors in 
accordance with approved policies and standards. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 D.  Setting clear policies for the compensation and remuneration of 
directors and senior executives. 
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Q4.1.1:   Please indicate whether these committees exist in your organisation by choosing Yes 
or No. Then indicate to what extent you agree that they are important in Libyan listed 
companies by choosing a score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
 
Board Committee 
Does it exist? Is it important? 
  Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 
Audit committee               
Nomination committee               
Remuneration committee               
Risk committee               
Corporate governance (CG) 
committee               
Shariah committee               
Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.2 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies have written disclosure policies, 
endorsed by the Board of Directors, to ensure that disclosure 
arrangements comply with the requirements of the regulatory 
authorities. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Directors in Libyan listed companies disclose any personal 
interest they may have in other companies and any 
transactions that might affect the company. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 In their annual reports, Libyan listed companies disclose the 
meetings of the Board of Directors. 
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose the results of the annual 
audit assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of internal 
control procedures. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose both financial and of non-
financial data in their annual reports. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose what has and what has not 
been applied in respect of the rules on CG. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose their policies and 
programmes concerning the local community and the 
environment. 
7 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies use their websites to promote 
disclosure and transparency as well as to provide appropriate 
information for investors and others. 
8 
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Internal and External Audit Mechanisms 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.3 
5 4 3 2 1 Internal control systems in Libyan listed companies are 
effective. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Internal auditors provide a quarterly report to the Board of 
Directors and the audit committee describing the extent of 
the company‟s compliance with the laws and rules that 
regulate its activities. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors determines the objectives, functions 
and terms of reference of the internal audit in Libyan listed 
companies. 
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Listed companies choose an external auditor registered in 
the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) to review their financial 
statements. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The external auditor undertakes no additional work for the 
company under review (e.g. providing consulting or 
administrative services). 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders’ Rights Mechanism 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.4 
5 4 3 2 1 The statutes of Libyan listed companies and their internal 
regulations contain the necessary procedures to ensure all 
shareholders‟ rights are upheld. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Shareholders in Libyan listed companies are entitled to attend 
the general assembly‟s meetings, participate in its 
deliberations and vote on its decisions. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Shareholders in Libyan listed companies have the right to ask 
for any information, as long as this does not breach financial 
regulations or damage the interests of the company. 
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Information is provided to shareholders without 
discrimination, regardless of whether they are majority or 
minority shareholders. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 General assembly meeting agendas take into consideration 
the issues that shareholders want to discuss. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a clear policy from the Board of Directors regarding 
the distribution of dividends, and shareholders have the right 
to see this policy during the general assembly meeting. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Shareholders‟ legal rights are respected by Libyan listed 
companies. 
7 
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Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q5: 
5 4 3 2 1 The laws and regulations in Libya are effective and 
sufficient and provide a suitable environment for CG 
practices. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The laws and regulations in Libya are effective and 
sufficient and provide a suitable environment for 
accountability practices. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Legislative bodies and the LSMA play an effective role in 
the supervision and control of CG and accountability 
practices in Libyan listed companies.  
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies adhere to the laws and regulations 
in force in the LSM. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) should be 
mandatory for all Libyan listed companies. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 There is an urgent need for the establishment of an 
independent body to oversee CG issues in Libya. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies that do not comply with the LCGC 
should be de-listed. 
7 
 
 
Factors influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.                                                                                                            
Q6: 
5 4 3 2 1 There is administrative and financial corruption in some 
Libyan listed companies. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 There is weakness in terms of the independence of the 
external auditor. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 There are weaknesses in the administrative and legal 
environment for listed companies. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a lack of knowledge about CG in listed companies. 4 
5 4 3 2 1 The mechanisms protecting the rights of stakeholders are 
weak. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 There are limited training programmes for directors with 
respect to CG. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Accountability mechanisms in general are weak. 7 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a weak investment climate in the LSM. 8 
5 4 3 2 1 The Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA) is inefficient. 9 
5 4 3 2 1 The principles of CG are incompatible with the interests of 
joint stock companies. 
10 
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5 4 3 2 1 Boards of Directors in Libyan listed companies lack diversity. 11 
5 4 3 2 1 The implementation of CG in listed companies takes a long 
time. 
12 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a limited number of listed companies in the LSM. 13 
5 4 3 2 1 International accounting and auditing standards are not widely 
adopted. 
14 
5 4 3 2 1 There is political interference (government intervention) in the 
economic activities of Libyan listed companies. 
15 
5 4 3 2 1 The economic and political situation in Libya adversely 
affects CG practice. 
16 
 
 
Section Three: Accountability  
Perception and Practice of Accountability 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q7: 
5 4 3 2 1 Those in authority must be accountable and able to clarify 
and justify the actions taken on behalf of stakeholders.  
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Accountability is practised and discharged in all Libyan 
listed companies. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies commit to accountability as one 
way of fulfilling their responsibilities towards Libyan 
society. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 The existence of effective mechanisms of accountability in 
the LSM inspires confidence in investors and stakeholders 
alike. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 All relevant parties (stakeholders) with Libyan listed 
companies practise accountability upon these companies. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies‟ boards of directors, executive 
managers and employees are accountable for the 
consequences of their actions. 
  6 
5 4 3 2 1 Adopting a good CG makes Libyan listed companies to 
discharge their accountability.  
7 
 
 Please feel free to make any other comments that you think are relevant to CG and 
accountability practices in Libyan listed companies: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Section One: Demographic Information 
A) Please indicate your job by ticking () in the appropriate place (please choose one): 
 
  Academic Staff    External Auditor 
  Broker    Financial Analyst 
  Regulator    Financial Consultant 
     (Other) Please Specify……. 
 
B) Please tick () in the appropriate place according to your level of academic 
qualification: 
 
  Master    PhD 
  (Other) Please specify…...............    First degree 
 
C) Please tick (  ) in the appropriate place according to the place where you studied 
 
  The US    Libya 
  The UK    Other Arab Countries  
     (Other) Please specify……… 
 
D) Please tick ( ) in the appropriate place according to the number of years of experience: 
 
  From 1 year up to less than 5 years     Less than one year 
 
 From 5 years up to less than 10 
years 
  
 From 5 years up to less than 10 
years 
 
 More than 15 years 
  
 From 10 years up to less than 
15 years 
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Section Two: Corporate Governance (CG)  
Please indicate to what extent you agree that the following Arabic terms are suitable 
translations for the English term Corporate Governance by choosing a score from (1) 
strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q1: 
 
5 4 3 2 1 Hawkamat Alsharekat 1 
5 4 3 2 1 Aledarah Alrashedah 2 
5 4 3 2 1 Edart Tandheem wa Murakabat Alsharekat 3 
5 4 3 2 1 Alhakemia Almoassasatia 4 
 
 
Definition of Corporate Governance (CG) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following definitions by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.  
Q2: 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is the system through which a company is directed and 
controlled. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is used to regulate the relationship between a company and 
its shareholders. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is used to regulate the relationship between a company and 
the different stakeholders who are affected by and affect the 
activities and decisions of the company. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is the monitoring and supervision of a company‟s 
management to ensure it is working in the interests of the 
shareholders. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is a set of regulations, rules, procedures and cultures that 
enable a company to perform successfully. 
5 
 
 
Importance and Awareness of Corporate Governance (CG) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q3: 
 
5 4 3 2 1 CG is important for Libyan listed companies. 1 
5 4 3 2 1 The implementation of CG gives confidence to shareholders. 2 
5 4 3 2 1 There is sufficient awareness of CG issues in the Libyan 
environment. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies follow the international developments in 
the area of CG. 
4 
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 Compliance with Corporate Governance (CG) Mechanisms  Q4 
 The Board of Directors Mechanism 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements concerning 
the duties, responsibilities and composition of the board of directors and its 
committees by choosing a score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.1 
   Duties of the Board of Directors  
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors endorses the strategic direction and main 
objectives of the company and supervises their implementation. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets up and supervises systems of internal 
control. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets out specific and clear policies, 
standards and procedures for the membership of the Board of 
Directors. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets out a clear written policy governing 
the relations between stakeholders in order to protect their interests 
and preserve their rights. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors sets up policies and procedures to ensure 
that the company‟s rules and regulations, as well as its 
commitment to disclose essential information to shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders, are respected. 
5 
      Responsibilities of the Board of Directors  
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors has the full authority and power to monitor 
the operations of the company‟s management in general and 
monitor the executives in particular. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors carries out its duties seriously and 
attentively and ensures its decisions are based on adequate 
information from the executive departments. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 The members of the Board of Directors represent the majority of 
the shareholders and are committed to serving the company's 
interests generally. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors determines the authority delegated to the 
executive management, the executive decision-making procedures 
and the authorisation period. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors takes into account the interests of 
stakeholders when making strategic decisions. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Board members devote enough time to undertake their 
responsibilities and to prepare for the meetings of the board. 
6 
      The Composition of the Board of Directors  
5 4 3 2 1 Boards in Libyan listed companies have no fewer than three 
members and no more than eleven. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The general assemblies have criteria for appointing the board 
members in Libyan listed companies and the period for their 
appointment is no longer than three years. 
2 
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5 4 3 2 1 The majority of board members in Libyan listed companies are 
non-executive members. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 In Libyan listed companies, at least two board members or one 
third of the board (whichever is greater) are independent. 
4 
      The Board of Directors’ Committees  
5 4 3 2 1 Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are completely 
independent. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Audit committees in Libyan listed companies are formed from 
non-executive directors and have no fewer than three members. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 The general assembly in a Libyan listed company determines the 
rules for selecting the members of the audit committee, the 
duration of their membership and the committee‟s method of 
working based on the suggestions of the Board of Directors. 
3 
     In practice, the functions and responsibilities of the audit 
committee in Libyan listed companies include the following: 
4 
5 4 3 2 1  A. Directly supervising the internal audit of the company‟s     
management and verifying its effectiveness. 
 
5 4 3 2 1  B.  Examining the internal control system of the company and 
producing a written report giving opinions and recommendations. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 C.   Making recommendations to the Board of Directors regarding 
the appointment of the external auditor and sequestration, and the 
determining of fees. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 D.  Checking the annual financial statements before referring them     
to the Board of Directors. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 E. Checking administrative and accounting policies and making 
recommendations where necessary to the Board of Directors. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors determines the functions of each 
committee, its period of operation and the powers granted to it. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 The members of nomination and remuneration committees in 
Libyan listed companies are selected based on the suggestions of 
the Board of Directors. 
6 
     In practice, the duties and responsibilities of nomination and 
remuneration committees in Libyan listed companies include the 
following: 
7 
5 4 3 2 1 A.  Annually reviewing the skills required of board members.  
5 4 3 2 1 B. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the Board of   
Directors and taking steps to improve it in line with the company‟s 
interests. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 C. Recommending candidates to the Board of Directors in 
accordance with approved policies and standards. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 D.  Setting clear policies for the compensation and remuneration of 
directors and senior executives. 
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Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.2 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies have written disclosure policies, 
endorsed by the Board of Directors, to ensure that disclosure 
arrangements comply with the requirements of the regulatory 
authorities. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Directors in Libyan listed companies disclose any personal 
interest they may have in other companies and any 
transactions that might affect the company. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 In their annual reports, Libyan listed companies disclose the 
meetings of the Board of Directors. 
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose the results of the annual 
audit assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of internal 
control procedures. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose both financial and of non-
financial data in their annual reports. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose what has and what has not 
been applied in respect of the rules on CG. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies disclose their policies and 
programmes concerning the local community and the 
environment. 
7 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies use their websites to promote 
disclosure and transparency as well as to provide appropriate 
information for investors and others. 
8 
 
 
Q4.1.1: Please indicate whether these committees exist in Libyan listed companies by 
choosing Yes or No. Then indicate to what extent you agree that they are important in these 
listed companies by choosing a score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
 
Board Committee 
Does it exist? Is it important? 
  Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 
 Audit committee                
 Nomination committee               
 Remuneration committee               
 Risk committee               
 Corporate governance (CG) 
committee               
 Shariah committee               
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Internal and External Audit Mechanisms 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.3 
5 4 3 2 1 Internal control systems in Libyan listed companies are 
effective. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Internal auditors provide a quarterly report to the Board of 
Directors and the audit committee describing the extent of 
the company's compliance with the laws and rules that 
regulate its activities. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 The Board of Directors determines the objectives, functions 
and terms of reference of the internal audit in Libyan listed 
companies. 
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Listed companies choose an external auditor registered in 
the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) to review their financial 
statements. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The external auditor undertakes no additional work for the 
company under review (e.g. providing consulting or 
administrative services). 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders’ Rights Mechanism 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q4.4 
5 4 3 2 1 The statutes of Libyan listed companies and their internal 
regulations contain the necessary procedures to ensure all 
shareholders‟ rights are upheld. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Shareholders in Libyan listed companies are entitled to attend 
the general assembly‟s meetings, participate in its 
deliberations and vote on its decisions. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Shareholders in Libyan listed companies have the right to ask 
for any information, as long as this does not breach financial 
regulations or damage the interests of the company. 
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Information is provided to shareholders without 
discrimination, regardless of whether they are majority or 
minority shareholders. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 General assembly meeting agendas take into consideration 
the issues that shareholders want to discuss. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a clear policy from the Board of Directors regarding 
the distribution of dividends, and shareholders have the right 
to see this policy during the general assembly meeting. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Shareholders‟ legal rights are respected by Libyan listed 
companies. 
7 
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Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q5: 
5 4 3 2 1 The laws and regulations in Libya are effective and 
sufficient and provide a suitable environment for CG 
practices. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 The laws and regulations in Libya are effective and 
sufficient and provide a suitable environment for 
accountability practices. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Legislative bodies and the LSMA play an effective role in 
the supervision and control of CG and accountability 
practices in Libyan listed companies.  
0 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies adhere to the laws and regulations 
in force in the LSM. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 The Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) should be 
mandatory for all Libyan listed companies. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 There is an urgent need for the establishment of an 
independent body to oversee CG issues in Libya. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies that do not comply with the LCGC 
should be de-listed. 
7 
 
 
Factors influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.                                                                                                            
Q6: 
5 4 3 2 1 There is administrative and financial corruption in some 
Libyan listed companies. 
1 
5 4 3 2 1 There is weakness in terms of the independence of the 
external auditor. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 There are weaknesses in the administrative and legal 
environment for listed companies. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a lack of knowledge about CG in listed companies. 4 
5 4 3 2 1 The mechanisms protecting the rights of stakeholders are 
weak. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 There are limited training programmes for directors with 
respect to CG. 
6 
5 4 3 2 1 Accountability mechanisms in general are weak. 7 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a weak investment climate in the LSM. 8 
5 4 3 2 1 The Libyan Stock Market Authority (LSMA) is inefficient. 9 
5 4 3 2 1 The principles of CG are incompatible with the interests of 
joint stock companies. 
10 
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5 4 3 2 1 Boards of Directors in Libyan listed companies lack diversity. 11 
5 4 3 2 1 The implementation of CG in listed companies takes a long 
time. 
12 
5 4 3 2 1 There is a limited number of listed companies in the LSM. 13 
5 4 3 2 1 International accounting and auditing standards are not widely 
adopted. 
14 
5 4 3 2 1 There is political interference (government intervention) in the 
economic activities of Libyan listed companies. 
15 
5 4 3 2 1 The economic and political situation in Libya adversely 
affects CG practice. 
16 
 
Section Three: Accountability  
Perception and Practice of Accountability 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by choosing a 
score from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. 
Q7: 
5 4 3 2 1 Those in authority must be accountable and able to clarify and 
justify the actions taken on behalf of stakeholders.  
1 
5 4 3 2 1 Accountability is practised and discharged in all Libyan listed 
companies. 
2 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies commit to accountability as one way 
of fulfilling their responsibilities towards Libyan society. 
3 
5 4 3 2 1 The existence of effective mechanisms of accountability in the 
LSM inspires confidence in investors and stakeholders alike. 
4 
5 4 3 2 1 All relevant parties (stakeholders) with Libyan listed 
companies practise accountability upon these companies. 
5 
5 4 3 2 1 Libyan listed companies‟ boards of directors, executive 
managers and employees are accountable for the 
consequences of their actions. 
  6 
5 4 3 2 1 Adopting a good CG makes Libyan listed companies to 
discharge their accountability.  
7 
 
 Please feel free to make any other comments that you think are relevant to CG and 
accountability practices in Libyan listed companies: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix III: Questionnaire Survey – Internal Stakeholders (Arabic) 
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 ,,المحترّ,الأخ 
 ايشلاّ عًٝهِ ٚسحم١ الله ٚبشنات٘
بالمًُه١ المتخذ٠ ٚريو عٔ مماسسات حٛنُ١ ايششنات  لفي جاَع١ سٜذْ ايذنتٛساٙأفٝذنِ بأْٞ أقّٛ حايًٝا بتخضير دسج١         
ايًٝبي,  الماٍفي ايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ في سٛم  ytilibatnuoccA dna ecnanrevoG etaroproC ٚالمشاءي١
بٗذف  استبٝاْٞايذنتٛس٠ إيٝزابٝتا باسْٚٞ ٚايبرٚفٝشٛس جٌٝ أثهٓص, ٚنجزء ٖاّ َٔ ايذساس١ ايتطبٝكٝ١ يًبخح أقّٛ بمشح  فبإششا
ششنات ٚالمشاءي١ ٚمماسساتٗا في آساء الأطشاف رات ايصً١ بايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ حٍٛ المٛاضٝع المتعًك١ بحٛنُ١ اي ً٢ايتعشف ع
 بٝئ١ الأعُاٍ ايًٝبٝ١.
ٚيعًُٞ ايتاّ بإيماْهِ بأُٖٝ١ ٚدعِ ٚتشجٝع ايبخح ايعًُٞ ٚدٚسٙ في تطٜٛش ايفشد ٚالمجتُع, فإْني أسجٛ َٓهِ ايتهشّ          
في مختًف ايكضاٜا  ِاس ٚجٗ١ ْظشنالمشفك١, نُا لا ٜفٛتني ايتٜٓٛ٘ عً٢ أُٖٝ١ عذّ ايتردد في إظٗ الاستبٝإبالإجاب١ عً٢ أسئً١ 
 المطشٚح١ ٚريو لأُٖٝ١ ايتعشف عً٢ ايٛاقع ايفعًٞ لمُاسسات حٛنُ١ ايششنات ٚالمشاءي١ في ايبٝئ١ ايًٝبٝ١.
ٚفي حاٍ سغبتهِ في  ,إلا لأغشاض ايبخح ايعًُٞ فكط تشتخذّنُا أؤنذ يهِ بإٔ إجاباتهِ ستعاٌَ بمٓتٗ٢ ايششٜ١ ٚئ          
أخيرًا لا ٜشعني إلا إٔ . ٚفإْ٘ ٜششْٞ إسساي٘ إيٝهِ بايطشٜك١ ايتي تفضًْٛٗا اْتٗائٗاخص يٓتائج ايذساس١ عٓذ الحصٍٛ عً٢ ًَ
  الاستبٝإ.أشهشنِ جزٌٜ ايشهش َكذسًا حشٔ تعاْٚهِ ٚإْفام جزء َٔ ٚقتهِ ايجُين يلإجاب١ عً٢ أسئً١ 
 إسماعٌٝ سالم ايشٗٛبٞ
 محاسب١ –طايب دنتٛساٙ 
 68155654981533
 14707695474433
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 ةاهقشٍ الأوي: ًعووًات ديموغرافي
 ٚاؽذح فمظ) اخز١بسٌٛظ١فزه (٠شعٝ  اٌّىبْ إٌّبعت طجمب   أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  إداسح رٕف١زٞػضٛ ِغٍظ     سئ١ظ ِغٍظ إداسح رٕف١زٞ 
  ػضٛ ِغٍظ إداسح غ١ش رٕف١زٞ    سئ١ظ ِغٍظ إداسح غ١ش رٕف١زٞ 
  ِٛظف    ِذ٠ش رٕف١زٞ 
  ؽذد) ............... ا  أخشٜ (سعبء    ِذ٠ش غ١ش رٕف١زٞ 
 
 ٍّؤً٘ اٌؼٌٍّٟ اٌّىبْ إٌّبعت ٚفمب   أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  دوزٛساٖ 
  ِبعغز١ش 
  ثىبٌٛس٠ٛط 
  ؽذد) .......... ا  أخشٜ (سعبء 
 
 اٌّىبْ اٌزٞ دسعذ ف١ٗ أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  اٌٛلا٠بد اٌّزؾذح    ٌ١ج١ب 
  ؽذد) ............. ا  أخشٜ (سعبء    دٚي ػشث١خ أخشٜ 
     ثش٠طبٔ١ب 
 
 ٌؼذد عٕٛاد اٌخجشح فٟ ِغبي اٌؼًّ اٌّىبْ إٌّبعت ٚفمب   أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  عٕخ 51إٌٝ ألً ِٓ  31ِٓ     ألً ِٓ عٕخ 
  عٕخ 51أوضش ِٓ     عٕٛاد 5ِٓ عٕخ إٌٝ ألً ِٓ  
     عٕٛاد 31إٌٝ ألً ِٓ  5ِٓ  
 
 اٌششوخاٌزٞ رٕزّٟ إٌ١ٗ أِبَ اٌمطبع  )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  اٌمطبع اٌخذِٟ    اٌمطبع اٌّظشفٟ 
  لطبع اٌزؤِ١ٓ    اٌمطبع اٌظٕبػٟ 
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 اهشركات وآهياتٔا اهقشٍ اهثاُي: حوكٌة
 دسعخ اٌّٛافمخ اٌّلائّخ ؽ١ش أْ:  ثٛضغ دائشح ؽٛياٌشعبء الإعبثخ ػٍٝ أعئٍخ الاعزج١بْ اٌزبٌ١خ  
 
 = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ اٌّظطٍؾبد اٌؼشث١خ اٌزبٌ١خ ٟ٘ رشعّخ ِٕبعجخ ٌؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد  1ط
  "ecnanrevoG etaroproC"
 5 4 3 2 1 ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد 1
 5 4 3 2 1 الإداسح اٌشش١ذح 2
 5 4 3 2 1 إداسح رٕظ١ُ ِٚشالجخ اٌششوبد 3
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌؾبوّ١خ اٌّؤعغبر١خ 4
  
 
  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2غير ًوافق بشدة,   =1( 
 تعريف حوكٌة اهشركات  5ط
 ٠ش١ش إٌٝ: "ecnanrevoG etaroproC"٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ ِظطٍؼ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد 
 5 4 3 2 1 إٌظبَ اٌزٞ ٠زُ ِٓ خلاٌٗ رٛع١ٗ ِٚشالجخ اٌششوخ 1
 5 4 3 2 1 الإعشاءاد اٌزٟ رغزخذَ ٌزٕظ١ُ اٌؼلالخ ث١ٓ اٌششوخ ِٚغبّ٘١ٙب  2
 3
إٌظبَ اٌزٞ ٠غزخذَ ٌزٕظ١ُ اٌؼلالخ ث١ٓ اٌششوخ ٚأطؾبة اٌّظبٌؼ اٌز٠ٓ ٠زؤصشْٚ 
 ٚ٠ؤصشْٚ ػٍٝ أٔشطخ ٚلشاساد اٌششوخ
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌّشالجخ ٚالإششاف ػٍٝ إداسح اٌششوخ ٌٍزؤوذ ِٓ أٔٙب رؼًّ ٌّظٍؾخ اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ  4
 5
ِغّٛػخ ِٓ الأٔظّخ ٚاٌمٛاػذ ٚالإعشاءاد ٚاٌضمبفبد اٌزٟ رؤدٞ إٌٝ ٔغبػ ػٍّ١بد 
 اٌششوخ   
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 
  بشدة )= ًوافق  5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 أٌٓية وإدران حوكٌة اهشركات  0ط
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفك ِغ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ:
 5 4 3 2 1 ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد ِّٙخ ٌٍششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 1
 5 4 3 2 1 ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد رؼطٟ اٌضمخ ٌٍّغبّ٘١ٓ 2
 5 4 3 2 1 ٕ٘بن ٚػٟ ٚإدسان وبف ثبٌمضب٠ب اٌّزؼٍمخ ثؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ اٌج١ئخ اٌٍ١ج١خ 0
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ رزبثغ اٌزطٛساد اٌذٌٚ١خ فٟ ِغبي ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد 4
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 = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 4ط
 
 الإهتزاَ بآهيات حوكٌة اهشركات   
 آهية لدوص الإدارة: 
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثٛاعجبد, ِغؤٌٚ١بد, رىٛ٠ٓ ٌٚغبْ ِغٍظ الإداسح
      واجباث مجلس الإدارة  
 1
ٚالأ٘ذاف اٌشئ١غ١خ ٌٍششوخ ٚالإششاف  ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؼزّذ اٌزٛعٙبد الإعزشار١غ١خ 
 5 4 3 2 1 ػٍٝ رٕف١ز٘ب
 5 4 3 2 1 ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠مَٛ ثٛضغ أٔظّخ اٌشلبثخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ٚالإششاف ػٍ١ٙب 2
 5 4 3 2 1 ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؾذد ع١بعبد ِٚؼب٠١ش ٚإعشاءاد ٚاضؾخ ٌؼضٛ٠خ ِغٍظ الإداسح 3
 4
اٌؼلالبد ث١ٓ أطؾبة اٌّظبٌؼ  ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ضغ ع١بعبد ِىزٛثخ ٚاضؾخ رؾىُ
 ِٓ أعً ؽّب٠خ ِظبٌؾُٙ ٚاٌؾفبظ ػٍٝ ؽمٛلُٙ
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ضغ اٌغ١بعبد ٚالإعشاءاد اٌزٟ رضّٓ اؽزشاَ اٌششوخ ٌلأٔظّخ 
ٚاٌٍٛائؼ ٚاٌزضاِٙب ثبلإفظبػ ػٓ اٌّؼٍِٛبد اٌغٛ٘ش٠خ ٌٍّغبّ٘١ٓ ٚأطؾبة 
 اٌّظبٌؼ
 5 4 3 2 1
      الإدارةمسؤولياث مجلس   
 1
 بشكل الشركة إدارة عملٌات مراقبة على والقدرة الكاملة السلطة لدٌه الإدارة مجلس
 5 4 3 2 1 الخصوص وجه على التنفٌذٌٌن المدٌرٌن ومراقبة عام
 2
ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؤدٞ ِٙبِٗ ػٍٝ ِؾًّ اٌغذ ٚثبٔزجبٖ ٚوزٌه لشاسارٗ ِجٕ١خ ػٍٝ 
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌزٕف١ز٠خِؼٍِٛبد ٚاف١خ ِٓ الإداساد 
 3
٠ّضً أػضبء ِغٍظ الإداسح أغٍج١خ اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ ٍِٚزضِ١ٓ ثخذِخ ِظبٌؼ اٌششوخ 
 5 4 3 2 1 ػِّٛب  
 4
ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؾذد اٌظلاؽ١بد اٌّخٌٛخ ٌلإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠خ ٚإعشاءاد ارخبر اٌمشاساد 
 اٌزٕف١ز٠خ ٚوزٌه ِذح اٌزفٛ٠ض
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 القرارات اتخاذ عند المصلحة أصحاب مصالح الاعتبار بعٌن ٌؤخذ الإدارة مجلس 
 الإستراتٌجٌة
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
أعضاء مجلس الإدارة لدٌهم الوقت الكافً للقٌام بمسإولٌاتهم والتحضٌر لاجتماعات 
 المجلس
 5 4 3 2 1
      تركيبت (تشكيل) مجلس الإدارة  
 1
ِغبٌظ الإداسح فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ لا ٠مً ػٓ صلاصخ أػضبء ٚلا ٠ض٠ذ ػٓ 
 5 4 3 2 1 إؽذٜ ػشش ػضٛ 
 2
اٌغّؼ١بد اٌؼِّٛ١خ ٌذ٠ٙب ِؼب٠١ش ٌزؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ِغبٌظ الإداسح فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ 
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌّذسعخ ٚاٌّذح إٌّظٛص ػٍ١ٙب ٌزؼ١١ٓ أػضبء اٌّغٍظ لا رزغبٚص اٌضلاس عٕٛاد
 3
 غٌر المدرجة من الأعضاء الشركات اللٌبٌة فً الإدارة مجلس أعضاء غالبٌة
 5 4 3 2 1 التنفٌذٌٌن
 4
فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ لا ٠مً أػضبء ِغٍظ الإداسح اٌّغزمٍ١ٓ ػٓ ػضٛ٠ٓ أٚ 
 5 4 3 2 1 صٍش أػضبء اٌّغٍظ أ٠ّٙب أوضش
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      لجان مجلس الإدارة  
 5 4 3 2 1  تماما مستقلة المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المراجعة لجان 1
 2
ٌغبْ اٌّشاعؼخ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ رزؤٌف ِٓ الأػضبء غ١ش اٌزٕف١ز٠١ٓ ٚلا 
 ٠مً ػذدُ٘ ػٓ صلاصخ أػضبء
 5 4 3 2 1
 3
 لجنة أعضاء اختٌار قواعد تحدد اللٌبٌة المدرجة فً الشركات العامة الجمعٌة
 عمل اللجنة بناءا على إقتراح مجلس الإدارة وأسلوب عضوٌتهم ومدة المراجعة
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
 المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المراجعة لجنة ومسإولٌات مهام العملٌة، الممارسة فً
 تشمل ما ٌلً:
     
 أ
 من والتحقق بالشركة الداخلٌة المراجعة المباشر على إدارة الإشراف
 فعالٌتها
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  وتوصٌات آراء ٌتضمن كتابً تقرٌر وإعداد للشركة الداخلٌة الرقابة نظام فحص ة
 ط
 وعزله الخارجً الحسابات مراجع بتعٌٌن ٌتعلق فٌما الإدارة لمجلس توصٌات تقدٌم
 وتحدٌد أتعابه
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  إدارة الشركة مجلس على عرضها قبل السنوٌة المالٌة القوائم فحص د
 ٖ
 إلى الاقتضاء عند التوصٌات بشؤنها وتقدٌم والمحاسبٌة الإدارٌة السٌاسات فحص
 الإدارة مجلس
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 عملها وفترة لجنة، كل مهام ٌحدد الإدارة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة مجلس
 لها  الممنوحة والصلاحٌات
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
 على بناء المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً والمكافآت الترشٌح لجان أعضاء اختٌار ٌتم
 الإدارة مجلس اقتراحات
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
الشركات  فً والمكافآت الترشٌح لجان ومسإولٌات واجبات العملٌة، الممارسة فً
  :ٌلً المدرجة تشمل ما اللٌبٌة
     
 أ
اٌّشاعؼخ اٌغٕٛ٠خ ٌلاؽز١بعبد اٌّطٍٛثخ ِٓ اٌّٙبساد إٌّبعجخ ٌؼضٛ٠خ ِغٍظ 
 الإداسح
 5 4 3 2 1
 ة
 اللازمة الخطوات واتخاذ الإدارة مجلس فً والضعف القوة نقاط على التعرف
 5 4 3 2 1 الشركة مصالح مع ٌتماشى بما لتحسٌنه
 5 4 3 2 1 رٛط١خ اٌّششؾ١ٓ ٌّغٍظ الإداسح ٚفمب  ٌٍغ١بعبد ٚاٌّؼب٠١ش اٌّؼزّذح ط
 5 4 3 2 1 التنفٌذٌٌن وكبار الإدارة مجلس أعضاء ومكافآت لتعوٌضات واضحة سٌاسات وضع د
 
 
  ) ٓاَ جدًا=  5, ٓاَ -4= غير ًتأكد,  3,  ٓاَ= غير 2,  غير ٓاَ جدًا=1( 
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رؼزمذ ثؤّ٘١خ ٚعٛد اٌٍغبْ اٌزبٌ١خ فٟ ششوزه اٌّذسعخ؟ ِٚب ِذٜ ٚعٛد ٘زٖ اٌٍغبْ؟ 
 أٌٓية وجود اهوجِـــة في اهشركة    ةوجـــود اهوجِــــ                                  ـــــــــة                  اهوجِ                            
 أ ٌغٕخ اٌّشاعؼخ ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ة ٌغٕخ اٌزشش١ؾبد ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ط ٌغٕخ اٌزؼٛ٠ضبد أٚ اٌّىبفآد ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 د  اٌّخبطشٌغٕخ  ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ٖ ٌغٕخ اٌؾٛوّخ ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ٚ اٌٍغٕخ اٌششػ١خ ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
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  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2ًوافق بشدة,  = غير 1( 
 آهية الإفصاح واهشفافية  
 ٚاٌشفبف١خ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثآٌ١خ الإفظبػ 
 1
اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ ٌٙب ع١بعبد إفظبػ ِىزٛثخ ِؼزّذح ِٓ ِغٍظ الإداسح 
 ٌضّبْ رٛافمٙب ِغ ِزطٍجبد اٌغٙبد اٌشلبث١خ
 5 4 3 2 1
 2
 تكون قد شخصٌة مصلحة أي ٌفصحون عن المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المدراء
 الشركة على تإثر قد المعاملات وأي أخرى شركات فً لدٌهم
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  مجلس الإدارة فً تقارٌرها السنوٌة اجتماعات عن المدرجة تفصح اللٌبٌة الشركات 3
 4
 وفعالٌة كفاءة لتقٌٌم السنوٌة المراجعة نتائج عن المدرجة تفصح الشركات اللٌبٌة
 الداخلٌة الرقابة إجراءات
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 فً المالٌة وغٌر المالٌة البٌانات من كل تفصح عن المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة
 السنوٌة تقارٌرها
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
ٌطبق فٌما ٌتعلق بقواعد  لم وما المدرجة تفصح عن ما تم تطبٌقه الشركات اللٌبٌة
 وآلٌات حوكمة الشركات
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
المدرجة تفصح عن سٌاساتها وبرامجها فٌما ٌتعلق بالمجتمع  الشركات اللٌبٌة
 والبٌئة
 5 4 3 2 1
 8
 الإفصاح لتعزٌز الإنترنت شبكة على مواقعها تستخدم الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة
 5 4 3 2 1 وغٌرهم للمستثمرٌن المناسبة المعلومات لتوفٌر وكذلك والشفافٌة،
 
 
 
  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 اهداخوية والخارجيةآهيات المراجعة   
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثآٌ١بد اٌّشاعؼخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ٚاٌخبسع١خ
 
 5 4 3 2 1  فعالة المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً الداخلٌة الرقابة نظم 1
 2
 لمجلس سنوي ربع تقرٌر الداخلٌٌن بالشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة ٌقدم المراجعٌن
 تنظم التً والقواعد بالقوانٌن الشركة التزام ٌصف مدى المراجعة ولجنة الإدارة
 أنشطتها
 5 4 3 2 1
 3
الشركات  فً الداخلٌة المراجعة واختصاصات ومهام أهداف ٌحدد الإدارة مجلس
 المدرجة اللٌبٌة
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
المدرجة تختار المراجع الخارجً المعتمد فً سوق المال اللٌبً  الشركات اللٌبٌة
 لمراجعة قوائمها المالٌة 
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 المراجعة قٌد للشركة إضافً عمل أي الخارجً عن عدم مزاولة ٌتعهد المراجع
 5 4 3 2 1 )الإدارٌة والخدمات الاستشارات تقدٌم المثال سبٌل على(
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  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3غير ًوافق,   =2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 آهية حقوق المشآٌين  
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثآٌ١خ ؽمٛق اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ
 
 1
 الإجراءات تتضمن الداخلٌة وأنظمتها اللٌبٌة المدرجة للشركات الأساسً النظام
 المساهمٌن جمٌع حقوق على الحفاظ لضمان اللازمة
 5 4 3 2 1
 2
 الجمعٌة اجتماعات الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة ٌحق لهم لحضور فً المساهمٌن
 قراراتها على والتصوٌت مداولاتها فً والمشاركة العمومٌة،
 5 4 3 2 1
 3
لطالما لا  معلومات أي طلب فً لهم الحق المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المساهمٌن
 الشركة بمصالح الإضرار أو المالٌة اللوائح ٌعارض
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
 أغلبٌة كانت هناك إذا عما النظر بغض تمٌٌز دون للمساهمٌن معلومات توفٌر ٌتم
 للمساهمٌن أقلٌة أو
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 بعٌن تؤخذ الجمعٌة العمومٌة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة اجتماعات أعمال جداول
 مناقشتها المساهمٌن ٌرٌدالتً  القضاٌا الاعتبار
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
 والمساهمٌن الأسهم، أرباح توزٌع بشؤن الإدارة مجلس من واضحة سٌاسة هناك
 العمومٌة الجمعٌة اجتماع خلال السٌاسة هذه على الاطلاع فً الحق لدٌها
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة قبل من القانونٌة للمساهمٌن محترمة الحقوق 7
     
 
  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1(  
 الإطار اهقاُوُي واهتِظيٌي لحوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة  5ط
اٌششوبد  ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبلإطبس اٌمبٟٔٛٔ ٚاٌزٕظ١ّٟ ٌؾٛوّخ
 ٚاٌّغبءٌخ
 
 1
لممارسات حوكمة  مناسبة بٌئة وتوفر وكافٌة فعالة لٌبٌا فً واللوائح القوانٌن
 الشركات
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 المساءلة لممارسات مناسبة بٌئة وتوفر وكافٌة فعالة لٌبٌا فً واللوائح القوانٌن 2
 3
 والرقابة الإشراف فً فعالا دورا   التشرٌعٌة وهٌئة سوق المال اللٌبً تلعب الهٌئات
  المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً على ممارسات حوكمة الشركات والمساءلة
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
المعمول بها فً سوق المال  والأنظمة بالقوانٌن المدرجة تلتزم الشركات اللٌبٌة
 اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
اٌششوبد اٌٍ١جٟ إٌضاِ١ب  ٌغّ١غ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ  ٠ٕجغٟ أْ ٠ىْٛ لبْٔٛ ؽٛوّخ
 اٌّذسعخ
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
على قضاٌا حوكمة الشركات فً   للإشراف مستقلة هٌئة لإنشاء ملحة حاجة هناك
  سوق المال اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
الشركات ٌجب أن  الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة التً لا تلتزم بتطبٌق لائحة حوكمة
 5 4 3 2 1 تشطب من قائمة الشركات المدرجة فً سوف المال اللٌبً
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  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1(  
 اهعوائق (الحواجز) اهتي تحوي دوْ تطبيق حوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة  6ط
٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبٌؼٛائك (اٌؾٛاعض) اٌزٟ رؾٛي دْٚ رطج١ك 
 ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد ٚاٌّغبءٌخ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ 
 5 4 3 2 1  المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة بعض فً ومالً فساد إداري هناك 1
 5 4 3 2 1 الخارجً الحسابات مراجع استقلالٌة حٌث من ضعف هناك 2
 5 4 3 2 1 المدرجة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة والقانونٌة الإدارٌة البٌئة ضعف 3
 5 4 3 2 1 ػذَ الإٌّبَ (ضؼف اٌّؼشفخ) ثؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ 4
 5 4 3 2 1 ضعٌفة  المصالح أصحاب حقوق حماٌة آلٌات 5
 5 4 3 2 1 محدودٌة البرامج التدرٌبٌة للمدراء فٌما ٌتعلق بممارسات حوكمة الشركات  6
 5 4 3 2 1 ضعٌفة عام بشكل المساءلة آلٌات 7
 5 4 3 2 1 ضؼف إٌّبؿ الاعزضّبسٞ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 8
 5 4 3 2 1 ٘١ئخ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ غ١ش فؼبٌخ 9
 5 4 3 2 1  الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة  مصالح مع تعارض مبادئ حوكمة الشركات 31
 5 4 3 2 1 التنوع إلى تفتقر المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً الإدارة مجالس 11
 5 4 3 2 1 تنفٌذ حوكمة الشركات فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة ٌؤخذ وقتا  طوٌلا   51
 5 4 3 2 1 ِؾذٚد٠خ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 01
 5 4 3 2 1 ػذَ الاػزّبد ػٍٝ ِؼب٠١ش اٌّؾبعجخ ٚاٌّشاعؼخ اٌذٌٚ١خ 41
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌزذخً اٌؾىِٟٛ (اٌغ١بعٟ) فٟ الأٔشطخ الالزظبد٠خ ٌٍششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ 51
 61
ممارسة حوكمة الشركات  على سلبا ٌإثر والسٌاسً اللٌبً الاقتصادي الوضع
 والمساءلة
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 
 اهثاهث: المشاءهـةاهقشٍ 
 = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 ًفٔوَ وممارسات المشاءهـة  7ط
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثّب٘١خ اٌّغبءٌخ
 1
لممارسة المسإولٌة المساءلة هً مطلب من هم فً موقع أعلى سلطة رقابٌة 
 لتبرٌر وتوضٌح الإجراءات التً تتخذها نٌابة عن أصحاب المصالح
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 المساءلة ممارسة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة 2
 3
 المجتمع تجاه بمسإولٌاتها للوفاء كوسٌلة بالمساءلة تلتزم المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة
 اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
 للمستثمرٌن سوق المال اللٌبً ٌمنح الثقة فً للمساءلة فعالة آلٌات وجود
 سواء حد على والمساهمٌن
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة مع) المصالح أصحاب( الصلة ذات جمٌع الأطراف
 الشركات هذه على تمارس المساءلة
 5 4 3 2 1
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 6
فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة  والموظفون التنفٌذٌون المدٌرون الإداراة، مجالس
 نتائج تصرفاتهم عن مساءلون
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
 بالمساءلة تفً المدرجة تبنى نظام جٌد لحوكمة الشركات ٌجعل الشركات اللٌبٌة
 المصالح أصحاب أمام
 5 4 3 2 1
اٌششوبد ٚاٌّغبءٌخ فٟ  اٌشعبء لا رزشدد فٟ إثذاء أٞ رؼٍ١مبد أخشٜ رؼزمذ أٔٙب راد طٍخ ثّّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ 
 اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 كل الشكر والتقدير على حسن تعاونك 
 إرا سغجذ فٟ اٌؾظٛي ػٍٝ ٍِخض ٌٕزبئظ اٌذساعخ ٠شعٝ وزبثخ ثش٠ذن الاٌىزشٟٚٔ
 ...................................................................................................
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Appendix IV: Questionnaire Survey – Internal Stakeholders (Arabic) 
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 ,,المحترّ,الأخ 
 ايشلاّ عًٝهِ ٚسحم١ الله ٚبشنات٘
بالمًُه١ المتخذ٠ ٚريو عٔ مماسسات حٛنُ١ ايششنات  لفي جاَع١ سٜذْ ايذنتٛساٙأفٝذنِ بأْٞ أقّٛ حايًٝا بتخضير دسج١         
ايًٝبي,  الماٍفي ايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ في سٛم  ytilibatnuoccA dna ecnanrevoG etaroproC ٚالمشاءي١
بٗذف  استبٝاْٞايذنتٛس٠ إيٝزابٝتا باسْٚٞ ٚايبرٚفٝشٛس جٌٝ أثهٓص, ٚنجزء ٖاّ َٔ ايذساس١ ايتطبٝكٝ١ يًبخح أقّٛ بمشح  فبإششا
آساء الأطشاف رات ايصً١ بايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ حٍٛ المٛاضٝع المتعًك١ بحٛنُ١ ايششنات ٚالمشاءي١ ٚمماسساتٗا في  ً٢ايتعشف ع
 اٍ ايًٝبٝ١.بٝئ١ الأعُ
ٚيعًُٞ ايتاّ بإيماْهِ بأُٖٝ١ ٚدعِ ٚتشجٝع ايبخح ايعًُٞ ٚدٚسٙ في تطٜٛش ايفشد ٚالمجتُع, فإْني أسجٛ َٓهِ ايتهشّ          
في مختًف ايكضاٜا  ِالمشفك١, نُا لا ٜفٛتني ايتٜٓٛ٘ عً٢ أُٖٝ١ عذّ ايتردد في إظٗاس ٚجٗ١ ْظشن الاستبٝإبالإجاب١ عً٢ أسئً١ 
 ٚريو لأُٖٝ١ ايتعشف عً٢ ايٛاقع ايفعًٞ لمُاسسات حٛنُ١ ايششنات ٚالمشاءي١ في ايبٝئ١ ايًٝبٝ١.المطشٚح١ 
ٚفي حاٍ سغبتهِ في  ,إلا لأغشاض ايبخح ايعًُٞ فكط تشتخذّنُا أؤنذ يهِ بإٔ إجاباتهِ ستعاٌَ بمٓتٗ٢ ايششٜ١ ٚئ          
أخيرًا لا ٜشعني إلا إٔ . ٚفإْ٘ ٜششْٞ إسساي٘ إيٝهِ بايطشٜك١ ايتي تفضًْٛٗا اْتٗائٗاالحصٍٛ عً٢ ًَخص يٓتائج ايذساس١ عٓذ 
  الاستبٝإ.أشهشنِ جزٌٜ ايشهش َكذسًا حشٔ تعاْٚهِ ٚإْفام جزء َٔ ٚقتهِ ايجُين يلإجاب١ عً٢ أسئً١ 
 إسماعٌٝ سالم ايشٗٛبٞ
 محاسب١ –طايب دنتٛساٙ 
 68155654981533
 14707695474433
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 اهقشٍ الأوي: ًعووًات ديموغرافيٕ
 ٚاؽذح فمظ) اخز١بسٌٛظ١فزه (٠شعٝ  اٌّىبْ إٌّبعت طجمب   أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  ششوخ ٚعبطخ (عّغبس)    ِشاعغ ؽغبثبد خبسعٟ 
  ِغزشبس ِبٌٟ    رذس٠ظػضٛ ٘١ئخ  
  .......ؽذد) ....... ا  أخشٜ (سعبء    ِؾًٍ ِبٌٟ 
 
 ٍّؤً٘ اٌؼٌٍّٟ اٌّىبْ إٌّبعت ٚفمب   أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  دوزٛساٖ 
  ِبعغز١ش 
  ثىبٌٛس٠ٛط 
  ؽذد) .......... ا  أخشٜ (سعبء 
 
 اٌّىبْ اٌزٞ دسعذ ف١ٗ أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  اٌٛلا٠بد اٌّزؾذح    ٌ١ج١ب 
  ؽذد) .............. ا  أخشٜ (سعبء    دٚي ػشث١خ أخشٜ 
     ثش٠طبٔ١ب 
 
 ٌؼذد عٕٛاد اٌخجشح فٟ ِغبي اٌؼًّ اٌّىبْ إٌّبعت ٚفمب   أِبَ )(اٌشعبء ٚضغ ػلاِخ  
  عٕخ 51إٌٝ ألً ِٓ  31ِٓ     ألً ِٓ عٕخ 
  عٕخ 51أوضش ِٓ     عٕٛاد 5ِٓ عٕخ إٌٝ ألً ِٓ  
     عٕٛاد 31إٌٝ ألً ِٓ  5ِٓ  
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 اهقشٍ اهثاُي: حوكٌة اهشركات وآهياتٔا
 دسعخ اٌّٛافمخ اٌّلائّخ ؽ١ش أْ:  ثٛضغ دائشح ؽٛياٌشعبء الإعبثخ ػٍٝ أعئٍخ الاعزج١بْ اٌزبٌ١خ  
 = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ اٌّظطٍؾبد اٌؼشث١خ اٌزبٌ١خ ٟ٘ رشعّخ ِٕبعجخ ٌؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد  1ط
  "ecnanrevoG etaroproC"
 5 4 3 2 1 ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد 1
 5 4 3 2 1 الإداسح اٌشش١ذح 2
 5 4 3 2 1 إداسح رٕظ١ُ ِٚشالجخ اٌششوبد 3
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌؾبوّ١خ اٌّؤعغبر١خ 4
  
 
  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2غير ًوافق بشدة,   =1( 
 تعريف حوكٌة اهشركات  5ط
 ٠ش١ش إٌٝ: "ecnanrevoG etaroproC"٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ ِظطٍؼ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد 
 5 4 3 2 1 إٌظبَ اٌزٞ ٠زُ ِٓ خلاٌٗ رٛع١ٗ ِٚشالجخ اٌششوخ 1
 5 4 3 2 1 الإعشاءاد اٌزٟ رغزخذَ ٌزٕظ١ُ اٌؼلالخ ث١ٓ اٌششوخ ِٚغبّ٘١ٙب  2
 3
إٌظبَ اٌزٞ ٠غزخذَ ٌزٕظ١ُ اٌؼلالخ ث١ٓ اٌششوخ ٚأطؾبة اٌّظبٌؼ اٌز٠ٓ ٠زؤصشْٚ 
 ٚ٠ؤصشْٚ ػٍٝ أٔشطخ ٚلشاساد اٌششوخ
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌّشالجخ ٚالإششاف ػٍٝ إداسح اٌششوخ ٌٍزؤوذ ِٓ أٔٙب رؼًّ ٌّظٍؾخ اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ  4
 5
ِغّٛػخ ِٓ الأٔظّخ ٚاٌمٛاػذ ٚالإعشاءاد ٚاٌضمبفبد اٌزٟ رؤدٞ إٌٝ ٔغبػ ػٍّ١بد 
 اٌششوخ   
 5 4 3 2 1
 
  بشدة )= ًوافق  5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 أٌٓية وإدران حوكٌة اهشركات  0ط
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفك ِغ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ:
 5 4 3 2 1 ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد ِّٙخ ٌٍششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 1
 5 4 3 2 1 ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد رؼطٟ اٌضمخ ٌٍّغبّ٘١ٓ 2
 5 4 3 2 1 ٕ٘بن ٚػٟ ٚإدسان وبف ثبٌمضب٠ب اٌّزؼٍمخ ثؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ اٌج١ئخ اٌٍ١ج١خ 0
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ رزبثغ اٌزطٛساد اٌذٌٚ١خ فٟ ِغبي ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد 4
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 = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 4ط
 
 الإهتزاَ بآهيات حوكٌة اهشركات   
 آهية لدوص الإدارة: 
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثٛاعجبد, ِغؤٌٚ١بد, رىٛ٠ٓ ٌٚغبْ ِغٍظ الإداسح
      واجباث مجلس الإدارة  
 1
ٚالأ٘ذاف اٌشئ١غ١خ ٌٍششوخ ٚالإششاف  ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؼزّذ اٌزٛعٙبد الإعزشار١غ١خ 
 5 4 3 2 1 ػٍٝ رٕف١ز٘ب
 5 4 3 2 1 ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠مَٛ ثٛضغ أٔظّخ اٌشلبثخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ٚالإششاف ػٍ١ٙب 2
 5 4 3 2 1 ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؾذد ع١بعبد ِٚؼب٠١ش ٚإعشاءاد ٚاضؾخ ٌؼضٛ٠خ ِغٍظ الإداسح 3
 4
اٌؼلالبد ث١ٓ أطؾبة اٌّظبٌؼ  ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ضغ ع١بعبد ِىزٛثخ ٚاضؾخ رؾىُ
 5 4 3 2 1 ِٓ أعً ؽّب٠خ ِظبٌؾُٙ ٚاٌؾفبظ ػٍٝ ؽمٛلُٙ
 5
ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ضغ اٌغ١بعبد ٚالإعشاءاد اٌزٟ رضّٓ اؽزشاَ اٌششوخ ٌلأٔظّخ 
ٚاٌٍٛائؼ ٚاٌزضاِٙب ثبلإفظبػ ػٓ اٌّؼٍِٛبد اٌغٛ٘ش٠خ ٌٍّغبّ٘١ٓ ٚأطؾبة 
 اٌّظبٌؼ
 5 4 3 2 1
      الإدارةمسؤولياث مجلس   
 1
 بشكل الشركة إدارة عملٌات مراقبة على والقدرة الكاملة السلطة لدٌه الإدارة مجلس
 5 4 3 2 1 الخصوص وجه على التنفٌذٌٌن المدٌرٌن ومراقبة عام
 2
ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؤدٞ ِٙبِٗ ػٍٝ ِؾًّ اٌغذ ٚثبٔزجبٖ ٚوزٌه لشاسارٗ ِجٕ١خ ػٍٝ 
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌزٕف١ز٠خِؼٍِٛبد ٚاف١خ ِٓ الإداساد 
 3
٠ّضً أػضبء ِغٍظ الإداسح أغٍج١خ اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ ٍِٚزضِ١ٓ ثخذِخ ِظبٌؼ اٌششوخ 
 ػِّٛب  
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
ِغٍظ الإداسح ٠ؾذد اٌظلاؽ١بد اٌّخٌٛخ ٌلإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠خ ٚإعشاءاد ارخبر اٌمشاساد 
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌزٕف١ز٠خ ٚوزٌه ِذح اٌزفٛ٠ض
 5
 القرارات اتخاذ عند المصلحة أصحاب مصالح الاعتبار بعٌن ٌؤخذ الإدارة مجلس 
 5 4 3 2 1 الإستراتٌجٌة
 6
أعضاء مجلس الإدارة لدٌهم الوقت الكافً للقٌام بمسإولٌاتهم والتحضٌر لاجتماعات 
 المجلس
 5 4 3 2 1
      تركيبت (تشكيل) مجلس الإدارة  
 1
ِغبٌظ الإداسح فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ لا ٠مً ػٓ صلاصخ أػضبء ٚلا ٠ض٠ذ ػٓ 
 5 4 3 2 1 إؽذٜ ػشش ػضٛ 
 2
اٌغّؼ١بد اٌؼِّٛ١خ ٌذ٠ٙب ِؼب٠١ش ٌزؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ِغبٌظ الإداسح فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ 
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌّذسعخ ٚاٌّذح إٌّظٛص ػٍ١ٙب ٌزؼ١١ٓ أػضبء اٌّغٍظ لا رزغبٚص اٌضلاس عٕٛاد
 3
 غٌر المدرجة من الأعضاء الشركات اللٌبٌة فً الإدارة مجلس أعضاء غالبٌة
 التنفٌذٌٌن
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ لا ٠مً أػضبء ِغٍظ الإداسح اٌّغزمٍ١ٓ ػٓ ػضٛ٠ٓ أٚ 
 5 4 3 2 1 صٍش أػضبء اٌّغٍظ أ٠ّٙب أوضش
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      لجان مجلس الإدارة  
 5 4 3 2 1  تماما مستقلة المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المراجعة لجان 1
 2
ٌغبْ اٌّشاعؼخ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ رزؤٌف ِٓ الأػضبء غ١ش اٌزٕف١ز٠١ٓ ٚلا 
 ٠مً ػذدُ٘ ػٓ صلاصخ أػضبء
 5 4 3 2 1
 3
 لجنة أعضاء اختٌار قواعد تحدد اللٌبٌة المدرجة فً الشركات العامة الجمعٌة
 عمل اللجنة بناءا على إقتراح مجلس الإدارة وأسلوب عضوٌتهم ومدة المراجعة
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
 المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المراجعة لجنة ومسإولٌات مهام العملٌة، الممارسة فً
 تشمل ما ٌلً:
     
 أ
 من والتحقق بالشركة الداخلٌة المراجعة المباشر على إدارة الإشراف
 فعالٌتها
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  وتوصٌات آراء ٌتضمن كتابً تقرٌر وإعداد للشركة الداخلٌة الرقابة نظام فحص ة
 ط
 وعزله الخارجً الحسابات مراجع بتعٌٌن ٌتعلق فٌما الإدارة لمجلس توصٌات تقدٌم
 وتحدٌد أتعابه
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  إدارة الشركة مجلس على عرضها قبل السنوٌة المالٌة القوائم فحص د
 ٖ
 إلى الاقتضاء عند التوصٌات بشؤنها وتقدٌم والمحاسبٌة الإدارٌة السٌاسات فحص
 الإدارة مجلس
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 عملها وفترة لجنة، كل مهام ٌحدد الإدارة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة مجلس
 لها  الممنوحة والصلاحٌات
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
 على بناء المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً والمكافآت الترشٌح لجان أعضاء اختٌار ٌتم
 الإدارة مجلس اقتراحات
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
الشركات  فً والمكافآت الترشٌح لجان ومسإولٌات واجبات العملٌة، الممارسة فً
  :ٌلً المدرجة تشمل ما اللٌبٌة
     
 أ
اٌّشاعؼخ اٌغٕٛ٠خ ٌلاؽز١بعبد اٌّطٍٛثخ ِٓ اٌّٙبساد إٌّبعجخ ٌؼضٛ٠خ ِغٍظ 
 الإداسح
 5 4 3 2 1
 ة
 اللازمة الخطوات واتخاذ الإدارة مجلس فً والضعف القوة نقاط على التعرف
 5 4 3 2 1 الشركة مصالح مع ٌتماشى بما لتحسٌنه
 5 4 3 2 1 رٛط١خ اٌّششؾ١ٓ ٌّغٍظ الإداسح ٚفمب  ٌٍغ١بعبد ٚاٌّؼب٠١ش اٌّؼزّذح ط
 5 4 3 2 1 التنفٌذٌٌن وكبار الإدارة مجلس أعضاء ومكافآت لتعوٌضات واضحة سٌاسات وضع د
 
  ) ٓاَ جدًا=  5, ٓاَ -4= غير ًتأكد,  3,  ٓاَ= غير 2,  غير ٓاَ جدًا=1( 
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رؼزمذ ثؤّ٘١خ ٚعٛد اٌٍغبْ اٌزبٌ١خ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ؟ ِٚب ِذٜ ٚعٛد ٘زٖ اٌٍغبْ؟ 
 أٌٓية وجود اهوجِـــة في اهشركة   وجـــود اهوجِــــة                                         اهوجِـــــــــة                           
 أ ٌغٕخ اٌّشاعؼخ ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ة ٌغٕخ اٌزشش١ؾبد ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ط ٌغٕخ اٌزؼٛ٠ضبد أٚ اٌّىبفآد ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 د ٌغٕخ اٌّخبطش ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ٖ ٌغٕخ اٌؾٛوّخ ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
 ٚ اٌٍغٕخ اٌششػ١خ ٔؼُ لا 1 2 3 4 5
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  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 آهية الإفصاح واهشفافية  
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثآٌ١خ الإفظبػ ٚاٌشفبف١خ
 1
اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ ٌٙب ع١بعبد إفظبػ ِىزٛثخ ِؼزّذح ِٓ ِغٍظ الإداسح اٌششوبد 
 ٌضّبْ رٛافمٙب ِغ ِزطٍجبد اٌغٙبد اٌشلبث١خ
 5 4 3 2 1
 2
 تكون قد شخصٌة مصلحة أي ٌفصحون عن المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المدراء
 الشركة على تإثر قد المعاملات وأي أخرى شركات فً لدٌهم
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  مجلس الإدارة فً تقارٌرها السنوٌة اجتماعات عن المدرجة تفصح اللٌبٌة الشركات 3
 4
 وفعالٌة كفاءة لتقٌٌم السنوٌة المراجعة نتائج عن المدرجة تفصح الشركات اللٌبٌة
 الداخلٌة الرقابة إجراءات
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 فً المالٌة وغٌر المالٌة البٌانات من كل تفصح عن المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة
 السنوٌة تقارٌرها
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
ٌطبق فٌما ٌتعلق بقواعد  لم وما المدرجة تفصح عن ما تم تطبٌقه الشركات اللٌبٌة
 وآلٌات حوكمة الشركات
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
المدرجة تفصح عن سٌاساتها وبرامجها فٌما ٌتعلق بالمجتمع  الشركات اللٌبٌة
 والبٌئة
 5 4 3 2 1
 8
 الإفصاح لتعزٌز الإنترنت شبكة على مواقعها تستخدم اللٌبٌة المدرجةالشركات 
 وغٌرهم للمستثمرٌن المناسبة المعلومات لتوفٌر وكذلك والشفافٌة،
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 
  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 آهيات المراجعة اهداخوية والخارجية  
 الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثآٌ١بد اٌّشاعؼخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ٚاٌخبسع١خ ٠شعٝ
 
 5 4 3 2 1  فعالة المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً الداخلٌة الرقابة نظم 1
 2
 لمجلس سنوي ربع تقرٌر الداخلٌٌن بالشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة ٌقدم المراجعٌن
 تنظم التً والقواعد بالقوانٌن الشركة التزام ٌصف مدى المراجعة ولجنة الإدارة
 أنشطتها
 5 4 3 2 1
 3
الشركات  فً الداخلٌة المراجعة واختصاصات ومهام أهداف ٌحدد الإدارة مجلس
 المدرجة اللٌبٌة
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
المدرجة تختار المراجع الخارجً المعتمد فً سوق المال اللٌبً  الشركات اللٌبٌة
 لمراجعة قوائمها المالٌة 
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 المراجعة قٌد للشركة إضافً عمل أي الخارجً عن عدم مزاولة ٌتعهد المراجع
 )الإدارٌة والخدمات الاستشارات تقدٌم المثال سبٌل على(
 5 4 3 2 1
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  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1(  
 آهية حقوق المشآٌين  
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثآٌ١خ ؽمٛق اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ
 
 1
 الإجراءات تتضمن الداخلٌة وأنظمتها اللٌبٌة المدرجة للشركات الأساسً النظام
 المساهمٌن جمٌع حقوق على الحفاظ لضمان اللازمة
 5 4 3 2 1
 2
 الجمعٌة اجتماعات الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة ٌحق لهم لحضور فً المساهمٌن
 قراراتها على والتصوٌت مداولاتها فً والمشاركة العمومٌة،
 5 4 3 2 1
 3
لطالما لا  معلومات أي طلب فً لهم الحق المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً المساهمٌن
 الشركة بمصالح الإضرار أو المالٌة اللوائح ٌعارض
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
 أغلبٌة كانت هناك إذا عما النظر بغض تمٌٌز دون للمساهمٌن معلومات توفٌر ٌتم
 للمساهمٌن أقلٌة أو
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
 بعٌن تؤخذ الجمعٌة العمومٌة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة اجتماعات أعمال جداول
 مناقشتها المساهمٌن التً ٌرٌد القضاٌا الاعتبار
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
 والمساهمٌن الأسهم، أرباح توزٌع بشؤن الإدارة مجلس من واضحة سٌاسة هناك
 العمومٌة الجمعٌة اجتماع خلال السٌاسة هذه على الاطلاع فً الحق لدٌها
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1  المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة قبل من القانونٌة للمساهمٌن محترمة الحقوق 7
     
 
  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1(  
 الإطار اهقاُوُي واهتِظيٌي لحوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة  5ط
٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبلإطبس اٌمبٟٔٛٔ ٚاٌزٕظ١ّٟ ٌؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد 
 ٚاٌّغبءٌخ
 
 1
لممارسات حوكمة  مناسبة بٌئة وتوفر وكافٌة فعالة لٌبٌا فً واللوائح القوانٌن
 الشركات
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 المساءلة لممارسات مناسبة بٌئة وتوفر وكافٌة فعالة لٌبٌا فً واللوائح القوانٌن 2
 3
 والرقابة الإشراف فً فعالا دورا   التشرٌعٌة وهٌئة سوق المال اللٌبً تلعب الهٌئات
  المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً على ممارسات حوكمة الشركات والمساءلة
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
بها فً سوق المال المعمول  والأنظمة بالقوانٌن المدرجة تلتزم الشركات اللٌبٌة
 اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
 5
٠ٕجغٟ أْ ٠ىْٛ لبْٔٛ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١جٟ إٌضاِ١ب  ٌغّ١غ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ 
 اٌّذسعخ
 5 4 3 2 1
 6
على قضاٌا حوكمة الشركات فً   للإشراف مستقلة هٌئة لإنشاء ملحة حاجة هناك
  سوق المال اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة التً لا تلتزم بتطبٌق لائحة حوكمة الشركات ٌجب أن 
 تشطب من قائمة الشركات المدرجة فً سوف المال اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
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  = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 حوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهةاهعوائق (الحواجز) اهتي تحوي دوْ تطبيق   6ط
٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبٌؼٛائك (اٌؾٛاعض) اٌزٟ رؾٛي دْٚ رطج١ك 
 ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد ٚاٌّغبءٌخ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ 
 5 4 3 2 1  المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة بعض فً ومالً فساد إداري هناك 1
 5 4 3 2 1  الخارجً الحسابات مراجع استقلالٌة حٌث من ضعف هناك 2
 5 4 3 2 1  المدرجة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة والقانونٌة الإدارٌة البٌئة ضعف 3
 5 4 3 2 1 ػذَ الإٌّبَ (ضؼف اٌّؼشفخ) ثؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ 4
 5 4 3 2 1  ضعٌفة  المصالح أصحاب حقوق حماٌة آلٌات 5
 5 4 3 2 1 محدودٌة البرامج التدرٌبٌة للمدراء فٌما ٌتعلق بممارسات حوكمة الشركات  6
 5 4 3 2 1  ضعٌفة عام بشكل المساءلة آلٌات 7
 5 4 3 2 1 ضؼف إٌّبؿ الاعزضّبسٞ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 8
 5 4 3 2 1 ٘١ئخ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ غ١ش فؼبٌخ 9
 5 4 3 2 1  الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة  مصالح مع تعارض مبادئ حوكمة الشركات 31
 5 4 3 2 1  التنوع إلى تفتقر المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة فً الإدارة مجالس 11
 5 4 3 2 1 تنفٌذ حوكمة الشركات فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة ٌؤخذ وقتا  طوٌلا   51
 5 4 3 2 1 ِؾذٚد٠خ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 01
 5 4 3 2 1 ػذَ الاػزّبد ػٍٝ ِؼب٠١ش اٌّؾبعجخ ٚاٌّشاعؼخ اٌذٌٚ١خ 41
 5 4 3 2 1 اٌزذخً اٌؾىِٟٛ (اٌغ١بعٟ) فٟ الأٔشطخ الالزظبد٠خ ٌٍششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ 51
 61
ممارسة حوكمة الشركات  على سلبا ٌإثر والسٌاسً اللٌبً الاقتصادي الوضع
 والمساءلة
 5 4 3 2 1
 
 
 المشاءهـةاهقشٍ اهثاهث: 
 = ًوافق بشدة ) 5= ًوافق, 4= غير ًتأكد,  3= غير ًوافق,  2= غير ًوافق بشدة,  1( 
 ًفٔوَ وممارسات المشاءهـة  7ط
 ٠شعٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك ػٍٝ اٌؼجبساد اٌزبٌ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثّب٘١خ اٌّغبءٌخ
 1
رقابٌة لممارسة المسإولٌة المساءلة هً مطلب من هم فً موقع أعلى سلطة 
 لتبرٌر وتوضٌح الإجراءات التً تتخذها نٌابة عن أصحاب المصالح
 5 4 3 2 1
 5 4 3 2 1 المساءلة ممارسة فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة 2
 3
 المجتمع تجاه بمسإولٌاتها للوفاء كوسٌلة بالمساءلة تلتزم المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة
 اللٌبً
 5 4 3 2 1
 4
 للمستثمرٌن سوق المال اللٌبً ٌمنح الثقة فً للمساءلة فعالة آلٌات وجود
 5 4 3 2 1 سواء حد على والمساهمٌن
 5
 المدرجة الشركات اللٌبٌة مع) المصالح أصحاب( الصلة ذات جمٌع الأطراف
 الشركات هذه على تمارس المساءلة
 5 4 3 2 1
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 6
فً الشركات اللٌبٌة المدرجة  والموظفون التنفٌذٌون المدٌرون الإداراة، مجالس
 نتائج تصرفاتهم عن مساءلون
 5 4 3 2 1
 7
 بالمساءلة تفً المدرجة تبنى نظام جٌد لحوكمة الشركات ٌجعل الشركات اللٌبٌة
 المصالح أصحاب أمام
 5 4 3 2 1
اٌششوبد ٚاٌّغبءٌخ فٟ  اٌشعبء لا رزشدد فٟ إثذاء أٞ رؼٍ١مبد أخشٜ رؼزمذ أٔٙب راد طٍخ ثّّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ 
 اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 كى اهشلر واهتقدير عوى حشّ تعاوُم 
 إرا سغجذ فٟ اٌؾظٛي ػٍٝ ٍِخض ٌٕزبئظ اٌذساعخ ٠شعٝ وزبثخ ثش٠ذن الاٌىزشٟٚٔ
 ...................................................................................................
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 General Information  
……………………………….…………  Participant‟s Name (optional) 
……………………………….………… 
 Company Name 
…………………………….…………… 
 Sector 
………………………….……………… 
 Participant‟s Position 
………………………….……………… 
 Participant‟s Number of Years of 
Experience 
 
Q1: Understanding of Corporate Governance (CG) 
1. What is your translation of the term CG? 
2. What is your understanding of the concept of CG? 
3. How important is CG in Libyan listed companies? 
 
Q2: Compliance with CG Mechanisms 
 The Board of Directors Mechanism: Composition, Duties and Responsibilities of the 
Board of Directors and Board Committees 
1. How would you describe board composition in your company?  
2. How are board members selected and appointed in your company? 
3. Are the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors precisely defined and 
practised in your company? If so, please explain what these are? 
4. Which sub-committees are found in your company? Which sub-committees are the most 
important? 
5. How are the members of these committees selected in your company? 
6. Are the duties and responsibilities of board committees precisely defined and practised in 
your company? If so, please explain what these are? 
 Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism 
1. Is there adequate disclosure and transparency in your company? 
2. Do your company disclose its CG practices in its annual reports? 
3. What steps, if any, is your company taking to develop a system for disclosure and 
transparency? 
 Internal and External Audit Mechanisms 
1. Are the duties and responsibilities of the internal audit accurately defined and practised 
in your company? If so, please explain how? 
352 
2. Is the internal control system in your company efficient? 
3. What are the duties and responsibilities of the external auditors who review your listed 
company? 
4. What are the criteria for selecting external auditors in your listed company? 
 Shareholders’ Rights Mechanism 
1. To what extent are shareholders' voting rights, rights to attend GA meetings, share 
disposal rights and dividends protected in your company? 
 
Q3: The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability 
1. Are Libyan regulations and laws creating an environment that encourages the 
implementation of CG and accountability in your listed company? 
2. Do you think that it is the job of the legislative bodies and the LSMA to monitor listed 
companies‟ compliance with CG principles?  
3. How efficient and effective do you think Libya‟s legal and legislative bodies are? 
4. Do you think the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) should be compulsory 
rather than voluntary? 
 
      Q4: Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
1. What are the main barriers limiting CG practice in your company? 
  
Q5: The Perception and Current State of Accountability 
1. What is your understanding of the term „accountability‟? 
2. Do all the stakeholders of Libyan listed companies demand accountability from these 
companies? 
3. Are your listed company and its boards of directors accountable for the consequences of 
their actions in the company? If so, to whom and how? 
4. Do you think that accountability requires a good CG system? Please explain how? 
 
Q6: Development of CG Practices and Accountability in the Libyan Environment 
1. Do you have any suggestions and recommendations for the development of CG practice 
and accountability in Libyan listed companies? What mechanisms are needed to bring 
about this development? 
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Ismail Salem Elshahoubi 
PhD Student 
Henley Business School 
 
 
     
 
Supervised by: 
 
Professor Jill Atkins 
Professor of Accounting 
Director of Research for BISA 
Henley Business School 
 
 
 
2015 
 
An Investigation into the Assessment of Corporate Governance (CG) and 
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 (Semi-Structured Interview – Other Stakeholders)  
Ismail Elshahoubi 
Dr. Elisabetta Barone 
Professor Jill Atkins 
354 
 General Information  
……………………………….…………  Participant‟s Name (optional) 
……………………………….………… 
 Company Name 
…………………………….…………… 
 Sector 
………………………….……………… 
 Participant‟s Position 
………………………….……………… 
 Participant‟s Number of Years of Experience 
 
    Q1: Understanding of Corporate Governance (CG) 
1. What is your translation of the term CG? 
2. What is your understanding of the concept of CG? 
3. How important is CG in Libyan listed companies? 
 
      Q2: Compliance with CG Mechanisms 
 The Board of Directors Mechanism: Composition, Duties and Responsibilities of the 
Board of Directors and Board Committees 
1. How would you describe board composition in Libyan listed companies?  
2. How are board members selected and appointed in Libyan listed companies? 
3. Are the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors precisely defined and practised 
in Libyan listed companies? If so, please explain what these are? 
4. Which sub-committees are found in Libyan listed companies? Which sub-committees are 
the most important? 
5. How are the members of these committees selected in Libyan listed companies? 
6. Are the duties and responsibilities of board committees precisely defined and practised in 
Libyan listed companies? If so, please explain what these are? 
 Disclosure and Transparency Mechanism 
1. Is there adequate disclosure and transparency in Libyan listed companies? 
2. Do Libyan listed companies disclose their CG practices in their annual reports? 
3. What steps, if any, are Libyan listed companies taking to develop a system for disclosure 
and transparency? 
 Internal and External Audit Mechanisms 
1. Are the duties and responsibilities of the internal audit accurately defined and practised in 
Libyan listed companies? If so, please explain how? 
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2. Is the internal control system in Libyan listed companies efficient? 
3. What are the duties and responsibilities of the external auditors who review Libyan listed 
companies? 
4. What are the criteria for selecting external auditors in Libyan listed companies? 
 Shareholders’ Rights Mechanism 
1. To what extent are shareholders' voting rights, rights to attend GA meetings, share 
disposal rights and dividends protected in Libyan listed companies? 
 
    Q3: The Legal and Regulatory Framework of CG and Accountability 
1. Are Libyan regulations and laws creating an environment that encourages the 
implementation of CG and accountability in Libyan listed companies? 
2. Do you think that it is the job of the legislative bodies and the LSMA to monitor listed 
companies‟ compliance with CG principles?  
3. How efficient and effective do you think Libya‟s legal and legislative bodies are? 
4. Do you think the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) should be compulsory 
rather than voluntary? 
 
           Q4: Factors Influencing the Practices of CG and Accountability 
1. What are the main barriers limiting CG practice in Libyan listed companies? 
  
     Q5: The Perception and Current State of Accountability 
1. What is your understanding of the term „accountability‟? 
2. Do all the stakeholders of Libyan listed companies demand accountability from these 
companies? 
3. Are Libyan listed companies and their boards of directors accountable for the 
consequences of their actions? If so, to whom and how? 
4. Do you think that accountability requires a good CG system? Please explain how? 
 
    Q6: Development of CG Practices and Accountability in the Libyan Environment 
1. Do you have any suggestions and recommendations for the development of CG practice 
and accountability in Libyan listed companies? What mechanisms are needed to bring 
about this development? 
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 )نموذج ًوافقة لإجراء ًقابوة(
 ,,المحترّ,الأخ 
 ايشلاّ عًٝهِ ٚسحم١ الله ٚبشنات٘
ايششنات  بالمًُه١ المتخذ٠ ٚريو عٔ مماسسات حٛنُ١ لفي جاَع١ سٜذْ ايذنتٛساٙأفٝذنِ بأْٞ أقّٛ حايًٝا بتخضير دسج١         
ٚنجزء  ايًٝبي, الماٍفي ايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ في سٛم  ytilibatnuoccA dna ecnanrevoG etaroproC ٚالمشاءي١
بٗذف ايتعشف عٔ آساء الأطشاف رات ايصً١ بايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ حٍٛ  بإجشاء َكابلاتٖاّ َٔ ايذساس١ ايتطبٝكٝ١ يًبخح أقّٛ 
 ايششنات ٚالمشاءي١ ٚمماسساتٗا في بٝئ١ الأعُاٍ ايًٝبٝ١.المٛاضٝع المتعًك١ بحٛنُ١ 
عًٝ٘ ْأٌَ َٓهِ الإرٕ بالمٛافك١ عً٢ إجشاء المكابً١ ٚايتشجٌٝ ايصٛتٞ لها, نُا أفٝذنِ لأْ٘ ئ ٜتِ الإشاس٠ إلى أسماؤنِ ٚأسماء 
كابً١. نُا أٚد إٔ أشير إلى إٔ َٓظُتهِ في ٖزٙ ايذساس١. نُا أعًُهِ بأْ٘ سٛف ٜتِ احتراّ خصٛصٝتهِ في جمٝع أٚقات الم
 َشاسنتهِ طٛعٝ١ تماًَا ٚيهِ حل ايتٛقف عٔ الإجاب١ في أٟ ٚقت خلاٍ المكابً١. 
 :المٛافك١ 
 ِأْا ................................................ أفٝذ بأْ٘ قذ تم قشاء٠ ٚاستٝعاب المعًَٛات ايٛاسد٠ بُٓٛرج المٛافك١, ٚأفٝذن
 بالمٛافك١ عً٢ المشاسن١ في ٖزٙ ايذساس١ بمجشد ايتٛقٝع عً٢ ٖزا ايُٓٛرج.
  .......تٛقٝع المشاسى: .........................                                                               ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L...
  ......تٛقٝع ايباحح: .........................                                                               ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L.... 
 :تشجٌٝ ايصٛتٞاي 
ٌ قبٌ أْا َٛافل عً٢ تشجٌٝ المكابً١ ٚريو يضُإ ايذق١ ٚأٜضًا أْا َذسى بأْ٘ يزٟ ايفشص١ لمشاجع١ ْشخ١ ايتشجٝ          
 استخذاَٗا.
  .......تٛقٝع المشاسى: .........................                                                               ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L...
  اسٜخ:....L.....L.........  تٛقٝع ايباحح: .........................                                                               ايت 
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 ًعووًـات عاًـة 
 
  (اخز١بسٞ) اعُ اٌّشبسن 
 
 اعُ اٌششوخ
 
 اٌمطبع
 
 ٚظ١فخ اٌّشبسن
 
  حاٌخجش ػذد عٕٛاد
 
  اهقشٍ الأوي: أسئوة تتعوق بمفٔوَ حوكٌة اهشركات 
  1ط  ٌّظطٍؼ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟ رشعّزهِب ٘ٛ 
  5ط ِب ٘ٛ فّٙه ٌّظطٍؼ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟
  0ط  ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخِب ِذٜ أّ٘١خ ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ 
 
 
 اهقشٍ اهثاُي: أسئوة تتعوق بآهيات حوكٌة اهشركات 
 آهية لدوص الإدارة 
 
  1ط و١ف رظف رشو١جخ ِغٍظ الإداسح فٟ ششوزه؟
  5ط و١ف ٠زُ اخز١بس ٚرؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ِغٍظ الإداسح فٟ ششوزه؟
 توضٌح ٌرجى كذلك، الأمر كان إذا شركتك؟ فًومطبقة  بدقة محددة الإدارة مجلس ومسإولٌات واجبات هل
 ذلك؟
  0ط
  4ط  وضش أّ٘١خ؟أاٌٍغبْ  أٞ ٘زِٖب ٟ٘ اٌٍغبْ اٌفشػ١خ اٌّٛعٛدح فٟ ششوزه؟ 
  5ط و١ف ٠زُ اخز١بس ٚرؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ٘زٖ اٌٍغبْ فٟ ششوزه؟
 توضٌح ٌرجى كذلك، الأمر كان إذا شركتك؟ فًومطبقة  بدقة محددة لجان المجلس ومسإولٌات واجبات هل
 ذلك؟
  6ط
  آهية الإفصاح واهشفافية 
  1ط ً٘ الإفظبػ ٚاٌشفبف١خ وبف ٚفؼبي فٟ ششوزه؟
  5ط ً٘ رفظؼ ششوزه ػٓ ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ رمبس٠ش٘ب اٌّبٌٟ؟
  0ط ِب ٟ٘ اٌخطٛاد, إْ ٚعذد, اٌزٟ أخزرٙب ششوزه ٌزطٛ٠ش الإفظبػ ٚاٌشفبف١خ؟
  آهية المراجعة اهداخوية والخارجية 
فٟ ششوزه؟ إرا وبْ الأِش وزٌه, ٠شعٝ رٛض١ؼ ِٚطجمخ ً٘ ٚاعجبد ِٚغؤٌٚ١بد اٌّشاعؼخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ِؾذدح ثذلخ 
 رٌه؟
  1ط
  5ط ً٘ ٔظبَ اٌشلبثخ اٌذاخٍ١خ فؼبي فٟ ششوزه اٌّذسعخ؟
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  0ط ؟ششوزه اٌّذسعخِب ٟ٘ ٚاعجبد ِٚغؤٌٚ١بد اٌّشاعؼ١ٓ اٌخبسع١١ٓ اٌز٠ٓ ٠مِْٛٛ ثّشاعؼخ 
  4ط ِب ٟ٘ ِؼب٠١ش اخز١بس اٌّشاعؼ١ٓ اٌخبسع١١ٓ فٟ ششوزه اٌّذسعخ؟
  آهية حقوق المشآٌين 
الأعُٙ إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ ؽمٛق اٌزظٛ٠ذ ٌٍّغبّ٘١ٓ, ٚؽمٛق ؽضٛس اعزّبػبد اٌغّؼ١خ اٌؼِّٛ١خ, ٚؽمٛق أسثبػ 
 ِؾّ١خ فٟ ششوزه؟
  1ط
 
  اهقشٍ اهثاهث: أسئوة تتعوق بالإطار اهقاُوُي واهتِظيٌي لحوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة 
 اٌّؼّٛي ثٙب رز١ؼ ث١ئخ رشغغ ػٍٝ رٕف١ز ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد ٚاٌّغبءٌخ فٟاٌٍ١ج١خ اٌٍٛائؼ ٚاٌمٛأ١ٓ  ً٘
 ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ
  1ط
ِذٜ اِزضبي اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ ِغ ٘ٛ ِشالجخ ً٘ رؼزمذ أْ ػًّ اٌٙ١ئبد اٌزشش٠ؼ١خ ٚ٘١ئخ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 
 ِجبدئ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟ 
  5ط
  0ط ٌ١ج١ب؟ ٚاٌزشش٠ؼ١خ فٟ فٟ سأ٠ه ِب ِذٜ وفبءح ٚفؼبٌ١خ اٌٙ١ئبد اٌمبٔٛٔ١خ
 ػٍٝ ئؾخ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد) إٌضاِٟ ٌٚ١ظ اخز١بسًٞ٘ رؼزمذ ضشٚسح أْ ٠ىْٛ لبْٔٛ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١جٟ (لا
 ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ
  4ط
 
  اهقشٍ اهرابع: أسئوة تتعوق بمعوقات تطبيق حوكٌة اهشركات 
  1ط ِب ٟ٘ اٌؼٛائك (اٌؾٛاعض) اٌشئ١غ١خ اٌزٟ رؼزمذ أٔٙب رؾذ ِٓ ِّبسعخ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ ششوزه؟
 
  وممارسات المشاءهة: أسئوة تتعوق بمفٔوَ الخاًصاهقشٍ  
  1ط ٌّظطٍؼ اٌّغبءٌخ؟ فّٙهِب ٘ٛ 
  5ط ً٘ عّ١غ أطؾبة اٌّظبٌؼ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ رطٍت اٌّغبءٌخ ِٓ ٘زٖ اٌششوبد؟
  0ط ً٘ ششوزه اٌّذسعخ ِٚغٍظ إداسرٙب ِغؤٌٚخ ػٓ ػٛالت أفؼبٌُٙ فٟ اٌششوخ؟ إرا وبْ الأِش وزٌه, ٌّٓ ٚو١ف؟
  4ط ً٘ رؼزمذ ثؤْ اٌّغبءٌخ رزطٍت ٚعٛد ٔظبَ ع١ذ ٌؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟ ٠شعٝ اٌزٛض١ؼ؟
 
  اهقشٍ اهشادض: أسئوة تتعوق بتطوير ممارسات حوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة 
ِٓ ٚعٙخ  ً٘ ٌذ٠ه أٞ الزشاؽبد ٚرٛط١بد رؼزمذ أٔٙب ِّٙخ ٌزطٛ٠ش ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ اٌج١ئخ اٌٍ١ج١خ؟
 ا٢ٌ١بد اٌلاصِخ لإؽذاس ٘زا اٌزطٛس؟ٔظشن, ِب ٟ٘ 
  1ط
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 )نموذج ًوافقة لإجراء ًقابوة(
 ,,المحترّ,الأخ 
 ايشلاّ عًٝهِ ٚسحم١ الله ٚبشنات٘
بالمًُه١ المتخذ٠ ٚريو عٔ مماسسات حٛنُ١ ايششنات  لفي جاَع١ سٜذْ ايذنتٛساٙأفٝذنِ بأْٞ أقّٛ حايًٝا بتخضير دسج١         
ايًٝبي,ٚنجزء  الماٍفي ايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ في سٛم  ytilibatnuoccA dna ecnanrevoG etaroproC ٚالمشاءي١
بٗذف ايتعشف عٔ آساء الأطشاف رات ايصً١ بايششنات ايًٝبٝ١ المذسج١ حٍٛ  بإجشاء َكابلاتٖاّ َٔ ايذساس١ ايتطبٝكٝ١ يًبخح أقّٛ 
 المٛاضٝع المتعًك١ بحٛنُ١ ايششنات ٚالمشاءي١ ٚمماسساتٗا في بٝئ١ الأعُاٍ ايًٝبٝ١.
عًٝ٘ ْأٌَ َٓهِ الإرٕ بالمٛافك١ عً٢ إجشاء المكابً١ ٚايتشجٌٝ ايصٛتٞ لها, نُا أفٝذنِ لأْ٘ ئ ٜتِ الإشاس٠ إلى أسماؤنِ ٚأسماء 
َٓظُتهِ في ٖزٙ ايذساس١. نُا أعًُهِ بأْ٘ سٛف ٜتِ احتراّ خصٛصٝتهِ في جمٝع أٚقات المكابً١. نُا أٚد إٔ أشير إلى إٔ 
 هِ حل ايتٛقف عٔ الإجاب١ في أٟ ٚقت خلاٍ المكابً١. َشاسنتهِ طٛعٝ١ تماًَا ٚي
 :المٛافك١ 
ِ أْا ................................................ أفٝذ بأْ٘ قذ تم قشاء٠ ٚاستٝعاب المعًَٛات ايٛاسد٠ بُٓٛرج المٛافك١, ٚأفٝذن
 بالمٛافك١ عً٢ المشاسن١ في ٖزٙ ايذساس١ بمجشد ايتٛقٝع عً٢ ٖزا ايُٓٛرج.
  .......تٛقٝع المشاسى: .........................                                                               ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L...
  .........تٛقٝع ايباحح: .........................                                                               ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L. 
 :تشجٌٝ ايصٛتٞاي 
أْا َٛافل عً٢ تشجٌٝ المكابً١ ٚريو يضُإ ايذق١ ٚأٜضًا أْا َذسى بأْ٘ يزٟ ايفشص١ لمشاجع١ ْشخ١ ايتشجٌٝ قبٌ           
 استخذاَٗا.
  ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L..........تٛقٝع المشاسى: .........................                                                               
     .....تٛقٝع ايباحح: .........................                                                               ايتاسٜخ:....L.....L.... 
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 ًعووًـات عاًـة 
 
  (اخز١بسٞ) اعُ اٌّشبسن 
 
 اعُ اٌششوخ
 
 اٌمطبع
 
 ٚظ١فخ اٌّشبسن
 
  حاٌخجش عٕٛادػذد 
 
  اهقشٍ الأوي: أسئوة تتعوق بمفٔوَ حوكٌة اهشركات 
  1ط  ٌّظطٍؼ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟ رشعّزهِب ٘ٛ 
  5ط ِب ٘ٛ فّٙه ٌّظطٍؼ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟
  0ط  ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخِب ِذٜ أّ٘١خ ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ 
 
 اهقشٍ اهثاُي: أسئوة تتعوق بآهيات حوكٌة اهشركات 
 آهية لدوص الإدارة 
 
  1ط و١ف رظف رشو١جخ ِغٍظ الإداسح فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ؟
  5ط و١ف ٠زُ اخز١بس ٚرؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ِغٍظ الإداسح فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ؟
 توضٌح ٌرجى كذلك، الأمر كان إذا شركتك؟ فًومطبقة  بدقة محددة الإدارة مجلس ومسإولٌات واجبات هل
 ذلك؟
  0ط
  4ط  وضش أّ٘١خ؟أاٌٍغبْ  أٞ ٘زِٖب ٟ٘ اٌٍغبْ اٌفشػ١خ اٌّٛعٛدح فٟ ششوزه؟ 
  5ط و١ف ٠زُ اخز١بس ٚرؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ٘زٖ اٌٍغبْ فٟ ششوزه؟
 توضٌح ٌرجى كذلك، الأمر كان إذا شركتك؟ ومطبقة فً بدقة محددة لجان المجلس ومسإولٌات واجبات هل
 ذلك؟
  6ط
  آهية الإفصاح واهشفافية 
  1ط  الإفظبػ ٚاٌشفبف١خ وبف ٚفؼبي فٟ ششوزه؟ً٘ 
  5ط ً٘ رفظؼ ششوزه ػٓ ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ رمبس٠ش٘ب اٌّبٌٟ؟
  0ط ِب ٟ٘ اٌخطٛاد, إْ ٚعذد, اٌزٟ أخزرٙب ششوزه ٌزطٛ٠ش الإفظبػ ٚاٌشفبف١خ؟
  آهية المراجعة اهداخوية والخارجية 
فٟ ششوزه؟ إرا وبْ الأِش وزٌه, ٠شعٝ رٛض١ؼ ِٚطجمخ ً٘ ٚاعجبد ِٚغؤٌٚ١بد اٌّشاعؼخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ِؾذدح ثذلخ 
 رٌه؟
  1ط
  5ط ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخً٘ ٔظبَ اٌشلبثخ اٌذاخٍ١خ فؼبي فٟ 
  0ط ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخِب ٟ٘ ٚاعجبد ِٚغؤٌٚ١بد اٌّشاعؼ١ٓ اٌخبسع١١ٓ اٌز٠ٓ ٠مِْٛٛ ثّشاعؼخ 
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  4ط  ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخِب ٟ٘ ِؼب٠١ش اخز١بس اٌّشاعؼ١ٓ اٌخبسع١١ٓ فٟ 
  آهية حقوق المشآٌين 
إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ ؽمٛق اٌزظٛ٠ذ ٌٍّغبّ٘١ٓ, ٚؽمٛق ؽضٛس اعزّبػبد اٌغّؼ١خ اٌؼِّٛ١خ, ٚؽمٛق أسثبػ الأعُٙ 
 ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخِؾّ١خ فٟ 
  1ط
 
  اهقشٍ اهثاهث: أسئوة تتعوق بالإطار اهقاُوُي واهتِظيٌي لحوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة 
 اٌّؼّٛي ثٙب رز١ؼ ث١ئخ رشغغ ػٍٝ رٕف١ز ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد ٚاٌّغبءٌخ فٟاٌٍ١ج١خ اٌٍٛائؼ ٚاٌمٛأ١ٓ  ً٘
 ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ
  1ط
ِذٜ اِزضبي اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ ِغ ٘ٛ ِشالجخ ً٘ رؼزمذ أْ ػًّ اٌٙ١ئبد اٌزشش٠ؼ١خ ٚ٘١ئخ عٛق اٌّبي اٌٍ١جٟ 
 ِجبدئ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟ 
  5ط
  0ط ٌ١ج١ب؟ ٚاٌزشش٠ؼ١خ فٟ فٟ سأ٠ه ِب ِذٜ وفبءح ٚفؼبٌ١خ اٌٙ١ئبد اٌمبٔٛٔ١خ
 ػٍٝ ئؾخ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد) إٌضاِٟ ٌٚ١ظ اخز١بسًٞ٘ رؼزمذ ضشٚسح أْ ٠ىْٛ لبْٔٛ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١جٟ (لا
 ؟اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ
  4ط
 
  اهقشٍ اهرابع: أسئوة تتعوق بمعوقات تطبيق حوكٌة اهشركات 
اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ ِب ٟ٘ اٌؼٛائك (اٌؾٛاعض) اٌشئ١غ١خ اٌزٟ رؼزمذ أٔٙب رؾذ ِٓ ِّبسعخ ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ 
 ؟اٌّذسعخ
  1ط
 
  أسئوة تتعوق بمفٔوَ وممارسات المشاءهة: الخاًصاهقشٍ  
  1ط ِب ٘ٛ فّٙه ٌّظطٍؼ اٌّغبءٌخ؟
  5ط ً٘ عّ١غ أطؾبة اٌّظبٌؼ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخ رطٍت اٌّغبءٌخ ِٓ ٘زٖ اٌششوبد؟
  0ط ٌظ إداسرٙب ِغؤٌٚخ ػٓ ػٛالت أفؼبٌُٙ؟ إرا وبْ الأِش وزٌه, ٌّٓ ٚو١ف؟بِٚغ اٌششوبد اٌٍ١ج١خ اٌّذسعخً٘ 
  4ط ً٘ رؼزمذ ثؤْ اٌّغبءٌخ رزطٍت ٚعٛد ٔظبَ ع١ذ ٌؾٛوّخ اٌششوبد؟ ٠شعٝ اٌزٛض١ؼ؟
 
  اهقشٍ اهشادض: أسئوة تتعوق بتطوير ممارسات حوكٌة اهشركات والمشاءهة 
ِٓ ٚعٙخ  ً٘ ٌذ٠ه أٞ الزشاؽبد ٚرٛط١بد رؼزمذ أٔٙب ِّٙخ ٌزطٛ٠ش ِّبسعبد ؽٛوّخ اٌششوبد فٟ اٌج١ئخ اٌٍ١ج١خ؟
 ا٢ٌ١بد اٌلاصِخ لإؽذاس ٘زا اٌزطٛس؟ٔظشن, ِب ٟ٘ 
  1ط
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